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I

Abstract
The end of the post-World War II ‘long boom’ in the mid-1970s proved the beginning
of a process of political-economic change that has fundamentally transformed
Australian labour law. Given the centrality of labour law to the production/reproduction
of the commodity labour-power and the class struggle, the dramatic changes in labour
law are a matter of tremendous importance, particularly for organised labour, which has
found itself operating in an ever more hostile legal climate. However, the nature of
labour law change in Australia remains poorly theorised. The traditional disciplines of
labour law and industrial relations are primarily beholden to empiricist methods, whilst
work on Australian political economy has typically paid scant attention to the issue of
law beyond the descriptive account that neoliberalism has been associated with legal
change. The result is a lack of a theoretically rigorous account of the evolution of
Australian labour law.
It is in to this lacuna that this thesis steps. Utilising the methodology of the Parisian
Regulation Approach (PRA), I periodise Australian capitalism since World War II into
two models of development, which are historically specific crystallisations of capitalist
social relations unifying an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of
regulation. The ability of the PRA to explain the role of a labour law regime within
these models of development is crucially buttressed by its synthesis with a Marxist
jurisprudence I have constructed, drawing upon the best work of scholars in this field.
In particular, I argue that law is best conceived as a juridic form of capitalist production
and exchange relations, rather than as a fundamentally a-capitalist institution
determined by an economic base. Such a construction allows us to appreciate that law
not only performs certain functions within a model of development, but also helps
constitute its physiology and character.
The two models identified are antipodean Fordism (1945-early 1970s) and liberalproductivism in Australia (late 1980s to the present), separated by a period of crisis
characterised by ‘institutional searching’ to navigate an escape therefrom. Each model
possesses a unique regime of labour law which both executes key roles within it and
helps constitute its fabric. Both regimes reflect a particular configuration of the ‘lawadministration’ continuum, a balance point between the abstraction and de-classed,
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juridically equal citizen-subject of law and the collective subject and specific subject
matter of administration.
The labour law regime of antipodean Fordism was unique in the way it precociously
enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus in the form of the compulsory conciliation and
arbitration system. This system was absolutely central in undergirding the key features
of the regime, which included a permissive attitude towards organised labour,
bargaining between capital and labour at a broad occupational level, wage and
conditions flow-on through the award structure from lead sectors, the diffusion of the
standard employment model and the growth of administrative fixes to heightened
worker power.

In terms of the law-administration continuum, administration was

predominant, with the purer legal form largely submerged (but not extinguished).
Whilst this labour law regime did ensure the temporary coherence of antipodean
Fordism, reinforcing the ‘virtuous cycle’ that powered it, it nevertheless was laden with
its own set of contradictions, particularly the degree to which it institutionally
entrenched trade union power, was dependent upon moderate unionism, and facilitated
destabilisation of the wage structure through large, leap-frogging wage claims when
unions pressed against and outside the system.
From the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s, a process of institutional searching for
ways out of crisis developed and deepened. This was a deeply contradictory process, in
which efforts to intensify the institutions of antipodean Fordism co-existed with, and
grated against, developments corrosive of the established order. Over time, the latter
came to predominate, such that by the late 1980s/early 1990s, the new liberalproductivist model of development was coming into existence. Its labour law regime
differed fundamentally from its predecessor, reflecting its own unique dynamic and the
way in which it provisionally answered the crisis tendencies of antipodean Fordism. Its
fundamental essences include the destruction of the conciliation and arbitration system,
hostility to trade unionism, a severing of the institutional links homogenising the wage
structure and associating productivity and wage growth, the erosion of the standard
employment model with a concomitant explosion of precarious employment forms, and
intensified juridification.
The result of this analysis, which also employs case studies in the metals, food
processing and retail sectors to sharpen key claims, is an account of labour law
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evolution in Australia which is theoretically rigorous yet empirically concrete. The
union of the PRA with a Marxist jurisprudence creates a powerful analytical model
which, with appropriate modification, could be used in exploring broader legal change
in the transition between Fordism and liberal-productivism, both in Australia and
elsewhere.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

‘The ever-changing forces of society incessantly mould and transform the law and yet it
pretends to stand aloof and prides itself on its immutability in a tumultuous world.
While it seems to be a spectator of the great social drama, serene and imperturbable, it
suffers all the agonies and fights all the struggles of an actor in the play.’1

There are few components of a capitalist society that penetrate as deeply and profoundly
into the lives of the people as law. Capitalism is legalised to a degree that is historically
unprecedented. The very form of bourgeois law is premised on its universality and
abstraction, a reality grasped by Kahn-Freund.

In a society where everyone is

considered an abstract, de-classed juridical citizen, law becomes the medium through
which these citizens relate to each other and to the state. Within this pervasive and
immensely powerful social force, labour law forms an especially crucial segment. The
fact that within capitalism labour assumes a generalised commodity form means that the
sale and purchase of labour power, together with the conditions on which it is exploited,
becomes an explicitly legal matter. The resultant body of labour law is a most complex
amalgam, with the law of ‘things,’ namely property and contract law, attempting to
commodify and regulate a living, breathing and thinking subject, the proletarian. This
domain of law is an object of class struggle in its own right, as labour and capital
attempt to impress their own competing political economies on the legal form.
Given this centrality of labour law to the production and reproduction of the commodity
labour-power and the class struggle, the dramatic changes in Australia’s labour law
regime since the 1980s is a matter of tremendous importance, particularly for organised
labour, which has found itself operating in an ever more hostile legal climate. Despite
its importance, however, the nature of labour law change in Australia remains poorly
theorised. The disciplines of labour law and industrial relations are largely beholden to
an empiricist method, with the result that they are usually unable to explain why labour
law has changed in the way it has, or elucidate the abstract functions it fulfils within
Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Introduction’ in Karl Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social
Functions (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949) 43.
1

1
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different models of development.

By contrast, the considerable body of political-

economic work dealing with the evolution of Australian capitalism over the past several
decades typically pays scant attention to the issue of law beyond the descriptive account
that neoliberalism has been associated with legal change. This myopia is often a
function of a lack of a sophisticated theory of law as a specific form of capitalist social
relations.

The role of labour law in helping constitute the process of capitalist

transformation, together with its own distinctive contributions to the nature of crisis, is
elided in such accounts.
It is in to this lacuna that this thesis steps. Utilising the methodology of the Parisian
Regulation Approach (PRA), I periodise Australian capitalism since World War II into
two models of development, which are historically specific crystallisations of capitalist
social relations unifying an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of
regulation. The ability of the PRA to explain the role of a labour law regime within
these models of development is crucially buttressed by its synthesis with a Marxist
jurisprudence that I have constructed, drawing upon the best work in the field. In
particular, I argue that law is best conceived as a juridic form of capitalist production
relations, rather than as a fundamentally a-capitalist institution determined by an
economic base. Such a construction allows us to appreciate that law not only performs
certain functions within a model of development, but also helps constitute its fabric.
Throughout this thesis I seek to restore to the study of labour law the engine of capitalist
social relations and their evolution through class struggle. By the end, I will have
demonstrated that labour law ‘suffers all the agonies and fights all the struggles of an
actor in the play,’2 precisely because it is an actor in the capitalist ensemble. The
waxing and waning of the class struggle, together with the historically variant character
of capitalism’s crisis tendencies, ensures that demands are made of the legal form that
consistently threaten its integrity and mould its contours. Given its historically novel
labour law system, these processes can be seen in particularly sharp relief in Australia.
Indeed, there are few better examples of the intimate link between labour law and
capitalist coherence, crisis and transformation. Focussing in particular on the period of
1964-2009, I will demonstrate how labour law simultaneously helps constitute the
coherence of particular models of development whilst at the same time contributing
towards the particular crisis tendencies of those models. This is demonstrated through a
2

Ibid.

3

rigorous hierarchy of abstraction, beginning with the most abstract roots of law in
capitalist social relations, proceeding through a general history of labour law evolution
in Australia using a regulationist periodisation schema, to particular case studies centred
on the metals, food processing and retail sectors.

Structure of the thesis
My departure point is chapter 2, where the PRA is introduced and analysed. This
chapter explores the historical origins of the approach, as well as elucidating some of its
key concepts, including ‘industrial paradigm,’ ‘accumulation regime,’ ‘mode of
regulation’ and ‘model of development.’ I argue that a model of development, the most
embracing regulationist concept, is ideally placed to deliver the PRA’s promise of a
sophisticated intermediate-level account of capitalist development and crisis, cognisant
of the abstract, long-run tendencies of capitalism identified by Marx yet able to account
for stabilising forces in the short to medium term. The criticisms of the approach are
discussed and addressed. The most serious of these, namely an increasingly eclectic
theoretical framework cut free from its Marxist foundations and an inadequate treatment
of the state and law, are given special attention. Through a reconnection with its
Marxist heritage and an acknowledgment of capital as having juridic, as well as
economic, forms, these challenges can be met.
The conception of capitalism as having a multi-faceted economic and juridical existence
is the platform for chapter 3. The chapter begins by tracing the treatment of law in the
works of Marx and Engels. Although they never focussed on law in a systematic way,
their best accounts of it demonstrate that they regarded law as a strange creature, whose
form and content is structured by capitalist relations of production and exchange, and
the class struggle underpinning them. Building upon the work of scholars such as
Pashukanis, Fine, and Kay and Mott, I argue that the most basic cell of the legal form,
the owner of private property, is common to all societies, capitalist or pre-capitalist,
with large-scale commodity exchange. However, it is only with the development of
capitalist production relations that there emerges the specifically bourgeois legal form,
an axiomatic system of abstract, universal and formal norms regulating juridically equal
citizen-subjects. Most importantly, the commodification of labour-power ensures that
law becomes a proper object of class struggle in its own right, as the competing political
economies of labour and capital attempt to impress themselves on the legal form. As a
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result of this process, the fabric of the legal form, woven out of abstract equality and the
de-classed juridical citizen, can become rent and torn, unable to contain the collective
interests of workers. Proletarian struggle can force the state to plug these gaps with
administrative solutions, producing institution and practices which take as their
reference point collective subjects such as industrial organisations, and whose subject
matter is often specific. I argue law and administration form two poles of a lawadministration continuum, whose exact configuration is intimately tied to a model of
development. In particular, the method in which the latter handles and orders the
contradictions of capitalism, derives coherence and embeds or excludes working-class
power to varying degrees fixes the nexus point of this continuum.
Chapter 4 takes the theoretical union of the PRA and Marxist legal theory established in
the preceding chapters and applies them to the Australian context. I periodise postWorld War II Australian capitalism into two distinct models of development, separated
by a period of profound crisis and institutional searching: antipodean Fordism,
stretching from 1945 to the early 1970s; and liberal-productivism, which had begun to
cohere in the late 1980s and early 1990s and remains on foot today. I elucidate the way
in which each model of development handles the abstract crisis tendencies of
capitalism, hierarchises different institutional forms, achieves coherence and carries
latent within it fresh seeds of crisis. In these processes, labour law is absolutely central.
I argue that both antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism are characterised by
unique labour law regimes that not only perform certain abstract functions within their
models of development, but in fact help constitute their physiology.

Labour law

features here not as a passive reflection of an economic base, but as a specific juridic
form of capital that imparts its own logic and crisis tendencies within a model of
development.
Chapters 5 and 6 provide the concrete legal history necessary to flesh out the abstract
framework of labour law produced in chapter 4. In both chapters I explore labour law
change over four key themes: wage fixation, forms of employment/flexibility,
collectivism/individualism together with the scale of industrial relations, and the
broader legal matrix.

A ‘slice’ approach is then employed, building upon the

periodisation of post-World War II Australian capitalism advanced in chapter 4.
Certain key years are selected as a snapshot and are analysed according to the state of
labour law vis-à-vis the four themes identified. Each period represents a crucial point in
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the process of political-economic transformation. Chapter 5 focusses on the nature of
the antipodean Fordist labour law regime, both en régulation and in crisis. I will
demonstrate that it helped constitute and maintain the coherence of antipodean Fordism,
but at the cost of generating its own crisis tendencies. Chapter 6, by contrast, traces the
development of the liberal-productivist labour law regime, which emerged out of a long
and often contradictory process of institutional searching in the 1980s.

Although

pregnant with its own contradictions, it provisionally answered the dysfunctionalities of
its antipodean Fordist predecessor.
A series of case studies in chapters 7, 8 and 9 sharpens some of the key claims made in
chapters 4, 5 and 6. In chapter 7, I trace the ascent and decline of the antipodean Fordist
cycle of wage and conditions flow-on centred on the metal trades sector, one of the
central dynamics of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus. Labour law played an
absolutely crucial role in constituting this cycle through institutionalising the metal
awards at the apex of the award pyramid and facilitating flow-on between different
sectors through ‘comparative wage justice’ claims.

The growing dysfunctionality of

this circuit proved to be one of the key levers of antipodean Fordist crisis in the 1970s
and early 1980s. As the economic dynamism of the metals sector waned, its continued
institutional role as a leader helped stoke large wage rounds that destabilised the wage
structure and ate into the profit share of capital. The destruction of this cycle is a key
moment in the formation of a liberal-productivist labour law regime, which instead
separates the industrially strong from the weak and stymies industry-level bargaining.
The Accord between the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Labor government
in the 1980s and the movement to enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s proved key
forces in this process.
In chapter 8, the content of award restructuring and enterprise bargaining in the food
processing sector is investigated. This sector has been selected for study precisely
because it has been one of the most affected by liberal-productivist norms of precarity
and international competition. After a more-or-less archetypical pattern of industrial
regulation within antipodean Fordism, the industry was hit hard by forces fundamental
to the new liberal-productivist model of development, including intensified international
competition, rationalisation of production and the increasing domination of multinational corporations.

In such an environment, award restructuring and enterprise

bargaining effected profound change in the sector. Of particular importance is the
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extent to which both processes served to implant the precarity, intensified managerial
prerogative and work reorganisation central to the liberal-productivist wage-labour
nexus and industrial paradigm.
Chapter 9 explores much the same processes as chapter 8, but in the context of the New
South Wales retail sector. Unlike the case of the food processing sector, retail proved a
laggard when it came to crystallising an antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus,
particularly given that the working-time arrangements characterising the standard
employment model were only achieved on the cusp of Fordist crisis. However, by dint
of this fact and the broader economic restructuring of Australian capitalism, the retail
sector precociously enshrined the liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus of increased
precarity and intensification of labour stripped of the quid pro quo of job security, rising
remuneration and internal labour markets of antipodean Fordism (making it a
particularly important object of regulationist study). In the early to late 1980s, these
impulses were refracted through the still-dominant award system, with the process of
institutional searching generating a new quasi-administrative tribunal combining the
juridical structure of arbitration with a corporatist practice. In the late 1980s, 1990s and
2000s, however, award restructuring, enterprise bargaining and statutory individual
contracts effected much the same outcomes as in the food processing sector, namely
precarity, heightened managerial control over the labour process and deployment of
labour and increasingly fragmented and polarised wage and conditions outcomes. The
fact that such similar outcomes and patterns emerge in two completely different
industries strengthens the theory of transition forwarded in this thesis, demonstrating
that liberal-productivist tendencies have taken hold of the workforce at large.
Finally, in chapter 10, I conclude by summarising my findings, discussing the
usefulness of the approach I have taken, and exploring some potential political
implications.

Chapter 2
THE PARISIAN REGULATION APPROACH
In the endeavour to theorise and describe the transformation of Australian labour law
between 1964 and 2009, it quickly becomes clear that the ambit of this thesis cannot
help but be multi-disciplinary. If we take seriously the need to locate labour law within
the broader spectrum of capitalist economic, social and political relations, then four
broad areas of inquiry for a Marxist perspective are of signal importance. These are:
1. The operation of the circuit of capital, with particular emphasis upon the
inherently contradictory and unstable process of accumulation this sets in train;1
2. The form, functions and operation of the state in capitalist society;
3. The organisation of the capitalist labour process, particularly how it is arranged
to beget surplus value and how, to use Goodrich’s term, it is riven by a ‘frontier
of control’ between capital and labour;2 and, most importantly,
4. The role of law in the constitution, regulation and maintenance of capitalist
society, both in terms of its content and the specificity of the legal form.3

It is important to note that these distinctions are to an extent arbitrary and a product of
the balkanization of economics, politics and law that evolved throughout the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This was not always so.

Indeed, the early

proponents of classical jurisprudence were in many cases the same pioneers of classical
political economy, such as Smith, Hegel and Rousseau.4
A reification of the disciplinary boundaries arising around these themes is also
antithetical to a genuinely Marxist analysis of law. As Lebowitz states of Marx’s

1

The description of which was the central preoccupation of Marx in Capital. See: Karl Marx, Capital: A
Critique of Political Economy Volume I (Ben Fowkes trans, Penguin Classics, 1990); Karl Marx, Capital:
A Critique of Political Economy Volume II (David Fernbach trans, Penguin Classics, 1992); Karl Marx,
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume III (David Fernback trans, Penguin Classics, 1991).
2
Carter Goodrich, The Frontier of Control: A Study in British Workshop Politics (G. Bell and Sons Ltd,
1920).
3
An important distinction that, as we shall see in the next chapter, is often elided in practice, almost
always to the disadvantage of analysis of the legal form. For a useful discussion of the prevalence and
dangers of this elision, see: China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International
Law (Haymarket Books, 2006) 79-84.
4
Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the Legal Form (The Blackburn Press,
2002) 10-65.
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methodology, ‘[f]irstly, it is an emphasis on the “whole.”

Marx’s goal was to

understand bourgeois society as a totality, as an inter-connected whole.’5 Lukács goes
even further, elucidating the core of the revolutionary method Marx pioneered: ‘The
category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the
essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed
into the foundations of a wholly new science.’6
The Marxist political economy that underlies this thesis thus demands an integration of
capital, the state, the labour process and law as analytic categories. These must not be
thought of as discrete, internally coherent and externally delimited fields, but as
complex, emergent and ultimately interdependent structures, part of a basket of
invariant features of the capitalist mode of production. It is in addressing this need for
explanatory coherence that the Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA) proves its utility.
The PRA goes further than most alternative approaches (though not far enough, as we
shall see) in theorising the interconnections between these four areas to provide a wideranging account of how the circuit of capital, particular state forms, a dominant labour
process model and forms of regulation including law combine to produce and reproduce
distinctive capitalist social formations.
Given the centrality of law to this thesis, the entire following chapter will be dedicated
to unfolding the form and function of law in a capitalist society, ascertaining the
particular status of labour law, and pulling together the threads of various scholars into a
coherent Marxist theory of labour law. The current chapter will focus on discussing
relevant work on capital, the state and the labour process so far as it affects the
theoretical orientation of this study. In keeping with the need to move along the
hierarchy of the abstract to the concrete, and in so doing generate conclusions of both
theoretical rigour and empirical sensitivity, it is necessary to first outline the basic
ontological and methodological parameters of the Marxist political economy on which
the PRA has historically been grounded. I will then explicate the concepts used by
regulationists to explain the articulations between capital, the state and the labour
process, which form an effective and hierarchically coherent model in the movement
from abstract to concrete. With this understanding in hand, I will then broaden the
5
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focus to take into account the relevant contributions of Australian scholars working
within the regulationist paradigm.

The political economy of capitalism
The PRA was founded on an essentially Marxist political economy. Thus, in the study
of capitalist social formations, a theoretically informed regulationist analysis must begin
with the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production.
Before further analysis, it is necessary to put in hand a working, albeit incomplete,
definition of capitalism. The capitalist mode of production is characterised by a basket
of invariant core elements, in the absence of which it would be incorrect to speak of a
capitalist society. Following Marx’s method (which is to abstract invariant elements of
a mode of production across all its stages in a logical, rather than necessarily historical,
manner),7 Neilson states:
As a rational abstraction, private ownership, wage dependence, and the market
define key institutions and norms that govern core capitalist production
relations. In turn, these relations can be expressed as the exploitative capitalwage-labor relation, plus competition-based market coordination of production.8

I will have occasion to add to this definition later in the chapter, but it will suffice for
now as the basis for deeper exploration.
At the most abstract level, Marx identifies that capitalism is erected on the
fundamentally contradictory character of the commodity as a (dis-) unity of use value
and exchange value.9 This tension, which underwrites real and fictitious commodities
(e.g. labour) alike,10 manifests itself in different forms at various stages in the circuit of
capital, as it transitions between money, fixed capital and commodities.11 Jessop and
Sum observe the full play of this process:

7
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The commodity is both an exchange value and a use value; the worker is both an
abstract unit of labour power replaceable by other such units (or, indeed, other
factors of production) and a concrete individual with specific skills, knowledge
and creativity; the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand;
money functions both as an international currency and as national money;
productive capital is both abstract value in motion (notably in the form of
realized profits available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of time-andplace-specific assets in the course of being valorized; and so forth.12

Like preceding class societies (such as those founded on the slave or feudal modes of
production), capitalism is based on exploitative class relations characterised by
differential ownership of the surplus that human labour produces once a certain level of
economic and social development is attained. Capitalism, however, is governed by a
radically different modality of both producing and appropriating this surplus. Unlike,
say, feudal peasants, who effectively possessed their own means of production,13 the
capitalist labour process is premised upon the private ownership of these means of
production by a class minority, the bourgeoisie. In turn, the majority of the population
has no access to the means of production except through the medium of wage-labour.
This makes for a system that formally demands both the present and continued
compulsion of an essentially propertyless, wage-earning class to sell their labour-power
in exchange for money and an inability of that class to reproduce itself except through
purchasing commodities in the marketplace.
These requirements are intimately related to the method by which surplus labour is
obtained and the form it takes. Feudal and slave exploitation was direct and specific,
premised upon an explicit union of economic and political/legal coercion. 14 At the
height of feudalism, the feudal lord extracted primarily surplus goods (such as
agricultural products), which in turn was dependent upon the military strength they
could muster under their banner;15 the moments of economic and extra-economic
coercion constituted a unity.16 Mature capitalism, by contrast, is historically unique, in
12
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that these moments are formally distinct (rooted in the divorce of the proletariat from
the means of production) whilst the appropriation of surplus value (the difference
between what workers are paid by employers and the value which they produce for
them)17 is mediated through a formally free contract operating in a labour market. This
separation of economic and extra-economic coercion forms the basis of the distinction
between the economic and political spheres that arises under capitalism and is the basis
of the alienated, formally neutral, capitalist state.18
Given the contradictory character of the commodity (particularly in an economy of
generalised commodity production) and the power asymmetry between workers and
capital, Jessop and Sum’s characterisation of the paradoxical nature of the circuit of
capital is no surprise.19

These contradictions are exacerbated by various other

tendencies that bedevil the capitalist mode of production. Key among these is the
corrosive competition between many separate, atomised capitals competing for surplus
value in a market founded on highly interdependent but privately-made economic
decisions (which is the form in which the logic of capital as a whole is played out). 20 In
such a fragmented system, what is best for collective capital, such as a high level of
working-class consumption, often grates against the interests of individual capitalists,
who will often attempt to limit their outlay in wages. Another tendency is that towards
over-accumulation, whereby too much capital is available for profitable investment,
such that profitability falls (either relatively or in absolute terms).21 Yet, given the
desire to maximise surplus value appropriation and outcompete other units of capital,
the fundamental drive of individual capitalists, as well as the system as a whole, is to
accumulate, to continually produce on an expanded scale.22 Coterminious with this
drive to accumulate is the tendency towards ever greater concentration and
centralisation of capital (larger units of productive capital under the control of fewer
capitalists respectively). These processes aid various capitals to rationalise production,
provide insulation from competition, vest a greater ability to monopolise resources and
17
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mobilise a counter to Marx’s much-debated observation of the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall.23 These crisis tendencies, which will be discussed in greater detail where
they are relevant in the following chapters, are just that – tendencies, in the face of
which counter-tendencies can be mobilised.24 They do not operate as iron historical
laws (despite the fact that this impression has often been gleaned from Marx’s work)
beyond the tautological point that amongst capitalist society’s aforementioned invariant
features is private ownership, creation of surplus value by wage-labour and competition.
Most important for our discussion here is the fact that the class distinctions that both
constitute and are reproduced by capitalism, and the class struggle which they beget,
throw the sustainability of the circuit of capital into constant peril. Lebowitz crucially
notes that the fundamental labour-capital divide in a capitalist society, and the wagelabour relationship which drives it, leads to two disparate and competing political
economies, with the capitalist’s valorisation and profit creation objections grating
against the proletariat’s desire for the full product of its labour and the fulfilment of
concrete needs.25
Taking all these tendencies into account, it is clear that the circuit of capital is wrought
with structural contradictions which render continued capital accumulation in the long
term not only difficult but inherently improbable.26 The result, as Marx and Engels
vividly described, is that ‘[m]odern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of
exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of
production and of exchange, is like a sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the
powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.’27
Given the fact that, despite a litany of failed experiments and horrendous creations, the
sorcerer remains at work, the question posed by Boyer becomes both obvious and
logically necessary in understanding the evolution of capitalist social formations: ‘If one
23
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accepts Marx’s intuitions regarding capitalism, the central question then takes the form
of a paradox: how can such a contradictory process succeed over a long period of
time.’28
The dominant economic paradigm of our time, neoclassicism, and its political
stablemate, neoliberalism, are particularly ill-suited to answering this question.29
Geared towards a highly abstract, vacuous conception of general equilibrium and a
methodological individualism based on a transhistorical homo economicus, mainstream
economics is incapable of explaining crisis as anything other than a temporary
aberration resulting from market imperfections; the work of irrational consumers,
workers or interest groups (such as trade unions or the state) with a vested interest in
blocking market mechanisms.30

The history of capitalism, littered as it is with crisis,

breakdown, and ‘crippled monstrosities,’31 simply cannot be explained by reference to
neoclassical theory.

By extension, its future is also beyond the ability of the

neoclassical school to chart.
It was partly in response to both the theoretical poverty of neoclassicism and the
fossilisation of post-World War II orthodox Marxism that the PRA first stepped on to
the scene.32

Enter the regulationists
The Parisian school is dominant within the broader regulationist project and ‘enjoys the
greatest international impact.’33

Notable scholars who kick-started the approach,

including Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz, were heavily influenced by
Althusserian structuralism, even if they rejected its problematic construction of
reproduction as quasi-automatic and its piecemeal treatment of contradiction.34 Neilson

28
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continues: ‘Central to the appeal of Althusser’s French Regulation School (FRS) “rebel
sons” was the implicit promise of a mid-range theory of capitalist development that
could complement Marx’s long-range account.’35
The focus on generating an intermediate account of capitalist development entailed a
development of concepts and methods to achieve four primary goals (shared with other
schools which Jessop and Sum locate within a more broadly construed Regulation
Approach):36
1. ‘Describe the institutions and practices of capitalism;’37
2. ‘Explain the various crisis tendencies of modern capitalism and/or likely sources
of crisis resolution;’38
3. ‘Analyse different stages … of capitalism and compare accumulation regimes
and modes of regulation in a given period of capitalist development;’39 and
4. ‘Examine the social embedding and social regularization of economic
institutions and conduct.’40

Implicit in these questions is both an historical and logical acknowledgement that,
despite the crisis tendencies of capitalism, strong accumulation and stability can be
achieved in the short to medium term. The thirty-year post-World War II Fordist boom
(the elucidation of which is the subject of chapter 4) presented the first regulationists
with a reality that defied explanation in orthodox Marxist terms.41 The boom had been
an epoch of unrivalled growth and stability in the West, with increased production,
productivity improvements and high profit margins being complemented by full
employment, rising real incomes and a redistributive welfare state. 42

Mainstream

economics, dominated by Keynesianism, spoke of the demise of the traditional business
35
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cycle and the crises of overproduction Marxism holds dear.43

Although the early

regulationists witnessed the demise of this system and the emergence of a new structural
crisis in the 1970s, they nevertheless had to grapple with the reality that capitalism
could be comparatively stable and prosperous for a period of time. This situation
highlighted the need for an intermediate account of capitalist development that, whilst
employing a Marxist methodology and cognisant of Marx’s long-run observations, was
able to account for stabilising forces in the short to medium term.
The answer, for the Parisians, lay in the notion of regulation. Capital accumulation, and
the tendential laws governing it, could be guided and regularised through a contingent,
historically variant combination of economic and extra-economic factors in a distinctive
institutional matrix, handling, to varying degrees, the different crisis tendencies of
capitalist social relations. Aglietta, one of the leading pioneers of the school, eloquently
states:
To speak of the regulation of a mode of production is to try to formulate in
general laws the ways in which the determinant structure of society is
reproduced … [A] theory of social regulation is a complete alternative to the
theory of general equilibrium … The study of capitalist regulation, therefore,
cannot be the investigation of abstract economic laws. It is the study of the
transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both economic
and noneconomic, that are organized in structures and themselves reproduce a
determinant structure, the mode of production (my emphasis).44

This definition pays clear homage to the structural Marxist roots of the PRA, and is
echoed by Lipietz who, recognising the dialectical link between regulation and crisis,45
notes that the former describes a situation where there is a temporary, relative primacy
of unity over struggle in a deeply contradictory society.46 Neilson adds that ‘regulation
politically modifies the economic process to temporarily stabilize, or contain, the
contradictory core of capitalism.’47 Whilst there is a certain danger, latent in this
statement, in seeing capitalism as a fundamentally economic concern regulated by an
autonomous realm of politics (a danger that will be explored later), the acknowledgment
that capitalism must be regulated if it is to succeed through time is well-made.
43
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A critical precondition of the attempt to create a mid-range account of capitalist
development shaped through regulation is a theory that is armed with a range of
concepts of varying compass occupying different locations on the plane from abstract to
concrete. This is certainly evident in the spiralling method of analysis advocated by the
regulationists, which employs a dialectical movement along the plane from abstractsimple to concrete-complex.48 This is similar to Jessop’s ‘method of articulation’49 and
involves a dynamic interaction between the abstract and the empirical.
Aglietta describes this spiral thus:
It follows that concepts are not introduced once and for all at a single level of
abstraction. They are transformed by the characteristic interplay which
constitutes the passage from the abstract to the concrete and enables the concrete
to be absorbed within theory. Theory, for its part, is never final and complete, it
is always in the process of development.50

This method flows from the refusal of Marx to attribute an immutable, transhistorical
essence to humans which must be distilled in order to explain the development of
society (unlike neo-classicism).51 In its place, the regulationists approve of Marx’s
understanding that people make their history, but not under conditions of their
choosing.52
In generating these spiralling, intermediate-level accounts of the trajectory of capitalist
development, it follows that the PRA must be equipped with concepts of a lower level
of abstraction that, whilst taking their methodological lead from Marx, must
nevertheless be more concrete and historically sensitive in their operation. Broadly
speaking, four such concepts are apparent within the school. They are:


Industrial paradigm;



Accumulation regime;



Mode of regulation; and



Model of development.
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These four concepts traverse the analytical categories of capital, the state, the labour
process and law that were introduced at the beginning of this chapter.53 The conceptual
breadth and the opportunity for careful, incremental movement along the plane from
abstract to concrete which these concepts open is what vests the Parisian school with its
exceptional ability to combine theoretical rigour with empirical sensitivity (although, as
will be explored later, the theoretical sophistication of the approach is suffering from an
increasing eclecticism and dissociation with a Marxist political economy).

These

notions thus require further unpacking and articulation as distinct moments of that
hierarchy.
Industrial paradigm
Absolutely central to the early work of Aglietta and Lipietz is a dominant ‘industrial
paradigm’ or labour process model. The organisation of the labour process, particularly
the manner in which it produces surplus value for the capitalist, has a powerful
influence on the architecture of a capitalist society, a reality Lukács grasped when he
stated that the organisation of the factory ‘contained in concentrated form the whole
structure of capitalist society.’54 In this light, it is somewhat surprising that an industrial
paradigm does not generally assume the status of a discrete concept in later regulationist
work,55 although there are promising signs of a renewed emphasis on the labour
process.56

53
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Generally speaking, early regulationist labour process analysis was closely related to
Braverman’s influential account.57 Aglietta thus neatly describes how:
Capitalist production is the unity of a labour process and a process of
valorization, in which the valorization is dominant … On the one hand, we have
defined the wage relation, the appropriation of labour-power as a commodity, as
the fundamental relation of production. On the other hand, we said that
capitalist relations of production present a dual character of antagonism and
cooperation. In showing how the labour process is transformed under the
impulse of the struggle for surplus-value, we must acquit a task that is essential
for the transition from the abstract to the concrete in any theory of accumulation:
namely to demonstrate that the transformation of the labour process creates
relationships within production that adapt the cooperation of labour-power to the
domination of the wage relation.58

The particular nexus point between valorisation and production, together with the state
of technology, results in an industrial paradigm, which can be thought of as a dominant
model of labour process organisation, governing the social and technical division of
labour, such as mass production on semi-automatic production lines.59 This does not
necessarily imply that all branches of the economy are organised according to the same
principles; it is enough that the leading sectors (the role of which will be explored in
later chapters) revolve around them.60
Accumulation regime
Boyer describes an accumulation regime as ‘a set of regularities that ensure the general
and relatively coherent progress of capital accumulation.’61 It is a structure of economic
and social patterns governing the composition of social demand corresponding to
productive capacity, the time horizons of capital valorisation and the distribution of
value within and between classes.62 Such a regime is necessary in the attempt to
contain capitalism’s contradictions. Of particular importance is the reality that within
capitalist social formations the factors that favour profitability in the sphere of
57
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production are the same factors which impinge upon the realisation of surplus value in
the sphere of circulation.63 In a very general sense, a viable accumulation regime must
then articulate production and consumption at the macro-level in a stable, reproducible
fashion.64 As mentioned above, I essentially conceive this structure of production and
consumption as a concrete arrangement of the economic forms of capital (conceptually
distinct, that is, from its juridic forms, which will be explored below).
In Volume II of Capital, Marx identified the difficulties facing the achievement of such
stability, due in part to the restricted nature of working-class purchasing power and the
disjunction between the two great departments of the economy (namely, Department I,
producing means of production, and Department

II, producing means of

consumption).65 Unless surplus value were reduced to nought, workers could never
have the purchasing power to procure all they had made, whilst the interlocking demand
of capitalists in one department for the products of the other was beset by a host of
temporal irregularities and discontinuities.66
Aglietta, using Marx’s reproduction schemas, demonstrated how an accumulation
regime could help combat this tendency towards instability by the development of
particular linkages between the two departments.67 Specifically, he developed a notion
of extensive versus intensive accumulation.

Whilst the former revolved around

transformations of the labour process narrowly construed, the latter involves a
simultaneous development of both the labour process and the proletariat’s conditions of
existence through a commodification of individual consumption.68 Put another way,
extensive accumulation (which characterised capitalism in America and other capitalist
countries up to the 1920s) was, in the face of continued petty-bourgeois production of
working-class subsistence goods and the poverty of the proletariat, dependent primarily
upon increasing the scale of production in Department I, resulting in recurrent obstacles
to the pace of accumulation.69 Intensive accumulation, through extending the field of
63
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capitalist production to the very necessities of life, permitted a more organic series of
linkages between the two departments, allowing the creation of a social consumption
norm, a more rapid and regular increase in the rate of accumulation and the destruction
of remaining enclaves of non-capitalist production.70

Intensive accumulation thus

denotes more than the link between rapid technological change and surplus value; it is a
specific mechanism by which social reproduction is mediated.71
This outwardly simple typology of regimes of accumulation has become increasingly
nuanced and complicated, particularly as the school has expanded its ambit of study
beyond advanced industrialised economies. Boyer in particular notes the profusion of
regimes of accumulation in the developing world, including those of pre-industrial,
rentier and inward-looking industrialising states.72
Mode of regulation
An accumulation regime cannot in isolation secure the continued reproduction of
capital. For this, it requires an attendant mode of regulation, which Jessop and Sum
have described as an ‘emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, organizational forms,
social networks and patterns of conduct that can temporarily stabilize an accumulation
regime.’73

Typically, this includes coherent and compatible structures of wage

relations, state forms, enterprise forms and linkages, money and (arguably) international
relations.74 A functioning mode of regulation both channels the crisis tendencies of a
particular capitalist society through institutional pathways and modifies the behaviour
of actors (both individual and collective) to accord with the rhythms of the
accumulation regime. In containing, ameliorating or deferring the contradictions of an
accumulation regime (and their root in capitalist social relations) a mode of regulation
70
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can ensure a period of relative stability and growth in capital accumulation.75
Alternatively, to the extent that modes of regulation contain certain capitalist
contradictions at the expense of others and shape economic and social relations in a
path-dependent manner, they routinely undermine the very source of their success, and
become barriers to new modalities of capitalist growth.76 Moreover, if we move beyond
a reductionist conception of capitalism as a purely economic concern, and instead
perceive capitalist social relations as assuming both economic and extra-economic
forms, then it follows that a political handling of capitalism’s contradictions does not
dispel them; they merely assume a different form.
It is worth reiterating at this point my contention above, that a mode of regulation can
equally be regarded as a concrete hierarchy of capital’s juridic forms. The abstract state
and legal forms, as root juridic forms, are absolutely key in constituting the particular
structural forms making up a mode of regulation. This conception best captures the
reality that capital has a juridic, as well as economic, existence. Elam hits upon this
truth when he states of the regulation approach:
The result of this marriage between Marxist political economy and
institutionalist tradition is a conceptualization of qualitative change within
capitalism which posits the existence of not one, but two, fundamental dynamics
forcing change. Two dynamics growing out of the same discordant soil of
capitalist social relations. One giving rise to specific regimes of accumulation,
the other to particular modes of regulation.77

Elam’s conception is correct, and dovetails with my view that accumulation regimes
and modes of regulation, as concrete orders of economic and juridic forms respectively,

Adam Tickell and Jamie A. Peck, ‘Social regulation after Fordism: regulation theory, neo-liberalism
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were instead a historical quirk of Fordism. Vidal goes further, saying that the PRA must be revitalised by
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forms is highly unlikely empirically. Neilson is right to the extent that a successful mode of regulation
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provisional way, the crisis tendencies placed before it and clears the ground for accumulation. On this
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cannot be viewed as ‘macro’ or ‘meso’ vis-à-vis each other.78 As will be demonstrated
in the next chapter, this construction is necessary if a fruitful union between the PRA
and a sophisticated Marxist theory of law is to be achieved.
The notion of a mode of regulation is directly tied to explicating the relationships
between capital and the state, given that the state in this conception is, both in terms of
form and content, a vital force in stabilizing the inherently contradictory and crisisprone march of the circuit of capital (and the accumulation regime into which it viably
crystallises).
Model of development
A model of development is the most embracing regulationist concept outside of the
capitalist mode of production, which is common to Marxist political economy at large.
Neilson describes a model of development as ‘a stable regime of accumulation or
virtuous cycle of production, investment, and consumption engineered by the stabilizing
regulation of unstable tendencies of the capitalist mode of production.’79 Boyer and
Saillard proffer a somewhat more dynamic definition that recognises the dialectical
unfolding of regulation and crisis, describing a ‘mode’ of development as ‘the way in
which an accumulation regime and a type of régulation stabilize themselves over the
long term and how they enter into a period of crisis and then renew themselves’.80
Lipietz’s conception is perhaps the most embracing, defining a model of development
as a coherent combination of an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of
regulation.81
I find this definition of Lipietz’s the most holistic and most useful, particularly as it
conceives of a structured totality of economic, political and social forms (thus allowing
the PRA to escape a perceived economistic bias). Given this, it is odd that his concept
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has not really achieved broader traction.82

In chapter 4, when I come to define

antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism as models of development, it is
specifically in the sense indicated by Lipietz.83 Also in chapter 4, it will be argued that
the model of development concept can be pitched at varying levels of abstractions,
depending upon the generality or specificity accorded to the model.
With this basket of concepts (summarised in Table 1 at the end of this chapter) and a
spiralling method of theory construction, the PRA is ideally placed to deliver
theoretically sophisticated yet empirically rigorous mid-range accounts of the
development of capitalist societies, accounts that both recognise the presence of
entrenched structures whilst affirming the role of human agency.

Criticisms
The school has, nevertheless, faced a host of criticisms and critiques.

Of chief

importance here are those targeted at the regulationist theoretical matrix and
methodology.

These must be addressed if the utility of the approach is to be

maintained.
Lack of commitment to a Marxist political economy
The most serious matter with which I am concerned is the weakening relationship with
Marxism which the school currently exhibits.
I have already noted the influence of Althusserian structuralism upon the early
regulationists.

The key innovation of structural Marxism was that it opened new

pathways to conceptualising relations between the economic, political and social
moments of capitalism in a way that avoided the crude ‘base-superstructure’ dichotomy
of orthodox Marxism (deformed as it was by Stalinism).84 A strict observance of this
latter framework led in no small part to the ‘fossilisation’ of post-World War II
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orthodox Marxism as both an academic discipline and political programme. It also
hampered efforts to develop an organically Marxist conception of the law.85
Structuralism was explicitly concerned with how the economic, political and social
spheres combine to produce and reproduce capitalism. Although they sought to analyse
and problematise this process of reproduction more intimately, the continuities between
structuralists and the early regulationists are manifest in the latter’s desire to understand
and articulate, in a non-reductionist manner, both the economic and extra-economic
aspects of a capitalist society.
Over time, however, the distinctly Marxist provenance and calling of the approach has
been neglected. In the 1980s divisions emerged within the school in relation to the
standing of the Marxist theory of value.86 Although Aglietta, one of the founders of the
school, based his influential book A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US
Experience on a fundamentally Marxist labour theory of value, he abandoned it in later
work. In concert with Orléan,87 he embarked upon an innovative application of the
work of René Girard to explain qualitatively the violent origins of money within a
market society.88

Whilst still rejecting a neoclassical economic conception of

rationality, this approach nonetheless loses touch with a founding concept of Marxist
political economy.

Other authors, such as Boyer and Mistral, don’t specify their

conception of the theory of value.89
Lipietz, widely recognised as the regulationist most influenced by Marxist political
economy, continues to take the labour theory of value seriously, whilst recognising
practical issues regarding the theory’s relationship to real world phenomena, such as the
level of prices. In his innovative book The Enchanted World: Inflation, Credit and the
World Crisis he develops an elegant theoretical model that contrasts the ‘esoteric’ world
of value and the ‘exoteric’ world of prices and everyday economic life. 90 In this way,
account is taken of the perennial ‘transformation problem’ in Marxist economics whilst
retaining the conceptual framework of the labour theory of value.
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The divergence within the Parisian school regarding the place of Marx’s theory of value
within the approach is symptomatic of a broader movement away from an explicitly
Marxist political economy.91

It is no accident that in a recent regulationist

compendium, Régulation Theory: The State of the Art, Keynes, Kalecki and Kaldor
feature as heavily as Marx. Out of some forty-two chapters, only one is reserved for an
explicit treatment of the influence of Marx, both historically and in terms of the current
research agenda, and that is as much concerned with distancing the school from its
Marxist roots as with embracing them.92
Neilson attributes the sources of this estrangement to a ‘focus on national difference,
linked with a de-emphasis of the Fordist model of development and the absence
altogether of a model of development in the analysis of the contemporary era.’ 93 He
cites as a key example the efforts of regulationist doyen Robert Boyer to seek
rapprochement with other heterodox currents, such as the Varieties of Capitalism
school, which are not necessarily theoretically commensurable.94 The corrosive effect
of such theoretical eclecticism is a danger that has already been recognised,95 one that
stymies the approach in delivering on its initial promise of a powerful mid-range
Marxist analysis of capitalist development. The result is that the PRA is increasingly at
odds with its Marxist heritage.96
The two key issues seem to be a lack of commitment to a holistic theory of the
dynamics of the capitalist mode of production and a growing confusion as to the
relationship of regulationist concepts to concrete history. On the first score, whereas
early regulationist work located its mid-range analysis explicitly within Marx’s
conception of the capitalist mode of production, and the more abstract, general and
long-term trends he identified therein, later work left these links unstated, neglected,
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and undermined by increasing eclecticism. In the absence of these links, the PRA loses
what had made it so attractive in the first place – the promise of reconciling an
intermediate account of capitalism with the more long-run tendencies identified by
Marx.97
Secondly, the power of the PRA to make wide-ranging accounts of the transformation
of advanced capitalist countries has been impaired by the increasingly narrow vistas of
several of its key notions, most particularly ‘Fordism.’ In sophisticated PRA analysis,
Fordism (as a model of development) is the result of a dialectical pattern of theorising
and historical study derived from Marx. When pitched at its highest operational level of
abstraction, Fordism is an ideal-type which, in the manner of Marx, ‘brings out and
fixes the common element.’98

The ideal-typical model of development does not

describe the concrete experience of any particular society in the absence of sensitisation
to specific national contexts. Rather, as Treuren notes, it forms a vital intermediate link
in the movement from abstract to concrete.99 It enters into a dialectical relationship
with concrete existence in which the model identifies causal relationships whilst
empirical study comments on the adequacy of the theoretical construct.100
If, however, the model is confused for an exact account of the experience of any one
society, it rapidly loses its explanatory potential; more and more caveats and
qualifications have to be added in the face of the infinitely diverse historical experience,
ultimately resulting in the model imploding. On this basis, Boyer could state ‘Fordism,
when defined by a conjunction of three properties, was a feature found only in a few
countries at best.’101

Boyer’s confusion represents both a strong tendency toward

empiricism and the abdication of the hierarchy of abstraction, whereby the explanatory
power of grand theory is foregone for an ever-increasing profusion of more descriptive
models.
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The relevance of these developments to this thesis is that I concur with Neilson that the
regulationist research programme must be placed back on course to deliver on its
promise of a mid-range Marxist account of the dynamics and trajectories of capitalist
social formations.102 This involves both re-establishing the links between the PRA and
the deep-seated tendencies of the capitalist mode of production and the reaffirmation of
the utility of the ideal-type as a means of identifying causal relationships and broad
structures. Happily, this task has already begun, and this project is firmly located within
this movement.103
Criticism from within Marxism
The PRA has also come in for criticism from within Marxism, being subjected to
sustained critique by scholars including John Holloway, Werner Bonefield, Simon
Clarke, Peter Kennedy, Robert Brenner and Mark Glick, and Stavros Mavroudeas.104
Their critiques cover a lot of ground, ranging from attacks on the theory and
methodology of the PRA to the political ramifications of its prescriptions. Whilst not
discounting the significance of the latter, what concerns us here are those criticisms
targeted at the former.
The main criticisms of the PRA on these theoretical and methodological scores can be
summarised as:


a reification of capitalist social production relations;105



a functionalist and undialectical separation of capitalist structures and class
struggle;106

102
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a weakness of mid-range theorising divorced from a broader theory of the
capitalist mode of production107 and the creation of historically vacuous models
of real epochs within capitalism;108 and



a poor treatment of the state.

These are serious charges, which must be addressed if the contention of this thesis, that
the PRA is a most useful vehicle for reconciling theory and practice in accounting for
labour law change, is to be justified.
The first and second accusations are best answered as a couplet, for the latter is the
logical outcome of the former. By a reification of capitalist social relations, critics seem
to mean that regulationists subscribe to a view of capitalism as dominated by a set of
self-contained and self-sufficient objective laws, a structuralist view devoid of the
motive force of class struggle.109 Kennedy states this view powerfully in his attack on
Hirsch’s work:
[H]e commences with the erroneous idea that somehow the objective laws of
value exist in a perpetually crisis ridden state separately from social relations of
production. The law of value, according to this regulationist view, becomes
little more than a sealed and timeless movement.110

If it is true that regulationists reify tendencies within capitalism to abstract historical
laws, then it follows that class struggle is, as Bonefeld describes, ‘seen as either
accelerating or retarding the definite course of the law-determined path of development
but it is incapable of challenging it.’111 The supposed result is that the PRA reproduces
the bourgeois fetishism of conceptually segregating laws and real-life human struggle
and generates ‘a picture which seals the appearance of bourgeois society rather than
prising it open.’112
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The first criticism is comparatively easy to deal with.113 The concept of a reification of
capitalist social relations appears to be confused with the regulationist positing of an
invariant core of relations that sits at the heart of capitalism.114 Regulationism, like any
Marxist political economy approach worth its salt, is not suggesting that capitalist social
relations are somehow eternal, immutable or mechanistically derived from the abstract
advance of productive forces.115

Indeed, Marx was explicitly concerned with

understanding how different relations hold under different modes of production,
reflected in his aforementioned refusal to attribute a transhistorical essence to humanity.
This does not mean, however, that Marx neglected to study the laws and tendencies that
characterised the capitalist mode of production; conversely, such an inquiry was the
business of a great deal of his life. As I outlined at the beginning of the chapter, the
capitalist mode of production is characterised by a basket of invariant features, in the
absence of which it would be improper to talk of ‘capitalism.’
To run with Kennedy’s example, let us take the laws of value, principally the labour
theory of value. Of course he is correct to state that it is impossible to separate an
eternal, objective law of value from the social relations of production.116 Fine notes
astutely that, for Marx, ‘value, money and capital are not things but economic
expressions of definite productive relations.’117 Marx states explicitly of commodities
in Volume I of Capital that ‘their objective character as values is therefore purely
social’ (my emphasis).118 The full operation of the law of value presupposes a society
of generalised commodity production, which in turn is prefaced on the compulsion of
the majority of people to sell their labour-power.
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It is in this sense that the generalised value relation faces humankind as a ‘law,’ as an
abstraction that subjugates real people. This is a phenomenon with its roots deeply
within capitalist social relations which, although it will necessarily manifest itself in
different ways, can be thought of as flowing from the invariant features of a capitalist
society. In other words, the basic properties that make a capitalist society what it is will
generate a universalised value relation. If describing this reality constitutes a reification
of the law of value, then we can equally say that any notion of a distinctive capitalist
mode of production is also a reification. Faced with the corruption of that model, we
would eventually be led to a structureless conception of political economy in which the
capitalist epoch would lose all specificity.119 Such a development would of course kill a
Marxist inquiry and runs counter to the essence of Marx’s life work.
Accepting that a capitalist society will exhibit certain tendencies on account of it being
capitalist, however, is not the same as suggesting that structure is an empty bucket
within which an un-related class struggle is contained.

One of Marx’s central

preoccupations was in explaining why the social relations of production, which is the
very matter of class struggle, manifest themselves in certain economic and political
forms.120

Within its own purview, regulationists critiqued structural Marxism’s

unsophisticated portrayal of the maintenance and reproduction of structures. Jessop and
Sum note that:
[T]he Parisians criticized the Althusserian view that structures somehow
maintain themselves quasi-automatically, independently of effective social
agency, and with no significant transformations. Rejecting the emphasis on
structural unity typical of Althusser’s concern with reproduction, regulation
theorists stressed the ‘unity of unity and struggle in regulation.’121

This can be seen most clearly in the regulationist treatment of ‘institutionalised class
compromises,’ particularly in the work of Delorme and Andre.122 Here, the focus is on
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how class struggle directly stimulates institutional development and how the resulting
institutions play a key role in canalising such struggle in a manageable fashion, a theme
we shall explore in detail in chapters 5 and 6. Class struggle and institutions are, in this
conception, intricately linked, and indeed represent the unity of structure and
struggle.123 The same unity underpins Jessop’s contention that the structure/struggle
duality is a false one:
This false duality links the two categories by counterposing structure (as rules
and resources) to action (as concrete conduct) and/or regarding them as
recursively reproductive of each other. Despite its counterposition of structure
to agency, this approach is still abstract; and, despite its ritual reference to
recursivity, it remains atemporal. Yet a genuine duality can be created by
dialectically relativizing (as opposed to mechanically relating) both analytical
categories.124

To say that regulationist analysis disarticulates the two thus seems off the mark. The
claim that it does is based on a reluctance to label the features and structures of a
capitalist society, which, although not the intention of critics such as Holloway and
Bonefield, is itself part of a broader trend to empiricism in the social sciences under the
impact of post-structuralism. The result is a voluntarist, structureless conception of
capitalism that abdicates the need to theorise and identify the invariant features of
capitalism and their concrete manifestations.
The contention that the PRA produces inadequate mid-range theory and/or vacuous
historical models is not one I intend to dwell on. Suffice it to say that critics on both
fronts misunderstand the nature of the process of abstraction engaged in by
sophisticated regulationist work, and the status of the resulting ideal-type models of
development. As I have outlined above, these ideal-typical models follow Marx’s lead
in his description of modes of production, which ‘brings out and fixes the common
element’ but apprehends ‘no real historical stage.’125

The ideal-typical model of
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concrete experience of any particular society.126 Vidal is completely correct when he
states that ‘[t]o expect a sort of narrow technical precision out of the broad conceptual
architecture of Fordism/postfordism would be to misunderstand this framework.’127
Rather, it forms a vital intermediate link in the movement from abstract to concrete.128
It enters into a dialectical relationship with concrete existence in which the model
identifies causal relationships whilst empirical study comments on the adequacy of the
theoretical construct.129 This is exactly the kind of process upheld by Mavroudeas as
the correct Marxist one, so it is difficult to see on what grounds he dismisses the PRA as
eclectic and historicist in this regard.130 Indeed, the ‘more complex levels’ that result
from his dialectical spiral between abstract theoretical development and concrete
historical reality are synonymous with regulationist concepts, which are frameworks for
the regularities observed at these levels.131 Criticisms like Salvati’s, that the PRA is
‘neither theory nor history,’ are therefore very wide of the mark.132
Ultimately, however, the reader will be best placed to judge if the PRA constructs
employed in this thesis are vacuous and/or inadequate middle-range theories, or are
instead valuable focussing devices illuminating the evolution of Australian capitalism.
Treatment of the state and juridic forms
The last criticism of import to deal with here is the claim that the PRA does not have a
coherent theory of the state. This one is critical to address, as this thesis proceeds on the
assumption that the state and law are related juridic forms of capitalist social relations
(discussed in greater detail in chapter 3).133

Meeting this challenge also involves

elucidating my own conception of the state and law as juridic forms. Given the fact that
both are intimately involved in the construction of law deployed in following chapter, it
is best to deal with this basket of issues separately.
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Specifically, some allege that its theory of the state is either under-developed or
borrowed from other disciplines,134 whilst other critics accuse it of a narrow,
functionalist account of state action.135 While there is some truth to these criticisms,
sophisticated regulationist analyses can overcome both of them.
The claim that the PRA renders functionalist and economistic accounts of the state can
be dealt with fairly quickly. It is fair to say that simplistic regulationist accounts (which
ironically are often constructed by the critics of regulationism, who then caricature
them)136 have a proclivity towards both functionalism and economism. On the first
score of functionalism, it seems that the tendency to slip into it is a danger inherent in
the objects of regulationist research. Given that the PRA is geared to an intermediate
trajectory of capitalist growth and development, and in particular towards understanding
how capitalism can be made stable within certain spatio-temporal horizons, it is easy to
assume not only that the state performs certain functions, but that it actually has the
capacity to do so.

As regarding the charge of economism, it is true that much

regulationist work (particularly the more recent) is economically dense and displays an
inordinate preoccupation with econometrics.137 The fact that many practitioners of
regulation theory, past and present, were economists no doubt contributes here. It is
equally true that there lurks within the PRA a more insidious form of economism, which
Jessop and Sum describe as regarding ‘the state and civil society as largely external to
the economy. Thus it overlooks how the latter is deeply penetrated by extra-economic
forces and relations.’138 It would not be unfair to state that this is an issue which has
dogged Marxist work ever since Marx and Engels outlined their method, exacerbated by
the unfortunate base-superstructure metaphor of Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy.139 My view is that the claim that the regulationist treatment of the
state tends towards economism is a function more of an ever-present tendency within
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Marxist political economy than any peculiarity of the Parisian school’s theoretical
orientation and/or methodology.
Moreover, these issues are not insurmountable from within a regulationist paradigm.
The PRA is predicated on acknowledging and understanding the intertwining and coevolution of the economic and extra-economic moments of capitalism, the state
included.140 The Althusserian structuralism which initially grounded the PRA was
explicitly premised upon a rejection of economism.141 This goes much further than
Neilson’s aforementioned description of capitalism being ‘politically modified’ in the
interests of capital’s stability and sustainability.142 The issue with Neilson’s statement
is that it appears to reify an image of a fundamentally capitalist ‘economy’ distinct from
the political sphere of the state and civil society whose form is merely contingent and
capacities only functional. In doing so, he risks hypostasizing the economism which
structural Marxism sought to combat.
Rather than conceiving capitalism as a fundamentally economic system paired with
contingent or epiphenomenal political forms, it is far better to remain true to the spirit of
Marx’s analysis and comprehend capitalism as a totality.

This is what structural

Marxism did, albeit in a highly abstract and impersonal fashion (with individuals
regarded as the passive bearers of ideology).143 Admittedly, it also tended to too rigidly
enforce its distinction between economics, politics and ideology, regarding them as
separate regions rather than many-sided manifestations of the same relations of
production.144
The way to retain the structural Marxist emphasis on the role of the state without
necessarily relegating it to a self-enclosed political sphere is to recognise that capitalist
production relations assume both economic and juridic forms, a reality we saw Elam
grasp above.145 Marx’s method in Capital was not that of base and superstructure, but
instead analysing why the social relations of production (the innermost social ‘content’)
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necessarily expressed itself in certain forms, such as value and money. 146 Although
Marx was primarily concerned with tracing the economic forms of capitalist society,
Fine notes that this focus has been confused as concept, giving ‘rise to the impression
that the economic expression of relations of production is their only expression, as if
there is an exclusive association between economics and social relations of production
which is not shared by other forms of social life.’147 As Marsden states eloquently:
The state is not ‘above’ society, as ‘base-superstructure’ suggests. Rather civil
society and political state are twin illusions atop a substratum: capital. This civil
society/political state couplet corresponds to the twin forms of capital, economic
and juridic, fused as private property. There are not ‘economic’ relations here
and ‘legal’ relations there. There is one network of relations of production with
juridic and economic forms.148

In their economic forms, capitalist production relations, by separating workers from
their means of production and marketising the commodities needed for their
subsistence, generate a commodity fetishism, whereby the social relations between
people are distorted into the economic relations between things, between
commodities.149 However, the existence of general commodity production/exchange
and private property presupposes, and is partly constituted by, parallel juridic forms.
Property rights, particularly capitalist notions of absolute property ownership, are
almost invariably legal from their beginning; indeed, to speak of ‘rights’ is difficult
without recourse to law.150 As Marx noted, the enormous expansion of commodity
relations entailed by capital requires mutual recognition of proprietary right on the part
of commodity buyers and sellers;151 the violence and robbery that characterised feudal
society, for example, would not be commensurable with the day-to-day conduct of a
market system.152 This mutual recognition of right and abstract equality is the simplest
incarnation of the legal form (whose contours I will trace in much greater detail in the
following chapter).

146

Fine, above n 4, 95.
Ibid 96.
148
Richard Marsden, The nature of capital: Marx after Foucault (Routledge, 1999) 179.
149
Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 1, 164-169.
150
A point made by Taiwo in his critique of Cohen’s conception of production relations: Olufemi Taiwo,
Legal Naturalism: A Marxist Theory of Law (Cornell University Press, 1996) 46-54.
151
Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 1, 178.
152
See, for example: Michael E. Tigar and Madeleine R. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (Monthly
Review Press, 2000) 20.
147

36

In the transition to a capitalist society, the separation of the economic and extraeconomic moments of coercion, alongside the roots of abstract equality between
commodity producers/owners, generates an additional juridic form, that of the alienated,
national state. The disintegration of the organic community of feudalism and the
atomisation of civil society is matched by the development of a formally equal political
community.153 Raised above civil society, Marx notes that ‘[t]he political state, in
relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth.’154
These juridic forms are every bit as inscribed in, and derived from, capitalist production
relations as economic forms. It is thus better to conceptualise them as Taiwo does, as
part of the essence of the capitalist mode of production, in the absence of which it
would be incorrect to speak of a capitalist society. 155 Or, to return to the beginning of
the chapter; the working definition of capitalism I used, courtesy of Neilson, identified
private ownership, wage dependence and the market as the key institutions which
express both an exploitative wage-labour relationship and competition-based private
coordination of production, the core social relations of capitalism.156 The admission of
the state and law as juridic forms of capital means that we can add both to the invariant
features of the capitalist mode of production. In other words, a stateless, lawless society
would not, over the long run, be a capitalist one.157 Chapter 3 will explore the notion of
juridic forms, their origins and their roles in the capitalist mode of production, in much
greater detail.
Despite the fact that this theory of juridic forms has historically been counterposed to
the Althusserian notion of separate economic, political and ideological ‘regions,’158
there is nothing in it that would make it incompatible with the PRA. In particular,
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Jessop draws attention to the existence of strong extant linkages in the work of scholars
such as Hirsch and Esser,159 who combine the concepts of the PRA with the insights of
the state derivation debate of the 1970s and 1980s.160 In such analyses, although the
form of the state is implanted in capitalist social relations, this form, like all others, is so
thoroughly underwritten by contradictions that there is no certainty it can perform the
functions required of it.161 To ascertain if it does, the more intermediate regulationist
notion of a mode of regulation comes into its own. If the particular state under analysis
coheres with an underlying accumulation regime, and fits into the constellation of other
institutional forms, such as the wage-labour nexus, money and enterprise relations,162
then we can say that it more-or-less executes its historically conditioned variety of
functions.
This approach characterises the best work on the state from a regulationist perspective.
The variety and sophistication of this work also puts paid to the claim that the PRA has
an unoriginal account of the state.163 Jessop in particular has developed an original and
rich ‘strategic-relational’ theory of the state, which combines the insights of Poulantzas,
the state derivation debate and work on ‘autopoiesis’ with the PRA and generally
provides a theoretically rigorous yet historically sensitive account of the functions,
capacities and historical trajectories of capitalist states.164 Elements of this theory will
be further elucidated and discussed in the following chapters.
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Regulationism in Australia
We now have an understanding of PRA concepts, the rebuttal of criticisms and a more
complete definition of capitalism in hand. It is necessary to state at this point that the
regulationist project and its suite of concepts were not devised in an abstract theoretical
laboratory. Rather, they were generated by a process of intensive investigation into the
actual history of post-World War II capitalism, with the path-breaking texts focussing
particularly upon the mechanics of US and French capitalism. In the same vein, the
utility of the PRA in studying Australian capitalism cannot be assumed, but must be
demonstrated. It is thus necessary to turn to the question of regulationist influence on
work regarding the nature of Australian capitalism. With some very notable exceptions,
it is fair to say that the PRA has had a quite limited impact on Australian scholarship.
Such influence as it has had seems to be concentrated in two main areas:
1. Scholars using regulationist notions to construct periodisation schemas of
Australian capitalism; and
2. The ‘Fordist/post-Fordist’ labour process debates of the late 1980s and early
1990s, especially as played out in the pages of the Journal of Australian
Political Economy.
Given the essential theoretical poverty and narrowness of the latter,165 it is only the
former that I am concerned with here.
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Regulationist periodisation schemas
In the Australian context, the scholar who has perhaps taken the greatest lead from the
PRA is Christopher Lloyd. He has taken the notion of regulation, in both its theoretical
and practical sense, seriously and has constructed an elegant, sophisticated model that,
in its economic moments, draws heavily upon Parisian work.
Building upon a framework he constructed in a 2002 article,166 Lloyd characterises an
overall regime of political economy as a product of sets of practices and modalities of
social life that can grouped under four headings: a production regime or social system
of production; a regime of formal regulation; a governance regime; and a cultural
regime.167 Since the beginnings of British colonialism in the country, there have been,
on Lloyd’s count, four broadly coherent and stable regimes of political economy,
separated by periods of crisis and experimentation.168

This notion of a regime is

roughly commensurable with the concept of a model of development, although it more
explicitly acknowledges the importance of culture to the overall regime of political
economy. Whilst this conception does employ a bundle of intermediate concepts that
resemble regulationist notions, however, it proceeds less rigorously from basic Marxian
categories and the contradictions inherent in the capital relation.
Lloyd quite openly acknowledges that his conceptualisation owes a good deal to French
regulationist work.169 However, he posits that it also differs from their analysis, in that
he draws more heavily on historical institutionalist analysis. Based on comments in his
2002 article, I take him to mean that the PRA concerns itself most with the production
regime and the regulation most directly targeted at the economic system, whereas his
analysis is broader in more explicitly identifying the role of government and culture in
shaping the social totality.170
Whilst the clear-cut acknowledgement of the importance of the political system and
culture to the architecture of the overall regime of political economy is to be
commended, I would argue that this does not take us a great distance from the PRA as it
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has been constructed here, particularly when it is infused with the notion of juridic
forms of capital. Aside from the aforementioned treatment of the state and law as
juridic forms, the criticism on the count of culture is misplaced. Although rarely the
explicit focus of regulationist analyses, it would appear mechanistic to talk of the nature
of wage labour, the production process and consumption norms without acknowledging
even obliquely the cultural forms and content that both help constitute, and are in turn
constituted by, these structures and processes. Although he does not subsequently go on
to explore the full impact of culture, Aglietta nonetheless places it conceptually centre
stage in his discussion of the evolution of the structural forms associated with collective
bargaining in the United States:
The formation and operation of structural forms are the theoretical site of the
articulation of social relations-economic, politico-legal and ideological. To
develop a theory of collective bargaining as a structural form means to conceive
this articulation as unity of the social practices necessary for the reproduction of
the wage relation (my emphasis).171

Lipietz goes further in explicitly outlining the significance of cultural norms in his
description of the ‘societal paradigm’ of Fordism, a social worldview constructed of
shared expectations and visions of progress.172

Although it is fair to say that

regulationist work focussing directly on cultural forms (outside of those directly
imbricated in the organisation of the labour process, patterns of collective bargaining or
modes of consumption) is lacking within the approach, this reflects more an historical
neglect rather than an innate inability to deal with the subject.173
On the whole, I find Lloyd’s work compelling, particularly given its sensitivity to
empirical data and the recognition that regimes of regulation are provisional and contain
within themselves the seeds of disequilibria, leading to periods of crisis and institutional
searching, whereby ways are sought out of that crisis.

His models represent an

informed and sophisticated integration of Parisian regulation work into Australian
scholarship.
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There are, however, several theoretical and methodological issues with Lloyd’s work
(specific criticisms of his models will be reserved for chapter 4). 174 Of key significance
is the fact that the analysis does not move from the abstract to the concrete in a lucid
fashion.

I regard this as a consequence of adopting a positively eclectic mix of

concepts, some of which may not be truly theoretically commensurable. For example,
Lloyd combines a conception of the production regime which is based heavily on a
critical (though not exclusively Marxist) political economy with a neo-Darwinian theory
of social evolution.175 Lloyd is right to note the interpenetration of the micro and macro
level in determining the course of social evolution, particularly in conceiving of the
macro level as a ‘selective’ environment for ‘innovations’ generated at the micro
level.176 However, there is no account of what spurs these ‘innovations’ in the first
place, nor the logic that binds them. For a genuinely Marxist political economy, the
capital relation and its evolution in and through class struggle is the central motor
driving the process of social evolution. From this perspective, innovations at the level
of, say, the workplace, may take the form of isolated and piecemeal developments, but
are in reality bound up in the logic of a greater tendency, such as the need to intensify
labour and raise the rate of exploitation.177 To account for the contours of social
evolution, without analysing root causes, is a serious lacuna that at best tends towards
empiricism (which informs his sometimes descriptive account of regimes of
accumulation as a conglomerate of features lacking a clear hierarchy) and at worst is
conducive towards a voluntarist conception of development at the micro-level.
A further methodological issue, which we will explore in greater detail in chapter 4, is
the fact that he sometimes confuses the history of institutions for the structured
coherence of a stable regulatory regime. Just because institutions have come into
existence doesn’t necessarily mean that the social formation is agreed as to their
function or desirability. This confusion is pronounced when he accords his ‘labouristprotectionism’ model a much earlier start date than I give antipodean Fordism on the
basis of certain of its institutions having a pre-World War II provenance.
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Lloyd’s work has inspired another scholar, Ray Broomhill, who has also adopted the
notion of a periodisation of capitalist accumulation in Australia that, whilst identifying
different epochs to Lloyd, is nonetheless quite consonant with the theoretical schema he
has developed.178 Importantly, he states:
Each previous 'boom' featured a burst of innovation and growth followed by
economic collapse. Each collapse was characterised by intensive capital, labour
and state restructuring during which there occurred significant changes in the
role of the state, shifts in economic policy, and fundamental realignments of
class forces. These phases of restructuring have been periods of 'creative
destruction' through which the problems increasingly inherent in the previous
boom were at least partly resolved and the conditions for a new phase of
accumulation forged.179

This characterisation of the nature and trajectory of capital accumulation is significant.
Firstly, it recognises the imbrications of the economic, political and social moments of
capitalism.

A coherent combination of all three provides the basis of a stable

accumulation phase. Secondly, it acknowledges how changes in the role of the state
accompany new patterns of accumulation.

Lastly, this framework unites the

development of new accumulation phases with the resolution (at least partially and
temporarily) of the issues that beset their predecessors.
This schema is quite in keeping with the PRA. As with Lloyd’s work, it admittedly
proceeds less rigorously from basic Marxian value categories, and doesn’t employ the
neat ‘institutional forms’ typology that characterise a mode of regulation. However, the
concept of accumulation phases appears roughly commensurable with the regulationist
notion of a development model, and there appears to be no major incompatibility
between regulationist work and the approach of Broomhill. This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that Broomhill had previously published an article that explicitly employed
regulation theory to analyse the impact of neoliberal globalisation on the development,
role and functions of state governments in Australia.180 Importantly, he favours a
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sophisticated and nuanced conception of regulation, noting the importance of agency,
class struggle and historical contingency in the constitution of modes of regulation.181
Lynne Chester has also employed a regulationist approach in the periodisation of
Australian capitalism.

More so than the other scholars discussed here, she has

continued to employ traditional PRA concepts, especially the mode of regulation
concept. In particular, she has developed a detailed account of Australia’s neoliberal
mode of regulation, tracing well the interconnections between its key structural forms182
and usefully applying it to the study of subjects such as electricity and water markets. 183
However, as indicated above, she generally does not describe in detail accumulation
regimes. Indeed, at times she tends to the view that a mode of regulation is actually a
more concrete instantiation of an accumulation regime,184 an example of the meso-level
construction (vis-à-vis an accumulation regime) of the concept I rejected above.
Moreover, her empirically detailed account of the Australian neoliberal mode of
regulation is not backed by a similarly rich account of Australia’s Fordist phase. What
crisis tendencies neoliberalism is responding to, and how it addresses them, are thus not
adequately explained. This shortcoming dovetails with the more general absence of a
holistic class perspective that links the constituent features of a mode of regulation to
the contradictions inscribed in capitalist social relations. Shorn of this basis, Chester’s
account, like Lloyd’s, mainly describes particular phases of Australian capitalism as
conglomerates of different institutions, with no organic understanding as to how they
manage capital’s crisis tendencies and evolve under the impetus of class struggle.
Another scholar who is informed by the regulation approach is Gerry Treuren. As well
as constructing a theory of institutional development and crisis completely
commensurable with the PRA (particularly regarding the distinction between ‘minor’
and ‘structural’ crisis),185 he was the first to sound the need for analysis of a specifically
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‘Australian mode of development,’186 a task he did not subsequently undertake. It was
specifically in response to this call that I have developed my own periodisation of
Australian capitalism which, whilst drawing upon the work of these other scholars, has
attempted to intensify and deepen the PRA method and reconnect it with its Marxist
heritage, rather than supplement it eclectically with concepts developed elsewhere.187
There is, of course, a huge body of work outside of the PRA paradigm which deals with
the categories of capital, the state, the labour process and law, either singly or jointly.
In particular, Australian scholarship seems to me quite strong in explicating links
between the state and capital188 (despite the oft-repeated assertion that it isn’t)189 and in
exploring the system of industrial relations that both partially constitutes, and is partly
constituted by, the organisation of the labour process. Work in these veins will be
integrated into the analysis throughout the thesis where relevant. The work of labour
law scholars is of course central, and will be discussed in the following chapter.

Conclusions
I began this chapter by noting that a thesis which seeks to truly ground an analysis of
workplace law within a critical political economy must work at the intersections of
capital, the state, the capitalist labour process/industrial relations, and the law.
Although broadly reflective of the disciplinary boundaries that demarcate these areas of
inquiry, I also noted how these distinctions are in a sense arbitrary, and these categories
are intimately related through their status as invariant features of the capitalist mode of
production.
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I have demonstrated how the PRA analytically unites these moments of a capitalist
society using a variety of sophisticated concepts that together form a distinct hierarchy
on the plane from abstract to concrete. Building upon the long-term tendencies that
Marx identifies, the regulationists proffer a dynamic mid-range account of the
development of capitalist societies, particularly in their economic and political facets.
The regulationist notion of a model of development uniting a dominant industrial
paradigm, mode of regulation and an accumulation regime traverses the categories of
capital, the state, the labour process/industrial relations and law and, in doing so, offers
a wide-ranging account that allows us to understand the interpenetration of economic
and extra-economic forces in a capitalist society and their evolution through time and
space. Importantly, a perceived weakness in treating the state and, by extension law,
was resolved by explicitly including both of these in the bundle of invariant features of
a capitalist society. Capitalist production relations have juridic, as well as economic,
forms. It thus does not pay to see the law and the state as secondarily derived from an
economic base; they are simply different forms of capital’s existence, in the absence of
which the resulting society would be something other than capitalist.190 Making this
strong claim, implicit in better regulationist work, does no damage to a PRA analysis
when it is acknowledged that the form’s functionality is always in question;191
conversely, it helps purge it of a claimed economistic bias. It does, however, require the
regulationist project to cease its drift into eclecticism and reconnect with its roots in
Marxism.
The limited impact of the PRA in the Australian context is somewhat surprising,
particularly given the fact that post-World War II Australian capitalism exhibited many
of the characteristics of the ideal-typical Fordist model. There are, however, sufficient
examples of quality regulationist-inspired work to attest to the rigour and lucidity the
PRA could introduce into an account of the development of Australian capitalism.
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Table 1: Regulationist concepts
Concept
Industrial paradigm

Definition

Examples

- dominant method of organising the labour process.
- governs social and technical division of labour.

- mass-production on semi-automatic production
lines, governed by logic of Taylorism.

- not necessary that all labour processes are organised on
these lines; enough that certain lead sectors are.
Accumulation regime

- macro-level articulation of production and consumption
reproducible through time.
- governs relationship between Departments I and II.

Mode of regulation

- extensive accumulation, where capitalist
production in Department I sits alongside pettybourgeois production in Department II.

- can broadly be conceived as a concrete arrangement of
capitalism’s economic forms.

- intensive accumulation, where capitalist
production in Department I is matched by
commodification of working-class
consumption goods.

- ensemble of structural forms stabilising and guiding an
accumulation regime.

- mode centred on Keynesian Welfare National
State.

- forms include wage-labour nexus, particular form of the
state, enterprise forms and competition, and money form.

- neoliberal mode of regulation.

- can broadly be conceived as a concrete arrangement of
capitalism’s juridic forms.
Model of development

- coherent combination of an industrial paradigm,
accumulation regime and mode of regulation.
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- Fordism
- Liberal-productivism

Chapter 3
THE LEGAL FORM, LABOUR LAW AND THE LAWADMINISTRATION CONTINUUM
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the PRA’s concepts and methodology
broaches capital, the state, the labour process and law as analytic categories. Given the
centrality of law to this thesis, this chapter will be concerned primarily with developing
a theoretically rigorous account of the form and function of law generally, and labour
law more specifically.

This task requires placing law within a precisely defined

hierarchy of abstraction, rooted in Marxist political economy. This must explicate the
abstract place of law within the capitalist mode of production at the same time that it
tackles legal change at the concrete level. Only by integrating both can we arrive at an
understanding of law that is theoretically lucid yet empirically accurate.1 Through
generating ideal-typical models periodising capitalism into distinctive epochs, the
Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA) is ideally placed to serve as the mid-wife of this
process of unifying the abstract and the concrete. Taking the PRA as the point of
articulation between the two levels, this chapter will construct a coherent hierarchy of
abstraction that retains the theoretical incisiveness of Marxism whilst exploring the
impact of history on the legal form.2
It will be recalled that in chapter 2 I identified the law, along with the state, as juridic
forms of capital that are part of the basket of invariant features characterising the
capitalist mode of production. Given that to many Marxists this would appear a bold
claim, it is necessary to first explore something of the history of legal analysis from
within a Marxist political economy. Only once we have canvassed the best of such
work can we lay a solid foundation at the abstract level saying what the ‘legal form’ is,
why it assumes this guise, how it is actualised at the concrete level and how it is
reproduced over time.

1

As was outlined in the preceding chapter, this process of theory construction assumes a spiralling
pattern, whereby the abstract and the concrete are dialectically relativised.
2
I have already sketched elsewhere the basic outlines of the theoretical framework established here: Brett
Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law: Towards a new theoretical model’
(2015) 39(3) Capital & Class 453.
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Marxism and the law
Considering the fact that law is a highly visible and potent presence in both public and
private life, it is somewhat surprising that Marxist analyses specifically grappling with
the law are, with several very notable exceptions,3 uncommon. Given that ‘Marx’s goal
was to understand bourgeois society as a totality, as an inter-connected whole,’4 this
legal lacuna seems at first instance to be inexplicable. It becomes more understandable,
though no less inadequate, in light of the fact that many Marxist scholars have
historically tended to subsume law within an epiphenomenal ‘superstructure’
determined by an economic ‘base.’5 Whilst establishing a vision of a totality, this
species of determinism leaves little space for a specific understanding of the form of
law. It is to these shortcomings Collins (a staunch critic) refers when he states:
The paucity of Marxist jurisprudence until modern times is probably largely a
result of the materialist emphasis of Marxism. Since the primary focus rests on
the economy and the corresponding power relations within a society, law is
treated as a peripheral concern. Even then it is usually relegated to the position
of a relatively unproblematic sector of the State scarcely worthy of detailed
consideration.6

Undoubtedly there is a certain truth to this contention, especially insofar as it describes
the Stalinist, economistic vision of Marxism that came to dominate the politics of
mainstream Communist parties in the decades bracketing World War II.7 However, it
must be qualified in two ways. Firstly, one must be very cautious not to confuse the
traditional focus and emphases of any theory (Marxist or otherwise) with the actual
3

See, for example: Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (Barbara Einhorn trans,
Ink Links Ltd, 1978); Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (Patrick Camiller trans, NLB, 1978);
Isaac Balbus, ‘Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative Autonomy” of the Law’
(1977) 11(3) Law & Society Review 571; Bob Fine et al (ed), Capitalism and the Rule of Law: From
Deviancy Theory to Marxism (Hutchinson, 1979); Bernard Edelman, Ownership of the Image: Elements
for a Marxist Theory of Law (Elizabeth Kingdom trans, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Geoffrey Kay
and James Mott, Political Order and the Law of Labour (The Macmillan Press, 1982); Csaba Varga (ed),
Marxian Legal Theory (Dartmouth, 1993); Olufemi Taiwo, Legal Naturalism: A Marxist Theory of Law
(Cornell University Press, 1996); Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the
Legal Form (The Blackburn Press, 2002); China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of
International Law (Haymarket Books, 2006); Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour
law’, above n 2.
4
Michael Lebowitz, Beyond Capital (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 52.
5
See, for example: Alan Hunt, ‘Marxist Theory of Law’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 350, 353-354.
6
Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Clarendon Press, 1982) 10.
7
Paul Blackledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History (Manchester University Press, 2006) 7678, 97-98.
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explanatory possibilities opened by it. Marxism’s historical neglect of the law as an
object of study must be distinguished from the opportunities for legal analysis from
within that theoretical framework. Relatedly, as we shall see in this chapter, this neglect
is by no means absolute; there is indeed a body of Marxist work explicitly concerned
with elucidating the place of law within capitalism.
By way of grounding, it is worth briefly surveying the contributions of Marx and Engels
on law. Whilst it is true that neither ever developed a detailed and consistent theory of
law,8 they nevertheless had more to say of it than is commonly supposed.9 It is apparent
that their approach (particularly Marx’s) was a dynamic one, characterised by
intellectual evolution and the discarding of concepts no longer deemed useful. Fine
notes how ‘Marx’s point of departure was classical jurisprudence and his journey away
from it was accomplished only in stages, without a preconceived destination.’10 More
specifically, this point of departure was Hegelianism, the influence of which informed
Marx’s initial legal rationalism, ‘the view that law is an embodiment of Reason striving
for freedom.’11 On the basis of this idealist notion, Marx opined that a nation’s statute
book was ‘a bible of freedom,’12 and law’s essence was Reason’s achievement of a
positive, impersonal existence free of particularistic interests.13
Marx and Engels’ movement towards their historical materialist method necessitated the
abandonment of this conception, and a recognition that the law must be approached
from the class perspective they had developed for political economy. 14

This

appreciation opened up two potential conceptions of law: as an element in a reactive
superstructure which is ultimately determined by an economic base;15 or as a social
institution with its roots deeply embedded within, and constitutive of, capitalist relations
of production and exchange. The tension between the two was never fully resolved in

8

See, for example, the observation of Campbell and Wiles, cited in Paul Phillips, Marx and Engels on
Law and Laws (Martin Robertson, 1980) x.
9
Maureen Cain and Alan Hunt (eds), Marx and Engels on Law (Academic Press, 1979) ix.
10
Fine, above n 3, 66.
11
Taiwo, above n 3, 8.
12
Karl Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press’ in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works
Volume I (Lawrence and Wishart Electric Book, 2010) 162.
13
Ibid.
14
A journey Fine traces in some detail; Fine, above n 3.
15
See, for example: Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Charles H. Kerr &
Company, 1904) 11-12.
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their writings,16 but, as indicated in the previous chapter’s discussion of juridic forms,
the latter represents a most fruitful line of enquiry that remains true to the tenets of
historical

materialism

whilst

avoiding an

instrumentalist

view

of

law

as

unproblematically functioning in the interest of capital.17
A prime example of this more sophisticated treatment of law can be found in Marx’s
treatment of commodity ownership and exchange in Volume I of Capital.

Marx

acknowledged that commodities cannot walk to market and exchange themselves.18 He
continues:
In order that these objects may enter into relation with each other as
commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to one another as
persons whose will resides in those objects, and must behave in such a way that
each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and alienate his own,
except through an act to which both parties consent. The guardians must
therefore recognize each other as owners of private property. The content of this
juridical relation (or relation of two wills) is itself determined by the economic
relation.19

Despite seeming on the surface to suggest some type of economic determinism
(depending upon the exact meaning given to the term ‘economic’ in this context),20 the
practical effect of this statement is in fact quite the opposite. As Von Arx states of this
passage, ‘[b]y asserting that exchange requires mutual recognition of private property
rights, Marx clearly acknowledges that the legal relation between subjects is intrinsic to
the value relation’ (my emphasis).21

The association of commodities with some

minimum notion of juridical equality preventing theft was developed further by Engels,

16

Additionally, Fine states that Marx never overcame his tendency to oscillate between viewing law as a
false semblance of equality or, conversely, an actual substantive structure that afforded some degree of
equality to those ruled by it: Fine, above n 3, 120.
17
From a crude instrumentalist perspective, every action of the state is either a victory for capital or
capital granting some concession to the proletariat in furtherance of its own interests. Such theories thus
fail to provide a nuanced, sophisticated view of laws which seem either to aid capital in very indirect
ways or indeed work against the interests of capital. For a modern-day exemplar of such a framework
relevant to this thesis, see: Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, Labor’s Conflict: Big business, workers and the
politics of class (Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a deeper account of the flaws of
instrumentalism, see: Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York
University Press, 1982) 12-16.
18
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume I (Ben Fowkes trans, Penguin Classics,
1990) 178.
19
Ibid.
20
Fine, above n 3, 96.
21
Susan Von Arx, An Examination of E.B. Pashukanis’s General Theory of Law and Marxism (PhD
Thesis, State University of New York, 1997) 66.

51

who stated that law, whilst expressing the general economic expression, must
nevertheless be ‘coherently unified … and free from glaring internal inconsistencies.’22
Such notions are the fertile ground out of which a theory of law as a juridic form of
capital can grow.
Alongside this admittedly inchoate understanding of law as deeply embedded in
capitalist production and exchange relations, there is another important insight Marx
and Engels give us on law; that it is not simply a tool functioning in the interests of the
capitalist class (which makes law’s neglect at the hands of many Marxist scholars even
more puzzling). This can be seen most clearly in Marx and Engels treatment of the Ten
Hours statute fought for by the British proletariat in the middle decades of the
nineteenth century.23 For Marx, this legislation represented the concrete manifestation
of working-class power crystallised in the political arena, the first time that ‘the political
economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working
class.’24 By uniting as a class workers were capable of introducing laws that, in terms
of content, both represented and facilitated their class interests. The struggle to force
such change was a genuine political movement of the class ‘with the object of enforcing
its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force.’25
In this conception law, far from being immune to the class struggle, is instead a focal
point for it, and it is exactly over the content of labour law that we can expect the
greatest contestation.
From this very brief sketch,26 we can discern two central points for our analysis: firstly,
that law is a strange creature whose basic form is structured by the capitalist relations of
production and exchange of which it is part; and secondly, that class struggle can play a
formative role in determining the exact shape and content of law. The famous dictum

22

Engels in practice adhered more clearly to a base-superstructure model than Marx, which informs his
notion of law as being a reflection of the economic, a contention I have refuted in the previous chapter:
Friedrich Engels, ‘Letter to Conrad Schmidt’ in Irving Howe (ed), Essential Works of Socialism (Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1970) 70, 71.
23
See, for example: Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 18, 389-416; Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the
English Working Class in England (Electronic Book Company, 2001) 267-268, 330.
24
Marx, Karl, 'Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association' in Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works Volume XX (Lawrence and Wishart, 1985) 10-11; Lebowitz, above n
4, 80-81.
25
Karl Marx, ‘Letter to Bolte’ in David McLellan (ed), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University
Press, 2000) 636, 637.
26
For detailed overviews: see Cain and Hunt, above n 9; Phillips, above n 8.
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‘[b]etween equal rights, force decides’27 is of signal importance in understanding the
practical struggles over law that occurs within the framework of capitalist social
relations.

These two points are, moreover, recursive: form is meaningless except

through its material iterations, whilst the salience of using distinctions between different
kinds of struggle is predicated upon an understanding that capital has a multi-faceted
economic and juridical existence.
For all the promising hints within Marx and Engels’ work, however, it remains the case
that law never truly interested them in its own right.28 We must thus consult scholars
who, whilst taking their conceptual and methodological lead from Marx, explore these
questions of legal form and the class struggle surrounding it in much greater detail.

Legal form
In both the preceding and current chapter, repeated reference has been made to law as a
juridic form of capital. Before further developing this notion, it is necessary to ascertain
just what a ‘form’ is. Fine proffers a useful definition, using the ‘form-content’ couplet:
The imagery which informs Capital … is not that of base and superstructure, but
rather of ‘form’ and ‘content’ … starting with economic forms, e.g. value, price,
money, capital, interest, profit, etc – analysing the specific relations of
production which lie hidden beneath these forms, and then explaining
‘synthetically’ why these relations of production necessarily express themselves
in this economic way.29

Fine and Saad-Filho note of Capital that the ‘divorce between reality (or content or
essence) and the way it appears (or form) is a central aspect of Marx‘s (dialectical)
thought.’30 So, simply enough, the form of a thing is its external appearance, the
structure it presents to the perceiver.31 Within this world of perception it is easy

27

Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 18, 344.
Marx studied ‘the state, law and morality...only in so far as political economy professes to deal with
these subjects,’ whilst Engels acknowledged that in seeking to derive political, legal and ideological
notions from economic facts, he and Marx ‘neglected the formal side, i.e., the way in which these ideas
arose.’ See, respectively: Karl Marx, quoted in E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays
(Merlin, 1978) 259; Friedrich Engels, ‘Letter to F. Mehring’ in Irving Howe (ed), Essential Works of
Socialism (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970) 75.
29
Fine, above n 3, 95-96.
30
Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho, Marx’s ‘Capital’ (Pluto Press, 2004) 4.
31
And is in this way very different to Plato’s notion of form, from whence we get the term. This
conception of form is much closer to the sense in which Aristotle uses it. See, for example: Plato, The
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enough, beneath the endless diversity of material existence, to perceive regularities
which might be thought of as ‘master forms.’ Amidst the countless iterations of money,
wage-labour, laws and states, for example, a commonality can be observed which
allows us to speak of each in abstract terms, as modes of appearance in a capitalist
society. What Marx did was to disassemble mainly economic forms and demonstrate
why capitalist production relations generate these appearances. His method, whilst
starting from the real world, thus avoided the pitfalls of crude empiricism in mistaking
appearance for reality.32
Law forms a more-or-less distinctive entity in the life of a capitalist society. Kay and
Mott incisively characterise this form, stating, ‘[l]aw is not a set of coercive rules, but a
tangible expression of a social form with a predetermined historical content, namely the
commodity nature of the products of labour under a regime of absolute property.’33
Poulantzas notes that the developed legal form is defined by abstract, universal and
formal norms that together comprise an axiomatic system.34 In a mature capitalist
society, it regulates areas of social life as diverse as employment, commerce,
administration and the family, and it does so with a peculiar set of institutions, modes of
operation and norms.

Indeed, to meaningfully speak of law necessitates conceptually

distinguishing these institutions and norms from other, non-legal, ones.
Historically, however, Marxist work has been little concerned with why law is such a
pronounced feature of capitalism, and, more deeply, why relationships should take a
legal form at all. Evgeny Pashukanis, a leading Soviet jurist in the 1920s and early
1930s,35 posed the problem of a Marxist account not sensitive to the specificity of the
legal form:

Republic (Desmond Lee trans, Penguin Classics, 2007) 237-240; Aristotle, Physics (R.P. Hardie and R.K.
Gaye trans, Infomotions, 2001) 11-15.
32
Indeed, Marx once noted that ‘all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things
directly coincided with their essence’: Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume III
(David Fernback trans, Penguin Classics, 1991) 956.
33
Kay and Mott, above n 3, 94.
34
Poulantzas, above n 3, 86.
35
Despite a number of increasingly abject recantations, his original characterisation of the legal form as
grounded in commodity exchange, and its subsequent existential impossibility in a communist society,
ran against the grain of Stalinism, particularly after the refutation of the New Economic Policy. He was
arrested and executed in 1937. For a highly useful overview of his life and the radical jurisprudence of
which he was part, see: Michael Head, Evgeny Pashukanis: A Critical Reappraisal (RoutledgeCavendish, 2008).
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[A]ll we get is a theory which explains the emergence of legal regulation from
the material needs of society … Instead of being able to avail ourselves of an
abundance of internal structures and interconnections of the juridical, we are
forced to make do with bare outlines, only approximately indicated. These
outlines are so blurred that the borderline between the sphere of the juridical and
adjacent spheres is completely obliterated.36

We must thus construct such an account of the legal form, drawing carefully from the
work of scholars such as Pashukanis, Fine, and Kay and Mott, who concern themselves
with this question of form.
In the previous chapter I noted the distinction between use-value and exchange-value
which characterised the commodity form.37

This distinction is also what actually

constitutes the commodity; if it meets no concrete need it is worthless, whilst if it is not
produced for exchange it is not a commodity. A commodity, therefore, only fulfils its
life mission if it is traded on the market, either in kind for another commodity or for
money.38 As indicated in the statement by Marx above,39 this in turn requires that the
owners of those commodities be able to relate to one another as fellow owners. In other
words, alongside the economic relation between the objects being traded, there is a
‘relation of two wills’40 whereby owners recognise each other as such and formally
respect their right of ownership.41 In this recognition lies the cell of the legal form, the
owner of private property, 42 and the understanding that law ‘is inseparably linked with
private property and production for exchange – in other words with commodity
production.’43
Like the relationship between commodities being expressed at a certain stage of
development through the universal equivalent of money, so to does this juridic relation
achieve a form independent of the respective parties.44 A section of society becomes
vested with overseeing, guaranteeing and codifying this relationship; the law courts and
36

Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, above n 3, 55.
Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 18, 125-131.
38
Ibid 178-244.
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judges thus emerge on the historical scene.45 All pre-capitalist societies which engage
in an appreciable measure of commodity exchange exhibit these kinds of institutions
and personnel,46 and it is telling (as Pashukanis presciently observed)47 that the most
highly developed systems were in formations like the Roman Empire. Indeed, the
reappearance of Roman jurisprudence around commerce and contract from the 1100s
coincided with the onset of a long decay in European feudalism, partly due to the
influence of rising merchant and commercial classes re-establishing wide-scale
commodity exchange.48
The commodity form therefore requires the most basic cell of the legal form, owner of
private property, and all societies, capitalist or pre-capitalist, with large-scale
commodity exchange will be marked by it.49 Whilst some Marxist critics would decry
this as deriving forms from exchange, rather than production relations (and so running
against the grain of Marx’s emphasis on the determining role of the latter), this criticism
is misplaced on two counts. Firstly, it is appropriate to direct attention to the influence
of exchange when talking of commodities and the legal form, as it is precisely exchange
that partially constitutes that form.50 To be exchanged is part of the essence of a
commodity, and whatever the production relations underlying them, they must still go
through a process of purchase and sale.51 Secondly, the positing of a bare legal form
consonant with the commodity form is not to suggest this form is immutable and
unchanging, nor that the difference between the law of pre-capitalist and capitalist

45
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societies is one of degree and not kind.52 Such an understanding runs counter to the
dialectical relationship between the two elucidated by Marx.53
Instead, form and content represent a dialectically intertwined unity.

Whilst the

exchange of commodities provides a most basic, abstract legal form, the content of this
form (namely, the social relations of production) determines its exact shape and
development. This is a reality Marx demonstrated in relation to the commodity form.
The development from simple to expanded commodity production is not merely
emptying and filling a static form with new content, but is a simultaneous alteration of
that form.54 The union of economic and extra-economic coercion in pre-capitalist
societies,55 along with the particularistic nature of property,56 ensures that the
boundaries between law and other forms of social power (such as religion and direct
force) are ambiguous and the reach of the law circumscribed.57 Legal authority in a
feudal society, for example, was often vested in manorial courts, where the dispenser of
justice and the economic exploiter was often the same person, whilst feudal law
recognised all manner of estate, guild and military distinction.

The notion of

impersonal law binding all members of society as juridically equal citizens, which
capitalist society would come to know as the rule of law, would have been thoroughly
foreign in such societies.58
It is only with the development of capitalist production relations that the specifically
bourgeois legal form, which Poulantzas describes as an axiomatic system of abstract,
universal and formal norms regulating juridically equal citizens,59 emerges. This is so
for several reasons.
52

Firstly, the conceptual separation of economic and political
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exploitation, together with the divorce of the producers from the means of production,
opens the space for the abstract, alienated capitalist state.60 Although not reducible to
each other, the law and the state are related forms, and the development of the latter
takes the former to a new plane.61 The state now ‘introduces clarity and stability into
the structure of law,’62 and vests law with the formal equality which was only latent in it
before.63
More significant for our purposes is the universality of commodity production and
exchange and the commodification of labour power that occurs under capitalism. The
fact that the vast majority of capitalist production is for sale, rather than immediate use,
intensifies greatly the legal form,64 allowing it to penetrate every pore of social life.
Capitalism is legalised to a degree unknown in other class societies. 65 Even more
importantly, the fact that labour generally now takes the commodity form means that
the sale and purchase of labour power becomes an explicitly legal matter. Unlike the
feudal lord or slave owner, the capitalist’s extraction of surplus value is mediated
through a free contract in a labour market. As the capitalist is appropriating not fixed
sums of labour, but instead the capacity to labour, this appropriation cannot be onceand-for-all, but must be repeated on an episodic basis.66 It is at this nexus that we
identify that unique body of law regulating the terms and conditions of the alienation of
labour-power: labour law.67 Labour law is a most complex amalgam, with the law of
‘things’ and exchange relations, namely property and contract law, attempting to
60
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incorporate and regulate a living, breathing and thinking subject, the proletarian. This
integration marks a qualitative shift in the development of the law, and makes it a
proper object of class struggle in its own right which, as we saw above, was a reality
Marx and Engels grasped well.
The result, Kay and Mott most incisively observe, is that:
Labour law is the most complex and equivocal of the laws of property for
fundamental reasons … The buying and selling of labour-power summarises the
contradictions of capitalist society in a single moment. The impossibility of
formulating a contract of employment according to the general principles of the
formation of contracts originates here.68

Formal equality with unequal content; an alienation of capacities in fact with a
disavowal of it in contract; equivalent exchange being transformed into its polar
opposite69 – these are the contradictions with which the employment contract, one of the
planks of labour law, is riven. These contradictions are inevitable, and will endure for as
long as the capitalist legal form predominates. It is worth reiterating here what was said
in the previous chapter: law, along with the state, are juridic forms integral to the
capitalist mode of production.70 A society that is lawless and stateless would not, in the
long run, be a capitalist one.71

Legal form and administration
Although the preceding discussion has been abstract, it has been necessary insofar as we
now understand what is distinctive about the capitalist legal form and the specific
problems with which labour law must grapple. In particular, it is clear that the latter ‘is
shot through with all the tensions of capitalist social relations.’72 Along with the
general mediating function of law between juridically equal subjects, labour law is
specifically concerned with ensuring the continued commodification of labour-power.73
This process is not, however, given or uncontested. Lebowitz has shown how the
68
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workings of capitalist class relations generate two disparate and competing political
economies, with the capitalist’s valorisation and profit creation objections grating
against the proletariat’s desire for the full product of its labour and the fulfilment of
concrete needs.74

The objects that were the matter of the simple commodity

exchange/legal form couplet could not make demands of that form. The exchange of
human labour-power for wages, however, is inseparable from the people supplying that
labour. Workers are capable of mobilising as a class and attempting to impose their
own political economy on the legal form,75 which not only suffuses it with new content,
but alters the form itself. I have previously noted that ‘[t]he integration of a collective
historical subject (the proletariat) into the legal process ensures the law itself becomes
an arena of class struggle in which the competing political economies of labour and
capital struggle for the higher ground.’76
As the proletariat moves through class-struggle and the development of social labour
advances, it can struggle for new laws and new legal institutions. In the process, the
tension between a legal form revolving around juridically equal, de-classed citizensubjects and the reality of inequality and exploitation is sharply foregrounded. One of
the state’s primary functions is to facilitate the continued commodification of labourpower.77 A theoretical commitment to the purity of the legal form does not trouble the
minds of state personnel when they are seeking to reproduce labour. Although it must
continue to abstract and formalise working-class power, the state nevertheless receives
and acts upon the impulses of the working-class in struggle. What it then does depends
on a variety of factors, including the balance of class forces, the particular epoch of
capitalism and the structure and path-dependence of extant institutional structures78 (in
short, depending upon the kinds of forces the PRA best captures). If the working-class,
either singly or in combination with other classes, is able to apply a critical mass of
economic and/or political pressure, the state is often forced to develop techniques of
administration, whereby the spot-fires of proletarian activism are dampened by recourse
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to new tribunals, bureaucracies and procedures.79 Whereas the abstract legal form
aspires to universality and equality between de-classed juridical equals, administration
plugs the gaps created when this form can no longer contain the collective interests of
workers.80 As a result of contestation, institutions whose subject matter is the specific,
and whose subjects are often industrial organisations representing labour and capital
collectively, are created.
Such institutions represent a modification of the legal form, rather than its destruction.
On the one hand, they are material codifications of working-class power, of its ability to
rise above the appearance of formal equality and demand action on the basis of material
inequality. On the other, administration responds to this pressure in ways that exhaust
their subversive potential.81 Kay and Mott claim that administrative structures represent
‘working-class power post-festum; working-class political victories captured and
formalised at their moment of triumph.’82 Neocleous adds that state administration:
[A]ppropriates and nullifies the struggle of the working class; as such they are
the fossilised remnants of class struggle; they are the subsumption of struggle –
working-class struggle abolished and preserved. Born of the struggle of the
working class, these structures are then left with the task of administering that
same class, a task performed in relation to both collective organisations of the
working class and its decomposed elements, known as ‘citizens’’ (my
emphasis).83

The corrosiveness of the legal form,84 its useful capacity to interpellate people as
individualised citizens,85 and the inability of the state to depart from a notion of juridical
equality mean that the institutions of administration, although a counter to holes in the
abstract legal form, nevertheless are legal in terms of their constitution and modes of
operation. Indeed, they are normally bound to the formal legal system through the
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vehicle of judicial review under the separation of powers doctrine. On these bases, Kay
and Mott note that law and administration are not separate phenomena, but are instead
points on a law-administration continuum.86 Using the example of administrative law,
they demonstrate the interpenetration of the two forms: ‘Administration is law in the
sense that it creates law, is subject to law, and acts through legal forms; and the law
affecting administration … is probably the greater part of all law today.’87
As will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, the unique Australian system of
compulsory conciliation and arbitration is an example of state administration par
excellence. The system will be elucidated in much greater detail in chapters 4-9, but it
suffices here to understand it as a set of quasi-judicial arbitral tribunals that could
compulsorily determine disputes between employers and unions, with the resulting
determinations called ‘awards’. A response to the devastating Great Strikes of the
1890s, the structure came about through the political mobilisation of the working-class
in the form of the Australian Labor Party, allied with middle-class liberals.88 In terms
of the props given to trade union recognition and input into the process of determining
disputes, arbitration was, at the time, a definite historical advance for the proletariat.89
However, from its inception the system was highly legalised (both in terms of operation
and personnel), time-consuming and directed union attention away from the building of
strong rank-and-file organisation.90

Moreover, arbitration quickly proved itself

amenable to capital, with a series of decisions in the late 1920s and early 1930s
enforcing real wage reductions and increased working hours.91
The history of the arbitration system (the ascent and decline of which is the subject of
chapters 5 and 6) reveals the dynamic nature of the law-administration continuum.
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Unlike Kay and Mott, who seem to suggest that the development of the continuum
effaces once-and-for-all the distinctiveness of its two constituent features, 92 I have
argued that the nexus point between law and administration is moveable.93 That is,
depending upon the nature of the class struggle and the fortunes of its respective parties,
a labour law regime can be more heavily reliant upon those branches of law closest to
the abstract legal form (such as the common law of contract and property) or can have a
greater reliance on administrative structures, such as quasi-judicial arbitral tribunals.
Given the fact that administration is spawned by the state responding to working-class
pressure and is an answer to the gaps created by the abstract legal form, it is likely to be
the stronger current when the proletariat has a critical mass of strength, is integrated in
some way within the state apparatus, and is committed to the administrative structures
thus created. Conversely, when the working-class is in retreat, the state is less impelled
to generate administrative responses to its struggle.

In such an environment, the

traditional forms of law tend to reassert themselves, particularly if the climate is one of
increased commodification and the expansion of the competition principle.94 Given its
abstraction, assumption of juridical equality between unequal subjects and its
individualising effect,95 the abstract legal form is the form in which capital has always
operated most comfortably.96
Of course, what the proletariat and capital are struggling over is, within the broad
parameters of the capitalist mode of production, time and place specific. Alongside the
understanding that the working-class develops a political economy of its own,
intertwined with but distinct from that of capital’s,97 the manifold crisis tendencies of
capitalism are handled differently and to varying degrees in different historical epochs.
For example, capitalists seeking to boost their profit by cutting labour costs
simultaneously reduce the purchasing power of their workers, jeopardising the
realisation of surplus value in the marketplace. Jessop, building upon Althusser, notes
how capitalist contradictions are internally variegated, such that different poles of each
92
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contradiction assume varying weight in different historical conjunctures.98

In this

realisation lies the secret; the labour law regime is constantly evolving, with the nexus
point between law and administration shifting as the class struggle itself ebbs and flows.
The fact that this struggle is itself not static, but also ebbs and flows, revolving around
one set of contradictions before turning to others, means that the form and content of
labour law will vary between different periods. It is at this point that we can introduce
the PRA.

The Parisian Regulation Approach and legal analysis
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the PRA combines a number of concepts
along the plane from abstract to concrete to render an understanding of distinct models
of development, which represent a coherent and compatible combination of an
accumulation regime, mode of regulation and industrial paradigm.99

Of particular

significance for the study of labour law is the mode of regulation. In chapter 2, I noted
that a mode of regulation more-or-less represented a stable, historically conditioned
arrangement of capital’s juridic forms, revolving around four chief institutional forms
which must be guaranteed by the state, often through the vehicle of law. Amongst these
four forms,100 two are of critical importance for our analysis, namely, state forms and
the wage-labour nexus.101 The contention made previously, that law and the state are
related juridic forms of capital, informs my reading of what exactly is entailed by the
term ‘state forms.’ Located at a lower level of abstraction, ‘state forms’ as part of a
mode of regulation refers to the historically conditioned manifestations of the legal and
state forms. Labour law forms a distinct subset within this structure. It also serves a
key role in constituting the wage-labour nexus, what Boyer describes as the process of
socialisation of productive activity within capitalism.102 He goes on to state that its
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specific form is ‘defined by the set of legal and institutional conditions that govern the
use of wage-earning labour as the workers’ mode of existence’ (my emphasis).103 To
explore the content of these notions in the Australian context is the task of the following
chapter. What is significant to note here is that labour law is a crucial component in the
constitution of a mode of regulation, particularly so regarding the two key institutional
forms identified.
The models of development of which modes of regulation are part (whether en
régulation or in crisis) have their own distinct mechanisms of coherence and trajectories
of crisis. They handle the contradictions of capitalism differentially, embed or exclude
working-class power to varying degrees, and, given the evolving political economy of
both labour and capital, impart their own hue to the class struggle. It will be recalled
that these are the same features which determine the balance point in the lawadministration continuum. There is thus an intimate connection between the two, such
that we can say that models of development are tied to distinctive arrangements of this
continuum.
The aforementioned dynamism of the processes of law and administration is itself tied
to the fortunes of the model of development of which it is part. The latter represent
broadly coherent formations in which the crisis tendencies of capital are contained,
managed and/or deferred.104 Whilst the contradictions of capital, and the class struggle
that generates them, ensures that the basis of such coherence is temporary and inevitably
undermined, continuity and stability prevail over the short to medium term.

By

contrast, crisis disrupts extant institutions and norms, typically resulting in periods of
experimentation and ‘institutional searching,’ whereby new structures are sought which
can restabilise and renew capital accumulation.105 The same process holds for the lawadministration continuum, and is the subject of extensive discussion in chapters 5 and 6.
The particular balance between law and administration, and the institutions which
express it, will be generally stable, albeit evolving, in periods en régulation. However,
this arrangement can never absolve the fundamentally contradictory character of the
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wage-labour/capital relationship. To the extent that it solves some problem of labour
commodification, it opens others, a reality strongly expressed in times of crisis. It is at
these junctures that, when capital accumulation breaks down and support for previously
functional institutions wanes, opportunities for remaking the continuum are strongest.
A theoretically rigorous understanding of the evolution of labour law is thus impossible
without an adequate account of capitalist periodisation, and it is precisely in the latter
task that the PRA outperforms competing approaches.
It is worth noting at this point that specific regulationist studies of labour law are
uncommon (law generally, still less). This is not necessarily because regulationists
deny causal power to the law. Indeed, Boyer has opined that ‘laws, regulations, and
rules imposed or confirmed by the state often play an essential role in spreading, and
sometimes even originating, essential institutional forms’ (my emphasis).106 He also
notes that law plays a key role in mediating between the system-level needs of an
accumulation regime and individual decision-making, through exercising a combination
of coercion and symbolism.107 However, what is lacking in such a perspective is an
understanding of law as a juridic form of capital, as a necessary and embedded feature
of capitalism.108 Studies of labour law tend to be in discussions of broader compass,
and commonly analyse it in terms of the instrumental purposes it serves.109 Law doesn’t
feature here as a specific, form-determined battleground, but as just one of so many
forms of regulation and control in a capitalist society. The warning of Pashukanis
against conceiving law in these terms springs to mind.110
As canvassed in chapter 2, this historical shortcoming presents no great difficulty. The
PRA is perfectly capable of accommodating a theory of juridic forms,111 provided the
mode of regulation concept is not conceived as a bundle of institutions designed to
externally control a capitalist economy, but is instead a hierarchy of forms no less
106
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rooted in capitalist social relations.112 With this union, a powerful synthetic theory
emerges, one capable of unifying the abstract and the concrete in the study of labour
law.
Moreover, the comparative neglect of labour law from a PRA perspective is ameliorated
somewhat by the fact that the past two decades has seen a broader resurgence in work
exploring the articulations between law and the economy. Perspectives include the law
and economics literature, Varieties of Capitalism, Legal Origins, Critical Legal Studies,
the ‘New Institutionalism,’ institutional complementarity and the Labour Market
Regulation Approach.113 Certain of these approaches, notably the law and economic
literature, are thoroughly incompatible with a PRA perspective, rooted as it is in a
neoclassical conception of rational actors and efficiency.114 I have elsewhere criticised
others, such as the Varieties of Capitalism and Legal Origins, for being markedly
inferior to the PRA in terms of explaining legal development.115

None of these

traditions tend to start from a rigorous Marxist political economy, revealed by the fact
that notions like ‘endogenity’ and ‘complementarity’ start from a conceptual separation
of law and economics, as opposed to conceiving them as different forms of capital. For
all that, however, much of this work paints a rich empirical picture of the developments
taking hold of labour law at the concrete level.

The Labour Market Regulation

Approach in particular has tackled the problem of describing the changing face of
Australian labour law and the increasingly diverse web of legal relations surrounding
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work.116 Where relevant, and with a retooling to fit a regulation perspective, such work
can help illuminate the legal changes which the PRA has generally eschewed to analyse.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have constructed a rigorous hierarchy of abstraction accounting for the
place of law within the capitalist mode of production abstractly, and within models of
development more concretely. The most abstract legal form is a necessary correlate to
the commodity form, which explains its roots in pre-capitalist societies. However, the
development of capitalist production relations sees both a quantitative extension and
qualitative deepening of this form. The advent of the state as a related juridic form, the
generalisation of commodity production and exchange and the commodification of
labour power exert a fundamentally transformative influence.

The lattermost in

particular is crucial; by commodifying labour-power, and thus extending the legal form
over it, capitalism integrates a thinking and active collective subject, the proletariat, into
the legal process.
Labour law features most prominently in this process, as it is the area of law most
intimately related to the class struggle, defining as it does the terms and conditions upon
which labour-power can be employed and exploited by capitalists. By unifying as a
class, the proletariat is capable of forcing its own political economy onto the legal form,
which the state registers through acts of administration. These are ad hoc responses to
working-class power that plug the gaps opened in the abstract legal form (and its
assumption of de-classed juridical citizen-subjects) with specific institutions that
address workers and their organisations at the same time that they extinguish the
subversive potential of their struggle. Within the framework of a capitalist society,
administration can thus never liberate the working-class; it can only alter the terms on
which it is exploited.
The structure of a law-administration continuum, and the balance between its two poles,
is an explicitly historical product. Labour law forms a key part of a mode of regulation,
whether in coherence or crisis, and is especially significant regarding state forms and
the codification of the wage-labour nexus.

Given the contribution of a mode of

regulation to a stable model of development, it is clear that particular arrangements of
116

Arup et al, above n 113.

68

this continuum are in part constitutive of the latter. To the extent that models of
development work out the many contradictions of capital to varying degrees, are
premised upon a particular modality of accumulation and extant institutions, and
channel the class struggle in different fashions, the regimes of labour law corresponding
with them will be unique. When, however, crisis undermines the stability of a model of
development, its labour law regime will be called into question. At such historical
junctures, the nexus point between law and administration proves fluid and can,
depending upon the balance of social forces, be shifted. In chapters 5 and 6 I will
elucidate the relationship between the evolution of post-World War II Australian
capitalism and regimes of labour law, focussing particularly upon the reformulation of
the law-administration continuum.

Chapter 4
ANTIPODEAN FORDISM AND LIBERAL-PODUCTIVISM
IN AUSTRALIA
In chapter 2 I outlined the concepts and methodology underpinning a regulationist
perspective.

In particular, I noted that a coherent combination of an industrial

paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of regulation can constitute a model of
development, a stable instantiation of the capitalist mode of production. Understanding
the ascendency of certain models, their ensuing crisis and the rise of new structures
(which may or may not cohere into a new model of development) is a most useful
means by which capitalism can be periodised into distinct epochs.
Here, I elucidate the two models of development which have defined post-World War II
Australian capitalism: antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism in Australia.
These are derived from the more abstract regulationist ideal-types, Fordism and liberalproductivism, which have broadly characterised the nature of capitalism in advanced
capitalist countries.

The former, however, have been sensitised to the Australian

context and thus display a unique institutional materiality and distinctive trajectories of
crisis. They are therefore pitched at a lower level of abstraction and do, contra Fordism
and liberal-productivism as used in the regulation literature, concretely describe the
experience of a specific society.
As will become clear in the course of this chapter, antipodean Fordism and liberalproductivism, whilst clearly manifestations of their respective ideal-types, were/are
distinctive in a number of significant ways.

Peculiarities in industrial paradigms,

accumulation regimes and modes of regulation ensured that antipodean Fordism and
liberal-productivism in Australia had/have unique mechanisms of coherence and
trajectories of crisis.1
This reality informs the second task of this chapter, which is to indicate in an abstract
way the place of labour law within these two models.

The picture presented is

somewhat one-sided, in that I am here more concerned with how the labour law regime,
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and the industrial relations institutions it creates, gives effect to the functional
requirements of a model of development; that is, what abstract conditions does a model
of development require to successfully reproduce, and how does labour law contribute
to that process? The results of this analysis specifies the kind of functions a labour law
regime will be called upon to perform and its resultant basic characteristics, as well as
the particular configuration of the law-administration continuum it manifests. However,
echoing Jessop, the fact that particular functions are expected of a form is no indication
it can actually perform accordingly.2 If this chapter concentrates more on the political
economic framework within which labour law operates, this is not to suggest that the
latter plays no role in constituting that framework. The conception of law as a juridic
form of capital does not admit of conceiving law in these terms. The following chapter
will explore in a more detailed and dynamic sense the internal structure of the labour
law regime, and how it shaped the fortunes of both models of development.
Before this closer investigation, however, I must first outline the abstract ideal-typical
models of development from which the Australian variants are derived.

Fordism as an ideal-type
The construction for which the PRA is most well-known (or perhaps notorious) is
Fordism. The term, which was coined by Gramsci to describe the development of early
twentieth century American capitalism,3 has, within a regulationist perspective, been
used variously to describe an industrial paradigm, an accumulation regime and a mode
of regulation.4

This is not to mention the confusion added by use outside of a

regulationist paradigm.5 I stated in chapter 2 that it was specifically as a model of
development that I deployed Fordism. It is thus necessary to unfold it precisely.
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Lipietz is the scholar who has most consistently and rigorously described Fordism as a
model of development.6 According to him, Fordism combined:


a Taylorist, mechanised labour process paradigm within large, multi-department
firms;



an autocentric mass production/mass consumption intensive accumulation
regime synthesizing full employment with rising productivity and real wages;
and



a mode of regulation involving a Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS)
that guaranteed effective demand through protective social legislation and the
generalisation of mass consumption norms.7

Each of these structures had their roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. However, it was only after World War II – which simultaneously soaked up
Depression-era unemployment, intensified industrial production, resulted in a massive
devalorisation of capital and forged a new international hierarchy – that these elements
could cohere into the Fordist model of development.
As was indicated in the previous chapter, the contradictions of capitalism are not
expressed uniformly, or assume the same significance, in different historical
conjunctures. Althusser notes that within given social orders, certain contradictions
appear as primary, others secondary.8 Moreover, each contradiction has opposite poles,
tension points pulling in opposite directions.9 It is this reality Jessop and Sum capture
when they note that:
The commodity is both an exchange value and a use value; the worker is both an
abstract unit of labour power replaceable by other such units … and a concrete
individual with specific skills, knowledge and creativity; the wage is both a cost
of production and a source of demand; money functions both as an international
currency and as national money; productive capital is both abstract value in

6

See, for example: Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and
Democracy (Malcolm Slater trans, Polity Press, 1992) 3-7; Alain Lipietz, ‘The Post-Fordist World:
Labour Relations, International Hierarchy and Global Ecology’ (1997) 4(1) Review of International
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its green alternative’ (2013) 37(1) Capital & Class 127, 128-129.
7
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8
Louis Althusser, For Marx (Ben Brewster trans, NLB, 1977) 87-128.
9
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motion … and a concrete stock of time-and-place-specific assets in the course of
being valorized; and so forth.10

On this basis, Jessop adds that:
[A] given stage or variety of capitalism would differ in terms of the weights
attributed to different contradictions and dilemmas (hierarchisation), the
importance accorded to their different aspects (prioritisation), the role of
different spaces, places, and scales in these regards (spatialisation), and the
temporal patterns of their treatment (temporalisation).11

Fordism was indelibly marked by the ruination of the Great Depression out of which it
emerged.

The causes of this economic catastrophe were complex, but a yawning

disproportion between Departments I and II,12 and relative overproduction compared to
the restricted purchasing power of the working-class,13 were root problems. It is thus
unsurprising that various regulationists have remarked that the wage-labour nexus, the
set of legal and institutional conditions governing the terms of wage-labour,14 was the
site of dominant contradiction in the Fordist model of development.15 To prevent a
recurrence of the species of crisis seen in the Great Depression, the working-class had to
be subsumed within the developing Taylorist, mechanised industrial paradigm and
guaranteed the purchasing power to absorb the mass of commodities emanating
therefrom. The keys to both were the repositioning of wages as a source of domestic
demand (rather than simply a cost of production)16 and the encouragement of moderate

10

Jessop and Sum, above n 4, 329.
Bob Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach: Critical reflections on the contradictions, dilemmas,
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15
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57(2) Review of Social Economy 220, 221; Robert Boyer, ‘The Political in the Era of Globalization and
Finance: Focus on Some Régulation School Research’ (2000) 24(2) International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 274, 279-281; Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 14. Jessop
also notes that the money form was a site of dominant contradiction within Fordism. Money was
principally characterised by its form as national credit money, as opposed to the international,
hypermobile and diversified forms it assumes under liberal-productivism. Given my focus on labour law,
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16
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unionism, which obtained increased wages for workers at the cost of deeper real
subordination to managerial prerogative in the organisation of the labour process.17
With this understanding of the centrality of the wage-labour nexus within Fordism, we
can schematically describe the dynamic of Fordism en régulation. The application of
Taylorist, mass production principles in the labour process resulted in substantial
productivity gains for capitalists.18 In exchange for accepting the enhanced managerial
prerogative and labour intensification consequent upon this development, workers were
given liberal rights to organise and assured employment security and a growth in their
real wages in line with productivity improvements.19

The resultant increased

purchasing power in the proletariat’s hands allowed it to consume a greater proportion
of the goods and services it created (including the mass-produced consumer goods
increasingly emanating from Department II), ensuring both high utilisation of capital
capacity and further opportunities for capitalists to expand the scale of production.20
This demand thus begets further productivity improvements, beginning the cycle
afresh.21

To fortify and guarantee this process, the national state adopts policies

designed to maintain full employment, smooth the business cycle and support the
stability of demand by ensuring those temporarily out of work or not a part of the labour
force can nevertheless consume.22 This in turn presupposes both the capacity and
willingness of the state to directly involve itself in the circuit of capital.
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This ‘virtuous, self-reinforcing cycle’23 served to offset and/or defer the crisis
tendencies of capitalism, albeit in a provisional and ultimately self-defeating way.
Vidal notes that:
The profit rate in the Fordist period was high initially because it followed a
massive decline in the value of physical capital and the nominal value of
financial assets during the Great Depression and World War II. A rise in the
technical composition of capital was offset by a continuous rise in productivity
generated by intensive growth, underconsumptionism offset by rising real wages
and overproduction moderated through nationally bound, oligopolistic
competition, again with balanced growth via standardized mass production and
institutional supports for mass consumption.24

This ability to ameliorate some of capitalism’s most powerful crisis tendencies is the
key to understanding the physiology of the post-World War II boom, extending up until
the early 1970s. This was an era of unprecedented economic growth and stability in
advanced industrial countries. Kettell describes this period as:
[T]he greatest economic boom in the history of world capitalism. Between 1950
and 1973 the growth of output and fixed capital investment in “advanced”
capitalist economies reached virtually double the levels attained during the
previous golden age of capitalism from 1870 to 1913, while the global market
experienced an almost continuous expansion as industrialization spread further
into “developing” nations. These factors enabled major capitalist economies to
enjoy a heady mix of high profit margins, annual wage increases, moderate
inflation, and relatively low levels of unemployment.25

Faulkner adds, ‘[h]igh growth rates, rapidly rising living standards, a business cycle
whose occasional slowdowns were so slight as to be barely noticeable – these things
made it appear to many that capitalism had solved its problems and could now deliver
endless and increasing prosperity for all.’26 Countries as varied as the USA,27 France,28
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West Germany29 and, as we shall see, Australia, experienced a Fordist boom, albeit to
varying degrees and with distinct institutional twists.

Antipodean Fordism
Australia most certainly shared in the post-World War II boom. Between the years
1950-1969, the Australian economy grew at the very impressive average of over 5% per
annum.30 The pattern from the late 1940s until the early 1970s was one of high and
sustained growth, free from the perturbations of the 1920s and 1930s, where strong
growth years of between 5-10% were interspersed with periods of precipitous decline.31
Labour productivity grew vigorously in the 1950s, with a veritable surge of 2.75%
average annual growth between 1964-65 and 1973-74.32 This tremendous growth was
reflected in the fact that the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per worker
waxed in the 1950s and 1960s.33 As would be anticipated in a Fordist society, this
productivity growth was articulated to real wage improvements:34 real wage growth in
the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s averaged 2-3% per annum.35 Effective and durable
full employment was attained, with the unemployment rate rarely exceeding 2%
between 1945 and the early 1970s.36 The growth of investment in fixed capital, both in
trend terms and as a percentage of GDP, reached new highs.37 Most significantly for
capitalists, the basic indicators of the robustness of capital accumulation were healthy;
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the average rate of profit achieved during the boom is higher than at any subsequent
point.38 The same can be said for the rate of surplus value.39
That broadly similar results were achieved in countries identified by regulationists as
Fordist makes a prima facie case for saying that Australia too experienced a Fordist
phase. There is certainly a considerable number of scholars who have explicitly made
that claim, although the exact meaning they ascribe to the term Fordism is subject to the
ambiguities I noted above.40 Additionally, there is the work of those such as Lloyd and
Broomhill who, although they have coined their own terms, draw heavily from the
regulationist methodology and concepts and recognise something distinctive about
Australian capitalism during the long boom.41
The analysis embarked on here uses the ideal-typical model of Fordism elucidated
above as a focussing device, an abstract outline of causal relationships to guide
investigation into the structure of post-World War II Australian political economy. The
pattern of economic growth, the nature of macroeconomic indicators, the roles and
functions of the state and, most importantly here, the success of labour law and
industrial relations institutions in codifying the requisite wage-labour nexus entitle us to

O’Hara shows that the average rate of profit (after tax) from 1960-69 was 5.5% (compared, for
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call Australian society between 1945 and the early 1970s a Fordist one. 42 However, it
will be recalled that in chapter 2 I noted that Fordism as an ideal-type captures the
dynamic of an epoch of capitalism without describing the concrete experience of any
one society. For the model to fulfil its analytical potential, it must be sensitised to
particular concrete contexts.

If this process of sensitisation is ignored, important

features of national difference are elided and the experiences of the country closest to
the ideal-type (in the case of Fordism, the USA) tend to be reified. 43 Treuren highlights
the dangers in so applying the Fordist concept to Australia: ‘[S]imply reading off the
results of French or US regulationist research, and importing into the Australian context
is methodologically inappropriate, and will provide misleading results.’44
The proper method of placing the Fordist concept into a dialectical relationship with the
Australian experience of the post-War boom reveals a model of development that,
whilst recognisably Fordist, modifies some of its key constituent components. Broadly,
this Australian incarnation of Fordism combined:


an industrial paradigm based on mass production but marked by an incomplete
incorporation of Taylorist forms of work control and organisation; with45



an intensive accumulation regime of mass production and mass consumption
which was not autarkic; that is, it was premised upon the ability of the exportoriented farming and mining sectors to underwrite high levels of industrial
protection;46 and



a mode of regulation that precociously enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus
in the arbitration system. This mode, although guaranteed by the KWNS, was

42
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characterised by the unification of that state’s economic and social
objectives/functions.47
I have dubbed this model of development antipodean Fordism (a term coined by Rolfe
who, however, uses it as a vague cultural construct).48 It builds upon the features of the
‘Australian mode of development’ Treuren hinted at whilst more clearly systematising it
in line with discrete PRA concepts.49
With this cursory definition in hand, we can now move to a closer investigation of the
convergences and differences between the abstract Fordist model of development and
antipodean Fordism. This is best done by exploring the latter’s constituent industrial
paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of regulation.
Industrial paradigm
The dominant Fordist industrial paradigm is summarised pithily by Lipietz, who
describes it as ‘Taylorism plus mechanization.’50 It combined a Taylorist structure of
job organisation, culture and control with mechanised, supply-driven mass production
deriving economies of scale from the employment of rigid, specialised machinery. 51 As
mentioned in chapter 2, this is not to suggest that all work has to be organised on these
principles; indeed, the success of the latter was often reflected by a growth in those
sectors not then amenable to them.52 It is enough that certain ‘lead sectors’53 (in the
Fordist era epitomised by manufacturing, most commonly the automobile and
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whitegoods industries) employ them.54 The productivity growth and resultant wage
increases obtaining in these sectors can then, with appropriately supportive institutions,
spill over into the workforce at large.
It is clear that the industrial paradigm of antipodean Fordism fulfilled the mechanised
mass productionist side of the abstract model. World War II had fuelled a tremendous
increase in the scale and diversity of the manufacturing sector. 55 The most pronounced
growth

was

in

relatively

capital-intensive

industries,

such

as

metals,

chemicals/petrochemicals and electrical goods, which were able to exploit a growing
domestic market to reap economies of scale through the employment of machinery and
advanced manufacturing techniques.56 True, widespread mass production thus took off,
and Australians were soon consuming a wide variety of mass produced goods.
Whilst antipodean Fordism demonstrably took a mass productionist industrial paradigm
as the source of manufacturing dynamism, it didn’t, however, integrate Taylorist forms
of work organisation to the extent the abstract model would suggest. This claim can be
considerably sharpened if a nuanced approach to Taylorism is adopted.
To provide a complete overview of Taylorism (or ‘scientific management’ as it became
popularised) is beyond the ambit of this work. Indeed, a whole book could be devoted
simply to unfolding the different, and in many instances competing, definitions of
Taylorism.57 For the purposes of this chapter, I will advance a two-pronged definition
of scientific management: firstly, as a general ideology of labour process control; and
secondly as a concrete set of practices and techniques adopted by management.58
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As an ideology of industrial organisation, Taylorism is best conceived as the divorce of
the conception and execution elements that together unify the labour process.59 The
former becomes the preserve of management, which arrogates to itself the knowledge
and control once exercised by the skilled craftsperson. Simultaneously, this separation
of functions was to run parallel to a cultural revolution which was deliberately targeted
at the destruction of worker sub-cultures of collectivism and their substitution by a
unified culture of shared interests between labour and capital. 60 Allied to systems of
machinery, scientific management apprehended at this level is a key moment in capital
gaining real, as opposed to formal, control of the labour process.61
Considered in this broad sense, there is no denying the influence of Taylorism in the
Australian context. Australian capitalists routinely looked to their overseas counterparts
in America and Britain for what was perceived to be the ‘latest’ in managerial practices
and strategy, a process that began in the early decades of the twentieth century and
intensified after World War II.62 The formation of groups such as the Australian
Institute of Management represented a determined effort on the part of sections of
capital to train and support a new managerial class, schooled in the techniques and
culture of Taylorism.63

Moreover, Taksa notes that scientific management had

profound cultural and ideological implications in Australia that went well beyond the
extent of its technical application, most notably education reform and the cult of
‘Americanisation.’64
The question of how pervasive Taylorism as shop-floor practice was in Australia,
however, is the source of some debate.65 It is clear that both capital and the state made
intensive efforts to implant Taylorist forms of work organisation; indeed, as we shall
see in chapter 7 with the metal trades, the arbitration system itself was often a vehicle
for their imposition.66 Moreover, the dominant narrative amongst the union movement,
59

Braverman, above n 57, 124-126.
Lucy Taksa, ‘Scientific Management: Technique or Cultural Ideology?’ (1992) 34(3) Journal of
Industrial Relations 365, 383-387.
61
Neilson, ‘Formal and real subordination’, above n 17, 102-104.
62
Wright, above n 45, 40; Rolfe, ‘Antipodean Fordism’, above n 40, 327, 344-335.
63
Rolfe, ‘Antipodean Fordism’, above n 40, 335.
64
Lucy Taksa, ‘The Cultural Diffusion of Scientific Management: the United States and New South
Wales’ (1995) 37(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 427
65
Greg Patmore, ‘Australian Labor Historiography: The Influence of the USA’ (1996) 37(4) Labour
History 520, 533.
66
Sandra Cockfield, ‘Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace Relations: 'Metal Industry'
Developments in the 1920s’ (1993) 35(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 19.
60

81

particularly the peak Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), is certainly that
these forms were the prevailing logic of the labour process during the era according
with antipodean Fordism.67 Empirical research by Wright, however, suggests that the
actual adoption of Taylorist work practices in this period was somewhat less widespread
than its ideology.68 He states that ‘Taylorist practices were used by only a minority of
Australian firms and tended to be concentrated in particular industries.’69
Unsurprisingly, these industries were concentrated in the manufacturing sector, where
the production of physical goods generally allowed for a more thorough division of
labour and an ability to more accurately measure productivity, both on a collective and
individual basis.
Outside of manufacturing, the spread of Taylorism as a suite of shop-floor routines
appears limited.70 Despite the best efforts of capital and the state, for example, the
building industry in particular proved less amenable to Taylorist techniques than was
hoped and expected.71 Even within manufacturing, the diffusion of Taylorism was
retarded in some cases by the nature of the production process itself, particularly insofar
that the state of technology did not yet allow for a rigid application of Taylorist
principles. Wright notes, ‘there were practical limitations upon the use of scientific
work measurement in all industrial settings. In particular, detailed work measurement
was less practical in highly capital intensive industries or those whose products were
produced over longer periods of time.’72
As was often the case in the United Kingdom, the adoption of Taylorist techniques
could also be stymied by trade union resistance.73 Powerful metal unions such as the
67
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Amalgamated Engineering Union were particularly opposed, as evidenced by their
struggle against the imposition of pay incentive schemes.74 In the face of such hostility,
some employers in the metal trades took discretion as the better of valour and backed
down.75
A somewhat piecemeal and incomplete circulation of Taylorist work practices should
not be taken, however, as a refutation of both its material and symbolic importance
during the era of antipodean Fordism. As Wright himself acknowledges, ‘[t]he decades
of the 1950s and 1960s then were boom years for the application of Taylorist techniques
in Australian industry.’76 To the extent that Taylorist practices were imposed, they
tended to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, the engine of intensive
accumulation. Moreover, even in the absence of strictly defined and identifiable work
practices, the ideology of Taylorism informed the radical separation of conception and
execution that underlay the mass-production oriented industrial paradigm of antipodean
Fordism.77
Accumulation Regime
The accumulation regime of antipodean Fordism was unmistakably intensive in
character; that is, it involved an effort on the part of capital to raise the share of relative
surplus value through a commodification of the proletariat’s means of consumption and,
in so doing, create an organic series of linkages between Department I and II in the
production (and reproduction) process.78
More simply, this intensive accumulation regime unified mass production with mass
consumption. The post-War decades saw profligate advertising, easy access to banking
capital and comparatively high wages create a market for the vehicles, white goods,
televisions and other appliances which mass production and a diversified manufacturing
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sector could now proffer at an affordable price for the working class.79 Mass production
also took hold of more basic subsistence goods, particularly such items as canned
goods, confectionary and clothing.80 Suburbanisation, and the concomitant rise in home
ownership levels to record highs,81 was also a key element of this mass consumption
paradigm; indeed, Rolfe describes it as ‘the focal point of antipodean Fordism.’82
Broadly, Walsh notes how ‘[n]ew houses, cars, clothing and consumer durables all
provided an expanding market for the producers of the Fordist bloc.’83 The net effect
was to provide the skeleton of the virtuous circle described above.
As the abstract model of Fordism suggests, the engine of this regime was the
manufacturing sector. Balnave and Patmore state that ‘[t]he average annual rate of
growth for manufacturing output, employment and productivity between 1945-50 and
1967-68 was 6.1 per cent, 2 per cent and 4.1 per cent.’84 The Australian Bureau of
Statistics adds:
Growth of manufacturing output per employee from Federation to World War II
had varied from 1.0 to 1.3% per annum (excluding the years of the Great
Depression). During the 1950s and 60s, however, growth rose dramatically to an
average of 4.3% per annum. Over this period the expansion of manufacturing
productivity per annum was 11% higher than in the agricultural sector and
almost double that of the economy as a whole (my emphasis).85

The fact that manufacturing outperformed agriculture (the traditional bastion of the
Australian economy and its historical means of insertion into the international economy)
specifically, and the economy generally, prima facie justifies calling it the leading
sector. In chapter 7 we will see how the metals sector assumed a particularly important
lead sector role, acting as the primary site upon which the gains of intensive
accumulation were institutionally levered.
79
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However, despite these similarities between the accumulation regime of the abstract
model and antipodean Fordism, the latter was distinct in a highly significant way.
Unlike the ideal-typical construction, this accumulation regime was not autarkic; that is,
it was unable to form a self-sufficient system.86 It was heavily dependent upon the
export of primary commodities (such as agricultural and mineral products),87 the
success of which provided the material basis of the highly protective tariff system which
allowed Australian manufacturing to fuel intensive accumulation.88
This introduced a latent yet fundamental fracture point into antipodean Fordism,
cleaving a line between export-oriented, ‘competitive’ primary production and the
largely inward-looking, ‘uncompetitive’ manufacturing sector.

The ability of

antipodean Fordism to accumulate intensively was predicated in part upon the
subordination of pastoral and mining capital to industrial capital, largely through the
former paying higher prices for labour and capital inputs.89

Whilst the former

(particularly the farming sector) were co-opted into the system somewhat through the
liberal imposition of tariffs on imported products, the increase in mining and energy
exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s exposed, through a species of the ‘Dutch
Disease,’ this fragility of the accumulation regime of antipodean Fordism.90
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Mode of regulation
In many ways, the mode of regulation that ensured the coherence of the post-war long
boom was the archetypal Fordist exemplar.

As Lloyd notes, key features of his

‘labourist-protectionism’ model (which he plots as beginning in the early 1900s),91 such
as the historic class compromise between capital and labour and the institutions created
to crystallise and channel it, only became widespread in other industrial countries from
the 1940s.92 In a more explicitly regulationist fashion, Grieg adds: ‘The Australian
federal state was well placed to perform a central role in the advent of Fordism, as many
of the institutions established in the infancy of Federation coincided with the
requirements of Fordist growth.’93 He adds, ‘[i]f the experience of the US during the
1930s can be described as a Fordist regime of accumulation in search of a mode of
regulation, then the Australian experience appears as a mode of regulation waiting for
a Fordist regime of accumulation’ (my emphasis).94
This reality should not be taken to suggest that Australia represented a ‘proto-Fordist’
society. Fordism constructed as a model of development denotes the coherence of the
structured whole; a requisite mode of regulation revolving around the KWNS could not
be construed as an element of Fordism if it did not articulate with a regime of intensive
accumulation.95

What the presence of certain precocious institutions did mean,

however, was an ability to rapidly assume a Fordist trajectory once a critical mass of
industrialisation had been achieved.
Where the Australian mode of regulation was truly Fordist par excellence was its
unique system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration. A much deeper exploration
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of this structure will be made in the subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say here that the
arbitration framework proved exceedingly adept at effecting outcomes necessary for the
Fordist model of development, particularly insofar as it institutionally entrenched the
Fordist wage-labour nexus. As this touches directly on the labour law regime, further
discussion until be reserved for the following section.
More broadly, other aspects of the ideal-typical Fordist mode of regulation were also
present. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia and, from 1960 onward, the Reserve
Bank of Australia, executed the functions of a central bank and lender of last resort, one
of the key responses to the crisis of extensive accumulation in the 1930s.96 Both
oversaw a tightly managed national currency (pegged to the British pound sterling until
1971) subject to strict exchange and capital controls,97 which aided in the effort to
shield domestic institutions from the vagaries of the international economy. The state
was unmistakably Keynesian in its approach to macroeconomic management, and
actively used the budget as a counter-cyclical tool.98 The domestic economy was
dominated by a comparatively small number of large firms, particularly in the mining
and manufacturing sectors,99 with the latter selling its wares to a predominantly closed,
national market.100

Oligopolistic competition between such large, often vertically

integrated firms, was the norm.101 In these respects, the Australian mode of regulation
during the long boom period closely resembled the ideal-typical Fordist model.
This mode did, however, possess other features which represented a unique antipodean
twist to the abstract structures and tendencies of Fordism. For the purposes of this
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thesis, the most significant were certain characteristics of the KWNS, most notably the
mechanisms through which it performed its redistributive capacities.
Ironically, the arbitration system, which I regarded above as a precociously Fordist
institution, was also the vehicle of considerable divergence from the ideal-typical
Fordist model of development. This paradox stems not so much from the structure or
function of the arbitral tribunals themselves, but rather from their articulation with the
wider institutional ensemble of the state. Broadly, whereas the ideal-typical model of
the KWNS (and the experience of many European countries) envisages a
comprehensive system of social support married to a large public sector as the
instruments of government welfare, the Australian state used the arbitration system as a
vehicle to deliver social and economic policy.102 As shall be outlined in chapter 5, from
the landmark Harvester103 decision in 1907, the arbitration system took as a
foundational concept the ‘Basic Wage,’ a wage minimum deemed necessary to support
the male worker, his wife and two children in ‘frugal comfort.’ 104 The provision of a
substantial arbitral safety net, combined with industry protection and a selective inward
migration scheme, rendered possible a rather ‘minimalist and residual state welfare
system.’105 Whilst the abstract goals of the KWNS remained the same, they were
fulfilled in a distinct way.
The uniqueness of the Australian state in this regard has been well-captured by Castles,
who coined a new term to describe it – the ‘wage earners’ welfare state.’106 He states of
it:
The simplest way of locating the essential difference between Australia and
most other nations is to say that, in Australia, wages policy, in large part,
substituted for social policy, with the functional identity between the two being
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denoted by the peculiar (in terms of capitalistic criteria) importation into
Antipodean wage-setting mechanisms of such concepts as the ‘fair wage...’107

Although the Australian KWNS performed the functions necessary to Fordism, it
delivered these policy goals through an institutional configuration which was
thoroughly novel. As we shall see below, this idiosyncratic imbrication of the wagelabour nexus and the form of the Australian KWNS had profound ramifications for the
structure of antipodean Fordism, particularly insofar as it planted within it the seeds of
its own unique crisis tendencies.

Antipodean Fordism and labour law
With an understanding of antipodean Fordism now in hand, we can move to an abstract
consideration of the regime of labour law that characterised it. As was previously stated,
elements of the mode of regulation corresponding with antipodean Fordism predated the
structured coherence of the whole; certainly this was the case with the system of
compulsory conciliation and arbitration.

But Fordism as a concept denotes the

congruity of the whole, a totality that emerged only under the impulses of the crisis of
the Depression and World War II. It is to this era that my analysis of labour law
applies.
As was mentioned previously, the circuit of capital is wrought by structural
contradictions which, although all broadly derived from capitalist social relations, are
nonetheless variegated and fluid through time. The Fordist model of development,
partly as a response to the crisis dynamics of the Depression and partly as an effort to
formalise labour-power within the context of growing union strength, crystallised the
wage-labour nexus as its primary contradiction.108
It will be recalled that the key to this nexus is the exchange of employment security,
liberal rights to unionise and growing real wages for labour intensification and the
acceptance of managerial prerogative in the labour process. These are processes which
go to the heart of labour-power as a commodity, determining the terms and conditions
upon which labour-power will be exploited by capital. Chapter 3 demonstrated that this
Castles, ‘The Wage Earners’ Welfare State Revisited’, above n 47, 124.
Robert Boyer, 'The Political in the Era of Globalization and Finance: Focus on Some Regulation
School Research' (2000) 24(2) International Journal of Urban and Regional Studies 274, 280.
107
108

89

process of commodification was an inherently legal process, with labour law playing
this function in concrete societies through particular arrangements of the lawadministration continuum. We can thus say that the antipodean Fordist wage-labour
nexus both presupposed and reproduced a distinctive labour law regime.109
So what are the basic legal premises of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus? I
argue that for this nexus to function, a set of distinct legal and institutional conditions
was required, namely those that allowed for the diffusion of wage increases from highproductivity ‘lead sectors,’ permitted collective and ‘connective’ bargaining,
encouraged the organisation of labour and developed a notion of the ‘standard,’ fulltime employment contract.110
These functional requirements undergirded the key features of this regime, namely a
permissive attitude towards organised labour, bargaining between capital and labour at a
broad occupational and/or industry level, a series of institutions which diffused wage
gains from leading sectors and the growth of administrative fixes to heightened worker
power.111 With this abstract understanding in hand, a sketch can be made of the broad
nature of labour law during the period of antipodean Fordist functionality.

What

interests us here is the broad brush form and content of the regime of labour law,
particularly insofar as this is related to the distinct contours and social relationships of a
particular model of development. A much more detailed empirical investigation into
the evolution of labour law through time will be carried out in the following two
chapters.
As identified above, one of the key features rendering antipodean Fordism distinctive is
the unique system of compulsory arbitration. This structure proved exceedingly adept
at meeting one of the key requirements of the Fordist model of development, namely,
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ensuring the stability of effective demand, and with it the stability of Fordist intensive
accumulation, through the creation of a coherent and relatively homogenous wage
structure.112 This coherence was ensured by institutions linking high-productivity lead
sectors with the economy and labour force at large. In Australia, the arbitration system
was better placed to deliver these outcomes than in other Fordist countries, largely
through the pyramidal structure of the award system.113
Cochrane observes the process at play in the post-World War II years, with militant
unions in the metal trades, mining and stevedoring applying ‘plant by plant duress’ to
individual employers; concessions, once granted, could ‘flow-on’ to other sectors of the
economy.114 As we shall see in great detail in chapter 7, this was particularly the case
with the metals industry, an archetypal Fordist lead sector. Well into the late 1960s, the
Metal Trades Award was at the apex of the award system, with tribunal decisions about
wage margins for skill being founded upon it. Respondents to other federal awards
would then have their own award varied accordingly, whilst state tribunals would
generally follow the lead of their federal counterpart. Even after the advent of the
‘Total Wage’ in 1967 (which abolished the traditional practice of determining a ‘Basic
Wage’ and wage margins separately), the metal awards remained institutionally
entrenched as pace-setters, and were key instruments in the wage explosion of the early
1970s.115
This tendency for the Fordist wage-labour nexus to take root in the Australian
arbitration system was further expedited by the notion of ‘comparative wage justice,’
which enshrined the view that equal work should be equally recompensed regardless of
industrial location.116 When combined with the dynamic of the metals sector and the
carefully established relationships of relativities and differentials between various
awards in the structure, comparative wage justice ensured the flow-on of national wage
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cases to the workforce at large.117 As shall be demonstrated in chapter 5, such an
ideology was a powerful force of the wage homogeneity characteristic of the Fordist
model of development.
Arbitration was also instrumental in the deployment of another key element of the
Fordist wage-labour nexus, namely the creation of the category of the full-time, ongoing
employee working a delimited range of ordinary hours and enjoying a basket of legally
enforceable entitlements and protections, so-called ‘standard’ employment.118 Bosch
has described this relationship as:
‘[S]table, socially protected, dependent, full-time job . . . the basic conditions of
which (working time, pay, social transfers) are regulated to a minimum level by
collective labour and/or social security law’ (Bosch 1986: 165). The full-time
nature of the job, its stability, and the social standards linked with permanent
full-time work are the key elements in this definition.119

The standard employment model, together with the internal labour markets with which
they were intimately associated, accorded with the industrial paradigm of Fordism, with
security of employment part of the quid pro quo for managerial prerogative and labour
intensification.120 Moreover, it buttressed the ability of workers to take a share in the
large productivity increases that helped power Fordism,121 maintaining the high levels
of endogenous demand it required. Within the fabric of antipodean Fordism, it fell to
the arbitral tribunals to codify this model. In the following chapter, I will investigate
the mechanics of this process, but it suffices here to note that it was only by the midtwentieth century, and particularly after World War II, that standard employment came
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to define the working arrangements of the greater part of the Australian workingclass.122 This is perfectly commensurate with the periodisation forwarded in this thesis.
Another element of antipodean Fordism that directly shaped the modality of labour law
was its aforementioned unification of the economic and social policy goals of the
Australian KWNS. This tended to both support and place pressure on the antipodean
Fordist model of development in two distinct ways.

Firstly, the dissemination of

‘occupational welfare benefits’123 through the award system, and most particularly the
notions of a Basic Wage and comparative wage justice, tended to produce (in concert
with the dominance of manufacturing under intensive accumulation) the relatively
homogenous, compressed wage structure typical of Fordism. Secondly, however, the
fact that the mode of regulation peculiar to antipodean Fordism largely subsumed the
economic and social functions of the KWNS into the quasi-judicial system of wage
regulation heightened the fundamentally contradictory nature of labour law remarked
upon in the last chapter.124

That antipodean Fordism combined this contradictory

structure with broader social and economic imperatives could not help but exacerbate
this tension, particularly insofar as it encouraged an intimate identity of economic and
social performance with the regulation of the labour market.125 As will be seen over the
course of this thesis, this was a tendency that pronounced itself strongly in the crisis of
antipodean Fordism from the mid-1970s onwards, where the source of malaise was
often located in the award system and trade union militancy.
Labour law under antipodean Fordism was premised upon moderate trade unionism, the
encouragement of which was one of the purposes of the original Conciliation and
Arbitration Act 1904.126

The arbitration system itself can be viewed as an

institutionalised class compromise between labour and capital,127 one that fixed a
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pronounced institutional role for labour within the fabric of labour law. Indeed, Justice
Higgins, the renowned second President of the original Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration, had noted that ‘without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration could
be worked.’128 As was elucidated in the previous chapter, this integration of labour
demands a particular arrangement of the law-administration continuum, including a
whole suite of administrative concepts and institutions which take as their subjects the
collective organs of labour and capital. The arbitral tribunals and trade unions related to
each other as part of an administrative totality; the former, empowered by statute,
‘registered’ trade unions, in the process recognising them as the legitimate
representatives of the working-class at the same time as conferring a host of benefits
and costs. Unions, in turn, made the system effective, policing awards, bringing actions
and enforcing discipline over their members.

Arbitration required unionism (of a

moderate stripe) and unionism came to rely heavily upon arbitration.129

The

administrative forms that constituted and mediated their interactions represented in
themselves the essential character of administration; dealing with labour and capital as
collective entities, responding at times in an ad hoc fashion to the spot-fires of
proletarian activism, yet always striving to abstract the latter into an impersonal and
formalistic process. The following chapter will explore the historical unfolding of this
process in a more rigorous and detailed fashion.
In short, the features of the labour law regime appropriate to antipodean Fordism
reflected and crystallised its unique structuring of capitalism’s contradictions, most
particularly its construction of the wage-labour nexus. In practice, the elements of the
system – including compulsory arbitration, the diffusion of the standard employment
model, encouragement of moderate unionism, the unification of wage and social
objectives and the growth of administrative fixes to worker power – ensured its
coherence whilst also containing disequilibria.

All were premised upon a highly

distinctive law-administration continuum, the heart of which was the arbitration system.
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crisis of this order of labour law.
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Fordist crisis
At many points in the course of this thesis I will approach the issue of the crisis of
antipodean Fordism from around 1973 onwards. The current discussion is intended not
as an exhaustive treatment of this crisis, nor of its legal manifestations. Instead, I seek
to present a schematic understanding of the unfolding of the crisis, focussing
particularly on the distinct contribution of law to the nature and trajectory of the crisis
period.
For Fordist countries generally, crisis broke out in the early 1970s. De Vroey notes how
this crisis exhibited distinctive domestic and international characteristics:
On one hand, most of the advanced capitalist countries experience a parallel
dysfunction of intensive accumulation though each has a specific character. On
the other hand, on the international scene, we notice a weakening of the
American hegemony, shifts in the hierarchical structure among national
economies, and disruptions in the international monetary system.130

More specifically, Fordism began to come apart under the weight of several notable
crisis tendencies, all rooted in the general contradictions of capitalist social relations but
imparted with a distinct twist and weight by the architecture of the Fordist model of
development. The most important of these were the exhaustion of the productivityrealising potential of mechanised Taylorism in lead sectors,131 the resistance of
empowered workers to intensified exploitation and job fragmentation,132 the
internationalisation of production and resultant ebbing of state power over an enclosed
national space,133 and the dismemberment of the post-War Bretton Woods financial
framework.134

The result: burgeoning inflation and the re-emergence of mass

unemployment combined with slowing economic growth, the infamous ‘stagflation.’
That Australian capitalism fell into crisis at this time is indisputable. The Australian
Treasury’s figures demonstrate that average GDP growth decreased from 5.3% in the
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1960s to 3.4% in the 1970s and 1980s, whilst per capita GDP over the same period
decreased from 3.2% to 1.8% and 1.9% respectively.135 The same figures reveal that
inflation increased alarmingly, rising from an average of 2.5% in the 1960s to a
whopping 10.4% in the 1970s, and remaining high at 8.1% in the 1980s.136
Unemployment rose from around 2% in the late 1960s and early 1970s to 6% by the end
of the decade, spiking at 10% in 1983 and 11% in 1993. 137 After a large increase
brought about by a wages explosion in 1974-75, real wage levels remained more-or-less
stagnant for the next twenty years,138 whilst the wages share of GDP (which had peaked
in 1974-75 and jumped again in 1979-82) entered a period of retreat throughout the
majority of the 1980s.139 Productivity growth stagnated,140 whilst the value of private
equipment investment and gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP
generally declined after the early 1970s, bottoming out in the recession of the early
1990s.141 Finally, O’Hara notes that two key indicators of capitalist health, the rate of
profit and the rate of surplus value, took a hit: the former fell from an annual average of
5.5% from 1960-69 to 3.3% in 1970-79 and 3.0% in 1980-89; the latter dropped by
almost a third, from 15.0% in 1960-69 to 10.1% from 1970 to 1989.142
Although the domestic and international angles of this crisis of antipodean Fordism
were intimately related, it is salutary to treat them separately for purposes of analytical
clarity. Beginning with the former, this crisis was first and foremost a crisis of the
wage-labour relationship, particularly in its manifestation in the dominant industrial
paradigm and its fixture as a precociously institutionalised nexus in the mode of
regulation.
Although, as has been explored, the actual diffusion of Taylorist work practices was
uneven, and subject in some instances to strong union resistance, Taylorism began to
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encounter both technical and ideological limits by the late 1960s.143 Technical barriers
to a mass production-based industrial paradigm derived largely from the stagnation of
productivity growth that could be achieved by further intensification and routinisation
of the labour process, along with the growth of imbalances across production lines.144
Beyond a certain point, efforts to this end tended to provoke worker resistance, which
manifested itself in both an individual, inchoate way (seen through high absenteeism,
rapid employee turnover, poor quality work, sabotage etc) and in an organised fashion
(such as strikes).145
This phenomenon was no stranger in the Australian context. Broomhill notes how
‘[m]anufacturing industry, the engine of post-war growth, began to stumble as labour
productivity levels fell from an average of 3.4 per cent between 1960–73, to 2.3 per cent
between 1973–9 and then to 1.2 per cent between 1979–93.’146 Bramble describes the
‘blue-collar blues’ in the leading metals sector: ‘[T]he early 1970s witnessed growing
labour turnover and absenteeism that were sufficiently worrying to merit reports on the
first by the Department of Labour and Immigration (1974) and on the second by the
Department of Productivity (1977).’147 The South Australian Policy Research Group &
Political Economy Movement (1978: 82) add that:
During this period absenteeism, labour turnover and industrial disputation
reached record levels … Workers were sick of alienating and inhuman
production lines, filthy factories and low wages, they voted with their feet,
followed the highest pay and stayed away from work often.148
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Productivity improvement was the engine of the virtuous circle of manufacturing
underlying antipodean Fordism. Its stumbling (which was abetted by comparatively
poor aggregate investment in new technologies consequent upon the aforementioned
heavy but indiscriminate tariff wall)149 undermined intensive accumulation in that it
distorted the articulation of mass production and mass consumption with the continued
valorisation of capital. Lipietz adroitly summarises this contradiction:
This system of intensive accumulation combined with monopolist regulation
may go on indefinitely, the rise in mass purchasing-power making it possible to
ward off a crisis of overproduction. However, capital can only remain profitable
on two conditions: unless increased productivity in the producer-goods sector
offsets the rising technical composition of capital, the proportion of immobilized
assets will become dangerously high; and unless increased productivity in the
consumer-goods sector balances the rise in mass purchasing-power, the share of
wages in total value-added will climb to the detriment of profit.150

The last point is particularly significant. If wage rises outstrip productivity growth, the
foundation of intensive accumulation is fractured; where wages and productivity once
grew synergistically, wage growth now becomes directly competitive with profits in a
zero-sum game.
The irony of Fordism is that, in crystallising the wage-labour nexus as the key site of
contradiction and the lever of intensive accumulation, it was hamstrung in addressing
the productivity challenge and the dysfunctions of the accumulation regime. The need
to maintain effective demand amongst the working class, the co-opting of trade unions
within the fabric of Fordism and, in the Australian context, the centrality of unions to
the operation of the labour law regime and its associated economic and social functions,
all institutionally entrenched trade unionism. This phenomenon ensured that, whilst
productivity stagnated, wage demands did not, particularly when accompanied by a
wave of militancy amongst union rank-and-file members, who engaged in wildcat
stoppages to extract over-award payments.151 In consequence, wage claims, which until
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1973 had roughly been in line with productivity gains, started to outstrip them.152 The
1974-75 wage explosion discussed above had seen the wages share of GDP climb to
62.4%, the highest ever figure for which statistics are available.153 This heightening of
the real value of labour power spiked the long-run tendency of the rate of profit to fall,
which was in turn reflected in the share of profit in the national income; after peaking at
approximately 17% around 1968-69 (coinciding with the beginning of the ‘flood tide’
of working class militancy),154 the profit share declined rapidly.155 By the mid-1970s it
had shrunk to just over 13% of GDP.156
Union militancy also began to manifest itself in atypical and, for capital, disturbing
forms, such as the campaign for improved workplace safety, political strikes over the
Vietnam

War

and

conscription

and
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spate

of

experiments

in

worker

control/occupations.157 Such a development spoke of the maladaptive functioning (from
the standpoint of capital) of the mode of regulation centred on the arbitration system. 158
This will be discussed in greater detail below.
These domestic developments were reinforced by the international dimensions of
Fordist crisis. Mass production began to become spatially disaggregated as
multinational corporations relocated labour-intensive manufacturing to low wage but
newly-industrialising countries in South-East Asia.159

Declining manufacturing

competitiveness against these countries was exacerbated by the growing importance of
mineral and energy exports, which lead to something of a resources boom during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, and early 1980s.160 This development produced a form of
152

Cowgill, above n 34, 4-5.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian System of National Accounts 2007-08, above n 139, 7.
154
Bramble, Trade unionism in Australia, above n 115, 41-77.
155
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and
Product 1992-93 (5204.0, 1994) 1.
156
Ibid 1.
157
See, for example: Malcolm Waters, Strikes in Australia (George Allen & Unwin, 1982) 54-60, 159182; Bramble, Trade unionism in Australia, above n 115; Verity Burgmann, Ray Jureidini and Meredith
Burgmann, ‘Doing Without the Boss: Workers' Control Experiments in Australia in the 1970s’ (2012)
(103) Labour History 103.
158
Bill Harley, ‘Managing Industrial Conflict’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre (eds), The New Province
for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (Cambridge
University Press, 2004) 316, 338.
159
See, for example, the contributions to a 1977 Metal Unions Conference: Metal Unions Seminar on the
Future of Australian Manufacturing (7-8 June 1977) (Noel Butlin Archive Centre, N194/115). The
relocation of production is a theme that will be picked up again in the chapter on the food processing
sector.
160
Lloyd, ‘The Lucky Country Syndrome’, above n 87, 21; Ric Battellino, ‘Mining Booms and the
Australian Economy’ (Speech delivered at The Sydney Institute, Sydney, 23 February 2010).
153

99
‘Dutch Disease,’ whereby progressive increases in the exchange rate on the back of the
strength of commodity exports erodes the competitive position of manufacturing.161
Paradoxically, at the same time the strength of farming exports was being undermined
by technological advances in the farming sectors of most other industrialised countries
in concert with increased agricultural protectionism (as seen in the European Union’s
Common Agricultural Policy).162 In such a context, the latent divide between exportoriented mining and agricultural capital and inward-looking manufacturing capital
became explicit. The heavy tariff wall protecting Australian manufacturing came to be
regarded as no longer feasible. It is in this light that the Whitlam Government’s 1973
decision to introduce a blanket 25% cut in tariffs must be read. Such a policy, however,
fundamentally revealed the cleaving point of the intensive accumulation regime of
antipodean Fordism; not being autarkic, its dynamic could be maintained only so long
as wide-ranging industrial protection was viable, both economically and politically.
The collapse of this consensus, the subsequent assaults upon industrial protection and
the growth of competition from low-wage jurisdictions resulted in the essential collapse
of Australian manufacturing, a development we shall explore in greater detail in
chapters 7 and 8.
The loss of manufacturing jobs in Australia went hand-in-hand with the growth of
typically low-productivity/low-wage sectors, such as hospitality and retail,163 along with
the expansion of the services sector generally. 164

The growing importance of

information and communication technologies (ICTs) also served to overcome some of
the barriers Taylorism had experienced in Australia, both within and between different
sectors. Technological change associated with ICT’s tended to intensify and deepen the
reach of Taylorism within manufacturing, particularly sectors such as metals and
automobiles.165 Moreover, the new technologies (especially the computer) allowed the
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diffusion of Taylorism to industries which had previously remained relatively immune
because of technical limitations, such as retail, warehousing, fast food and health
care.166 The decline in the pre-eminence of manufacturing, associated with the diffusion
of Taylorist forms of work control into the services sector, fractures the functional unity
between lead sector productivity gains and general wage improvements for the
proletariat (particularly insofar as the hitherto lead sector is no longer so).167
So, how did the crisis of antipodean Fordism in the 1970s and 1980s impact upon the
regime of labour law appropriate to it? It is best to answer this question at this point in
terms of the forces this crisis unleashed and their ramifications for the legal system. As
shall be explored in chapters 5 and 7, a key issue for capital that had to be tackled was
the large wage-rounds consequent upon the institutionalised position of labour and the
hierarchical award structure. The pattern of flow-on from certain key awards, most
particularly the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, and the ideology of
comparative wage justice that lubricated it, ate into the profit share of national income
once productivity growth began to stagnate.168 This led to capital seeking ways to sever
the institutionalised links binding the workforce together, so that the gains of the
industrially strong could be quarantined from the weak.
The spatial disaggregation of the mass production paradigm, the diffusion of ICT
technologies into the labour process of tertiary sector jobs and the general decline of
manufacturing in its capacity as a lead-sector engine of growth also challenged the
norms with which labour law was used to dealing, particularly the view of the typical
worker as a male, unionised, manual employee.

The increasing corrosiveness of
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protection, together with the capacity of ICTs in more perfectly fragmenting labourpower into smaller units to be reassembled to match increasingly volatile market
conditions, undermined the standard employment model and encouraged the growth of
precarious employment forms, forms characterised by a ‘lack of protective regulation,
short or uncertain duration, lack of ‘standard’ employment benefits, and ambiguous or
unprotected legal status.’169 As shall be seen in the following chapters, awards in the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s were complex and involved documents, based around standard,
full-time employment and often equipped with a host of qualitative and quantitative
controls over part-time and casual labour. The impulses towards precarisation thus
tended to grate against the award system at the same time as they found expression
within it.
The unique structure of the Australian KWNS also contributed towards the unfolding of
Fordist crisis as a distinctly legal process. Indeed, the decline of antipodean Fordism
was in many cases seen as a prima facie crisis of labour law and industrial relations
institutions. The aforementioned unification of economic and social goals within the
arbitration system heightened the tendency to identify industrial relations outcomes as a
proxy for the economy at large. The perception of an ‘industrial relations problem,’
together with a reputation for industrial strife (not wholly deserved),170 created the view
that industrial law would have to be reformed if the conditions for economic growth
were to be restored. And indeed, this view was, in a highly fetishised way, at least
partly true; the limits of antipodean Fordism were in part constituted by the rise of union
militancy and an inability to contain proletarian struggle within Fordist institutions.
The crisis also directly informed the transformation of labour law instruments and
institutions through the process of ‘institutional searching,’ whereby the state, capital
and labour are engaged in a contradictory and contested process of institutional
experimentation to negotiate an escape from crisis and a return to growth and
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stability.171 These efforts were neither homogenous nor always coherent. In some
cases, recourse was made to an intensification and deepening of the institutions of
antipodean Fordism itself.172 For example, the Prices and Income Accord between the
Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Hawke Labor government (which we shall
explore in great detail in chapter 5) reinvigorated the federal Arbitration Commission,
placing it firmly in charge of national wage-setting.

On the other hand, certain

developments represented a rejection of the tenets of antipodean Fordism and a new
modality of ordering the social structure, including the recourse to common law torts
against strike action and the adoption of restructuring and efficiency and structural
efficiency principles by the Commission in the late 1980s. Both movements, and the
tensions and articulations between them, necessarily assumed a legal form (being partly
legal in origin), pulling the labour law regime in different directions.
Given the precocious nature of the wage-labour nexus and its entrenchment in
antipodean Fordism’s mode of regulation, this period of transition was bound to be
difficult, prolonged and contested. This reality, however, forebodes both the means and
ends of the process, each of which are profoundly important for the modality of labour
law. Firstly, the strength and institutional insertion of trade unionism within antipodean
Fordism suggests that change was likely to be incremental and conducive towards
corporatist political arrangements; it is far easier to push through reform with the active
consent of those whom the reforms will most affect. Secondly, the intractable nature of
the obstacles besetting the Fordist wage-labour nexus suggests that new sites of
contradiction will assume importance in the effort to escape crisis.173 Given the fact
that this wage-labour nexus assumed in Australia a unique legal form in the shape of the
arbitration system, this phenomenon unleashed a motive force that pushed the balance
point of Kay and Mott’s ‘law-administration continuum’ towards its former pole.174
That is, as the law of labour lost the economic and wider social influence it once
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wielded as part of the arbitration structure, it would tend to become less functionally
differentiated (vis-a-vis other bodies and institutions of law) and become more heavily
‘juridified,’ that is, subsumed to the logic of the abstract legal form at the expense of
administration.175 This tendency was invigorated by the increased valency of market
forces under neo-liberalism176 and the declining power of organised labour (which had
the effect of reducing the pressure on the state to formalise labour-power through
administrative fire-fighting).177 These two lattermost tendencies will be discussed in
greater detail below.
With an understanding of the forces unleashed by the crisis of antipodean Fordism, and
the legal implications of them, I can now turn to a consideration of the form and
function of labour law within the successor model of development; liberalproductivism.

Liberal-productivism as an ideal-type
The worldwide decline of Fordism forced regulationists to consider what would come
after. Was a successor model of development in evidence? If so, what did it look like,
how did it solve Fordist crisis, and would it enable a return to durable economic growth
and stability? These investigations, along with the work of other scholars not strictly
part of the PRA tradition but drawing upon its terminology, informed the debates on
‘post-Fordism’ in the 1980s and 1990s. I do not intend to recapitulate the often vitriolic
debates that have surrounded this notion. Suffice it to say here that, from the late 1980s
and early 1990s onwards, a recognisable, more-or-less coherent post-Fordist model of
development did emerge,178 answering, in a provisional fashion, the crisis of Fordism.179
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As with Fordism, the scholar who has most closely theorised this post-Fordist epoch in
line with the model of development concept outlined in chapter 2 is Lipietz. He has
dubbed the model that has become dominant liberal-productivism.180 According to him,
it combines:


an intensification and deepening of Taylorism into the tertiary sector, together
with the rise of ‘lean’ production;



an intensive accumulation regime that disassociates wages and productivity (and
is thus debt-fuelled); and



a neoliberal mode of regulation in an increasingly complex global division of
labour.181

Each of these structures had their roots in the development of Fordism’s crisis
tendencies. However, they only began to cohere into something resembling a cogent
model of development from the late 1980s-early 1990s.
Bearing in mind the discussion above about the nature of capitalism’s contradictions,
their division into dominant and secondary poles and the uneven nature of their
historical manifestation, what can be said about the ordering of these contradictions
within the fabric of liberal-productivism? Unlike Fordism, which crystallised the wagelabour nexus as the site of dominant contradiction in response to the ruinous
underconsumption of the Great Depression, liberal-productivism was born of a crisis
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rooted at least partially in the power of organised labour and the grating of national state
boundaries against growing transnational capital. Of particular note in the latter regard
is the spatial and temporal disaggregation of liberal-productivism’s dominant industrial
paradigm.

Whereas Fordism enshrined a mass-productionist labour process model

which was nationally organised and executed, liberal-productivism reformulates the
social division of labour on an increasingly global scale.

Unlike previous

configurations of the global social division of labour,182 liberal-productivism has
segmented the production process of manufactured goods and distributed the resulting
atoms in spatially uneven ways.

The typical example is of a globally organised

production chain in which high-end research and development, marketing and financial
arrangements are concentrated in the previous hubs of Fordism, whilst labour-intensive
manufacturing is relocated to low-wage, newly industrialising zones such as China and
South-East Asia. This has led to a certain degree of deindustrialisation in the former
countries and a commensurate growth in the tertiary sector.183 In such an environment,
the competition principle (which was carefully controlled with Fordism through
monopoly/oligopoly arrangements between firms and limits upon the reach of the
commodity form),184 both between firms and between countries, requires an open field
of action if capitalists are to exploit the global production system to their advantage.
This in turn has seen competition within liberal-productivism assume the place once
occupied by the wage-labour nexus within Fordism,185 a reformulation with profound
influences for labour law.
Additionally, the centrality of the competition principle in a new global division of
labour necessarily entails an inversion of the wage-labour nexus, whereby the wage is
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reconstructed as a cost of international production, rather than source of domestic
demand.186 This places downwards pressure on wages, encourages the intensification of
Taylorism and lean production within the labour process,187 and dovetails with the
growth of low-paying, low-productivity service sector jobs mentioned above.188 These
developments undermine the domestically-focused virtuous circle of manufacturing that
had fuelled the intensive accumulation regime of Fordism. The question then becomes
how the latter is maintained within liberal-productivism and what its version of a
virtuous circle looks like.
Broadly, the application of intensified Taylorism and lean production within both the
manufacturing and service sectors has the effect not only of raising productivity but of
deepening managerial control of the labour process even further.189 Companies are thus
able to appropriate a greater share of surplus value, resulting in extremely high profit
shares of national income (and concomitantly low labour shares) even in the midst of
profit rates below that achieved during Fordist coherence.190 In the midst of a continued
tendency towards global overproduction,191 finance often proves the more attractive
investment for these profits,192 and it is finance capital which provides the engine of the
accumulation regime. This remains intensive in character, in that it is premised upon a
commodification of the proletariat’s means of subsistence and an articulation of mass
production and consumption. However, as mentioned above, intensive accumulation is
now based on a disassociation of wages and productivity, and is globally configured.193
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Cheap credit emanating from the financial system covers the gap between worker
demand and worker purchasing power expressed in hard money. 194 This cheap credit, a
function of the financialisation of capital investment and the hypermobile, international
capital flows it begets,195 now provides the motive force of intensive accumulation.
A neoliberal mode of regulation is both constitutive of, and constituted by, these
developments. Neoliberalism is a multifaceted and value-laden concept, but it can in
regulationist terms be described as a mode of regulation that supports the accumulation
regime of liberal-productivism.196 Broadly speaking, the KWNS (which was crippled
by heavy fiscal burdens and a corroded ability to control a bounded economic and
political space)197 is replaced by a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime
(SWPR).198 This performs a variety of functions, including the recasting of labour as a
commodity like any other, the subordination of social policy to the increasingly deregulated labour market, and reducing fetters on the free movement of commodities and
capital across an increasingly connected yet variegated global space.199

These

developments, full told, represent a huge expansion of the frontiers of the commodity
form, a qualitative and quantitative extension with profound influences for labour law.
Like Fordism, liberal-productivism bears within itself the seeds of crisis, derived from
the abstract crisis tendencies of capitalism yet given a distinct character. Of particular
note is the lack of a distinctive scale of primary regulation (the space occupied by the
national state within Fordism),200 the centrality of debt as the motive force of intensive
accumulation,201 the mountain of fictitious financial capital which can never be
validated by the real economy,202 and the still-depressed state of the rate of profit.203
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The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 arguably represents the beginning of a period of
terminal decline for liberal-productivism.204

However, these are questions for the

future, and do not weigh upon the discussion of labour law here. I can thus move to an
investigation of the relationship between liberal-productivism in Australia and the idealtype.

Liberal-productivism in Australia
There is certainly a prima facie case that a liberal-productivist model has taken hold in
Australia since the early 1990s. Indeed, more so than other advanced capitalist nations,
Australia has, in macroeconomic terms, benefitted from the coherence of this model.
After the doldrums of the early 1990s recession, average GDP growth recovered to
4.5% in the second half of the 1990s (3.2% in per capita terms). 205 Over the period of
1995-2005, the average rate of GDP growth weighed in at 3.5%, whilst another measure
recorded growth of 3% between 2000 and 2010 (both considerably superior to the
commensurate Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD,
figures of 2.5% and 1.9%).206

Productivity generally, and labour productivity

specifically, surged in the 1990s, averaging 3.9% average annual growth from 1994/941998/99.207 Real wage growth, which had remained stagnant between 1975 and the
early 1990s, resumed from the mid-1990s and has outperformed many other OECD
nations,208 but has, in accordance with liberal-productivist ideal-type, not been able to
arrest a declining wage share of national income,209 and started to lag behind
productivity gains from 2000 onwards.210 This growth, moreover, has been achieved
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despite the fact that the Australian manufacturing sector has contracted sharply, going
from accounting for nearly 30% of GDP in the late 1950s and early 1960s 211 to a paltry
6.2% in early 2015.212 As anticipated in the abstract model, this dissolution has been
accompanied by exponentially increased levels of personal debt.213
We are thus in a position to make the claim that Australia is in a liberal-productivist
phase.214

Although they do not necessarily use the same terminology, there is

agreement amongst a number of scholars that Australia has indeed entered a new,
broadly coherent capitalist epoch.215

The constituent features of this model of

development continue to demonstrate unique structures and mechanisms of coherence.
However, given the fact that liberal-productivism is characterised by a corrosive global
logic that undermines the ability of individual states to remain outside it, and has
achieved purest expression in liberal-market economies such as Australia, the US and
the UK, fewer divergences from the abstract model are encountered.
Industrial paradigm
The dominant model of labour-process organisation in Australia matches almost exactly
that of the ideal-type. The diffusion of ICTs, changed managerial practices, a shift from
supply to demand driven production, and the development of economies of scope has
cohered as a system of lean production, which subsumes both the manufacturing and
services sectors within its logic.216 As indicated above, this has allowed the extension
of Taylorism deep into the service sector,217 particularly insofar as computer
211
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technologies allowed the measurement and routinisation of work that ‘mechanical’
Taylorism found difficult to penetrate.218 In chapter 9 I will elucidate the impact of this
development for retail workers, most specifically the link between the new industrial
paradigm and precarious employment forms.
Accumulation Regime
In a conceptual sense, the accumulation regime of liberal-productivism in Australia
closely accords with that of the ideal-typical model. The aforementioned fracturing of
the virtuous circle of domestic manufacturing, and the resulting disarticulation of mass
production and mass consumption it effected, destroyed the engine of growth which had
powered antipodean Fordism. An alternative basis of intensive accumulation was found
in the shape of debt-financed consumption,219 which allowed consumption levels to
remain high even in the face of the growing disassociation between productivity growth
and real wages.220
However, the accumulation regime of Australian liberal-productivism is also
characterised by significant continuities with its predecessor, continuities which made
the process of transition less radical than was the case with, say, the United States.
Unlike the latter, the accumulation regime of antipodean Fordism was never selfsufficient. Indeed, as was demonstrated above, the viability of its virtuous cycle of
manufacturing was underwritten by the stability of agricultural and mining commodity
exports.221

Today, Australia depends as heavily as ever on commodity exports,

particularly from the mining sector.

The unprecedented level of demand for raw

materials, particularly for coal and metals, consequent upon the industrialisation of
China led both to massive investment in the development of Australia’s vast mineral
resources and burgeoning commodity prices on world markets. The resultant upsurge in
Australia’s terms of trade (which peaked in the middle of 2011 and has declined
substantially since) is probably the single greatest factor in Australia’s superior
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economic performance compared to other OECD nations.222 However, given the fact
that mining is highly capital-intensive, it employs a comparatively small number of
workers.223 The currency appreciation brought about on the back of strong commodity
exports has had a deleterious effect on the competitiveness and viability of Australian
manufacturing,224 which, even at its May 2015 nadir, still employs four times as many
workers as the mining sector.225 As shall be seen in chapters 7 and 8, this exacerbation
of the long-term decline of manufacturing, together with the broader economic volatility
associated with an increased dependence upon commodity exports,226 eroded the
standard employment model at its very heart.
Mode of regulation
The aforementioned features of the neoliberal mode of regulation which characterises
liberal-productivism have largely taken hold in Australia. The most important of these
is the inversion of the wage-labour nexus from a source of domestic demand to a cost of
international production.

This required a frontal assault on the institutionalised

crystallisation of this nexus in its Fordist form, the arbitration system. This is of such
importance to the labour law regime that it is discussed in the following section.
Also of key importance is the effective dissolution of many of the key functions of the
KWNS and its replacement by the SWPR. Whereas the KWNS’s objectives in abstract
terms was the maintenance of full employment, demand-side economic management
and the generalisation of norms of mass consumption within a more-or-less delimited
national space,227 the SWPR’s abstract goals include state facilitation of product,
process, organisational and market innovation to bolster economic competitiveness
through supply-side intervention and the subordination of social policy to the dictates of
222
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labour market flexibility and global competition.228 In practical terms, the movement
towards the SWPR involved an intensified commodification of social life through the
marketisation of goods and services previously rendered by the state, 229 a general state
aversion towards explicit intervention in the economy and,230 most importantly for our
purposes here, an explicit and self-aware abandonment of the principle of full
employment.231 The latter development is of particular importance in that the crisis of
the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus was understood by some, in a highly
fetishised manner, as the issue of industrial relations in a climate of full employment.232
Lastly, and in line with the SWPR’s ethos of bolstering economic competitiveness
through exposure to international competition, Australian liberal-productivism has
effected a transformation in the regime of industrial protection. From the very high
levels of industrial protection cited above, a period of sustained tariff reductions has
occurred since the peak reached in the late 1970s and early 1980s.233 Whereas in 197879 the average tariff plus primage on all dutiable goods was 31.3%, in 2004-05 the
figure stood at only 9.5%.234 Leigh states more broadly that ‘[f]rom 1970 to 2001, the
average level of industry assistance fell from over thirty percent to under five
percent.’235 This reduction has both constituted, and been constituted by, the fracturing
of the base of antipodean Fordist accumulation; the phasing out of tariffs as a long-term
response to the crisis of Fordism both removed the domestic engine of intensive
accumulation, and in so doing exposed the vulnerability of the manufacturing sector.
228
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This development was one of the root causes of the manufacturing sector’s woes in the
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and further encouraged the precarisation of the manufacturing
workforce and the undermining of the standard employment model more generally
(explored in chapters 7 and 8).

Liberal-productivism and labour law
I have stated that the general characteristics, or ‘essences,’ of the liberal-productivist
regime of Australian labour law includes ‘hostility to trade unions, a destruction of the
conciliation and arbitration system, a severing of the institutional links homogenising
the wage structure and associating productivity and wage growth and an intensified
juridification on the back of the increased valency of market forces.’ 236 To this can be
included the erosion of the standard employment model and the profusion of various
precarious forms of employment, such as casuals and contract labour.237
The single most important distinction between antipodean Fordism and liberalproductivism vis-a-vis labour law is the latter’s inversion and reordering of the
contradictory wage-labour nexus. The precocious institutionalisation of the Fordist
wage-labour nexus in the form of the arbitration system, together with the bundle of
functions this particular institution played in antipodean Fordism en régulation, meant
that a cogent liberal-productivist system could only be ‘rolled out’ after a multi-pronged
attack had ‘rolled back’ arbitration.238

This attack has both displaced the arbitral

tribunals from their traditional functions and usurped their centrality within the fabric of
Australian industrial relations, a reality graphically demonstrated in chapter 6.
As has been outlined, the dysfunctionality of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus
largely derived from the power and privileged institutional position accorded to
organised labour (especially insofar as it allowed the industrially strong to universalise
their gains through the award framework). In answer, wage bargaining within liberalproductivism is fragmented and generally decentralised.

In particular, I will

demonstrate in chapter 7 how the pyramidal structure of the award system, spearheaded
by the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, was broken by the Accord in the 1980s
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and ‘enterprise bargaining’ in the 1990s. Metal trades margins cases and comparative
wage justice claims, based on establishing parity in occupations between industries, no
longer exist to homogenise the wage structure and act as a transmission belt linking the
strong and the weak.
Awards more generally have been recast as ‘safety nets,’ providing minimum wages
and conditions which can only be improved upon through enterprise bargaining. The
rise of enterprise bargaining in both federal and state jurisdictions from the early 1990s
onwards has been of immense importance to the rise of a cogent liberal-productivist
labour law regime. Indeed, enterprise bargaining is the node at which many of the
essences of legal change have been realised. Increasingly strict statutory control has
seen the process pitched at the workplace and/or firm level, increasing resource
demands upon unions to negotiate literally thousands of agreements whilst intensifying
the atomisation of the proletariat into competing units agglomerated around ‘their’
separate capitals. Attempts to return to the industry-level bargaining de facto permitted
by the award system, such as the metal and manufacturing unions campaign in the late
1990s, have been rebuffed by the legislature, a reality that shall be explored in greater
detail in chapter 7.
Whilst the form of bargaining thus hinders the proletariat in making common cause, the
content of these agreements has often dovetailed with the lean production/neo-Taylorist
industrial paradigm and the displacement of the standard employment model. The
general pattern of enterprise agreements has been that they trade headline wage
increases for a thoroughgoing enhancement of the real subordination of labour.
Workers have been subjected to a radical increase in both functional and numerical
flexibility; that is, they have had to accept management’s right to deploy them across a
broader range of functions with ever greater control over when and in what numbers. 239
Enterprise agreements have also typically restricted union input into key management
decisions such as manning and the control over part-time and casual labour. In chapters
7, 8 and 9, it will be demonstrated that this is a development which holds in both the
manufacturing (specifically metals and food processing) and retail sectors.
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The tendency of enterprise agreements to reduce or dispose of qualitative and
quantitative controls over part-time, casual and contract labour is representative of a
broader truth. The standard employment model, so significant to the antipodean Fordist
wage-labour nexus, has been fundamentally usurped by a host of precarious forms,
forms which were characterised above by a ‘lack of protective regulation, short or
uncertain duration, lack of “standard” employment benefits, and ambiguous or
unprotected legal status.’240 In 2004, some 34.4% of the workforce fell outside the
standard employment model,241 whilst in 2013 nearly one-quarter of employees were
casual (the largest sub-group within non-standard employment).242 The profusion of
such employment forms (which shall be analysed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6)
has stymied working-class power in a variety of ways, not least the fact that such
employees are less likely to be union members243 and are less likely to resist the
exercise of managerial prerogative precisely because of the insecurity of their position.
Chapters 8 and 9 in particular demonstrate the unfolding of this process of precarisation
in food processing industries and the New South Wales retail sector.
The disempowerment of workers under the impact of precarisation has had its mirror at
the macro-level, with the power of the trade union movement at a historic low ebb.
Union density, which had peaked at two-thirds of the workforce in the early 1950s,244
has been in free-fall since the early 1990s, and in August 2014 only 15% of employees
were union members in their main job.245

Organisational weakness has both

constituted, and been constituted by, a movement to legally hamstring the ability of
trade unions to make common cause, itself a result of the inversion of the antipodean
Fordist wage-labour nexus. The dysfunction of the latter manifested itself in a wave of
industrial militancy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which often pressed against and
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outside the established legal and administrative channels.246 The threat this posed to the
continued valorisation of capital, and the related strain this placed on the state’s ability
to formalise labour-power, necessitated mechanisms by which the unification and
solidarity of the proletariat (a development that Fordism continually tends toward)247
could be disrupted. Labour law, at the forefront of the commodification of labourpower and the construction of labour as a subject, is crucial in this endeavour. This
tendency was the driving force behind a legal climate that became increasingly hostile
towards trade unionism, firstly by breaking the most militant sections of organised
labour248 and then through gradually severing the institutionalised links between trade
unionism and the conduct of industrial relations. The tight embrace between the arbitral
tribunals and unions has been replaced by an arm’s length relationship, one in which the
state finds it easier to legislate against union interests. This has informed a myriad of
legal prohibitions against concerted union action, with laws against secondary boycotts,
solidarity strikes and industrial action outside of designated bargaining periods
disrupting the expression of common working-class interests.249
As was outlined in chapter 3, a labour law regime is both predicated upon, and tends to
reproduce, a certain arrangement of the law-administration continuum. The decline of
proletarian power that has been a feature of liberal-productivism is itself a force that
impinges upon the form and content of this regime. The erosion of trade union power
and the fragmentation and atomisation of the proletariat reduces the ability of the
working-class to force the state to generate administrative solutions to the class
struggle; administrative fixes which take as their subjects the collective organs of labour
give way to an increasing penetration of the legal form narrowly construed, the form in
which capital has always operated most comfortably. In the Australian experience of
liberal-productivism, this reality has seen a continual state retreat from direct
administrative regulation of the labour market, partly substituted by an increasing
juridifcation of work relations that constructs the labour-capital relationship in the
fetishised image of abstract, de-classed juridical equals engaged in mutually beneficial
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exchange.250 Juridification, which I construct as the subsumption of administrative
fixes beneath the abstract legal form, is, on this score, merely the concrete expression of
the reduced need of the state to spawn institutional fixes to proletarian struggle. It also
represents a reconfiguration of the law-administration continuum in which the centre of
balance is shifted towards law. The combined effect of juridification in supplanting
arbitration, weakening administration’s collective subjects and re-asserting the ‘purer’
legal form has resulted in the lengthy experiment with statutory individual contracts, the
channelling of industrial disputes through the regular court system or a weakened
tribunal, the recrudescence of common law industrial torts and the usurping of the
constitutional basis for federal industrial regulation. These will be the focus of deeper
investigation in chapter 6.
As was the case with antipodean Fordism, the regime of labour law appropriate to
liberal-productivism reflects and crystallises its unique structuring of capitalism’s crisis
tendencies. Although it comes with a host of its own unique twists to these abstract
tendencies, and is inherently unstable given its international configuration and debtfinanced accumulation regime, it does answer the crisis of the antipodean Fordist wagelabour nexus. This was achieved through shattering the law-administration continuum,
and its nexus point in the arbitration system, and the erection of a new order of labour
law fixed in a transformed continuum and predicated on working-class weakness.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have demonstrated that post-World War II Australian capitalism can be
usefully periodised using the regulationist concepts of Fordism and liberalproductivism. These are ideal-types, and when pitched at this level of abstraction do
not describe the concrete experience of any one society.

In order to fulfil their

analytical potential, they must be sensitised to the Australian context. This process of
sensitisation reveals two distinct models of development, separated by a period of
profound crisis and institutional searching: antipodean Fordism, stretching from 1945 to
the early 1970s; and liberal-productivism in Australia, which had begun to cohere in the
late 1980s and early 1990s and remains on foot today. These clearly share in the
dynamic and hierarchisation of crisis tendencies of their ideal-types, but are often
unique in how the key abstract functions are performed. This is particularly true of
250
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antipodean Fordism, given that its central scale of economic and political regulation was
the nation-state (unlike liberal-productivism, which is premised on an explicitly global
production system).
In Table 2, I have summarised the key similarities and differences between the idealtypes and antipodean Fordism/liberal-productivism in Australia across their respective
industrial paradigms, accumulation regimes and modes of regulation.

Table 2: Ideal-types and Australian instantiations
Industrial paradigm
Ideal-typical
Fordism

Antipodean
Fordism

Ideal-typical
liberalproductivism

Accumulation regime

Mode of regulation

- based on unification of
Taylorism and mechanisation
in lead sectors.

- autocentric mass production/mass
consumption intensive accumulation
regime.

- KWNS guaranteed effective demand through
protective social legislation and the
generalisation of mass consumption norms.

- tailored to mass production;
economies of scale.

- productivity and wages linked.

- wage-labour nexus site of primary
contradiction

- based on mass production but
marked by an incomplete
incorporation of Taylorist
forms of work control and
organisation.

- intensive accumulation regime based on
mass production/mass consumption.

- Fordist wage-labour nexus preciously
institutionalised in arbitration system.

- however, regime not autarkic – depends
upon primary commodity exports to
underwrite industrial protection.

- KWNS economic and social
objectives/functions unified.

- intensification and deepening
of Taylorism into the tertiary
sector.

- intensive accumulation, still based on
mass production/mass consumption but
globally configured.

- SWPR oversees neoliberal of regulation.

- rise of ‘lean’ production;
economies of scope.

- disassociation of wages and productivity;
regime debt-fuelled.

- labour recast as a commodity like any other;
subordination of social policy to
increasingly free labour market; reduced
fetters on the free movement of
commodities and capital.
-competition site of primary contradiction;
Fordist wage-labour nexus inverted.

Liberalproductivism in
Australia

- dominant model of labour
process organisation closely
matches ideal-type.

- intensive accumulation regime closely
matching ideal-type.

- mode of regulation closely matches idealtype.

- significant continuities with forebear.

- Fordist wage-labour nexus destroyed.
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Chapter 5
EVOLUTION AND CRISIS OF THE ANTIPODEAN
FORDIST LABOUR LAW REGIME
In the preceding chapter, I outlined the abstract tendencies and characteristics of the
labour law regimes of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism, concentrating in
particular upon how these regimes helped ensure the coherence of their respective
models of development. I noted that the picture was somewhat one-sided, focussing
more upon the conditions that must be fulfilled for both models of development to
reproduce themselves and the place of labour law in constituting those conditions. As a
first step in the dialectical relationship between theory and concrete history, it
established the functions of law within these models of development, the requisite
structure of the law-administration continuum, and regions of change. The actual legal
history of these processes, specifically how and in what fashion the law and industrial
relations institutions changed, was only cursorily indicated.
Chapters 5 and 6 provide this concrete legal history.

I begin by noting that the

transition between antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism saw labour law
transform along a number of broad fronts. The dimensions I am focussing on can be
described thematically as:


Wage fixation – how wages and conditions for workers are determined, the
instruments that control them, and the motive force of the system;



Forms of employment/flexibility – the legal categories defining work
relationships, the relationship between ‘standard’ employment and more
precarious forms, and the ability of management to deploy labour and organise
the labour process as it sees fit;



Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations – the degree
to which the industrial relations system takes collective entities of capital and
labour or individual workers and corporations as its subject, who controls the
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creation, content and enforcement of the rules of the employment relationship,1
and the predominant spatial scale at which this relation is expressed; and


The legal matrix – how the labour law regime is embedded within the broader
legal framework, particularly regarding the former’s constitutional basis and
standing.

To highlight best the fundamental characteristics of the antipodean Fordist and liberalproductivist labour law regimes, a ‘slice’ approach is employed, building upon the
periodisation of post-World War II Australian capitalism advanced in chapter 4.
Certain key years are selected as a snapshot and are analysed according to the state of
labour law vis-à-vis the four themes identified. Each period represents a crucial point in
the process of political-economic transformation. 1964 is the departure point, a time
when antipodean Fordism was at its height. From there I move to 1975, by which time
the antipodean Fordist boom had ended and serious symptoms of crisis were becoming
manifest. The year 1982 marks a time of institutional exhaustion, where the final
iteration of the post-war cycle of metal trade flow-on revealed the intrinsic and
intractable nature of Fordist crisis. This period of profound and insoluble crisis is the
end point of the current analysis. In chapter 6, I will pick up the threads in the late1980s, when some of the constituent legal elements of liberal-productivism were
coming into existence.
Taken together with the framework established in chapter 4, this analysis allows us to
come to an account of labour law change that is theoretically rigorous yet empirically
rich. As shall be seen, the nature and timing of the transformations taking place is
completely in keeping with the periodisation schema forwarded in this thesis. Indeed,
echoing Treuren, the analysis reflects upon the fundamental soundness of the theory
advanced.2

1964 – Height of antipodean Fordism
The starting point of my analysis is the year 1964, the high water mark of the
antipodean Fordist model of development. At this point in time, the institutions of the
Mark Bray and Johanna Macneil, ‘Individualism, Collectivism and Awards in the Australian Hospitality
Industry’ (2012) 22(4) Labour & Industry 333, 335-336.
2
Gerry Treuren, ‘State theory and the origins of federal arbitration legislation in Australia’ (1997) 13
Policy, Organisation and Society 56, 61.
1
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antipodean Fordist mode of regulation cohered fully with the intensive accumulation
regime and Taylorised, mass-production based industrial paradigm.
In terms of the key themes elucidated above, the antipodean Fordist labour law regime
exhibited a coherent and self-reinforcing character.

Wage fixation, particularly

regarding marginal payments for skill, revolved around the manufacturing sector
generally, and the metal trades industries specifically.

Gains won in the latter,

crystallised in the leading Metal Trades Award, generally diffused throughout the work
force at large, producing the relatively homogenous wage structure described in the
previous chapter and a ‘standardised award structure.’3 In turn, this structure was
premised upon the dominance of standard, full-time employment for male workers, with
the male fitter employed in blue-collar industries generally taken as the regulatory
yardstick by arbitral tribunals. Chapter 4 also indicated that the labour law regime itself
was highly collectivist, with organised labour deeply imbricated in the workings of the
arbitration system and awards, the latter of which provided detailed and comprehensive
rules governing the employment relationship.

Lastly, the unique legal matrix

surrounding the labour law regime helped shape the architecture of the system,
particularly concerning the overlapping jurisdictions of the federal and state
government. Together, these structures constituted a cogent whole, channelling class
conflict through institutionalised channels and moderating certain crisis tendencies
although, as will be demonstrated, at the expense of setting others in motion.
Wage fixation
The fundamental concepts of wage fixation in 1964 had been in evidence since the
beginnings of the compulsory arbitration system.

In the famous Harvester Case,4

Higgins J had established a two-tiered structure, composed of a ‘Basic Wage’5 that
ideally supported all working-men and their families in ‘frugal comfort’6 and a system
of marginal payments for skill.7 Whereas the former was based upon the needs of an

Justice E.A. Dunphy and Justice S.C.G. Wright, ‘The Jubilee of Industrial Arbitration in the Federal
Sphere’ (1951) 25 Australian Law Journal 360, 365.
4
Ex parte H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (Harvester case).
5
Higgins J did not actually dub his creation the ‘Basic Wage’ until 1911: Federated Engine-Drivers and
Firemen’s Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (1911) 5 CAR 9, 14.
6
Harvester (1907) 2 CAR 1, 4.
7
See, for example: Ibid 7-16; Gas Employees Case (1919) 13 CAR 427, 461.
3
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unskilled labourer, the latter represented an increment paid for ‘[t]hose who have
acquired a skilled handicraft.’8
By 1964, this dual-wage remained on foot, albeit with significant modifications since
Harvester. Whereas the initial determination of a Basic Wage was on a needs basis, the
Great Depression had infused it with a more economistic logic, with the capacity of
industry to pay becoming a key concern.9 Moreover, the attempt to maintain the value
of the Basic Wage through automatic quarterly adjustments (indexed to prices),
introduced in 1922,10 had been abandoned in 1953 (again, largely on the grounds that
this principle was inconsistent with the capacity of the economy to pay). 11

The

combined result of both developments was a substantial increase in the size and scope
of Basic Wage cases. Faced with a Basic Wage that would not maintain purchasing
power automatically, unions resorted to launching claims more frequently, with Basic
Wage cases generally conducted annually from 1956 onwards. Moreover, the growing
centrality of the capacity to pay criterion saw an increasingly technocratic approach to
cases, with both unions and employer associations calling upon a retinue of expert
witnesses to buttress their cases.12
Capacity to pay had also come to feature prominently in the fixation of margins. As
will be seen chapter 7, from 1947 onwards the metal trades sector was increasingly
institutionalised at the apex of the award structure,13 a Fordist lead sector par
excellence. The fixation of margins there tended to ‘flow-on’ to other awards, whilst

Harvester (1907) 2 CAR 1, 4. Margins were defined more exhaustively in a 1954 case as ‘minimum
amounts awarded above the basic wage to particular classifications of employees for the features
attaching to their work which justify payments above the basic wage, whether those features are the skill
or experience required for the performance of the work, its particularly laborious nature, or the disabilities
attached to its performance.’ This expanded definition took into account the post-World War II reality
that most work attracted a margin of some kind. See: Metal Trades Margins Case (1954) 80 CAR 3, 24.
9
In 1931, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration reduced the Basic Wage by 10%. In
this case, and the subsequent decisions in 1932 and 1933 to reject claims for wage restoration, national
economic capacity featured as the predominant concern. See: Basic Wage Inquiry (1931) 30 CAR 2;
Application for Cancellation—Emergency Reduction of Award Rates (1932) 31 CAR 305; Application
(No. 2) for Cancellation Emergency Reduction of Wage Rates (1933) 32 CAR 90.
10
Basic Wage Case (1922) 16 CAR 829.
11
Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry 1952-1953 (1953) 77 CAR 477, 497.
12
Stuart Macintyre, ‘Arbitration in Action’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre (eds), The New Province for
Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (Cambridge University
Press, 2004) 55, 88.
13
Beginning in earnest with the Metal Trades Margins Case (1947) 58 CAR 1088.
8
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the capacity of the metal trades and of the national economy were largely taken as
synonymous.14
Equally important as the macro-level methods of Basic Wage and margins fixation were
inter-award relationships, regulated by the notion of ‘comparative wage justice.’ This
concept had a long pedigree in the landscape of Australian industrial regulation. It can
be read in a broad or narrow light,15 but its core is that ‘employees doing the same work
for different employers or in different industries should by and large receive the same
amount of pay irrespective of the capacity of their employer or industry.’16 Such a
system requires certain benchmark occupations to which most others can be
compared.17 From the 1920s, the fitter was increasingly taken as the measuring rod by
which other blue-collar occupations were judged,18 a reflection both of the fact that
fitters were found throughout the industrial structure and played a significant role in the
growing manufacturing sector.19 Combined with the dominance of the metal trades in
the post-World War II award framework, the general engineering fitter within the Metal
Trades Award occupied a special place in the architecture of Australian wage fixation.20
It provided the nexus point between the metals awards and most others in the award
framework, a relationship explored further in chapter 7.
Comparative wage justice has also been used to describe the preservation of historical
inter-award relativities.21 The practice of using benchmark occupations, and the fact
that early tribunal decisions often tended to codify existing employment categories and
pay differentials,22 encouraged the entrenchment of pay differentials. Combined with
the historically occupational-based structure of Australian trade unionism, this
established a complex web of intra- and inter-award relativities, with certain awards
14

See, for example: Metal Trades Margins Case (1954) 80 CAR 3, 32.
See, for example: Chris Provis, ‘Comparative Wage Justice’ (1986) 28(1) Journal of Industrial
Relations 24.
16
Oil Industry Case (1970) 134 CAR 159, 165.
17
As Commissioner O’Reilly noted in 1968: Furnishing Trades Award, 1964 in C.P. Mills and E.G.A.
Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 10(32) (23 November 1968) ¶461.
18
See, for example: Boilermakers’ Case (1924) 20 CAR 770, 778; Meat Industry Case (1925) 22 CAR
794, 803-804.
19
Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920-1972
(Cambridge University Press, 1975) 22.
20
Metal Trades Margins Case (1952) 73 CAR 324, 345.
21
Provis, above n 15, 27-30.
22
Keith Hancock and Sue Richardson, ‘Economic and Social Effects’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre
(eds), The New Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 139, 182.
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sharing ‘historical nexus’ with others. How these differentials arose was less important
than the fact that once on foot, they were jealously guarded by unions.23 A change in
the pay rates of one classification produced pressures for the changes in others in the
name of maintaining wage relativities.
The sensitivity of unions to intra- and inter-award relativities, together with a
willingness to take action to maintain them, was such as to force a de facto
acknowledgment on the part of the arbitral tribunals of the role of comparative wage
justice in ensuring industrial order.

A federal tribunal judge, Raymond Kelly,

commented in 1942 that:
It will of course be conceded by employers and employees alike that in default
of the adoption of, and adherence to the principle of comparative wage justice,
nothing but chaos would result in the field of minimum wage fixation. No basis
could be laid without this ‘cornerstone of industrial regulation’ for industrial
contentment in the community (my emphasis).24

This last statement reveals much more than it means to. It was made at a time when the
immense stresses of World War II were forging the critical industrial mass that could
found the antipodean Fordist model of development. It is remarkably prescient in
understanding how central comparative wage justice became to the post-War Australian
wage structure.
We are now in a position to describe the means by which wages were set for the
majority of the workforce during the height of antipodean Fordism.

From 1956

onwards, more-or-less annual Basic Wage Cases took as their reference point national
economy capacity. The union movement appeared quicker on the draw in developing a
cogent and sophisticated model of wage-fixation before the tribunal, particularly after
future Prime Minister Bob Hawke became the Australian Council of Trade Unions
(ACTU) advocate in 1959. From 1961 to 1964, its ‘prices plus productivity’ formula of
adjusting the Basic Wage for both productivity improvements and price increases was
the officially accepted model employed by the federal Commission.25 Importantly, in
23

See, for example: Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation v Archer (1913) 7 CAR 210; J. Hutson,
Six Wage Concepts (Amalgamated Engineering Union, 1971) 144-145.
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Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia v Balmoral Press (1942) 49 CAR 304, 310.
25
Basic Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry (1961) 97 CAR 376. For a useful overview of the prices plus
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the latter year, the employers’ proposal for a ‘Total Wage,’ 26 a fundamental
reformulation of the basic structure of Australian wage fixation, was rejected out of
hand.
When adjustments were made to the Basic Wage and margins, it was technically only
the Metal Trades Award that was being varied, with other awards moving in line when
the unions responsible for them applied to the Commission. The metals sector was a
Fordist lead sector par excellence, providing the motive force by which the institutional
structure turned.

The typical antipodean Fordist wage cycle it dominated can be

described thus. Militant metal unions, such as the Amalgamated Engineering Union,
were adroit in applying industrial pressure in a comparatively small number of large,
well-organised ‘hot shops’ over issues of margins, conditions and over-award
payments.27

The threat and efficacy of industrial action, together with the gains

achieved by this ‘plant-by-plant duress,’28 informed national level Basic Wage and
margins cases, which proved more likely to grant substantial increases when so
pressured.29 The paramountcy of the Metal Trades Award, together with the complex
web of relativities and nexus between awards, ensured that the Commission’s decisions
eventually flowed-on to the most workers. Stewart described this reality as:
‘[T]he shunter’s law’ or the law of transmitted shock. An upward pressure is
generated in one section or location in the economy and rapidly moves with a
series of successive thrusts, through other sections or territories, until its
momentum comes to rest. We have seen these upward pressures commence in
one State, or with margins for skill, or an Arbitration Court decision such as for
engineers and then reverberate quickly through other areas.30
This is a phenomenon key to a Fordist model of development, the ‘connective’
bargaining identified by Boyer that links the gains of employees in lead sectors with the

Employers’ Total Wage Case 1964 (1964) 106 CAR 683.
See, for example: Peter Cochrane, ‘Doing time’ in Verity Burgmann and Jenny Lee (eds), Making A
Life: A People’s History of Australia Since 1788 (McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, 1988) 177-193. Overawards were payments typically made at the workplace/enterprise level which were technically outside
the formal arbitration system.
28
Ibid.
29
Sheridan, above n 19, 286-293. Indeed, the federal Commission itself noted this pattern, describing
how ‘[t]he “militant” approach … was based upon the view that the way to win a case before the
Commission was, first to develop a major national propaganda campaign and make claims on every
employer and seek to obtain over-award payments by demands backed by the threat of strikes, which
should if necessary be carried into action. Application should then be made to the Commission to obtain
recognition of the established fact’: National Wage Cases of 1965 (1965) 110 CAR 189, 261.
30
Keith Stewart quoted in Hutson, above n 23, 142-143.
26
27
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workforce at large,31 producing the relatively homogenous wage structure noted in the
previous chapter and buttressing the contention that the arbitration system precociously
enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus.
At this point of maximum Fordist functionality, however, there were already indications
of potential crisis tendencies. Firstly, the two-tier Basic Wage/margin structure was
becoming increasingly unwieldly, with separate benches having to be constituted to
hear claims that, in the 1965, were heard concurrently anyway. 32 As national economic
capacity came to underpin both components of the formal wage, 33 employers came to
resent the process of dual determination, regarding it as an opportunity for unions to
‘double-dip.’34 The entrenchment of the Metal Trades Award as an institutionalised
pace-setter depended in part on the dynamism of the metals sector. As shall be seen in
chapter 7, if this dynamism waned, the relatively larger wage gains in other sectors
would tend to encourage wage rounds as metals workers sought to catch-up. This
potential was exacerbated by the pervasive ideology of comparative wage justice which,
in a situation of high inflation and industrial instability, could lead to wage ‘leapfrogging,’ the stoking of a wage-price spiral and, most significantly for capitalists, an
erosion of the profit share of national income. Moreover, full employment strengthened
the union hand in extracting over-award payments, which risked larger and larger
segments of total wage rises occurring outside the purview of the Commission.35
In 1964, however, these threats were largely latent, kept in check by the coherence of
antipodean Fordism.
Employment forms/flexibility
Absolutely central to the Fordist wage labour nexus was the provision of employment
security and a basket of rights and entitlements in exchange for the intensification of

31
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Jonathan Gaul, ‘Employers to test total wage plan in court case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 7 January
1965, 1.
34
See, for example: ‘Employers Open Wage Case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 22 April 1964, 3/16.
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labour and Taylorist work practices, the standard employment model described in
chapter 4.
By 1964, standard employment was firmly established as ‘the crucial pivot in the
development of labour regulation, social welfare policy and trade union action,’36
having assumed a more-or-less cogent shape in the post-World War II period.37 Part of
the basket of rights, both in Australia and other Fordist countries, was the prescription
of regular, so-called ‘ordinary,’ working hours. In Australia, the specific form this
assumed was the 40-hour work week spread over five days.38 For many Australian
workers, this was won off the back of a massive wave of industrial action following the
end of World War II. Reduced working-hours was seen as an essential component of
the post-War order, and was reflected by the universal support the 40-hours campaign
commanded amongst the union movement.39 After some groups of workers achieved a
40-hour week during the conflict, a general test case was convened before the federal
tribunal.40

Goaded by the New South Wales Australian Labor Party (ALP)

government,41 and sensitive to the threat of industrial disruption,42 the Commission
acquiesced and, on 8 September 1947, granted the 40-hour work week,43 with the other
state tribunals following its lead.44 Although the various commissions did not state that
this had to be worked over five days, unions sought to ensure that it did, proving willing

John Burgess and Iain Campbell, ‘Casual Employment in Australia: Growth, Characteristics, A Bridge
or a Trap?’ (1998) 9(1) Economic and Labour Relations Review 31, 33.
37
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to apply industrial pressure to this end.45 The success of unions in this regard is
evidenced by Jones’ observation that ‘[s]ince the adoption of the 40-hour week, there
has been general acceptance that ordinary hours of work should be within a five-day
week, except for retail and similar trades rendering service direct to the public.’46
The development of a 40-hour, five-day ordinary working week was one of the primary
hallmarks of the entrenchment of the standard employment model, a reality that shall be
explored in great detail when I come to consider the case of retail in chapter 9. By
1964, other rights and entitlements consonant with the model had also been achieved.
For example, test cases before the federal Commission increased paid annual leave to
two weeks in 1945,47 three weeks in 196348 and would soon (in 1973-74) be set at the
still-prevailing standard of four weeks.49 The majority of the states provided for longservice leave in the 1950s,50 with the federal tribunal following suit in 1964,51 a
development reinforcing the notion of lifetime employment significant to the workings
of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus.52
The entrenchment of the standard employment model was also effected by the
imposition of strict award controls over the use of other forms of labour. The link
between the former and full-time employment was particularly strong in Australia,53
with the result that unions took active steps to protect its position vis-à-vis other
employment categories. As shall be seen in the case study chapters, provision for parttime workers within awards was very limited, with unions typically intensely suspicious
of its capacity to supplant full-time employment. Casual employees had a greater
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standing in the award system;54 indeed, O’Donnell argues that ‘the category of casual
employment in Australia is largely the creation of the award system rather than the
common law.’55 However, as chapters 8 and 9 will demonstrate, this form was tightly
hemmed in by a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures, including proportions
clauses regulating the ratio of casual to full-time staff and/or the share of casual hours in
total hours worked.
These developments, together with the plentiful supply of full-time jobs in a strongly
growing economy, ensured the dominance of the standard employment model during
the period of antipodean Fordist functionality. However, as was the case with the
system of wage fixation, this state of affairs came with its own inbuilt crisis tendencies.
The development of a basket of standard hours and conditions had to be won through
struggle. Capital typically begrudged each and every concession to labour, despite the
fact they ultimately benefited from the resultant coherence of the Fordist wage-labour
nexus.56 In other words, the forward momentum that carried this model forward was
premised on working-class strength.

Moreover, the dominance of the standard

employment model went hand-in-hand with full employment. The two exhibited a
mutually-reinforcing character; full employment enabled unions to leverage the benefits
of standard employment, whilst standard employment tended to buttress the strength of
organised labour.57
Full employment would prove to be one of the key levers of the crisis of antipodean
Fordism, abrading the ability of the arbitration system to keep union power within the
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boundaries set by valorisation imperatives.58 To the extent of their interrelationship,
standard employment contributed to this reality.
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations
It will be recalled that in chapter 3 I elucidated the basic distinction between law and
administration.

Whereas the former is centred on the de-classed juridical citizen-

subject, equal to all other members of the polity, administration fills the gaps class
struggle rends in this structure by taking as its reference point the organised collectives
of labour and capital. There are few better concrete examples of this theoretical point
than the nature of the Australian arbitration system in 1964. In this period, the labour
law regime was highly collectivist, as it had been ever since the steady expansion of
federal and state awards in the 1920s progressively crowded out (but did not extinguish)
the common-law contractual system. Indeed, one of the stated purposes of the original
Conciliation and Arbitration Act was ‘[t]o facilitate and encourage the organization of
representative bodies of employers and of employees,’59 whilst Higgins J had stated in
1915 that ‘without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration could be worked.’60
This centrality was reflected in a number of ways. Firstly, after becoming a ‘registered’
organisation, a host of benefits accrued to a trade union. Most importantly, it could
initiate proceedings unilaterally in the Commission.

This guaranteed juridical

recognition of trade unions tended to prevent employers from refusing to recognise or
treat with them;61 if unions could obtain results on their own account in the tribunal, it
made little sense for employers to leave themselves out in the cold. Registration also
conferred other benefits, such as the guarantee of a union monopoly over a certain
group of workers (both in terms of representation and, in some instances, membership),
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the attainment of corporate status, the ability to be party to awards, and the protection of
trade union officials and members from certain acts of discrimination by employers.62
The collectivism of the regime was also reflected in the fact that the respondents to
awards were unions, and ipso facto those eligible to be members, as opposed to
individual workers. It was the union, rather than individual workers, who had standing
to appear before the Commission.63 It is telling that, formally speaking, non-unionists
were not parties to an award.64 The understanding which buttressed this particular
structure was that trade unions were the legitimate representatives of workers, including
employees who weren’t members and were working in non-union shops. Unions were
empowered to act on their behalf, even if the workers caught up in resultant disputes
were happy with their terms and conditions of employment.65
The period of antipodean Fordist functionality had seen this system reinforced,
particularly through cementing the ability of unions to maintain de facto monopolies of
labour through strengthened preference provisions.

From the beginnings of the

arbitration system it was within the power of both the federal and state tribunals to
award preference to unionists.66 This power, however, was tightly regulated and actual
use was comparatively rare.67 The aforementioned upsurge in industrial action in the
immediate post-World War II period, however, led to a re-think. As part of a basket of
amendments enacted in 1947, the federal tribunal was given a much wider power to
enact preference clauses in awards.68 Although the High Court read the provision in a
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narrow way, so preventing absolute preference to unionists,69 it was nevertheless an
attempt on the part of what was probably the most left-wing federal Labor government
to further integrate unionism with the award system.70
The 1947 amendments are also an instructive example of administration as practice as
well as structure.71 A concern that excessive legalism in the conduct of conciliation and
arbitration stoked industrial disruption72 encouraged the Chifley government to appoint
a host of ‘lay’ commissioners. These needn’t come from a legal background, and
enjoyed wide powers to make awards and settle disputes, except where these touched on
wages and hours.73 Frazer notes that ‘[i]t was expected that they would operate as
administrative bodies rather than legal tribunals, exercising their powers with
discretion to prevent impending disputes before they arose’ (my emphasis).74 Such a
system was predicated on an understanding and acknowledgement of union power and
the willingness of workers to resort to the strike weapon. Other scholars have noted the
recourse to more administrative or ‘accommodative’ attitudes and practices on the part
of the Commission during periods of intense class struggle and heightened worker
power,75 an implicit acknowledgement of the movement towards administration during
the antipodean Fordist period.
Despite the collectivism of the labour law regime, however, the species of collectivism
which was encouraged was of a moderate, bureaucratic nature. Peetz has described how
so-called ‘arbitral unionism’ was often more concerned with organisational efficiency
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before the tribunals than the building of an activist, self-reliant rank-and-file.76
Moreover, part of the historic mission of compulsory arbitration, as Justice Higgins saw
it, was to ameliorate ‘the rude and barbarous processes of strike and lockout. Reason is
to displace force; the might of the State is to enforce peace between industrial
combatants.’77
By 1964, the initial prohibitions on strikes and lockouts provided for in the original
Conciliation and Arbitration Act78 had long been repealed, but their disciplinary
function had been assumed by so-called ‘bans clauses,’ provisions inserted in awards
that typically prohibited conduct such as bans, limitations or restrictions upon the
performance of work.79 Once ascertained, breaches of bans clauses could be punished
by injunctions and/or fines. Whilst reflecting the collectivist nature of the Australian
labour law system (through, inter alia, making bans clauses binding on unions rather
than individual employees), these penal provisions exploited this collectivism to ensure
both union moderation and centralised union control over militant rank-and-file
members.80 After the 1956 Boilermakers’ Case,81 which saw the arbitral and judicial
functions of the Federal tribunal separated between the re-dubbed Commonwealth
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and a new Industrial Court respectively, the
latter was charged with the machinery of enforcing penal provisions. The Court existed
as an element of the formal judicial system, bound by the application of rigid juridical
formula, an ideological affinity with the employers and a profound aversion to the more
pragmatic approach of the arbitral tribunals.82 In short, it was an example of the nature
of law counter-posed to administration.83 Unsurprisingly, it proved itself a safe pair of
hands for business, freely granting injunctions for breaches of bans clauses; non-
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complying unions faced fines for contempt.84 From 1961 onwards in particular, the use
of these provisions by employers to discipline militant unions, especially in the metal
trades, escalated,85 and foreboded a showdown between metal unions and the
employers, the latter of whom would be supported by the state. In 1964, however,
metal union leaders were not at this point,86 and bans clauses were effective enough at
moderating industrial behaviour (or at least making militant unions pay a premium for
their activities).
As would be anticipated by the model of the antipodean Fordist labour process, the
collectivism of the regime was also generally barred entry to the inner sanctum of
control over the labour process. The federal tribunal was empowered to hear and
determine disputes only insofar as they revolved around ‘matters pertaining to the
relations of employers and employees,’87 the definition of which fell to the High Court.
Stating the case in 1972, Justice Stephen noted ‘the subject of demands by either party
which are, for example, of a political or social or managerial nature will not be
industrial matters’ (my emphasis).88 The period of antipodean Fordist functionality,
therefore, saw the domain of managerial prerogative more-or-less armoured against the
intrusion of trade unions into the control and organisation of the labour process
(excepting the aforementioned award controls on the use and deployment of precarious
labour).89
With this understanding in hand, I can move to a consideration of the scale of industrial
relations during this period of antipodean Fordist functionality. As can be gathered
from the discussion on wage fixation above, the Commonwealth tribunal was coming to
exercise a growing dominance over industrial regulation generally, with the state
equivalents increasingly following its lead. Given the centrality of the KWNS to the
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fabric of Fordism generally, this increasing development of the federal-level as the
primary scale of industrial relations is unsurprising. However, the unique institutional
fabric of the arbitration system ensured that the way in which this increasing
centralisation came about was novel.
As will be discussed in the following section, the Constitution vests the federal
parliament with the ability to legislate ‘conciliation and arbitration for the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.’90
The early history of arbitration saw this power read narrowly, with the High Court
maintaining that federal awards could not have common rule effect (unlike their state
equivalents).91 In other words, awards could only be made in the resolution of interstate disputes between identifiable parties.
By the period of antipodean Fordist functionality, however, this situation had changed,
in practice if not necessarily in the letter of the law. Firstly, the High Court had
validated the union tactic of creating ‘paper disputes’ (by serving logs of claims on
employers in more than one state), by which they could enliven the federal
jurisdiction.92 Secondly, the High Court had also given as expanded meaning to section
109 of the Constitution,93 which guarantees the paramountcy of laws of the
Commonwealth over individual states in the event of inconsistency.94 Lastly, as the
sphere of economic activity increasingly took on a national, as opposed to strictly statebased, character, the field of federal regulation naturally tended to grow. 95 Within this
framework, the federal tribunal gradually came to influence state bodies more than they
influenced it; from the 1950s in particular, the latter came to generally follow the lead of
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the former in matter such as Basic Wage determination96 and in fields where the
Commonwealth was dominant.97 Although not codified in the way it would be during
the crisis of antipodean Fordism, by 1964 the federal tribunal exercised the kind of
authority necessary to the maintenance of the national-level as the primary scale of
Fordist regulation.98
Legal matrix
Much of what is relevant about the broader legal matrix in the constitution of industrial
regulation, particularly regarding the constitutional foundations of conciliation and
arbitration, has been discussed above. Important to note here are two additional issues.
Firstly, the limitations as to the extent of federal regulation extended to the nature of the
industries under regulation. A dispute could only be handled under the arbitral power if
it could be regarded as ‘industrial.’ Despite a fairly liberal start,99 the High Court
generally came to regard industry as encompassing the production and/or distribution of
tangible goods and commodities, as well as activities thought to be incidental or
ancillary to it (such as banking and insurance).100 This meant that considerable numbers
of workers, such as teachers,101 firefighters102 and state health and welfare staff,103
remained outside federal jurisdiction. As well as impinging upon the ability of the
federal Commission to control the aggregate movement of wages, it grated against the
increasing spread of unionism into these white-collar occupations.
Secondly, the development of the machinery of arbitration and conciliation had in many
ways submerged, although by no means extinguished, the significance of the common
law as it applied to employment and industrial relations. Of particular note was the fact
that the disciplining mechanisms used to rein in intransigent unions, such as bans
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clauses and union de-registration, operated through the arbitration system. Older means
of employer redress, such as common law industrial torts, generally fell into desuetude.
That is, the tools of union restraint were attached to a system that I have identified as an
administrative response to class struggle, taking as its subjects the very bodies it was
trying to keep in line. The supremacy of these forms over older common law remedies
is evidence both of the relative dominance of administration over the ‘pure’ legal form
within antipodean Fordism and the degree of consensus between labour and capital
regarding arbitration’s place as the central node of industrial relations.104

1975 – End of antipodean Fordist boom
By 1975, the scene had changed dramatically. As established in the previous chapter,
the long boom had come to an end as antipodean Fordism lost coherence.

The

contradictions latent within the antipodean Fordist labour law regime had by now
germinated and were rapidly coming into full bloom. In particular, the system of wage
fixation had become deeply unstable and was increasingly outside the control of the
federal tribunal, compromising the lynchpin role it exercised within the antipodean
Fordist mode of regulation. The precocious institutionalisation of trade union power
had also become dysfunctional, as waves of rank-and-file militancy broke over the walls
of arbitration. Amidst this turmoil can also be seen emerging the first attempts to
address these crisis tendencies systematically. After a brief dalliance with the idea of
supplementing arbitration with a system of collective bargaining in 1973 (a de facto
recognition of union success in directly negotiating over-award payments with
employers), a system of wage indexation was officially adopted by the Commission in
1975. Such a development represented an attempt to resolve the contradictions of
antipodean Fordism through the intensification of its institutions.
Wage fixation
By 1975, huge changes had broken out all along the wage fixation front. Firstly, the
two-part Basic Wage/margins structure had been superseded in 1967 by the so-called
‘Total Wage,’ a single figure for award classifications into which both the Basic Wage
and margins were collapsed. As mentioned above, employer groups first floated the
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idea before the federal tribunal in 1964.105

The Commission had rejected the

application, noting that to do so was ‘to abandon a concept which had been an integral
part of Australian wage fixation for over fifty years.’106 It had also opined that there
was little more to the employers’ proposal than ‘greater tidiness’ in the operation of the
system, which was countervailed by trenchant union opposition and the tribunal’s
overarching (administrative) role in the prevention and settlement of disputes.107
However, union militancy in a situation of full employment had begun to tax the Basic
Wage/margins structure, especially given the incidence of escalating over-award
payments in key industries such as metals.108 In particular, employers were coming to
resent the centrality of the metals sector in the determination of marginal rates for the
national wage structure.109
By 1966, the Commission had been convinced, approving of the Total Wage in
principle110 and, consequent upon a work-value inquiry into the metal trades, deploying
it in 1967.111 If, however, the goal was to disrupt the status of the metal trades as an
institutionalised lead sector (as I argue in the next chapter), the effort failed dismally.
This brings us to the second major problem that had manifested itself by 1975: the
increasing exhaustion of the metal trades as a lead sector. Given that this is an issue
which is explored in great detail in chapter 7, it can be presented rather schematically
here.

From the early 1970s in particular, it was becoming apparent that the

aforementioned tension inherent in the position of the metal trades was manifesting
itself. In particular, the place of the Metal Trades Award and its successor, the Metal
Industry Award, at the apex of the award framework had generated a contradictory
reality in which metal workers were increasingly disadvantaged precisely because of
this structure. With the knowledge that any increase granted in metal awards would
flow through to large sections of the workforce, minimum rates in these awards had
tended to lose ground relative to other manufacturing awards, especially in the early
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1970s.112 This not only compelled metal workers to seek higher over-awards but also
invited large ‘catch-up’ claims to match wage rises granted in other key sectors, such as
transport and building.113 Given the fact that the metal awards remained institutional
leaders, even in the face of a loss of relative industrial significance, these catch-up
claims then flowed-though to other industries on the basis of comparative wage justice
claims. The result: large, ‘leap-frogging’ wage claims in the early to mid-1970s114
which made for industrial disruption and a fragile wage structure increasingly outside of
the control of the federal tribunal.
The Commission’s loss of control over the aggregate movement of wages, together with
its often ad hoc and contradictory responses, constitutes a third major frontier of change.
What Bramble posits as the start of the ‘flood tide’ of union militancy was the outcome
of the 1967 work-value inquiry into the Metal Trades Award.115 The Commission had
become increasingly uneasy with the fact that this leading award was based upon a
classification structure which was developed and valued when it was created in 1930.116
The concern of the Commission was that metal margins themselves, as well as the
relativities between them, did not reflect the actual value of the work being
performed.117 Given the pronounced impact of new technologies on the content and
range of jobs, and the use of the fitter as a yardstick for many awards, the Metal Trades
Award was, according to the Commission, increasingly anachronistic as a pace-setter in
its current form.
What was significant about the work value inquiry, however, was not so much its
findings as the aftermath.

The Commission had granted comparatively generous

marginal increases,118 but left it open to employers to ‘absorb,’ or off-set, the rises out
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of existing over-award payments.119 Moreover, as will be investigated further in chapter
7, the Commission explicitly sought to restrict the margins adjustments to the Metal
Trades Award,120 an attempted usurpation of its place at the apex of the award
framework. On both scores, the Commission failed dismally, with a huge upsurge of
industrial action in the metals sector ensuring the defeat of absorption and paving the
way for strong currents of flow-on.
This event marked an upswing in union militancy generally, a development greatly
aided by unions breaking the shackles of the bans clauses. A massive strike in May
1969 essentially wrecked the penal provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration
Act.121 The increasingly profligate use of such disciplining tools by employers, and the
willingness of the Industrial Court to grant them, had pushed union tolerance to the
edge.

Although an amended framework of penal powers was developed in the

aftermath, they fell into desuetude as their use became politically untenable in a context
of union militancy and Commission reticence.122
The most important consequence of this new reality for wage fixation was the removal
of legal-administrative impediments to union pay campaigns. Organised labour thus
found it easier to extract higher over-award payments and/or secure ‘consent’ awards123
through direct action. Employers generally caved along the front throughout the early
1970s, resulting in the real wage spike documented in the previous chapter, with
workers receiving an increasingly large chunk of their wage rises outside of the purview
of both state and federal tribunals. The percentage of wage increases stemming from
National Wage Cases steadily declined from 52.6% in 1969/70 to a mere 19.1% in
1973/74.124 That is, approximately 80% of the wage increases obtained by workers in
1973/74 were outside the Commission’s main instrument of wage policy.
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This fact was not lost on the Commission, a recognition that, in line with the schema
linking the law-administration continuum to class struggle developed in Chapter 2,
forced it to temporarily relinquish the system of principles developed throughout the
1960s (the administrative equivalent of legal precedent) and develop ad hoc
accommodative responses that attempted to put out the spot-fires of proletarian
struggle.125 It tacitly admitted as much in justifying the comparatively generous 6%
increase granted in the 1970 wage case,126 also foreshadowing restrictions on its scope
to award future increases:
If we are not realistic in our attitude to wage fixation, then those who look to the
Commission as their main source of wage increases … will be treated
inequitably while more and more of those who are strong enough to do so will
seek increases in the field. If in the present state of the economy and in the
atmosphere of general affluence … we failed to give a reasonable increase we
would be failing in our duty. However, we wish to emphasise that the material
before us … disclosed a state of affairs which if continued may inhibit the
Commission in future national wage cases. This material shows union pressure
for wage increases outside the Commission leading to concessions from
employers, sometimes granted too easily, which favour the industrially strong
(my emphasis).127

It will be noted that the Commission used the criterion of comparative wage justice as a
justification for the increase granted. Indeed, throughout this period it had held the line
on this principle as some unions sought to exploit the highly favourable economic
conditions of the mid to late 1960s by introducing the profitability of individual firms as
another basis upon which pay could be calculated.128 The Commission reiterated the
traditional view that capacity to pay, a central consideration in wage fixation, was to be
assessed at the industry/macroeconomic level. This was thoroughly in keeping with the
predominant spatial scales of industrial relations and the oligopolistic competition
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characterising antipodean Fordism.129 The Commission also argued that the system
sought by the unions in these cases would disrupt the equalising role comparative wage
justice played, as well as affirming the distribution of productivity gains to the
workforce at a national level.130
However, as was foreshadowed above, the continued entrenchment of the comparative
wage justice doctrine ensured accelerating wage rounds in the early to mid-1970s,
particularly from 1973-1975 as inflation spiralled. Hancock notes that in this latter
period, average annual earnings increased by a massive 20.5%, 131 constituting the real
wage spike documented in chapter 4. Bentley states that as the resultant ‘wage-price
spiral was dealt with by trade unions (and employers) in an unplanned and decentralized
manner, wage relativities were disturbed. These disturbances led to a process of wageleapfrogging…’132
By the end of 1974, however, the deepening of the economic crisis, both globally and
within Australia, had forced a rethink on the part of the state, capital and labour. 133 The
Whitlam Labor government grew perceptibly tired of union militancy and large wage
claims.134 It began to flirt with the idea of wage indexation,135 whereby wage increases
granted by the Commission were limited to the rise in the Consumer Price Index. This
would tend to reduce cost-push inflation, whilst the certainty in the level of wage rises
would reduce ambit claims by unions.136 Unions were generally supportive; right-wing
unions welcomed the prospect of wage increases without strikes, whilst the union most
129
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likely to oppose indexation, the militant Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union
(AMWU), was grappling with deepening economic problems in the metal sector. 137 For
the movement generally, indexation seemed appealing as a means of locking-in the
large real wage gains recently achieved.138 Employers and the conservative parties,
were generally reluctant, but many of the former had come around to the idea that
something needed to change.139
The ACTU and the Commonwealth proposed automatic wage indexation in the 1974
Wage Case.140 The Commission rejected it as this stage, citing amongst other things the
need for unions to rein in wage claims outside of National Wage Cases. 141 Once the
ACTU had reluctantly given such an undertaking,142 the Commission duly developed a
set of wage-fixing principles centred on indexation in its 1975 National Wage Case.143
The essence of the system was that wage rises outside of indexation would be small and
would not threaten the Commission’s efforts to regulate aggregate wage outcomes.144
I am now in a position to describe the dysfunctional character of wage fixation and its
role in constituting the crisis of antipodean Fordism in the early to mid-1970s. The
advent of the Total Wage in 1967 had done very little to usurp the institutionalised
position of the metals sector. However, the flagging dynamism of this sector, and
manufacturing more broadly, saw workers in other industries pull ahead. Given the fact
that many awards were tied to the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, large
catch-up campaigns by metal workers sparked comparative wage justice claims by other
unions. In a context of high inflation, a destabilising process of wage leapfrogging ate
into the profit share of national income, made for increasing uncertainty in wage
fixation and saw the Commission lose control of the aggregate movement in wages.
This movement was greatly facilitated by the union victory over the penal powers in

Braham Dabscheck, ‘The 1975 National Wage Case: Now We Have an Incomes Policy’ (1975) 17(3)
Journal of Industrial Relations 298, 306.
138
Hancock and Richardson, above n 22, 168.
139
See, for example: ‘Metal employers support wage indexation’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 30 August
1975, 3; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 October 1975, 1832
(Gough Whitlam); ‘Opposition’s policy ‘threatens wage indexation’’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 17
October 1975, 17.
140
National Wage Case 1974 (1974) 157 CAR 293.
141
Ibid.
142
Dabscheck, ‘The 1975 National Wage Case’, above n 137, 301-302.
143
National Wage Case April 1975 (1975) 167 CAR 18.
144
Ibid 32.
137

145

1969. Employers found it harder to resist over-award demands, whilst the Commission
and Industrial Court were shorn of a key tool used to discipline militant unions.
The confluence of these developments is key to understanding the Commission’s
decision, supported by the state and federal governments and the ACTU, to adopt a
wage indexation system in April 1975. It represented a conscious effort to re-establish
the Commission as the main source of wage increases and the arbiter of wage policy.
That this was necessary was also a function of the limitations of the arbitral power,
which rendered the Commission as the only real institutional means through which the
federal state could exercise wage and industry policy designed to address the economic
crisis. Wage indexation was thus an explicit effort to address the crisis of antipodean
Fordism through an intensification of its institutions. The arbitration system, a lynchpin
of the antipodean Fordist mode of regulation, was seeing its authority augmented in an
attempt to clamp down on the wage explosion that had largely come about outside its
framework.145
This was an effort fraught with danger. Deepening an antipodean Fordist institution
risked magnifying its contradictions on a broader stage. Moreover, given the limitations
inherent in the arbitral power of the Constitution, the Commission remained constrained
in the ways it could intervene in the labour market. For wage indexation to be effective,
a more-or-less durable consensus between the state, capital and labour was required.
The support of the latter was especially critical. The ability of the ACTU to keep
militant unions in check and promise minimal wage claims outside indexation was
explicitly identified by the Commission as key in making indexation a viable
concern.146 If unions rebelled, the system would be a dead-letter.
Forms of employment/flexibility
Unlike the case with wage fixation, the institutional arrangements surrounding the
standard employment model remained essentially unchanged. Awards continued to
encourage full-time employment, and the system of qualitative and quantitative checks
on other forms, such as casual and part-time labour, remained in place.
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However, beneath the surface of comparative institutional stasis, a major change was
taking place in the composition of the workforce. From the early 1960s, women were
entering the workforce in ever increasing numbers, being particularly concentrated in
clerical and sales positions.147

Whereas in February 1968, 36.9% of the female

population aged 15 and over were in the labour force,148 by November 1975 this had
grown substantially to 43.7%.149

This growth was overwhelmingly in ‘part-time’

employment;150 indeed, Hancock shows that the number of women employed as parttime workers increased by 84% between 1966 and 1975, compared to a 24% increase in
full-time female workers.151
Female workers not employed on a full-time basis were thus becoming an increasingly
important segment of the workforce. Chapters 8 and 9 will demonstrate that this
development would grate against the award system’s preference for, and defence of, the
standard employment model.
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations
The question of collectivism/individualism can be dispensed with easily enough. In
chapter 4, it was argued that the crisis of antipodean Fordism was at least partially
constituted by the very collectivism of the system, and the growing dysfunctionality in
its articulation with the valorisation of capital.

Certainly, trade union power was

waxing in the early 1970s.152 After comparatively slow absolute growth in the 1960s
(accompanied by a comparatively small but steady loss in density), 153 union
membership and density grew strongly in the early 1970s,154 even in traditionally
poorly-unionised white-collar sectors.155 Industrial disputation sky-rocketed as workers
147
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increasingly resorted to direct action to get results. Whereas in 1963, some 581,568
working-days were lost in industrial disputes,156 1969 saw 1,957,957 days lost,157 whilst
in 1974 (the peak of the early 1970s strike wave) an enormous 6,292,500 working days
were forfeited to disputes.158 Expressed differently, the days lost to industrial disputes
in 1974 represented an enormous 982% increase on the 1963 figure. The general
upswell in class struggle also encouraged employers to come to closed-shop
arrangements with unions perceived to be industrially moderate in sectors such as retail
(more on which will be discussed in chapter 9), banking and administration, in the
hopes of excluding militant competitors.159 Regardless of whether or not capital was
successful in the latter regard, such agreements reinforced the institutional entrenchment
of trade unionism within Australian industrial relations and buttressed the collectivist
character of its labour law regime.
As regarding the scale of industrial relations, this burgeoning crisis period of antipodean
Fordism saw a contradictory reality. The increasing significance of National Wage and
margins cases in the 1960s, together with the role of the federal Commission as one of
the key macroeconomic lynchpins in the fabric of antipodean Fordism, had encouraged
an increasing concentration of representation on the part of both capital and labour. The
resource and research demands of wage cases facilitated the growth in ACTU power
vis-à-vis affiliates. In the all-important metals sector, the immense AMWU had come
into being in 1973, whilst the employers had created the Metal Trades Industry
Association (MTIA). Workers and employers, therefore, were increasing the scale upon
which they mobilised.
However, as can be gathered from the foregoing discussion of over-award campaigns
and the marginalisation of National Wage Cases, increasing organisational
centralisation was concomitant with the emergence of a de facto collective bargaining
system, one that was most prevalent at the workplace, enterprise and, sometimes,
industry level. It made little sense for unions to go through the rigmarole of compulsory
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conciliation and arbitration for an uncertain outcome when the application of industrial
pressure on employers could deliver better outcomes in a timely fashion.160
The pervasiveness of union collective bargaining outside the bounds of the arbitration
system had convinced many within both the industrial and political wings of the labour
movement that the arbitration system was in need of a thorough overhaul. The ALP
Industrial Relations Committee had in 1970:
[R]ecommended that tribunals should confine themselves to the fixation of
minimum rates and conditions and expect that there will be bargaining for overaward payments and conditions. It also suggested that present bargaining
procedures for over-award conditions should be regularized and formalized.161

The recommendation was enshrined in the ALP’s industrial relations platform unveiled
in May 1971, which was ‘based firmly on the principle of collective bargaining.’ 162 The
tabling in April 1973 of a Bill to amend the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904
represented a wide-ranging reform package, including, amongst other things, a total
abolition of the penal powers, granting of immunity from tort liability for unions and
officials for acts related to an industrial matter163 and, most importantly, limiting the
power of the Commission to refuse to certify ‘collective agreements.’164

It was

described by Minister for Labour Clyde Cameron as ‘the first stage of a radical
transformation of industrial relations in Australia.’165 In the event, however, strong
hostility from the business community and parliamentary conservatives, together with
Senate obstructionism, ensured that the Act that was eventually passed was heavily

160

A fact explicitly acknowledged by important figures within the labour movement. See, for example:
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 June 1970, 2716 (Donald Cameron);
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 23 May 1972, 1937 (James Cavanagh);
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 May 1973, 1763 (Joseph Riordan).
161
Bentley, ‘‘Australian Trade Unionism 1970-71’, above n 132, 414.
162
Howard, ‘Australian Trade Unions in the Context of Union Theory’, above n 124, 269.
163
In the face of the strike wave and the abolition of the penal provisions, there was a small but troubling
reversion of some employers to common law actions against unions for so-called ‘economic’ torts:
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 April 1973, 1428 (Clyde
Cameron).
164
See, for example: Ibid 1430-1431; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,
9 May 1973, 1857-1858 (Joseph Riordan); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 15 May 1973, 15721577 (Reginald Bishop).
165
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 April 1973, 1424 (Clyde
Cameron).

149

diluted. In particular, a genuine collective bargaining system did not emerge, whilst
immunity from tort actions was dropped and strike penalties retained.166
Two key points are of note here. Firstly, the failure to grant unions immunity from
actions in tort would come to bear dark fruit in the 1980s (as shall be revealed below).
Secondly, the conservative reaction to the original Bill was due in no small part to the
fear that collective bargaining in a context of union strength would amount to industrial
duress untrammelled by arbitration.167 In 1970, the Minister for Labour Billy Snedden
stated the conservative case quite candidly: ‘The concern that I have about direct
negotiation is the degree to which powerful unions in an industrial sense are able to use
the threat of strike action to coerce employers to give wage increases beyond the
capacity of the economy to pay and in advance of the development of productivity.’168
From this perspective the arbitration system was perceived as a defence against union
militancy, a view shared by some employers concerned at its usurpation. The President
of the Australian Capital Territory Employers Federation, for example, pleaded that
‘[t]he Government and Parliament need to strengthen authority to discourage strikes and
encourage conciliation and arbitration’ (my emphasis).169
This last statement is significant for the purposes of this thesis in two ways. Firstly, it
helps explain why the process of institutional searching for ways out of the developing
crisis initially took the form of an intensification of antipodean Fordist institutions. If
the arbitration system, rather than union militancy at the point of production, was
identified as the core issue by a strategic majority of employers, then it is hardly likely
that the effort to recentralise control under its aegis would have succeeded. Secondly, it
provides a stark point of contrast to the developing attitude of capital in the latter half of
the 1980s and early 1990s, where the institutions of arbitration themselves were
perceived to be the source of malaise. Capital would come to forget its own history
when it championed the cause of collective, or ‘enterprise,’ bargaining in these periods.
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Legal matrix
Broadly speaking, the constitutional basis upon which the arbitration system was
erected remained unchanged.

However, another head of power which the

Commonwealth could use to legislate received a major boost in 1971 when the High
Court significantly expanded the ambit of the corporations power.170 This amplified
power underwrote the Trade Practices Act 1974,171 a statute that was initially concerned
with the establishment of ‘laws concerning restrictive trade practices … mergers and
acquisitions, and consumer protection.’172 This piece of legislation would, however,
become in the near future a major weapon against militant unionism.

1982 – Institutional exhaustion
1982 represents the end point of the initial attempts to handle the crisis of antipodean
Fordism through intensifying its institutions. The indexation system established in 1975
began to be abraded in the late 1970s and finally came unstuck in 1981. Its end was
brought about by another large wage round, ostensibly based on work-value
considerations but in essence simply another iteration of the post-war pattern of flowon. Crucially, the system again reverted to a more de-centralised model, with the
Commission’s decision to abandon indexation based in no small part on the fact that
employers were already conceding wage and conditions demands to unions at the
enterprise and industry level. Moreover, the conservative Fraser government’s efforts
to curb union power through a specialist body, the Industrial Relations Bureau (IRB),
proved a dead letter.
Amidst this stagnation, however, can be discerned the first developments that speak of a
qualitatively different means of addressing crisis, means which cut across the grain of
antipodean Fordism rather than buttressing it. Of especial note was the development of
tools to disrupt the unification of the proletariat, most notably through the emergence of
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statutory prohibitions on solidarity action, or ‘secondary boycotts.’ In outline, these can
be considered ‘proto’ liberal-productivist impulses.
Wage fixation
The wage indexation system established in 1975 operated effectively enough for several
years, particularly when viewed from the perspective of capital and the state.
Dabscheck notes that ‘the commission was generally successful in ensuring that
national wage cases were the major source of wage movements between 1975 and
1981.’173 In particular, before December 1978, National Wage cases accounted for well
over 90% of the movement in total wages.174 If the experiment with wage indexation
was designed to reassert Commission control over aggregate wages, as is maintained
here, then it must be regarded as a success, at least until 1979.175
However, the fragility of the consensus underpinning indexation was glaringly revealed
as the state and capital increasingly refused to hold up their end of the bargain in an
arrangement still requiring union support. Amongst other things, the Fraser government
repeatedly, and often successfully, petitioned the Commission to ‘discount’ wage rises
based upon the inflationary impact of some of their policies.176 This discounting was
tremendously frustrating to unions, who reasoned (legitimately) that the driving forces
of inflation were non-wage factors.177
In the face of persistent discounting, and an economic upturn in the late 1970s and very
early 1980s on the back of a minerals boom, some unions in construction, transport, and
metals attempted to get around the constraints of indexation by lodging ‘work-value’
cases, established exceptions to indexation guidelines based upon the changing skill
content of jobs.178 That unions in these industries were the spearhead was unsurprising
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– they were the same unions who in the early 1970s had been the most active in
collective bargaining outside the arbitration system. Their activity informed the 1979
Biennial Congress of the ACTU, which carried a resolution that suggested collective
bargaining and conciliation and arbitration were synonymous.179
Declining union commitment to indexation and the spread of work-value claims threw
the whole system into jeopardy. The Commission correctly appraised the danger,
noting that the future of the centralised system was in the hands of the participants
themselves180 and that a general round of work-value cases was not compatible with
indexation principles.181

Moreover, it lamented that the government, through its

insistent demands for discounting, was forcing it to choose between frustrating
government policy or letting the ‘fragile package’ of indexation collapse.182
In the event, indexation did not survive. A wave of work-value cases originating
amongst waterside, warehousing, road transport and metal workers had, by 1981,
brought across-the-board increases (often of around $8.00 a week) to approximately
80% of the workforce.183 Moreover, a 1981 consent award in the metals sector was the
precursor to the general spread of the 38-hour work week.184 Bramble’s account clearly
demonstrates that, in substance, the work-value round was little different to the
processes of collective bargaining, backed by industrial action, that had produced the
wage leap-frogging in the early 1970s.185

Once on foot, the entrenched logic of

comparative wage justice ensured the gains flowed-on.

Quite simply, the event

demonstrated the intractability of Fordist crisis. Its logic of wage and conditions flowon remained on foot, but in circumstances of dysfunctionality.
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Forms of employment/flexibility
The ongoing crisis of antipodean Fordism throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
intensified and deepened the growing significance of employment forms outside the
full-time, standard model.

Hancock notes that between 1975 and 1984, part-time

employment increased by a substantial 44%, compared to the paltry 5% increase
recorded in full-time employment.186 Whereas in 1966 only 10% of the workforce
worked part-time, by 1982 the figure had grown to 17%.187 Importantly, the crisis also
had the effect of accelerating the growth of part-time employment amongst males,188
foreshadowing the transformation from what was a highly gendered phenomenon into
something of more general compass. The significance of this shift was recognised by
many, with one commentator going so far as to call the growth in part-time work ‘the
most significant social change taking place in the Australian workforce.’189
As will be demonstrated in the case study chapters, the successful union claim for a 38hour working week in the early 1980s was accompanied by the demand for cost offsets,
which often included either the introduction of part-time employment in awards (as the
MTIA tried to do for male workers in the Metal Industry Award),190 or the relaxation of
some of the controls, both qualitative and quantitative, on its use (as was the case with
the New South Wales Shop Employees Award).191 These represented the first, very
tentative and inchoate, steps towards a liberal-productivist wage labour nexus based
upon precarity and increased managerial control over the engagement and control of
labour-power as a commodity.

Trade unions generally recognised the danger

(especially the threat to full-time jobs) and attempted to maintain the strict award
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controls on part-time and casual work.192 Even in 1982, they had adequately held the
line in this institutional regard.
Their stand was aided by the federal Commission, which agreed that part-time work
should not be used to compromise the model of standard, full-time employment. In an
important case involving the vehicle industry, employers cited the growth in part-time
work, together with the recent provision for it in awards covering sectors as varied as
insurance, banking and confectionary, as evidence enough that the Commission’s
presumption against part-time work should be voided.193 The Commission response is
telling: ‘[T]here has been no significant departure from the original concept that it must
be shown to be desirable to meet the particular needs of the industry and that it would
not be detrimental to full time employment’ (my emphasis).194 More thoroughgoing
change in the institutional settings around non-standard employment forms and
flexibility would have to wait until later on in the decade.
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations
The fundamentally collectivist nature of the labour law regime and the award
framework remained intact in 1982. As was the case in 1975, this collectivism was
dysfunctional for capital, particularly insofar as union power remained entrenched. The
wages explosion of the early 1980s was brought about by a large strike wave. Whilst
the strait-jacket of indexation had seen working days lost to industrial disputes reach a
nadir of 1,654,800 in 1977,195 rounds of work-value cases beginning in 1978-79 saw the
rate pick up, reaching a peak of 4,192,200 days lost in 1981 (an increase of
approximately 153% on the 1977 figure).196 It was, in many ways, the re-emergence of
the same crisis tendency that had manifested itself in 1975 – the system depended upon
trade unions to function, but demanded they act in a controlled, moderate way within
the bounds of valorisation imperatives.
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This re-emergence, however, was not for lack of the Fraser government trying to effect
profound change which, although generally not realised, represented in essence a protoliberal-productivist arrangement, particularly insofar as individual rights (which were
historically marginal to the system) assumed a greater importance.
The government’s reform program revolved around the creation of a body known as the
Industrial Relations Bureau in 1977.197 The IRB was armed with a wide suite of powers
well in excess of those it had inherited from its predecessor, the Arbitration
Inspectorate. Two powers in particular are key here:
1. ‘[T]he right to obtain an order restraining persons or organisations from
contravening the Act or regulations, and the imposition of a penalty in the case
of the breach or non-observance of an order or award.’198

Such a power

represented an attempt to reintroduce and enforce a penal provisions regime; and
2. Administering individual ‘safeguards,’ namely the freedom of workers not to
join a trade union on expanded conscientious grounds and a right not to be
compelled to partake in industrial action.199

The notion of individual safeguards was premised on the views of the Fraser
government that the closed shop placed enormous power in the hands of union
officials200 and that union members naturally grated against their leaderships expanding
the realm of union activity beyond the industrial sphere into broader political and social
issues.201 Government MP John Martyr stated, ‘[t]he whole essence of the legislation
before us is that it is designed to protect the individual, to protect his rights against
arbitrary dismissal, to protect his rights against arbitrary action by union officials’ (my
emphasis).202

This understanding sat uneasily with the administrative fabric of

arbitration. The latter’s primary function, the prevention and resolution of industrial
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disputes, took as its subject the collective organs of labour, whilst its administrative
practice demanded a sensitivity to the industrial realities of the 1970s.
This tension was graphically demonstrated by the case of Barbara Biggs, a young
woman employed as a tram conductor in the fiercely union Melbourne tramway
system.203

She had obtained a certificate exempting her from union membership, but

her employment by the Tramways Board was met by a strike of fellow employees ‘in
defence of the closed shop.’204

It is worth quoting Mitchell at length about the

subsequent events:
At this point the Commission came into the dispute and subsequent events
highlight the clash between the traditional pragmatism of the Commission’s
dispute settling processes and the ideology of the individual rights legislation.
The Commission recommended the removal of Biggs from the roster and that
she be offered alternative employment in exchange for a return to work. The
Tramways Board refused to accede to this recommendation because it felt that
such action on its part would involve a breach of the Act (my emphasis).205

The clash Mitchell observes assumes special importance in the context of this thesis. It
represents an image of the law-administration continuum at a time of tension. The
arbitration system was presented with a legislative agenda in which the collective
subject was jostled by newly important individual subjects. The nexus point of the lawadministration continuum was at stake, and the fact that Biggs discussed the dispute
with the IRB and subsequently opted to take a position with another employer206 attests
to the temporary victory of the established labour law institutions over the
Government’s legislative baby.
The case of Biggs was one of a number involving employees seeking to avoid union
membership with the support of the IRB.207 All basically came unstuck in the face of
unionists refusing to work with non-union labour.208

Such failures, coupled with

broader issues of maintaining adequate inspections209 and legal setbacks,210 made the
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IRB a widely recognised failure.211 ALP Opposition Leader Bill Hayden’s contention,
that the IRB ‘is useless and impotent,’212 was ultimately validated by its demise in
1983.213

For the moment, then, the administrative fabric of arbitration, and its

crystallisation of a distinct form of the law-administration continuum, was maintained.
With this understanding in hand, I can now move on to a brief consideration of the scale
of industrial relations. As was apparent from the foregoing discussion of wage fixation,
the 1975-1982 period was characterised by efforts to intensify the federal arbitration
commission as the pre-eminent lynchpin within antipodean Fordism.

Outside of

indexation, the Fraser government undertook other institutional reforms designed to
buttress the position of the federal tribunal. For example, it legislated to provide greater
consistency between the decisions of the Commission and its state counterparts,214 aided
by legislation in some states, such as New South Wales and Western Australia, basically
compelling the state body to follow the Commonwealth’s lead in the absence of
countervailing reasons.215

Moreover, it attempted to develop a more co-ordinated

approach between the Commonwealth and state governments regarding wage fixation,
seeking agreement with the latter, for example, in enforcing its 1982 wage-freeze.216
This effort at augmenting the centrality of the federal Commission was broadly
successful, as Hancock notes: ‘Since 1975, state tribunals have (with minor exceptions)
conformed to the principles laid down in major decisions of the Arbitration
Commission.’217
However, greater institutional coherence between the arms of federal and state
arbitration meant little when unions broke the straitjacket of indexation and reverted to a
system of de facto collective bargaining. Dabscheck pithily describes the result upon
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the destruction of indexation: ‘After July 1981 Australia moved to a decentralised,
unco-ordinated system of industrial relations regulation.’218
By 1982, therefore, Australian capitalism was in much the same state as it was in 1975.
The centrality of the Commission as the lynchpin in the antipodean Fordist mode of
regulation had been breached by unions pressing against and outside the arbitration
system. The Fraser government’s 1982 wage freeze was a crude acknowledgement that
its more sophisticated attempts at crisis resolution had failed. The fact that 1982 was a
re-run of the events of 1975 demonstrate that the crisis tendencies of antipodean
Fordism were intractable. To fundamentally shift the ground, unions would either have
to be held in line, or their integration into industrial relations fabric usurped. As I will
demonstrate later, the achievement of the former during the rest of the 1980s paved the
way for the latter in the 1990s.
Legal matrix
Whilst the constitutional basis of the arbitration system remained unchanged, a 1982
High Court decision augured a significant change.219 For some time members of the
Court had expressed dissatisfaction with the increasingly inadequate and complex
definition of an industry for the purposes of ascertaining if an industrial dispute
existed.220 It deprived large groups of workers access to the federal system 221 and was
premised on a narrow, productivist reading of ‘industry’ increasingly at odds with the
reality of an ever more intertwined economy. In the 1982 case, the Court ruled that,
under the traditional definition, staff at universities were not engaged in or in connexion
with industry.222

However, the bench left open the door, suggesting that had the

applicants sought to affirm principles of the Court’s earlier, more liberal approach to
determining the meaning of industry,223 the case may have been decided differently.224
In the next chapter we will see major change on this front, particularly as the pressures
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of the Accord forced the opening of a wider conception whilst allowing for a more
unified national system.
In other developments, the Trade Practices Act had, as foreshadowed above, been
turned into a tool of union repression. A 1976 committee of review was tasked with
exploring the application of the Act ‘to anticompetitive conduct by employees, and
employee or employer organisations’ (my emphasis).225 One of its recommendations
regarding secondary boycotts is worth citing at length:
If an organisation or group of persons for its own reasons deliberately interferes
with the competitive process, then the community is entitled to have those
reasons scrutinised by a body independent of the persons engaged in the dispute.
If that independent body finds those reasons inadequate, the community is
entitled to require that the position be remedied.226

Despite the fact that the committee made no recommendation as to whether the
provisions should be inserted into the administrative fabric of the arbitration system or
the more ‘pure’ legal form of the court system,227 the Fraser government opted for the
latter course, duly introducing section 45D into the Trade Practices Act228 in June 1977.
The section is highly complex, but is broadly a very wide net designed to capture all
manner of conduct in which ‘persons’ (most usually unions) disrupt one corporation’s
supply or acquisition of goods and services in an attempt to apply pressure on
another.229 A member of the ALP opposition presciently grasped the implications,
noting that what was termed ‘secondary boycotts’ by the government were really
sympathy strikes, and what the government actually sought was to break the cycle
whereby the industrially strong helped the weak.230 That is, it was part of an effort to
break the connective links binding the strong and the weak within antipodean Fordism
under the aegis of the arbitration system.
225
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Unsurprisingly, trade unions almost invariably lost their early battles with section 45D.
The very first encounter, involving the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union
(AMIEU), saw the union injuncted from black-banning two abattoirs in an attempt to
enforce compulsory unionism at a small butchery business. 231 Additional cases saw
storehouse,232 meat,233 and transport workers234 served with interlocutory injunctions
under the legislation. A case involving disruption of the NSW fuel transport industry235
also saw the introduction of another new provision, section 45E, designed to prevent
union and employer agreement in disrupting the supply or acquisition of goods and
services to/from ‘target’ companies.236 Full told, sections 45D and 45E represented a
determined effort on the part of employers and the conservative Fraser government to
place sympathy strikes outside the administrative fabric of arbitration, where the
resolution of disputes was paramount, and relocate it within the ordinary, and generally
hostile, court system.
However, even at this stage, union power made capital somewhat gun-shy. Although
section 82 of the Act provides that the aggrieved party can reclaim damages,237 in 1982
no case had ever gone beyond the injunction phase. Employers were typically content
to get the industrial action ended; pursuing further action for damages risked worsening
it, as well as making it incumbent upon the business to prove loss. The latter course of
action only became viable once the New Right ideology had congealed into a cogent
and explicitly activist program for utilising the legislation and court system to their
advantage.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have provided the first half of the concrete legal history needed to flesh
out the abstract framework developed in chapter 4. To demonstrate the soundness of
the theory of transition forwarded there, the state of labour law has been described at
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certain key dates capturing the coherence and crisis of antipodean Fordism. I began in
1964, when antipodean Fordism was at its zenith. The unique structure of the lawadministration continuum, in which the latter was dominant, was represented most
perfectly in the arbitration system, which precociously institutionalised the antipodean
Fordist wage labour nexus. In particular, compulsory arbitration at this time facilitated
the pattern of flow-on from the industrially strong to the industrially weak, further
developed and diffused standard employment, and strongly integrated organised labour
into the fabric of the law and the state, all essential planes of coherence in antipodean
Fordism.
By 1975, however, antipodean Fordism had entered a period of profound crisis,
constituted in part by the same legal framework essential to its functionality.

In

particular, in a context of stagnating productivity and dynamism in lead sectors such as
metals and rising inflation, the power of organised labour manifested itself in large
wage rounds and comparative wage justice claims, which proved highly destabilising
for the wage structure and ate into the profits of capitalists. Early experiments in crisis
management, such as wage indexation, proved exceedingly fragile, and by 1982 the
institutional exhaustion of antipodean Fordism and its labour law regime had become
apparent.
The stage was thus set for more radical changes in the second half of the 1980s,
developments that would prove corrosive of antipodean Fordism’s labour law regime
and constitutive of a liberal-productivist successor.

Chapter 6
FORMATION AND ASCENDENCY OF THE LIBERALPRODUCTIVIST LABOUR LAW REGIME
In this chapter I continue to trace the concrete history of labour law change begun in
chapter 5. From the intractably crisis-ridden and institutionally exhausted position of
antipodean Fordism in 1982, major developments had occurred across the four themes
(wage fixation, forms of employment/flexibility, collectivism/individualism and the
scale of industrial relations and the broader legal matrix) canvassed. By 1989, some of
the constituent legal elements of liberal-productivism were coming into existence,
grating against the decaying yet still entrenched institutions of antipodean Fordism.
Liberal-productivism had entered a stage of broad coherence by 1996, and by 2006 we
can speak of the ascendency of a liberal-productivist labour law regime. This regime
provisionally answers the crisis tendencies of its antipodean Fordist predecessor and
helps maintain the coherence of liberal-productivism.

1989 – Seeds of liberal-productivism germinating
Whereas 1982 had been the closing chapter of the post-World War II institutional status
quo, by 1989 a deep process of institutional searching had led to profound changes in
the fabric of industrial relations and labour law.

Although some developments

represented an extension of attempts at intensifying the institutions of antipodean
Fordism, others indicated that the elements of a liberal-productivist model of
development were coming into existence and starting to affect material and ideological
practice. In terms of the theory of transition forwarded in this thesis, this period thus
becomes a crucial one, one where the tension between the old and the new is at its
height.
Substantial evolution had occurred across all the key themes in the period from 1982 to
1989. The majority of this change is bound up with a historic deal between the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) and Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), named
‘the Accord’. It was struck in August 1982 and came into effect after the victory of the
ALP, led by Bob Hawke, in the 1983 election. Over the course of its history, the
Accord would be rewritten seven times, but in its original, ‘Mark I’ form, it was a
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comprehensive document that combined a return to wage indexation with a broad policy
package providing for improvements in the social wage, tripartite institutions for
industry planning and occupational health and safety, and a desired return to full
employment.1

It was, in essence, corporatism established without the explicit

cooperation of capital.23
There were other technological, economic, political and legal forces at play that bore
upon the four themes. These will be discussed where they are relevant below. The
primary vehicle of change, however, was the Accord, and it occupies a central place in
the following analysis.
Wage fixation
One of the Accord’s primary impacts was the destruction of the post-World War II
pattern of wage fixation centred on wage and conditions flow-on from the pace-setting
metal trades. It required of the ACTU and its constituent unions an acceptance that the
maintenance and improvement of living standards ‘will require a suppression of
sectional priorities and demands’ (my emphasis).4

Upon election, the Hawke

government convened a National Economic Summit, bringing together representatives
of the state, capital, organised labour and various community groups in an exercise of
attempted crisis management. In light of that event, Hawke stated:
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I would point out again that all at the Summit agreed that if a centralised system
of wage fixing is to work, there must be an abstention from sectional claims
except in special and extraordinary circumstances … my Government’s
interpretation of what constitutes such circumstances is the common-sense
interpretation and leaves no room for selfish claims from maverick sections of
the trade union movement.5

The Accord and the Summit, therefore, evinced a desire to break the historical pattern of
metal trade flow-on and the leap-frogging wage rounds of the mid-1970s and early
1980s.

The institutional mechanisms to realise this goal were ‘no-extra claims’

provisions and a renovated system of wage indexation, whereby wages were moved in
line with Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases at six-monthly intervals. The former
were designed to cut off sectional wage campaigns outside of price rises at their source.
To be entitled to receive the wage increases handed down by the Commission in
National Wage Cases, trade unions were compelled to ‘sign on’ to the Accord
principles, which included foregoing wage claims outside of indexation. Left-wing
unions which proved reluctant to sign on (such as the Victorian branches of the Food
Preservers’ Union and Federated Confectioners’ Association, who feature in chapter 8)
were excoriated by the Commission and denied the wage improvements given to other
unions.6

Regarding these unions, the ACTU was faced with a contradiction in

reconciling its functions as the peak organ of labour solidarity and its new found
position in the Accord fabric as industrial disciplinarian.7 Faced with this paradoxical
position, the ACTU leadership generally elected to perform the latter role.
In terms of re-establishing Commission control over the aggregate movement of wages,
the Accord was very successful. Dabscheck notes: ‘In June 1986 the commission
reported that, between September 1983 and December 1985, 96 per cent of all award
wage increases resulted from its decisions in national wage cases, and that it was unable
to identify any sizeable movements in over-award pay in this period.’8 By virtually
eliminating over-award campaigns in the field, the Accord placed great strain on the
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unions who had the most to gain by them, such as the Amalgamated Metal Workers’
Union (AMWU). This tendency was exacerbated by the fact that, despite the rhetoric of
shared burden, the Accord was functioning as a massive exercise in income
redistribution from wages to profit, producing the declining wage share of national
income noted in chapter 4.
Amidst the continued economic travails of the mid-1980s, full wage indexation came to
be regarded as a source of problems rather a solution,9 and wage rises above certain
minima needed to be justified by productivity and efficiency improvements.10 The
development of the resultant ‘restructuring and efficiency’ and ‘structural efficiency’
principles (in 1987 and 1988 respectively)11 represented the first movements to a more
decentralised system within the co-ordinated wages policy of the Accord framework. In
following sections I will be more concerned with the ramifications of these principles
for the structure and scope of industrial relations and the role of the Commission.
Suffice it to say here both principles rejected a system of total wage indexation. The
restructuring and efficiency principle provided for a flat $10.00 wage increase to all
employees covered by awards, plus ‘second-tier’ increases of up to 4% provided a range
of productivity directed, enterprise/workplace-based measures enunciated by the
Commission were met.12 The structural efficiency exercise saw a combination of flat
and proportional increases consequent upon unions agreeing to the process of award
restructuring and, later, upon the Commission ratifying an award restructuring
package.13 In both cases the Commission retained ultimate control over the wage
fixation system, but had changed the criteria for accessing it. Unlike the early years of
the Accord (1983-1985) in which wages were adjusted according to the macroeconomic
CPI figure, these later principles reduced inflation to one consideration amongst many,
and made certain pay rises dependent upon restructuring at the award and, more
importantly, enterprise level. This certainly presaged the turn to enterprise bargaining
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in the early 1990s, and was indicative of a wage structure in which the needs of
individual businesses were key. In this reality was implanted the dissolution of the
homogenised wage structure of antipodean Fordism and its usurpation by the polarised,
variegated wage system of liberal-productivism.
Forms of employment/flexibility
The 1980s proved an era that saw enforced employment precarisation intensify,
building upon the emergent tendencies of casualisation and part-time labour in the
1970s. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) recorded (using a measure that would
have captured the majority of casual employment) that part-time employment had
increased from 17.3% of employed persons in December 1982 to 20.7% of employed
persons in December 1989.14 Burgess and Campbell, using a more specific index, note
that casual workers as a percentage of the workforce had increased from 15.8% of
employees in 1984 to 18.9% in 1988.15 As economy-wide figures, these measurements
bespeak of a substantial increase in the incidence of forms of employment outside the
standard model.

At the sectoral level, the results demonstrate a highly uneven

development of these forms, with certain sectors, particularly retail, community services
and recreation/tourism heavily dependent upon casualised and part-time labour, whereas
other industries, such as manufacturing and transport, demonstrated much lower (but
still rising) proportions of such workers.16 At the same time, the use of contract labour,
which was generally free of award coverage, proliferated.17
What is of significance here is the removal of legal impediments to this growing
deployment of precarious labour. Here, the restructuring and efficiency and structural
efficiency principles are of key importance. In discussing the context of the former, the
Commission noted the continued stagnation of Australian manufacturing and the
consensus amongst all parties of the need to promote improved efficiency and
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productivity as a potential panacea.18 Amongst other things, the Commission identified
‘changed working patterns’ as a potentially necessary result. 19 The Department of
Industrial Relations reported that a substantial number of second-tier agreements
incorporated the use of part-time and casual labour, whilst others provided for the
engagement of contract and off-site labour.20 As will be seen in chapters 8 and 9
particularly, these agreements tended to loosen controls on part-time and casual labour,
thus threatening the dominance of the standard model of employment.
The restructuring and efficiency exercise also provided a tremendous jolt to employer
efforts to gain more control over the organisation of the labour process and the flexible
deployment of labour. A large number of agreements promoted multi-skilling and
broad-banding, whereby workers were to be trained across a number of functions and
certain narrow positions were to be collapsed into broader classifications.21

More

important were commitments to flexible staffing levels, a greater spread of hours,
flexibility in scheduling breaks, Rostered Days Off and holidays and changed overtime
arrangements.22

What Marx termed the ‘porosity’ of the working day was also

reduced,23 with strict controls on starting and finishing times and the explicit reduction
in ‘non-productive time’24 featuring in many agreements.
The structural efficiency principle built upon the localised and somewhat piecemeal
changes25 wrought by the restructuring and efficiency principle by systemic reform at
the award level. In its August 1988 decision, the Commission explicitly stated that one
of the fronts along which structural efficiency could proceed was ‘ensuring that working
patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and meet the competitive requirements of
the industry’ (my emphasis).26 A year later, the Commission indicated the kind of
changes it was envisaging, including:
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flexibility in the arrangement of hours of work (including 12-hour shifts and
ordinary hours on any day of the week);



greater flexibility in the taking of annual leave (with a view to maximising
production);



reviewing the role of part-time and casual employment; and



changes in award provisions which restricted the right of employers to manage
their business.27

Such changes were highly sought by employer groups, who ‘stressed the need for these
issues to be an integral part of the restructuring menu.’28 Unions were compelled to
sign on to the process, and saw their proposals scuttled if it did not accord with such
principles (a fate that befell the Food Preservers’ Union, as documented in chapter 8).
The exact implications of both the restructuring and efficiency and structural efficiency
principles for specific awards are explored further in the case study chapters, focussing
upon the unfolding of the twin pressures of flexibility and precarisation in the metals,
food processing and retail sector.
In the late 1980s, therefore, we see the process of precarisation and flexibilisation,
absolutely central to the development of a liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus and
industrial paradigm, received institutional jolts from the Commission, supported, to
varying degrees, by the Hawke Government, employers and the trade union movement.
These developments sat uneasily with the continued presence of proportions clauses in
both federal and state awards limiting casual and part-time labour and establishing a
role for unions in its engagement,29 both of which would be the source of further
conflict.
Collectivism/individualism and scale of industrial relations
In this era, although the system remained fundamentally collectivist, movements were
afoot concerning the scale at which collective arrangements operated. In 1985, a major
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report commissioned by the federal government into the Australian industrial relations
system was handed down (the ‘Hancock Report’).30 Although the overall argument of
the Hancock Report was for retention of the compulsory conciliation and arbitration
system, it approved of existing provisions in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act
relating to ‘certified agreements’ between parties given the force of awards, 31 and
argued for their strengthening.32 These recommendation were taken up by the Hawke
Government in its 1988 Industrial Relations Act.33 Importantly, the Act provided that,
to the extent an agreement and the underlying award dealt with the same matters, the
former prevailed.34 It also sought to prevent these bargains becoming a method of wage
flow-on in the manner of the early 1980s, giving the Commission the power to refuse
certification to agreements on public interest grounds and prima facie rejecting bargains
where they were based on terms on the terms of other agreements. 35

Additional

provisions guarded against industrial agreements being used as a vehicle to force
changes in awards.36
In chapter 4 I noted how a key feature of a liberal-productivist labour law regime is the
decentralisation of bargaining in the context of union weakness. At this particular
historical juncture, however, movement on this front was stymied by the continued
institutional entrenchment of the trade union movement through the Accord and its
dedication to that system, a comparatively buoyant economy and the fear of some
employers (most importantly the powerful Metal Trades Industry Association, or
MTIA)37 of a wages explosion in the manner of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. In the
face of this array of forces, the desire of some employer organisations (notably the
Business Council of Australia) for a system based on enterprise-level bargaining38 could
not be realised. The tension was reflected in the fact that the certified agreements
provided for by the Act were never particularly popular with employers or unions. As
shall be seen below, it would take the economic recession of the early 1990s and the
30
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breakdown of commitment to the Accord from some of the stronger unions amidst
continued wage restraint to clear the ground for the roll-out of a fundamentally more
decentralised system.
Legal matrix
The period from 1982 to 1989 saw considerable alterations in the legal framework
surrounding the labour law regime which, unsurprisingly for this period, were
paradoxical in character. On the one hand, as part of the broader intensification of the
Commission as an antipodean Fordist institution, it benefited from an expansion of its
jurisdiction consequent upon the enlarged meaning given to the term ‘industrial
dispute,’ upon which the Commission’s powers of conciliation and arbitration
depended.39 In the Social Welfare Union case, the High Court overturned the restrictive
definition of ‘industrial dispute’ mentioned above, stating instead: ‘The words are not a
technical or legal expression. They have to be given their popular meaning – what they
convey to the man in the street.’40 The fact that the Court’s decision brought about a
speedy expansion of federal authority in areas previously regulated by the states, 41
including education42 and health,43 is indicative of the thesis of intensification; the
standing of the Commission as the macroeconomic lynchpin for industrial relations was
enhanced.
The Social Welfare Union case cannot be understood apart from its historical context.
The strong growth of white-collar unionism noted in the previous chapter had helped
bridge the organisational cleavages that had separated it from its blue-collar brethren.
Unions representing non-manual workers and government employees were traditionally
affiliated with their own peak bodies (respectively, the Australian Council of Salaried &
Professional Associations and the Council of Australian Government Employee
Organisations). However, in 1979 the Australian Council of Salaried & Professional
Associations merged with the ACTU under the latter’s banner.

The Council of

Australian Government Employee Organisations would follow suit in 1981, such that
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by that year the ACTU could legitimately claim to be the peak body for almost every
trade union in Australia. Given the Accord’s early focus on centralised, macroeconomic
regulation, a situation in which large sections of the ACTU’s membership was locked
out of federal regulation was unlikely to persist long. This indeed proved the case.
The Accord process also informed other efforts to intensify the role of the Commission.
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the federal tribunal was historically
limited in its ability to deal with the full gamut of industrial disputes by the requirement
that the substance of the dispute be ‘matters pertaining to the relations of employers and
employees.’44 I also demonstrated that this was constructed by the High Court in such a
way as to generally place managerial prerogative outside the ambit of a matter
pertaining to the employment relationship.45 However, the Accord had pledged the
government to ‘support the establishment of rights for employees, through their unions,
to be notified and consulted by employers about the proposed introduction of
technological change.’46 The government had also agreed to support the creation of
redundancy protections for workers, including an obligation on employers to consult
with unions in redundancy situations.47 Both of these types of provisions, however, had
usually been taken to be outside the jurisdiction of the Commission, or were at least in
doubt.48 Given the fact, noted in chapter 5, that the federal government could only
effect such regulatory outcomes through the Commission, a broadened scope of matters
pertaining to the employment relationship was required in order to deliver on these
Accord promises.
Little more than a year after the Social Welfare Union case, the High Court ruled in a
crucial decision that consultation with unions about technological change could be
considered an industrial matter.49 Armed with this broadened power, the Commission
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was able to hand down its landmark Termination, Change & Redundancy case,50 which
allowed it to insert clauses in awards giving effect to the aforementioned Accord
promises. Like the broadening of the definition of ‘industry,’ this is to be understood as
an exercise in institutional intensification, augmenting and deepening the powers of the
Commission so it could play the macroeconomic role required of it.51
Against these developments, however, were others of an entirely different character and
provenance that were corrosive of the established order.

Perhaps of deepest

significance here is the legal strategy of a bellicose section of capital, the so-called
‘New Right,’ in a series of set-piece battles with militant unions, including the
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (AMIEU) at the Mudginberri abattoir, the
Federated Confectioners’ Association (FCA) at Dollar Sweets and the Australian
Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP). These disputes demonstrated the ability of employers
to subvert the arbitration system through a two-pronged attack: exploiting the secondary
boycott and fines provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974;52 and making recourse to
common law industrial torts such as the tort of nuisance and interference with
contractual relations.

In both cases disputes were basically removed from the

administrative fabric of arbitration and funnelled into the regular court system, the
domain of the legal form narrowly construed.
The Mudginberri dispute demonstrated how the 1977 trade practices amendments53
discussed in chapter 5 could be used to discipline labour outside of the traditional
channels of conciliation and arbitration. In response to an AMIEU picket line designed
to enforce a tally pay system, abattoir owner Jay Pendarvis successfully pursued the
union for damages under section 82(1) of the Act,54 with the Federal Court granting a
crippling sum of $1,759,444.55 Only after this critical damage had been inflicted was
the Commission in a position to deliver a more permanent settlement, handing down a
decision that validated the employer practice of seeking payment by result contracts
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with workers.56 The Trade Practices Act 1974, a piece of legislation which had started
out primarily as a protection for the consumer against monopoly interests, had thus
become a workable tool of union repression and offered a way for employers with the
will and resources to avoid what the New Right regarded as the union-friendly
arbitration system.
That avoidance of Commission oversight was the goal was even more vividly
demonstrated by the actions against the FCA and AFAP. The former lost a pitched
battle with the small confectionary manufacturer Dollar Sweets in 1985 over the refusal
of certain employees to pledge adherence to the award and forego an FCA campaign for
a shorter working week.57 Most significant here is the fact that the union was forced to
lift the picket after the imposition of an interlocutory injunction by the Supreme Court
of Victoria, based on actual and threatened torts of interference with contractual
relations, intimidation, nuisance and wilful injury.58 Subsequently, the FCA was forced
to pay a hefty $175,000 in what was only the second case since the early 1970s where a
company had pursued a damages claim after gaining interlocutory relief from the
courts.59 The Commission’s role in the dispute was exceedingly minimal, limited to a
recommendation to lift the pickets before the case was removed to the Supreme Court.60
The AFAP fared even worse, with pilots suffering a crushing defeat in 1989 in a showdown that revolved primarily around the government-owned Australian Airlines and the
privately-held Ansett. Upon application by the airlines, the Commission cancelled the
awards covering the pilots.61 This, however, was not what mortally wounded the union.
This blow was dealt when the AFAP was hit with a devastating suit for wrongfully
interfering with contractual relations, interfering with trade or business by unlawful
means and for conspiracy using unlawful means.62

A cabal consisting of Prime
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ministers explicitly constructed action using torts and the trade practices legislation as a
means of defeating the pilots; if they intended to go outside the (Accord) system, then
the state and capital would follow, so the reasoning went.63
These events are a window into a period where the centre of gravity in the lawadministration continuum was shifting.

The operation of the secondary boycott

provisions of the Trade Practices Act64 and the re-emergence of industrial torts65 were
elements of the process of juridification described in chapter 3, and represented the
diversion of matters usually determined by the Commission to common law courts. As
was seen with the case of bans clauses, courts of ordinary standing were bound by the
logics of the abstract rule of law, equality of juridical equals and the application of the
law according to formalistic tests. They shared very little indeed with the historic
mission of the Commission to reconcile the capitalist project of reproducing the
commodity labour-power with the struggle of an active, vigorous proletariat.
Such tactics on the part of capital, however, were more than just opportunistic. They
were elements of an inchoate liberal-productivism, capitalist answers to the unification
of the labour force set in motion by Fordism.66 Moreover, Australian capitalism was
becoming more competitive and more open to international competition at the same
time as the field of commodification increased ever further.67 These stimuli would tend
to place a premium on the role of law as a medium of association between private
property owners,68 the role Pashukanis always perceived as its essence and driving
force.69 In terms of the law-administration continuum, it is ‘law’ which performs this
function better, in that the concern of the working-class to place limits on the
exploitation of labour-power as property evident in administration is shorn away.
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1996 – Liberal-productivism coheres
By 1996, the seeds of liberal-productivism which were germinating in 1989 were
coming into full bloom. The 1980s had generally seen methods of crisis resolution
which oscillated between intensification of antipodean Fordist institutions and the
development of new liberal-productivist structures. The 1990s, however, would see the
former, most particularly the federal Commission, become thoroughly degraded,
playing an increasingly marginalised role in the emergent model of development.
Profound changes took place in the fields of wage fixation, forms of
employment/flexibility and the scale and nature of industrial relations.

Of key

importance for our purposes is the rise of enterprise bargaining, the explosion in the
incidence of precarious employment and the first full-blown statutory attempts to
encourage an individualist employment relations taking as its subject the individual
worker. Full told, these developments evinced the essential character of a liberalproductivist labour law regime outlined in chapter 4.
Wage fixation
As we shall see in our chapter on the metal trades, the enforced wage restraint of the
Accord became increasingly untenable in the late 1980s, particularly given the
comparatively buoyant labour market.70 The Accord saw the drop in the factor share of
wages noted in chapter 4, whilst real award wages decline markedly. 71 For unions such
as the AMWU, well-schooled in a tradition of over-award bargaining, a return to plant
and enterprise-level agreements free from national wage guidelines was seductive. It
dovetailed with the demands for enterprise bargaining emanating from some sections of
the business community, most notably the Business Council of Australia.72 So far as it
was concerned, most of the blame for Australia’s poor economic performance was due
to the structure and attitudes of trade unions and the existing legal-institutional
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framework.73

Enterprise bargaining, from the perspective of this organ of capital,

promised vastly increased productivity and flexibility.74
Enterprise bargaining had the virtue of being all things to all people. The confusion
over just what enterprise bargaining actually entailed would prove the source of conflict
between capital, labour and the state in the 1990s. However, by November 1990 the
government, many unions and a strategic majority of employers agreed that movement
to an enterprise bargaining system, however defined, was necessary. 75 In a submission
to the April 1991 National Wage Case, the ACTU duly argued for the adoption of an
enterprise bargaining principle, supported by the Government and most employer
groups.76 In this claim they were supported by the majority of the states, some of which
were beginning to experiment with enterprise bargaining systems of their own.77
The response of the Commission is the institutional equivalent of Trotsky’s observation
of declining classes flaring ‘with a bright although smoky light’ before the march of
history snuffs out their reason for being.78 The Commission, taking its Accord role of
macro-level wage regulator very seriously, noted the danger of outcomes deemed best at
the enterprise-level leading to excessive aggregate wage outcomes.79 Moreover, the
Commission was not duped by the language of novelty surrounding the current push to
bargaining, opining that ‘[t]he term may be relatively new in Australian industrial
relations. The substance is not … In its simplest form, enterprise bargaining explains
much of the growth of overaward payments which has occurred since the 1940s.’80 It
summed up by saying that enterprise bargaining required a whole new workplace
culture and management and that ‘[t]he parties to industrial relations have still to
develop the maturity necessary for the further shift of emphasis now proposed.’ 81 The
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whole exercise led one major paper to state that ‘[t]he Industrial Relations Commission
has moved aggressively to protect and entrench its central role in national wage
fixation’ (my emphasis).82
The response of the parties, particularly the ACTU and the government,83 demonstrated
the fact that the Commission in its historic form was in the process of being sloughed
off in the transition to liberal-productivism. ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty described the
decision as ‘vomit.’84 He was supported, if in less strident terms, by the broader union
movement, the Keating government and business groups.85 In a portent of things to
come, then-Opposition Industrial Relations spokesman, John Howard, stated that the
Commission’s rejection of enterprise bargaining was the result of an ‘almost
insufferable paternalism.’86
In the event, the isolation of the Commission, together with the recalcitrance of the
state, unions and employers in acting on its recommendations for more developed and
coherent enterprise bargaining policies, forced its hand.

Despite misgivings, 87 the

Commission duly adopted an enterprise bargaining principle in its October 1991
National Wage Case. It distinguished enterprise bargaining from the aforementioned
structural efficiency exercise; whereas the former was capped at a 2.5% pay rise, the
latter was not.88 Although agreements could sit alongside awards, they also had the
potential to replace them, provided they did not involve a reduction in ordinary time
earnings or a departure from Commission standards on matters such as hours of work,
‘A Wage Decision For The Times’, The Age (Melbourne), 17 April 1991, 13.
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annual leave and long-service leave.89

Lastly, and perhaps most tellingly, the

Commission’s preferred form of enterprise bargains was so-called section 115
agreements.90 In 1991, the section was in a sense a micro-level historical snapshot of
the transition between antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism. On the one hand,
it explicitly provided that bargains (known as certified agreements) could not be based
on the terms of another certified agreement except in limited circumstances, whilst the
legislation elsewhere provided that there could no automatic flow-on from certified
agreements to awards.91 On the other, section 115 also maintained that the Commission
had the power to refuse to certify agreements that were contrary to the public interest. 92
In short, the Commission still held the kind of macroeconomic guardian role it
exercised during the coherence and crisis of antipodean Fordism, but was expected to
neuter the cycle of wage and conditions flow-on that had been one of its central
dynamics.
Such a hybrid role could not be maintained for long, and was reflected initially by the
slow-uptake of certified agreements.93

In the face of what was considered the

conservatism of the Commission, the government passed the Industrial Relations
Legislation Amendment Act 1992,94 which removed the Commission’s ‘responsibility to
examine enterprise agreements in the public interest.’95 In it place was inserted a much
narrower ‘No-Disadvantage Test’ (NDT) which sought merely to ensure that employees
covered by agreements were not disadvantaged vis-à-vis the award.96 This was an
historic departure from the Commission’s traditional concern with moderating ‘the
outcomes of the industrial relations process by reference to the public interest.’97
The transformation of the Commission’s role in wage fixation received a qualitatively
new jolt from the passage of the Keating ALP government’s Industrial Relations

89

Ibid 16.
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 115.
91
Ibid ss 96, 115(7).
92
Ibid s 115(4).
93
‘Wage bargaining in the spotlight’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 29 August 1991, 3; Commonwealth,
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 June 1992, 3795 (Robert Brown).
94
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth).
95
J.T. Ludeke, ‘The Evolving Industrial Relations Regime: The Federal System – 1992-1998’ (1998)
72(11) The Australian Law Journal 863, 864.
96
Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) s 8.
97
Breen Creighton, ‘One Hundred Years of the Conciliation and Arbitration Power: A Province Lost?’
(2000) 24(3) Melbourne University Law Review 839, 860.
90

179
Reform Act 1993,98 which sought to much more surely entrench and encourage
enterprise bargaining as the primary lever of wage determination in Australia. The role
of the Commission in this new model was substantially reduced, as Prime Minister
Keating attests to in his description of the system:
It is a model which places primary emphasis on bargaining at the workplace
level within a framework of minimum standards provided by arbitral tribunals. It
is a model under which compulsorily arbitrated awards and arbitrated wage
increases would be there only as a safety net … We would have an Industrial
Relations Commission which helped employers and employees reach enterprise
bargains, which kept the safety net in good repair, which advised the
Government and the parties of emerging difficulties and possible improvements,
but which would rarely have to use its compulsory arbitral powers.99

In the following sections, I will explore the substantive implications of this shift in
terms of the collectivism/individualism of the labour law regime and the content of
awards and agreements. What is of interest here is the relationship of new methods of
wage determination to the wage structure and the historical pattern of flow-on.
In chapter 4 it was explained that a relatively homogenous wage structure was an
important structural feature of the antipodean Fordist model of development. By 1996,
a yawning gulf had emerged between the wage outcomes of the considerable number of
employees (some 35-40% of total employees) who were reliant purely on awards and
those who were bound by both awards and enterprise agreements (30-40% of
employees) or enterprise bargains alone (5-10% of employees).100 Whereas the former
experienced an estimated average annual wage increase of 1.3%, the latter two saw pay
rises of between 4-6%.101 Declining award coverage,102 together with the generally
small safety net adjustments made to them, also ensured that award wage increases
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accounted for a decreasing share of average weekly ordinary time earnings. 103 Awards,
which had previously been the comprehensive instruments of wage and conditions
control, were reduced to bare-bone minimums that left the workers reliant upon them
increasingly worse off in relative terms. Claims for wages and conditions above it was
considered the province of enterprise bargaining.104
Even more importantly, enterprise agreements, generally revolving around the power
dynamics, needs and nature of individual enterprises/workplaces, were a very poor
vessel for the flow-on of wages and conditions from the industrially strong to the weak.
The resource demands of negotiating many individual enterprise agreements, rather than
campaigning over one award, made it difficult to co-ordinate action and translate the
gains of some into gains for all. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in
presenting its view of the essence of the new system, came close to describing the
reality of enterprise bargaining as it would develop.105 It asked that the Commission
and the parties ‘recognise the role of awards as a safety net, rather than for example as a
mechanism for flowing the results of enterprise bargaining to non-unionised and nonconsenting employers’ (my emphasis).106
In chapter 7, it will be seen that unions, once they realised the danger, attempted to
return to the industry-level bargaining once common in the award system through the
tactic of ‘pattern bargaining.’ By 1996, this pressure was just beginning to manifest
itself.
Forms of employment/flexibility
The recession of the early 1990s greatly intensified the growth of employment forms
outside of the standard full-time model.107 The recession saw the loss of 127,900 full103
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time jobs go hand-in-and with a gain of 164,000 part-time jobs.108 Much of this growth
was in the form of casual employment.109 Indeed, Burgess and Campbell note that the
percentage of total employees who were casual increased from 19.4% in 1990 to 26.3%
in 1996.110 Importantly, although women as a whole remained over-represented in both
part-time and casual employment measures, the growth in casual employment was
proportionately faster amongst men.111 There was also an age dimension to the growth
of casual and part-time employment, with young men and women between 15 and 24
(many of them students)112 being largely funnelled into part-time and casual positions as
they entered the workforce in larger numbers.113 Lastly, the expansion of these forms
was, whilst still concentrated in certain industries such as a retail and hospitality, a
movement observed across all industry divisions.114
Whereas this process of precarisation had for the best part of the 1980s worked through
the award system, the advent of enterprise bargaining, and the associated degradation of
awards, saw precarity advance along new fronts in the 1990s. In particular, enterprise
bargains tended to fit a typical pattern: headline wage increases were obtained by
trading away many of the conditions that constituted the standard employment model.
The degradation of this model went much deeper than simply employing more casuals
and/or part-timers. Indeed, bearing in mind the definition forwarded in chapter 4,
precarity increasingly came to define the experience of full-time employees.115
The assault on the standard employment model within agreements, explored in the case
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1. The removal of qualitative and quantitative controls on the deployment of parttime and casual employment; and
2. The increasing spread of ordinary working hours for all workers, including fulltime employees, and concomitant reductions in penalty rates.116

The process of trading-off conditions and controls in exchange for wage increases also
extended to the organisation of the labour process. As shall be seen in great detail in
relation to the food processing and retail industries in chapters 8 and 9, ‘enterprise
bargaining explicitly linked the provision of wage increases to changes in work
arrangement.’117 These included, but were not limited to:


the introduction/deepening of performance benchmarks and productivity
agreements;



greater flexibility for management in rostering staff, with an emphasis on
maintaining constant production at minimum possible cost;



the broad-banding of classifications; and



contracting out of certain functions which had historically been performed by
employees of the enterprise.118

For those left on awards, the same process of enforced precarity and flexibility ensued
without the kind of wage improvements obtained through enterprise bargaining. The
aforementioned recasting of awards as a safety net tended to preclude them from
providing the kind of comprehensive controls on precarious employment forms that
they previously exhibited. This was made explicit by the Workplace Relations Act
1996,119 which limited awards to twenty ‘allowable’ matters,120 which did not include
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proportions clauses governing the employment of different categories of workers, 121 nor
minimum or maximum hours of work for part-time employees.122

Indeed, their

inclusion in awards was prohibited. The processes of award restructuring set in motion
by the structural efficiency principle in the late 1980s also flowered in the early 1990s,
and typically facilitated intensified managerial control over rostering, the allocation of
labour to different functions and the organisation of the labour process generally.
These developments are, for the purposes of this thesis, profound. Awards had been
transformed from instruments crystallising the standard employment model and
establishing more-or-less rigid controls on labour classifications and demarcations in
the workplace to bare-boned minima that now placed no barrier to the further extension
of precarity and flexibility into the heart of the employment relationship. This transition
represents no less than a substantial codification of the liberal-productivist wage-labour
nexus in the labour law regime.123
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations
Whereas the fundamentally collectivist nature of labour regulation had largely survived
the 1980s, the basket of reforms surrounding the introduction of enterprise bargaining
took concrete steps towards severing the institutionalised link between trade unions and
the labour law regime. Of paramount significance here is the Keating government’s
introduction of so-called ‘enterprise flexibility agreements’ (EFAs).124

These

essentially created a non-union bargaining stream, where employers could negotiate
with their workers without trade union representation.125
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The stated rationale from the ALP government was that it facilitated the penetration of
enterprise agreements to the non-union sector.126 Unions, however, recognised the
material and symbolic threat posed by EFAs.

Tim Pallas, the ACTU Assistant

Secretary, opined that employers could get the flexibility they desired from regular
enterprise agreements; those that went for EFAs did so for ‘ideological reasons.’127
Their concern was heightened by the fact that some employers attempted to supplant
union-negotiated agreements with EFAs.128
Although EFAs did not prove as popular with capital as one would have expected129 and
had a comparatively low uptake,130 a seismic symbolic shift had been effected,
demonstrating that unions were not indispensable to the bargaining process.131 The
conservative Howard government eagerly took the opportunity upon its election in 1996
to remove the institutional impediments to the union-excluding potential of EFAs,
substituting a new form of certified agreement that did not give unions the right to be
involved unless requested by members who were to be covered by it.132
The Howard government also took another, rather more direct, step to marginalise the
role of unions within the system: outlawing the closed shop. Unlike the Conciliation
and Arbitration Act 1904133 and the Industrial Relations Act 1988,134 the new
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Workplace Relations Act 1996 did not have as one of its objects the facilitation and
encouragement of representative organisations of workers and employers. Instead, it
manifested for the first time at the federal level a negative freedom of association, that
is, the freedom to not belong to a trade union.135

A government member stated

tellingly: ‘It is a very important element of this legislation that freedom of association
be vested with the individual, not with an organisation they are compelled to belong to
so they can have a job in a particular workplace’ (my emphasis).136 Rimmer adds that:
Until the Workplace Relations Act, individual employees had to gain
representation usually through the appropriate registered organisation if they
wished to have locus standii before the Commission. The Workplace Relations
Act has changed all that … the other objects make plain that the individual
employee can have legal standing in this jurisdiction.137

This concentration on the individual as subject, rather than the collective union subject,
establishes a revealing point of difference with the aforementioned efforts of the Fraser
government to make it easier for workers to avoid union membership. Whereas the
latter took as its reference point the collective system, attempting to provide exemptions
therefrom, the new legislation gave no conceptual pre-eminence to collective
arrangements. To this end, the Commission was denied the power to insert preference
clauses in federal awards, part of the Howard Government’s struggle to undermine
union power by eradicating the closed shop.138
The Howard government also used the opportunity of its election to introduce a far
more radical method of individualising industrial relationships; the introduction of
statutory individual contracts known as Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). In
this it was following the lead of some states, such as Western Australia and Queensland,
135
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which had developed their own individual contracting regimes in the early 1990s.139
AWAs were subject only to the weak NDT and were aggressively promoted by the
government. Individual workers were legally free to nominate a ‘bargaining agent,’140
but unions did not possess automatic standing to participate in the process. Generally
negotiated between single employees and bosses, AWAs were also perhaps the most decentralised tools of industrial regulation yet devised in the liberal-productivist
trajectory, and crucially appeared at a time of increasingly evident union weakness.
Perhaps the most important and telling element of the AWA reform bundle was the fact
that the administration of AWAs was not placed within the purview of the Commission,
but a new body called the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA). Agreements
were to be lodged with, and approved by, the OEA, and only in the event of uncertainty
on its part could the agreement be referred to the Commission for determination.141
This process was nothing less than an explicit attempt to recast the law-administration
continuum by marginalising the Commission, its dominant administrative form.
Burdened (from the perspective of the state and capital) by its collectivist heritage and
practice, the Commission was a poor vessel for the new species of individualism
represented by AWAs. Instead, AWAs were guaranteed by their own, purpose-built
institution which took as its basic subject the individual worker contracting with the
individual employer.142
The collectivism and centrality of the labour law regime was also breached by the
nature of the ‘safety net’ established by the 1993 legislation. As discussed above, in the
enterprise bargaining regime, awards were recast as part of a floor of minimum rights
and entitlements.143

Awards, the historically predominant instrument of collective

labour law, guarded by particular unions and often covering a swathe of workplaces,
was thus relegated to a lesser role within the fabric of the new system. By contrast, the
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scheme of statutory minima, including provisions relating to unfair dismissal,
redundancy and equal pay (discussed in the section below), were conceived, and often
enforced, as individual rights.144 In a context of union strength, such a development
might have been harmless.145 However, in the circumstances, it further attacked the
representational monopoly Australian trade unions had typically possessed in the
industrial relations system.
The last point of note to address here are the legislative fetters which were increasingly
placed around the ability of unions to organise and struggle, particularly on an interunion basis. Whilst the 1993 statute did relocate the secondary boycott provisions of
the Trade Practices Act 1974146 into industrial legislation (and so within the purview of
the Commission),147 it nevertheless hemmed in the circumstances in which unions could
strike. Ironically, the Keating government, in recognising the first de jure right to strike
in Australian industrial history, simultaneously cramped the comparatively wide de
facto ability of unions to engage in industrial action. Unions won a limited form of
immunity from tort liability and Commission-imposed penalties in the case of strikes,
but only if the action was deemed to be ‘protected,’ which required, amongst other
things, that it occurred within the bargaining period of an enterprise agreement. 148 Only
when an agreement was in the negotiation phase did strike action enjoy immunity.149
Once an agreement had been struck, industrial action for the duration of the agreement
was unprotected.

Although the legislative green light to tort claims in these

circumstances did not necessarily mean employers would take action,150 the threat was
often enough, particularly given the regime of toughened penalties established for
breaches during the currency of agreements.151

Mark Bray and Andrew Stewart, ‘From the Arbitration System to the Fair Work Act: The Changing
Approach in Australia to Voice and Representation at Work’ (2013) 34(1) Adelaide Law Review 21, 26.
145
Indeed, Stewart suggests that one of the reasons for the late development of a statutory unfair dismissal
regime, for example, was precisely because of the confidence of unions in their own ability to address
cases directly with employers: Andrew Stewart, ‘And (Industrial) Justice for All? Protecting Workers
Against Unfair Dismissal’ (1995) 1(1) Flinders Journal of Law Reform 85, 87.
146
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45D – 45E.
147
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) s 38.
148
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) s 170PM.
149
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 October 1993, 2782 (Laurie
Brereton).
150
See, for example: Mike Taylor, ‘Wider fight looms after air chaos’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 29
November 1994, 1
151
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 October 1993, 2782-2783
(Laurie Brereton).
144

188
Howard’s ascension to power in 1996 was marked by more stark anti-union measures.
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 explicitly provided that secondary boycotts could
not be the subject of protected industrial action.152 The secondary boycott provisions
were also reinserted into the Trade Practices Act 1974, which the conservative parties
had always regarded as their natural home.153

Indeed, one government member

revealingly stated of the purpose of the relocation: ‘When we have restored those
sections, they will eliminate the mindless, inane and insane strikes that we have seen
around this country … They will restore natural justice to the workplace.’154 Ironically,
the need to restore justice to the workplace did not save the requirement to bargain in
good faith, introduced by the Keating government in 1993. Under the Coalition’s new
legislative scheme, ‘there was no positive obligation on an employer to recognise a
union that sought to negotiate a collective agreement on behalf of employees, and … no
duty to bargain in good faith.’155
This last point is a particularly potent demonstration of the fundamental shift to a
liberal-productivist model of development. It will be recalled from chapter 4 that an
integration of organised labour into the fabric of the arbitration system was a defining
characteristic of antipodean Fordism, realised in the privileged legal status trade unions
enjoyed in the arbitration system. By 1996, the scene had changed entirely. Now, the
standing of unions was severely corroded, and employers who were so-inclined had the
legislative tools at their disposal to systematically expunge unions from the workplace
through refusing to recognise and treat with them in the negotiation of agreements.
Legal matrix
By the early 1990s, the limits of the arbitral power in supporting the reform agenda of
the Keating government were becoming manifest.

Informed by the radical de-

regulation of the Victorian Employee Relations Act 1992,156 Accord Mark VII included
a commitment to a range of minimum employment standards that would apply to all
employees; that is, they would have what amounted to common rule effect. To this end,
152
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some of the key protections embedded in the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993,
such as unfair dismissal, protections surrounding redundancy and equal pay for women,
were enacted using the external affairs power of the Constitution.157 In particular,
reliance was placed upon Australia’s ratification of a number of International Labour
Organization Conventions.158 Additionally, the creation of EFAs relied for its validity
not on the traditional arbitral power, but on the corporations power.159 In the Industrial
Relations Reform Act 1993, therefore, we have the first systemic effort on the part of
any federal government to ground important segments of the labour law regime on
something other than section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution.
Frazer has stated that, on this basis, ‘the legislation was the most dramatic example of
direct regulation by the Federal Parliament in the field of industrial relations since
Federation,’160 whilst McCallum opined that the Act marked ‘the commencement of the
internationalisation of Australian industrial law.’161 Unlike the arbitral power, which
prescribed a specific conciliation and arbitration machinery separate from the legislature
and executive, both the corporations and external affairs powers are plenary powers.162
This means that in enacting industrial legislation on these grounds, the Commonwealth
was not reliant upon the established channels of arbitration and the administrative
subjects and practices it entailed. The recasting of the law-administration continuum
noted throughout this section thus became immensely easier given that the legal fetters
placed upon the state’s statutory control of industrial relations were loosened. The
‘purer’ legal form was becoming easier to access at the same time that its administrative
brethren was corroding.
The links binding the ALP to the union movement meant that the Keating government
did not press this revolution as far as it could go. Indeed, the provisions enacted using
the corporations and external powers were generally placed within the purview of the
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Commission.163 However, a precedent had been set, and when the Howard Government
constructed its AWAs on the basis of the corporations power,164 it exploited the
potential to sideline arbitration and placed the administration of the program with the
OEA.
The re-assertion of the abstract legal form both informed and was constituted by the
diversification of the constitutional bases of industrial regulation. However, in 1996 the
arbitral power remained the most substantial of these, and was central to the operation
of the federal tribunal. It was not until 2005-06 that Australian liberal-productivism
purged itself of the arbitral power for good.
Almost as important in the reformulation of the law-administration continuum was a
crucial 1995 High Court decision, which had brought a great deal of clarity into the
relationship and hierarchy bonding law and administration together. 165

It will be

recalled from the previous chapter that the development of the arbitration system had
largely submerged, but not extinguished, the traditional body of common law
employment principles, most particularly the employment contract.

The case was

complicated, but basically revolved around a claim of two airport baggage handlers that
an award clause providing for procedural fairness should be imported or implied into
their contracts of employment.166 The Court found that the award term could not be
imported/implied into the award.167 In other words, the employment contract and the
award regime, although often intertwined, were conceptually distinct. To the extent that
awards established some of the key terms and conditions of employment, it was
unnecessary for the contract of employment to also provide for them. 168 However, we
have seen that the comprehensiveness of this regime was failing. As administration
continued to degrade, the regulatory vacuum could thus be captured by duties implied
into the common law employment contract, duties which typically favoured employers.
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2006 – Ascendancy of liberal-productivist labour law regime
On the 27th of March 2006, the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act169
came into effect. The passage of this legislation was the apotheosis of the liberalproductivist labour law regime, which had deepened and rested on an increasingly sure
institutional footing since 1996. Enterprise bargaining spread apace, whilst the role of
unions in its conduct was reduced. The collectivism of the broader labour law regime
continued to be corroded, especially after the passage of WorkChoices, which hampered
the activities of organised labour, further degraded the status of awards 170 and removed
the NDT, the last vestige of the link between awards and other instruments.
Concomitantly, the scope of individualisation was radically widened by the open legal
and political facilitation and encouragement of AWAs.

There was a continued

diminution in the role of the Commission, a function of explicit legislative fetters, the
development of competing institutions, and the broader juridification of labour law as
administration gave way to the legal form narrowly construed.

Perhaps most

importantly, the federal government at last succeeded in broadening its constitutional
capacity to regulate industrial relations. A monumental High Court decision in 2006
sounded the death-knell of the arbitral power,171 the keystone upon which a good deal of
the law-administration continuum peculiar to antipodean Fordism relied.
By 2006, therefore, the ascendancy of the liberal-productivist labour law regime had
been achieved. It gave effect to the dynamics of coherence and balance of social forces
constituting liberal-productivism in Australia, which were identified in chapter 4. The
repeal of WorkChoices and its replacement by the Fair Work Act 2009172 (FWA) bears
very little on this fundamental truth. Where differences are material they will be
discussed, but the FWA is best conceived as a technical modulation of WorkChoices,
concerned with calibrating liberal-productivist structures to the limits of political
legitimacy.173 The limited forms of collectivism it re-established have been made at a
time when trade unionism, the engine of working-class collectivism, has ebbed to
historic lows.
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Wage fixation
The general pattern of wage and conditions fixation from 1996 onwards is one of
decentralisation, fragmentation and increased polarity. The shift away from awards as
the primary source of wage determination is captured nicely by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics, which recorded methods of wage-setting between May 2000 and May
2010.174

In the former, 37% of workers had their pay determined by enterprise

agreements, 34% by individual arrangements,175 and 23% by award alone.176 By the
latter, the respective figures were 43%, 37% and 15%.177 The gains in both collective
and individual agreement coverage were thus almost totally at the expense of awards.
Moreover, this contraction of awards in scope was matched by a diminution in their
relevance to the quantum of average wage rises. For example, in May 2000, the average
weekly total earnings of non-managerial award-only employees was equivalent to
68.4% of the average for all non-managerial workers.178 By August 2008, however, this
had dropped to just 50.4%.179 Combined with further legislative undermining and the
sidelining of the Commission, which shall be explored below, the award system had
thus arrived at the point it was destined for within a liberal-productivist model of
development. It was in many respects unrecognisable, a permeable floor of minimum
rights and conditions, rather than a comprehensive, detailed framework of instruments
which could be used to universalise the gains won by sections of organised labour.
The only way over and above the increasingly poor award wage floor was through
enterprise bargaining or AWAs.

WorkChoices succeeded in severing the main

institutional link between these instruments and awards through abolishing the NDT (a
development I will return to below). Rather tellingly for my analysis, one government
174
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member opined that only through removing this safeguard could agreements become
full substitutes for awards.180

Peetz and Preston conducted a most useful study

comparing pay rates in AWAs and collective agreements in 2006, the first full year
without the NDT. The results speak for themselves: employees on AWAs earned on
average $2.00 less per hour than workers on collective agreements, whilst median AWA
earnings in 2006 were $4.00 below the figure for collective agreements. 181 Importantly,
the differences in earnings between workers on AWAs was pronounced, as they tended
to capture both low-income workers, such as those in retail and hospitality, and highincome workers, such as miners.182
One can only wonder at the number of AWAs that would have failed the NDT had it
been in place at this time. A disturbing insight is afforded following the reintroduction
of a weak ‘Fairness Test’ in 2007183 (the Howard government’s response to the electoral
damage threatened by public anger towards WorkChoices).

Figures from the

government’s own Workplace Authority (a successor to the OEA) revealed that one in
seven AWAs lodged failed the Fairness Test, usually through not compensating the
removal of penalty rates with a higher hourly rate.184
Even after the Rudd government phased out AWAs185 (leaving alone generally less
egregious unregistered individual contracts such as common law contracts) and replaced
the Fairness Test with a more robust ‘Better Off Overall’ test, the pay of nonmanagerial workers under ‘individual arrangements’ (to use the new ABS term)
remained in 2012 $1.80 less per hour than those bound by a collective agreement.186
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The marginally higher average weekly total earnings of the former was bought by
working, on average, an extra 2.4 hours a week.187
In short, since 1996 a three-part wage structure has crystallised, with an increasingly
small group of award-dependent workers falling behind employees in individual
arrangements, who themselves consistently earn less per hour than workers covered by
collective agreements.

The description of the implications of this structure for

inequality in earnings is best left to the government’s own neoliberal think tank, the
Productivity Commission.

This

body has

produced research

conclusively

demonstrating:


labour income growth has been strongest in the top three income deciles;188



greater dispersion in earnings;189 and



overall higher levels of labour income inequality.190

What we have here, therefore, is the fracturing of the relatively homogenous wage
structure deemed necessary to antipodean Fordism in chapter 4. Whilst it would be
exceedingly difficult to measure to what degree legal change ‘caused’ these
developments, the question of causation is largely beside the point; whatever the source,
transformations in the labour law regime were necessary for these wide degrees of
inequality to result.
In chapter 7, I will explore in detail a striking example of the liberal-productivist
assault upon wage equality, namely the struggle over pattern bargaining.

Upon

realising the danger posed by enterprise bargaining to the common weal of labour,
unions such as the AMWU attempted to orchestrate industry-wide enterprise bargaining
campaigns,

whereby

agreements

were

negotiated

with

various

employers

simultaneously and timed to have a common expiry date. In this effort, they were trying
at least in part to re-establish the antipodean Fordist cycle of flow-on, whereby the
militancy of well-organised workplaces could be leveraged at the industry and,
potentially, macroeconomic levels. As shall be seen, this endeavour, despite some
187
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promising early successes, ultimately came undone, stifled precisely because of newlydeveloped statutory inhibitions that rendered such conduct illegal. Here, labour law
achieved at last, and in totality, a purpose for which it had been pressed since at least the
Accord years; a destruction of the links binding the industrially strong and weak,
extinguishing the last remnants of the historical forces of flow-on.
Employment forms/flexibility
In the 1980s and 1990s the movement towards removing the formal barriers to the
intensification of precarity had proceeded apace, most specifically the stripping of
awards of qualitative and quantitative controls on the employment of casual, part-time
and/or junior labour, culminating in the 1996 prohibition of such clauses being included
in federal awards.191 On an institutional front, therefore, there was little more to do
regarding the accessibility of such forms for capital,192 although the case study chapters
will demonstrate a continued effort on the part of management to enhance their control
over the deployment and conditions of precarious labour.
An issue that was still live at the time of WorkChoices, however, was the growing use
of outsourcing strategies by increasingly lean firms, who sought to use labour hire
companies and independent contractors to perform jobs historically done in-house at a
lower cost and without the overheads associated with a direct employment relationship.
There had been historical difficulties in measuring the incidence and trajectories of
these particular forms.193

Nevertheless, a House of Representatives committee

estimated that in 1998 independent contractors represented around 10% of people in
employment (a 15% growth from 1978),194 a figure that remained broadly constant
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through the 2000s.195 The same committee found that in 2002 3.9% of all employees
were labour hire workers, a large increase on the equivalent figure of 0.8% in 1990.196
Such developments were in themselves indicative of the decline of antipodean Fordism,
evidencing the degradation of the internal labour markets and vertical company
integration that we saw in chapter 4 characterised it.
As shall be seen in chapter 8 in the case of the food processing industry, both forms
were valuable in capital’s effort to break union power in the workplace and disempower
employees, artificially dividing the workforce with complex tangles of legal
relationships outside the traditional standard employment model. Given the evidence
that outsourcing to contractors and labour hire companies did indeed effect these
outcomes, as well as threatening occupational health and safety and employee
wellbeing,197 moves to reduce the controls on these kinds of arrangements could not
help but exacerbate the deepening of flexibility and precarity at the heart of the liberalproductivist industrial paradigm and wage-labour nexus.
Such a deepening, however, was at the top of the Howard government’s list of
priorities. Historically, unfair contract provisions implanted in industrial legislation
gave contractors ready access to the court system, allowing them to seek redress for
‘unfair’ or ‘harsh’ agreements.198 The Howard government, however, had consistently
formed the view ‘that independent contracting arrangements should be regulated by
commercial law, not workplace relations law,’199 an expression par excellence of my
contention that capital prefers the legal form narrowly construed over administration in
times of proletarian weakness.
The Coalition’s efforts to realise their vision assumed a number of dimensions. Firstly,
regulations enacted pursuant to WorkChoices rendered provisions in enterprise
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agreements or AWAs restricting or qualifying the engagement of independent
contractors and/or labour hire workers as ‘prohibited content.’200

Secondly, a

contemporaneous piece of legislation, the Independent Contractors Act 2006,201 was
passed, which essentially meant that, ‘henceforth subcontractors with grievances had
access only to the much more expensive and time-consuming avenue of redress through
commercial law’ (my emphasis).202 Again, the recourse to commercial law further
strengthens my thesis of liberal-productivist reconstruction of the law-administration
continuum in favour of the former pole.
As the case study chapters will demonstrate, both enterprise bargaining and AWAs in
this period were subject to the extant forces of precarisation, heightened flexibility and
the whittling away of the basket of rights and entitlements attaching to the standard
employment model. Of particular note is the damning evidence of the utility of AWAs
for capital in these endeavours. Despite a disturbing level of opacity surrounding
them,203 the government’s own figures demonstrated incontrovertibly that AWAs
systematically undermined employee rights and entitlements. A sample of 998 AWAs
lodged between May and October 2006 found that:


76% did not include shift loadings;



68% did not include penalty rates;



59% omitted annual leave loading;



30% did not include rest breaks; and



23% did not protect declared public holidays.204

These are conditions which were hard-won over a long period of time, cohering as part
of the framework of protections and entitlements that were part and parcel of the
antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus. Although the AWA structure that permitted
such flagrant conditions-stripping has since been dispensed with by the FWA, the very
possibility of such an effort, together with its success, is demonstrative of the fact that
200
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the wage-labour nexus of liberal-productivism operates according to a very different
logic to its Fordist predecessor.
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations
Three key themes confront us when looking at the collectivism/individualism and scale
of the labour law regime in the late 1990s and 2000s: the further degradation in the
functions and powers of the federal Commission; the radically expanded scope for
AWAs to be employed; and the ever increasing density of legal fetters placed upon the
activities of trade unions.
The Commission’s powers were attacked on a number of fronts. The ability of the
Commission to compulsorily determine disputes was all but abolished, 205 a function of
the usurpation of the arbitral power. The award safety net for which it was responsible
was further gutted by WorkChoices, which reduced the number of allowable matters
from twenty to fourteen.206 Furthermore, the removal of the NDT mentioned above
severed the link between the skeletal award framework it oversaw and other
instruments.207 Concerning the latter, the Commission lost even its role in approving
collective agreements which, like AWAs, were now to be lodged with the OEA.
Perhaps most important was the diversification and empowerment of competitor
institutions. As seen above, this began with the creation of the OEA in 1996, and was
further evidenced by the establishment of the Fair Pay Commission,208 which was given
the responsibility of determining the federal minimum wage hitherto exercised by the
federal arbitral tribunal. Stripped even of its role in maintaining a meaningful basic
safety net of award wages and conditions, the Commission became, in many respects, a
voluntarist provider of conciliation services.209 Gifted the opportunity, Prime Minister
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Howard lived up to the threat he had made in 1992, stating of the Commission, ‘we will
stab them in the stomach.’210
Above and in chapter 4, I noted that the rise of liberal-productivism involves a
juridification of work relationships, whereby the law-administration continuum is
pushed towards its former pole as administrative fixes to proletarian struggle give way
to the purer legal form. The usurpation of the arbitration system was one manifestation
of this assault upon the law-administration continuum peculiar to antipodean Fordism. I
showed above how some employers in the mid-1980s achieved this through going
behind the Commission’s back, falling upon common law industrial torts and statutes
like the Trade Practices Act 1974 which were, in conception, only tangentially related
to labour law. After 1996, the process assumed a more direct and naked form, as the
development of a more comprehensive statutory scheme of industrial regulation
institutionalised channels outside the arbitration system.
In the Australian context, this involved an explicitly legalistic turn. Ludeke astutely
noted in 1998 that ‘[a]nother indicator of change is the growing tendency for parties to
turn to the courts rather than the traditional tribunals … it has now been held that the
structure of the present legislation itself “thrusts the parties towards the common law
courts.”’211 The ‘structure of the present legislation’ probably refers in part to the
explicit enlargement of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under the Workplace Relations
Act 1996 which, unlike its predecessor, granted the power for parties to commence
actions in the Court.212 More broadly, the general devolution of bargaining to the
enterprise and individual levels (in a context of union weakness), and the emphasis this
placed on the self-help of the parties, encouraged the pursuit of the full range of legal
institutions and instruments to secure desired outcomes. In Victoria, for example, the
Court of Appeal found that so long as employers had complied with their statutory
obligations, there should be no barrier placed before them in accessing their common
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law rights,213 a decision very much channelling the case of Byrne v Australian Airlines
Ltd214 discussed above.
The fact that the courts of ordinary standing were now competitors for the
Commission’s business was graphically demonstrated by the infamous 1998 Maritime
Dispute, in which Patrick Stevedores attempted to expel the Maritime Union of
Australia (MUA) from the waterfront. The case was notable for not directly involving
the Commission. The flow of events involved Patricks seeking injunctions against
picketing in the Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Victoria and Western
Australia,215 before the MUA eventually won a High Court challenge based upon the
freedom of association provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.216 Although
the MUA prevailed in this case, the observation made in chapter 3, that traditional
forms of law tend to reassert themselves during periods of working-class weakness,
holds.
Juridification was also apparent in the recasting of what had traditionally been collective
rights into individual ones, as well as the generation of new institutions to enforce
them.217

By severing the constitutional link between industrial legislation and the

arbitral power, which shall be discussed below, WorkChoices accorded a much greater
role to the individual worker, building upon the developments of the early 1990s. The
institutional expression of this was the expansion of the so-called Office of Workplace
Services218 and, in the final months of the Howard Government, its transformation into
a ‘Workplace Ombudsman.’219 These were both bodies designed explicitly to address
the complaints of employees qua individuals.220 Something of their character can be
discerned from the fact that the Office of Workplace Services deemed that a Cowra
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abattoir had not broken the law when it fired 29 of its workers and attempted to rehire
20 of them on new contracts that cut their weekly pay by $180.221
The FWA has retained in many ways the fundamentally individualistic character of the
rights and protections afforded by statute. Creighton notes that the individualistic
element of the regime:
[I]s also evidenced by the fact that all awards and enterprise agreements must
contain provisions enabling the making of IFAs where the operation of the
collective instrument can be modified in its application to individual employees,
that individuals … have the capacity to enforce their entitlements under
enterprise agreements and modern awards, and that the ‘safety net’ protections
set out in Part 2-2 relate very much to the rights of the individual rather than the
collectivity … unions are increasingly treated as just another participant in the
industrial process, rather than its driving force222 (my emphasis).

WorkChoices also radically intensified the individualism of the labour law regime
through making AWAs more accessible to capital at the same time that the protections
built in to them were wound back. Stung by the relatively slow take-up of AWAs,223
the Howard government increased their attractiveness and ease in a number of ways.
The abolition of the NDT severed the strings still binding it to the award system. Now,
AWAs merely had to comply with a new statutory Fair Pay and Conditions Standards’
scheme, prescribing only five basic conditions.224 Moreover, they could be offered as a
condition of employment for prospective workers.225 For those employees already
covered by collective agreements, employers proved willing to refuse to bargain when
they came up for re-negotiation, instead waiting workers out (and in some cases firing
them) in an attempt to force them on to AWAs.226 In short, WorkChoices created ‘a
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cascading hierarchy of instruments at the apex of which are AWAs, followed by
collective agreements then awards. An instrument higher up the hierarchy operates to
the complete exclusion of any instrument further down the list.’227 Unlike the case
hitherto, AWAs now completely displaced awards and collective agreements.
The generation of this hierarchy resulted in the rapid growth of the AWA stream. From
the 2.4% of employees calculated to be covered by AWAs in 2004, 228 the rate rose to
something between 5-7% in February 2008.229 They were particularly concentrated in
traditionally unionised industries, such as mining, transport and (as shall be seen in
chapter 9) retail,230 where they inflicted grievous damage to union strength.231
Although never high in absolute terms, the disempowering impact of AWAs went far
beyond their actual incidence. One AMWU official accurately grasped the case when
they stated that ‘[e]mployers now understand that a few AWAs here and there in key
enterprises dent confidence in union bargaining, lower standards and diminish outcomes
much more than the one or two per cent of workers that they cover.’232 It is true that the
FWA has subsequently dispensed with statutory individual contracts, but it has
introduced ‘Individual Flexibility Agreements’ into modern awards and enterprise
agreements, which permit variations of award conditions provided they satisfy the new
‘Better Off Overall’ test.233 Nevertheless, evidence demonstrating that they are open to
abuse suggests that at least some of the managerial prerogative-enhancing quality of
AWAs persists in them.234
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The diffusion of AWAs was proceeding apace at the same time as the capacity of trade
unions to resist them was weakening. WorkChoices struck at the heart of the ability of
unions to organise and operate. Union rights of entry were even more severely limited
than they had been, making it extremely difficult for organisers to access workplaces
without any union members. The legislation played the dual trick of specifying a highly
formalistic procedure by which union officials obtained ‘permits’235 whilst at the same
time preventing new workplace agreements from providing entry rights separate from
the statutory regime.236
The list of ‘prohibited content’ in workplace agreements did not stop with rights of
entry. Indeed, the list was voluminous. Among the immense number of prohibited
terms were any dealing with:


deduction of union dues;237



paid trade union training and/or meeting;238



encouragement or discouragement of union membership;239



allowing industrial action;240 or



restricting AWAs.241

These were clearly targeted directly at the ability of unions to obtain more favourable
terms through enterprise bargaining.
The damage inflicted on trade unions by the increasingly hostile legislative framework
from 1996 onwards is reflected in several key indicators, revealing a movement in a
deep malaise. The end of the closed shop, tightened access to existing and potential
members and the availability of instruments outside of union oversight combined with
the broader secular decline of trade unions to hit membership hard. In 1997, there were
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still more than 2.1 million members, representing some 30.3% of employees. 242 By
2009 there had been an absolute decline of more than 250,000 members, whilst union
density had decreased to 19.7%.243 The FWA has proved to be of no help in arresting
the decline; by August 2014, only 1.6 million people were trade unionists in their main
job, with density standing at the historically low rate of 15%.244
Levels of industrial disputation, which had been roughly steady for most of the 1980s
before falling rapidly after the recession of the early 1990s,245 proved remarkably
sensitive to changes in the labour law regime. The ABS reported that ‘[t]here was a
42% reduction in the number of working days lost between 1996 and 1997. The number
of employees involved dropped by 45%, and the number of disputes by 18%.’246 The
fact that 1996 saw the introduction of the Howard government’s anti-union program is
more than a little coincidental.
Disputation continued to decline throughout the Howard years, with the absolute nadir
being reached in 2007. In that year, there were a paltry 135 disputes, involving a mere
36,000 employees.247 Again, the FWA has proved of scant comfort to unionists, with
historically low levels of industrial action, in terms of numbers of disputes, employees
involved and working days lost remaining the order of the day.248
Legal matrix
In the discussion of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 and Workplace Relations
Act 1996, I noted how the arbitral power was supplemented by both the corporations
and external affairs powers. WorkChoices was a radical leap further down this road.
Given the parliamentary obstacles the Howard Government had encountered in further
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deploying its vision of workplace reform in the late 1990s, the 2004 election victory,
which granted the government majorities in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate,249 presented a window of opportunity for the conservative parties to force the
issue.

After failing to get the states to ‘refer’ their industrial powers to the

Commonwealth,250 the government turned to the corporations power to found the bulk
of the WorkChoices legislation.251 The prize for this effort, if successful, was twofold:
the ability to bring many workers currently covered by the state system under the
control of the Commonwealth, arrogating to the latter the common rule application it
had traditionally lacked; and an ability to break the mould of conciliation and
arbitration, with all its collectivist traditions, prescribed in the arbitral power.
Conservative parliamentarians made no bones about both objectives.252

An ALP

member incisively grasped the ramifications of the Coalition’s scheme, stating:
It is also important to note that this legislation shifts the most important
principles in our legal constitution – the way we work and the way workplaces
relations are run in this country – from the labour power to
the corporations power. What does that mean? We are no longer talking about
arbitration. We are no longer talking about two parties – the worker and the
employer in their workplace – we are now talking about corporations power and
about economic and employment costs. We are talking now about commodities
and simple units of production.253

This expansive use of the corporations power, although having historical antecedents in
the 1993 and 1996 legislative packages, was unique in that it essentially usurped the
arbitral power. Given the stakes, for both the union movement and state governments
who were seeing an enormous disturbance in the balance of federalism, 254 a High Court
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challenge was inevitable, despite the fact that it chances of success were seen by many
experts as slim.255
In a massive 385-page decision, the High Court (by a five to two majority) held that the
corporations power could be used to found the Howard Government’s industrial
relations legislation.256 Most significantly for my analysis, the majority held that:
s 51(xxxv) did not contain a positive prohibition or restriction on what would
otherwise be the ambit of the power conferred by s 51(xx) or give rise to a
negative implication of exclusivity which would deny the validity of laws with
respect other heads of power which also had the character of laws regulating
industrial relations in a fashion other than as required by s 51(xxxv) (my
emphasis).257

In other words, the High Court gave the Government an enormous latitude in legislating
for industrial relations, freeing the latter from the prescribed mode of industrial
regulation established by the arbitral power.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Kirby hit upon one of the motive forces for this
shift in terms supporting the theory of transition forwarded in this thesis. He stated of
the arbitral power:
[T]he feature of the independent determination of industrial disputes has the
potential to encourage and promote collective agreements between parties and
the protection of economic fairness to all those involved in industrial disputes,
secured by the distinctive procedures of conciliation and arbitration. Such
elements of fairness would not necessarily be assured by an unlimited focus of
federal law on the activities of employers as constitutional corporations.258

The analysis here and in chapters 4 and 5 allows us to regard the claims for the
arbitration system’s historic fairness with the skepticism it deserves.

Compulsory

conciliation and arbitration was not a gift to ensure fairness to workers, but a structure
sitting astride the competing demands of capital accumulation and a powerful labour
movement.

With that caveat in mind, however, I have demonstrated that part of
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arbitration’s utility to Australian capitalism in its antipodean Fordist phase was
precisely that it was more distributively ‘fair’ than the free labour market system which
had preceded it. This ensured both the maintenance of adequate demand in the hands of
the proletariat and the integration of organised labour into the fabric of the state. The
survival of the system more-or-less intact for the majority of the twentieth century,
together with the general acceptance of the federal state that its power to regulate
industrial relation was contained within this power to the exclusion of others,259 attests
to this fact. Liberal-productivism, however, is both premised upon, and reproduces, a
different balance of forces and modalities of cohesion. What made arbitration ‘fair’ is
precisely what made its destruction necessary in the new epoch of Australian capitalism.
The effective death of the arbitral power in 2006 was not reversed by the incoming ALP
government, which instead exploited the constitutional shift in enacting their own
industrial legislation. With that passed into history one of central foundation stones
upon which the law-administration configuration unique to antipodean Fordism was
erected.

Conclusions
In this chapter I have provided the second half of the concrete legal history needed to
flesh out the abstract framework developed in chapter 4. From where the previous
chapter left off, major developments across the four key themes have resulted in the
destruction of the antipodean Fordist labour law regime and its replacement by a liberalproductivist successor.
The advent of the Accord between the ACTU and the ALP heralded a far more
concerted effort at searching for ways out of crisis than had hitherto been the case,
revolving initially upon intensifying the federal Commission and placing it as the
lynchpin in aggregate wage fixation. However, the intractability of the crisis forced
more drastic changes by 1989, as the state, labour and capital sought for a way to
increase efficiency and competitiveness through a strategic decentralisation to the award
and workplace level. The development of the restructuring and efficiency and structural
efficiency principles was particularly important in this regard, especially to the extent
that they built upon the emerging norm of precarity and enhanced managerial control
259
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over the organisation and execution of the labour process. This movement towards new
forms of the traditional award system co-existed with, and to a certain extent grated
against, the development of new, more legalistic instruments of industrial control, such
as secondary boycott prohibitions, and the recrudescence of industrial torts in set-piece
battles between militant New Right employers and unions.
Juridification, this movement towards the ‘purer’ legal form, continued throughout the
1990s and 2000s, as collective rights gave way to individual ones and the Commission
found itself competing for business with courts of ordinary standing. The emergence of
enterprise bargaining further limited the tribunal’s role and power, as ALP and
Coalition governments sought to narrow the circumstances in which it could arbitrate
disputes and/or refuse to certify enterprise agreements.

In 1996, the Howard

government took the next step, introducing statutory individual contracts that
fundamentally threatened the collectivism of the labour law regime. In their war against
pattern bargaining and secondary boycotts, they attacked this collectivism from another
angle, finally severing the last remnants of the historical pattern of wage and conditions
flow-on.
The activation of WorkChoices in 2006 marks the ascendency of the new liberalproductivist labour law regime. The remnants of the award system and the Commission
were reduced to just that: institutions that, in the logic and effect of their action, shared
little with their predecessors but the names. Unions, once critical to the operation of the
industrial relations systems, were relegated to unwanted ‘third parties,’ stifled by a wide
array of legal fetters that largely survived the death of WorkChoices and remain integral
to the FWA. The new regime was made complete when WorkChoices, building on
exploratory moves in the 1990s, abandoned the arbitral power of the Constitution and
sought the footing of the corporations power. This constitutional revolution, legitimated
by the ALP when it used the latter to anchor the FWA, removed one of the keystones of
the law-administration continuum unique to antipodean Fordism, and is perhaps the
single most telling indication that liberal-productivism has remade labour law in its own
image.

Chapter 7
THE METAL TRADES SECTOR AND ANTIPODEAN
FORDIST FLOW-ON
In the previous two chapters I was concerned with developing a broad historical account
of labour law change in Australia. In particular, I explained how the labour law regimes
of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism concretely performed the abstract
functions required of them whilst also mapping the process of evolution between the
two. This chapter marks the beginning of the case studies, where I isolate some of the
most important changes identified and explore their application to specific
industries/sectors in greater detail.
The focus in this particular segment is the rise and decline of the antipodean Fordist
process of wage and conditions ‘flow-on’ centred on the articulation between the
arbitration system and the leading metals sector. In chapters 4 and 5 it was established
that the former performed the immensely important function of flowing-on gains won in
the latter to the labour force at large through the award framework, a process that helped
in no small part to establish the Fordist character and coherence of post-World War II
Australian capitalism. Here, the mechanics of flow-on, the architecture of the award
system and the role of metals within that structure will be examined in much greater
detail. In particular, the analysis will focus upon the historical role of the Metal Trades
and Metal Industry Awards as industrial pace-setters, an institutional expression par
excellence of a Fordist lead sector. I will trace the ascension of these awards to the apex
of the award hierarchy in the period of antipodean Fordist functionality, before
witnessing the growing dissonance between their institutional entrenchment and the
flagging dynamism of the metals, and broader manufacturing, sector. The enforced
wage straitjacket of the Accord stopped the cycle of metal trade flow-on in its tracks,
whilst the advent of enterprise bargaining and associated legislative change destroyed it
once and for all.
As shall be seen in this chapter, the fate of the antipodean Fordist cycle of flow-on was
a function both of the destruction of the horizontal and vertical links binding the award
system together and the unfolding of enterprise bargaining in the manufacturing sector.
Both processes reflect opposite sides of the same political-economic coin. Whereas the
209
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former was a critical development in the ‘rollback’ phase, whereby the foundational
institutions of antipodean Fordism were undermined, corroded and displaced, the latter
is part of an ongoing ‘roll-out’ of liberal-productivist structures.1
The choice of this particular subject is informed by a variety of considerations. Firstly,
the centrality of the flow-on process to the coherence of antipodean Fordism cannot be
under-estimated; indeed, in chapter 5 I stated that metal sector flow-on was ‘the motive
force by which the institutional structure turned.’ Understanding the institutionalisation
and usurpation of the metal trades as a lead sector is thus key to understanding one of
the central pivots of antipodean Fordist functionality and crisis. Secondly, the bundle of
legal changes investing the ascent and decline of the metals sector as an institutionalised
pace-setter go to the heart of several of the fundamental essences of the labour law
regimes of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism elucidated in chapters 4, 5 and
6, including:


For the former: compulsory arbitration precociously institutionalising the Fordist
wage-labour nexus, most particularly its linkage of the industrially strong and
weak, the growth of administration fixes to worker power, and broad
occupational/industry-level bargaining;



For the latter: the severing of the institutionalised links binding the labour force
together, de-centralisation and intensified juridifcation.

Before the analysis can be constructed, however, it is necessary to briefly plot the early
history of the relationship between the metal trades and the arbitration system.

Early history
By the time of Federation in 1901 there was already a small but growing manufacturing
sector.2 It is thus not surprising that cases involving manufacturing workers were
determined from the inception of the federal arbitral system. 3 The industrial impetus of
World War I, the growth of the domestic market and the advent of a cogent system of
1
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substantial tariff protection combined in the 1920s and 1930s to provide a kick-start to
manufacturing of a more industrial character, particularly basic metals, metal fabrication
and machinery construction (referred to collectively here as the ‘metal trades’ and
‘metal industry’).
The metal trades unions (including at this time the Amalgamated Engineering Union,
the Australasian Society of Engineers, the Federated Moulders Union of Australasia and
the Blacksmiths’ Society of Australasia) had pursued their own separate state awards
until the 1920s, when the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) sought and obtained
their first federal award in 1921.4 They were followed by the other craft unions5 and
more general unions organising unskilled workers (such as the Federated Ironworkers
Association),6 such that by the mid-1920s they all held awards in the federal
jurisdiction, representing the first concerted effort ‘to standardise conditions of
employment in the metal industries which were a key component of national industrial
expansion.’7
A moment of critical importance for the analysis here was the creation of what would
become the cornerstone of the post-World War II award structure, the consolidated
Metal Trades Award in 1930.8 Cockfield notes that, unlike the patchwork of awards
which had characterised the sector up to this point, the award ‘covered all occupational
unions: both engineering unions, the blacksmiths’, boilermakers’, and moulders’ unions,

4
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the Federated Ironworkers Association, and the Sheet Metal Workers Union.’9 In an
indication of how important the metals sector was even at this early stage, the tribunal
stated of the case:
The interests involved, all more or less related, constitute the most important
group of secondary industries of the Commonwealth.
The industrial
relationships of establishments, employing approximately 110,000 workers, will
be affected either directly or indirectly by the award.10

In terms significant to my construction of the industrial paradigm according with
antipodean Fordism, the award was determined at a time when mass production
techniques were beginning to transform the sector and supplant the typical ‘jobbing’
pattern which had characterised employment therein.11
From the mid-1930s onwards, the metal trades served a critical function as the base of
recovery for organised labour in the aftermath of the economic turmoil of the Great
Depression.

A 1935 adjustment to the Metal Trades Award by Justice Beeby

substantially increased margins for skilled workers12 and, more importantly, led to
requisite movements in many other awards, in what was to be the first example of the
Metal Trades Award acting as an industrial pace-setter.13 A concerted AEU campaign
to extract over-award payments from metal employers throughout 1936-1937 proved
extremely successful, triumphing despite the union being de-registered federally.14
Upon being re-registered, Beeby J noted: ‘[i]t is obvious that this Union not being
registered completely disorganises the Metal Trades Industry and the Metal Trades
Award, which is one of the most important ever made by the Court’ (my emphasis).15
This acknowledged significance of the metal trades industry only grew with the onset of
World War II. Sheridan notes how ‘[t]he metal trades workforce practically doubled
between 1938-9 and 1943-4 from 177,000 to 341,000.

This rapid expansion was
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accompanied by a revolution in engineering practice and the scale of operations.’16
Technological innovations, such as tungsten carbide tipped tools, new steels and
improved machinery, helped expand output vastly, whilst by 1943 domestic production
of machine tools had increased seven times on the pre-war figure.17 Just as significant
was the increasing scale of production, with metal workers increasingly employed in
large workplaces.18 Both developments combined were to provide the foundation of a
post-War metals sector of a different qualitative magnitude to the one that existed
before the conflict. With this industrial critical mass established, the metal unions,
characterised by powerful and active industrial organisation and a pent-up worker desire
to make good the privations incurred during the Depression and World War II, were
placed to take a vanguard role in the post-War wave of militancy. In these struggles the
Metal Trades Award would serve as a key institutional nexus.

Antipodean Fordism and the Metal Trades Award – Rise to
paramountcy
With the end of hostilities in 1945, the path was finally cleared for the coherence of the
antipodean Fordist model of development.

Key to this process was moving the

economy from a war footing through the reconversion of manufacturing capacity to
peacetime production and the release of bottled-up consumer demand.

The latter

phenomenon, however, was stymied by the Chifley Australian Labor Party (ALP)
government’s maintenance of the wage and price controls which had enabled the state
to maximise both output and macroeconomic control of the wartime economy. In
particular, there was reluctance and hedging on the part of Chifley to relinquish the
maximum wage ceiling and allow fresh applications for marginal rates variation.19 His
government’s overwhelming desire to restrain inflation, and thus wages, placed it on a
collision course with organised labour, whose hand was strengthened by the virtual
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elimination of pre-war, Depression-begat unemployment.

Unsurprisingly, the metal

trades were the primary front along which the conflict was waged.
The freezing of margins cases during the War, along with the fact that the Basic Wage
was varied by automatic quarterly adjustments to the ‘C Series’ price index, meant that
in nominal award terms the marginal relativity between skilled and unskilled employees
had declined. In practice, however, metal unions had been generally successful in
obtaining over-award payments (although technically illegal under the government’s
wage-pegging scheme) from employers keen to profit from war production in a tight
labour market.20 Direct action at the point of production proved similarly propitious in
the post-War environment. In the face of government and employer intransigence, a
massive six month dispute in the Victorian metal trades over the issue of over-awards
and margins proved critical.21 Angered by the protracted bureaucratic wrangling over
the Basic Wage and 40-hour week hearings, metal unions, most prominently the AEU,
embarked on an over-award wage campaign, with the latter enforcing overtime bans to
that effect. The employers responded with an ill-conceived lock-out, whilst the federal
Commission (at this time still the Arbitration Court) appeared fundamentally confused,
both as to the nature of wage-fixing regulations and how to control an industrial brawl
that threatened to spill over state boundaries.22 In the event, the employers and the
Arbitration Court caved along the line, with a 1947 Full Bench Margins case23
sandwiched by two decisions of Commissioner Mooney24 granting substantial marginal
increases.25
The 1947 Margins case was of critical importance to the institutionalisation of the role
of the metal trades at the apex of the award structure.

Although Hancock and

Richardson note that ‘[t]he tendency for the overall wage structure to move in line with
20
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“metals” emerged as early as 1935,’26 this trend only really became consistent from the
1947 Margins case onwards.27 Although the Bench stated that the 1947 rulings were ‘in
settlement of a specific industrial dispute and … of little value as a precedent,’28 Hutson
maintains that ‘[t]he 1947 Margins Case on the Metal Trades Award took on the
character of a national test case … because the increases eventually flowed to other
awards.’29 Despite their desire to prevent flow-on to other sectors, the Court was forced
to acknowledge after the case that ‘by consent and by adjudication, the metal trades
marginal increases are beginning to percolate into other industries.’30
The case was something of a prototype for the pattern of margins determinations that
would follow in the 1950s and 1960s. The participants in the hearing were still only the
metal unions and metal employers, a situation that was to change drastically in future
cases as their national significance was acknowledged. Moreover, the case represented
a hybrid in terms of the grounds upon which marginal increases were granted. Whereas
in a 1937 case evidence of a general economic recovery was regarded as inappropriate
in the fixation of metal margins,31 the 1947 hearings evinced a different methodology,
whereby both the economic capacity of the metals sector and the capacity of industry
generally were to considered in the fixation of marginal rates in the Metal Trades
Award.32 This melding of the fortunes of the metals sector with industry at large was a
key moment in the institutional entrenchment of the former as a lead-sector, a
crystallisation that would be completed by the 1954 Margins Case.33
The 1952 Margins Case34 served as a mid-wife to the momentous 1954 case. Although
it did not yet formally unify the capacity of the metal trades sector with that of industry
generally, Hancock notes that considerations of the macroeconomic impact of marginal
26
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adjustments were determining factors.35 It was also conducted with the air of a national
test case.36 Commissioner Galvin, although not actually awarding marginal increases in
the event,37 remarked of the nature of the proceedings:
It has been said on numerous occasions … that, to an extent, the principles laid
down in the Metal Trades Award, form the pattern for quite a large number of
other awards. What transpired in the case of other awards subsequent to the then
Full Court’s decision of 1947 amply bears that out, and that being so it is evident
that these proceedings do take on something in the nature of an economic
inquiry in miniature. In brief, the ultimate determination of this dispute is …
one fraught with possible grave consequences not only to the Metal industry but
to all industries (my emphasis).38

Galvin also traced the development of the fitter as the standard skilled employee when
comparing inter-award marginal relativities, which was indicated in chapter 5. Again, it
is worth quoting him at length:
[F]or many years past, first the members of the Court and later Conciliation
Commissioners have adopted the practice of treating the rate of pay prescribed
for the general engineering fitter as the focal point or yardstick upon which to
measure the rates of other skilled tradesmen, and to relate thereto the services of
the semi-skilled and unskilled class of workers … That has been proved time
and time again, and there is no more recent exemplification of it than what
happened subsequent to the Full Court’s 1947 Metal Trades decision, where
notwithstanding the clear pronouncement that it was designed to cover the
special circumstances of the Metal Trades Industry, it was quickly imported into
the awards of most other industries.39

The recognition that gains won in the Metal Trades Award tended to diffuse to industry
generally, elucidated so clearly by Galvin,40 underlay the momentous 1954 Margins
Case.41 The Arbitration Court (in what was to be its last major margins case before
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being reconstituted as the Arbitration Commission in 1956)42 understandably reasoned
that if Metal Trades Award decisions were going to have macro-level significance, it
followed that the capacity of the national economy should be the determining feature in
the fixation of metal margins. It stated of the skilled employee:
[W]e cannot overlook the fact that any increase in his margin is likely to have
some reflection in the marginal rates of other skilled employees not in this
industry. It is particularly because of this fact that in making any increase for
the skilled employee we have anxiously considered the state of the economy. 43

In determining whether or not the economy could bear the cost of increased marginal
payments, the Court marshalled data on rural production and productivity, investment
levels, employment and the state of secondary industry, little of which had to do with
the metals sector specifically.44

When requisite economic capacity had been

ascertained, the principles of comparative wage-justice ensured that the margins thus
determined flowed through the award structure at large.45 The case, whilst building on
the 1947 and 1952 decisions, represented a hitherto unprecedented entrenchment of the
Metal Trades Award at the pinnacle of the award structure. From now on, the capacity
of the metal trades and the capacity of the national economy were regarded as
synonymous. The fact that this position of paramountcy was buttressed by powerful
and generally militant metal unions ensured that the wage and conditions ‘inputs’
provided by their struggle found ready-made institutional channels through which to
diffuse.
The pattern set by this critical 1954 case was followed with only minor variations until
the 1967 Total Wage Case46 and the 1967 Metal Trades Work Value Inquiry.47 The
1959 Margins Case48 introduced a qualification into the use of general economic
capacity as a guide for setting marginal rates in the Metal Trades Award, arguing that
the economic position of particular industries could be a factor to be taken into account
in the fixing of margins where capacity was greater or less than the economy
42
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generally.49 However, it then proceeded to find that this was not the case with the
metals industry, whose capacity (not by accident) was taken as analogous to the
economy at large.50 Another margins hearing in 196351 reiterated the principle, adding:
‘[i]n our view it is proper … to ascertain if there has been any increase in economic
capacity in the Metal Trades industry and if that increase has occurred in a context of
increased capacity in industry generally.’52

Given the difficulty in making this

comparison, however, the relationship between the two was essentially assumed, with
evidence of widespread overtime, over-award payments and a lack of employer dissent
to the contrary taken as proof ‘that by and large, the economic capacity of the Metal
Trades industry is certainly not less than and probably more than that of industry
generally.’53
The 1963 Margins Case represents the institutional highpoint of the Metal Trades
Award.

Although conceptually distinct, the capacity of the metal trades and the

economy generally were in practice unified. The industrial capacity of the nation was
thus refracted through the prism of the Metal Trades Award; once so refracted, it could
flow through the award structure, lubricated by the ideology of comparative wage
justice elucidated in chapter 5. The Metal Trades Award was the nexus of this ideology,
certainly for blue-collar workers and, in many instances, their white-collar brethren.
Commissioner O’Reilly, in discussing the utility of the metal trades fitter as an
industrial measuring rod, summed it up best:
It seems elementary that some standard or measuring rod is indispensable in any
measuring assignment. The adequacy of any wage or salary cannot be
meaningfully assessed unless it is considered in relation to other wages or
salaries. This seems just as fundamental whether the jobs concerned have
common features or not (my emphasis).54
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Despite often repeating a stock-standard assertion that decisions concerning the metal
trades were not meant to automatically apply to other industries, 55 the award framework
as it evolved in the 1950s and 1960s came to be dominated by the Metal Trades Award.
Aside from the crucial role it played in margins determinations, it was also the vehicle
for Basic Wage claims; that is, the Commission formally altered the Basic Wage in the
Metal Trades Award, which was regarded as a decision of general application.56
Moreover, it was an important test award for the introduction of new standards of
employment, such as provision for three weeks annual leave.57 From no more an
authoritative source than the President of the Commission, Sir Richard Kirby, came the
admission that the metal trades industry acted as a ‘guide-liner or trend-setter for wages
and working conditions.’58 In short, it helped institutionalise the metals sector as an
archetypal Fordist lead-sector and facilitated the performance of its functions in this
role;59 as I stated in chapter 5, the reality of flow-on exerted a strong homogenising
impact on the wage structure60 at the same time as a ‘standardized award structure’ was
produced.61
It is vital to note, however, that this position of industrial gravity was not achieved nor
perpetuated by the institutions of arbitration alone. As seen in chapter 4, this period of
institutional ascendency was based on the waxing of the manufacturing sector generally
within Australian capitalism.

In 1957-1958, there were some 1,073,807 people

employed in what the-then Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics dubbed
‘industrial classes,’ of whom approximately 42.8% (459,345) were classified as
working in ‘industrial metals, machines and conveyances’ (in short, the metals sector).62
Over the same period, manufacturing engaged on aggregate a massive 38.3% of wage
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and salary earners in civilian employment.63 We can thus say that in this period,
employees engaged in the metal trades accounted for 16.4% of total civilian
employment.64 It was also in the late 1950s and early 1960s that manufacturing as a
contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) peaked, at just under 30%.65
Manufacturing in Australia was thus as large and significant, in relative terms, as it was
ever to be, and within this the metals sector constituted the single largest industrial
group. The Metal Trades Award was not simply important by dint of its institutional
position; rather, this was premised on its critical importance within the fabric of
Australian capitalism.
Moreover, the success of the union movement in achieving gains in the Metal Trades
Award and then flowing them on was predicated on the strength of the metal unions
themselves. Sheridan recounts at length the success the AEU and other metal unions
achieved in Basic Wage and margins cases when backed by industrial campaigning and
the application of ‘plant by plant duress’66 to individual employers.67 The Commission
itself rather lucidly described union strategy:
The “militant” approach … was based upon the view that the way to win a case
before the Commission was, first to develop a major national propaganda
campaign and make claims on every employer and seek to obtain over-award
payments by demands backed by the threat of strikes, which should if necessary
be carried into action. Application should then be made to the Commission to
obtain recognition of the established fact.68
In the absence of such pressure, the Commission proved more recalcitrant and hesitant
to effect timely change. This reality would become of crucial importance as union
power began to degrade through the 1980s.

63

Ibid 453-454. This figure excludes rural wage earners, female domestic servants and defence force
personnel. It is also worth noting the figure has to be taken with some caution, as at this stage it included
employees engaged in the selling and distribution of metals products.
64
Sheridan adds that factory employment in the metal trades grew by 58% between 1953-54 and 1967-68,
outstripping the 34% growth in total factory employment over the same period. The growth of consumer
durables production was a particularly important stimulus to this growth: Sheridan, Mindful Militants,
above n 4, 266.
65
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2012 (1301.0 No. 92, 2012) 510.
66
Peter Cochrane, 'Doing Time' in Verity Burgmann and Jenny Lee (eds), Making A Life: A People's
History of Australian Since 1788 (McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, 1988) 177-193.
67
Sheridan, Mindful Militants, above n 4, 282-291.
68
National Wage Cases of 1965 (1965) 110 CAR 189, 261.

221

Total Wage and Work Value – Attempted institutional dislocation and
industrial militancy
As seen in chapter 5, capital came to resent the ‘shunters law’69 set in motion by the
metal trades and resented the identification of metal trades margins with the capacity of
the wider economy, with employers feeling that unions were getting two bites at the
wage cherry through using national capacity to buttress both Basic Wage and margins
claims.70 Despite the functionality of the system for the overall coherence of antipodean
Fordism, capital, governed by the corrosive laws of competition, often loses sight of the
forest for the trees. A feeling that organised labour had the upper hand, along with the
Commission supporting the trade union sponsored ‘prices and productivity’ method of
adjusting the Basic Wage,71 convinced leading employer organisations that a change of
tack towards the whole system of wage determination was necessary.72
The first attempts to disrupt the paramountcy of the Metal Trades Award were part of
this broader effort to effect change in the methodology of the Commission. In chapter 5
I outlined the history of the employer’s desire for a ‘Total Wage,’ whereby the two-part
Basic Wage and margins structure would be replaced by a single wage which would
embrace both. After introducing the concept in 1964,73 it took only three years for the
Commission to come around to the employer’s point of view and jettison what had been
the bedrock of wage fixation since 1907 in favour of the Total Wage.74 Although
characterised by Justice Moore as ‘no more than a procedural change,’75 the Total Wage
concept bore within itself the ability to minimise the importance of metal trades
decisions.76 Indeed, Hawke noted that ‘while the present total wage system operates the
only automatic flow to other awards of decisions made under the Metal Trades Award
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will be in respect of decisions in annual national wage cases.’77 The formal abolition of
margins, combined with the centrality of the Metal Trades Award in their
determination, heightened this potential.
The primacy of the metal trades was also threatened somewhat by a huge work value
inquiry over 1966-1967, the first in over thirty years.78 It was a curious twist of fate that
the structural basis of margins fixation in federal awards escaped work value analysis
for such a long time, with Commissioner Winter noting that comparative evaluation of
the work processes ‘within the framework and scope of the Metal Trades Award has
been allowed to remain perennially within the rigid time capsule of the decade of the
1920s.’79 Over the objections of both employers and unions,80 the Commission initiated
an inquiry on its own accord. After an exhaustive process of workplace inspections and
hearings, it determined that the work value of employees (particularly tradesmen) in the
metal trades had grown in a context of deep technological innovation81 and granted
substantial marginal rises.
In granting the increases, however, the Commission made two critical, inter-related
qualifications, one conceptual and the other practical, which both threatened the
position of the Metal Trades Award as a pace-setter and upset the industrial relations of
the sector generally. The first was the stated desire to avoid flow-on to other sectors.
Although similar statements had been made in previous cases, they were largely token
and undermined by the identification of metal trade capacity with the capacity of the
national economy. This inquiry, however, was qualitatively distinct from the margins
cases which had come before, in that the primary consideration was not abstract
economic capacity, but the actual work value content of eleven pilot classifications
within the Metal Trades Award.

In this context, the following statement of the

Commission assumed a new weight:
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We also emphasise that this is not a case in which increases in wage rates for the
metal trades sets a pattern for wages in other industries. The increases which we
would grant … relate solely to employees working under clause 4 of the Metal
Trades Award and do not constitute a reason for awarding wage increases to
employees covered by other awards or working in other industries.82

Combined with this stated desire to minimise the pace-setting role of the Metal Trades
Award83 was the Commission’s invitation to employers to ‘absorb’ the wage-rises
granted out of existing over-award payments. In other words, an employer already
paying a $6.00 over-award would only have to grant a $1.40 increment to tradesmen to
fulfil the $7.40 increase ordered by the Commission.84

Given the comparatively

generous nature of the wage-rises given, metal employers and their organisations (such
as the Metal Trades Employers’ Association) needed no encouragement and, unlike
previous margins cases, made a concerted effort to enforce absorption.
The result was the monumental absorption struggle of early 1968.

Metal unions

embarked upon a series of rolling strikes, with the first six weeks of 1968 witnessing
some 400 stoppages.85

Judge Dunphy noted of the fracas: ‘Never before, in my

memory, have employers had more reason to fear industrial disruption of a grand scale
than is now in evidence before us in New South Wales.’86 Despite the levying of tens
of thousands of dollars in fines for breaches of bans clauses 87 and the imposition of
what amounted to a blanket no-strike order,88 the union campaign was almost
completely victorious, with the Commission stating, ‘[i]t appears to all of us that
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substantial absorption in over award payments of the wage increases recently granted
has not in this industry been practicable in the existing circumstances.’89
The defeat of absorption paved the way for powerful currents of flow-on from the metal
trades decision to other awards.90 Mills, writing in 1968, opined that the flow-on would
not be automatic, but would nevertheless be extensive.91 A year later, Woodward noted
that attempts to enforce flow-on had been a major factor in strikes in the building and
railways industries, and observed that wage increases were being awarded on a
comparative justice, rather than work value, basis.92 He added:
[S]ince the reasons given for the increases in the metal trades were sufficiently
general to have application in many other industries, the claim has proved very
hard to answer. As more and more industries have fallen more or less into line,
it has become increasingly difficult for any to be left aside.93

The early efforts to disrupt the place of the metal trades sector and its all-important
award in the wage fixation structure were thus largely thwarted. Decisions which
threatened to usurp the paramount position of the Metal Trades Award were rendered
ineffective, at least in this period, by a combination of intense industrial militancy on
the part of metal unions and the continued inability of the Commission to match its
rhetoric on flow-on with changed practice. This latter reality was best captured by
Commissioner O’Reilly when he stated of the 1967-1968 work value increases:
If I have paid insufficient heed to the strictures of the Metal Trades Bench I am
not alone. The Metal Trades increases have by now been reflected substantially
in other Federal and State awards … Some industries affected have been akin to
the metal trades industry; in others the affinity has been less apparent (my
emphasis).94
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Early 1970s-early 1980s – Institutional exhaustion and economic crisis
The first real signs of stress in the post-war award hierarchy began to manifest
themselves in the early 1970s. Regarding the place of the Metal Trades Award at the
apex of this structure, two of the biggest developments at this initial stage seem to have
been the mounting contradictions between the award as a vehicle of general and specific
interests, introduced in chapter 5, and a change in tactics on the part of employers.
Regarding the first point, Woodward opined in 1969 that:
The developments of the last few years seem to have produced the result that
award wages in the metal trades industry must now lag behind most others. If
all increases in the metal trades are to flow elsewhere … and if other industries
are to receive additional increases periodically, there must be a tendency for
workers in those other industries to move ahead of the metal trades.95

In other words, the very ascendency of the Metal Trades Award as a tool of industrial
regulation generally grated against its actual utility for workers employed in the metals
sector, who sought to make good the shortfall through exacting greater over-award
payments.96

Commissioner Winter, who was responsible for cases concerning the

metals sector and had played a key role in the work value inquiry, made a very similar
observation in 1971. It is worth quoting him at length:
For years the trade union movement in particular used the Metal Trades Award
as a vehicle to seek adjustment of marginal rates but never sought, on an acrossthe-board or even upon a division-by-division basis, to have wage rates
examined by detailed consideration.
Consequently, while large numbers of employees covered by other awards
gained steadily and repeatedly by dint of applications for wage increases which
did not ‘flow back’ to any area of the Metal Trades Award, those covered by the
latter award remained relatively static.’97
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The intensified impulse to the traditional pattern of unions extracting over-award
payments dovetailed with metal employers’ desire to diminish the national significance
attaching to the award98 and to avoid the pitched industrial battle they had lost so badly
in 1968.99 The result of this confluence of interests was a markedly different approach
to the determination of what would become the new Metal Industry Award 1971.100
Unlike previous cases, where respective claims were usually determined by the
Commission after a protracted process of legal wrangling, both the unions and the Metal
Trades Industry Association (MTIA)101 agreed to a process of direct negotiation without
going to arbitration.102 The parties received guidance in the form of conciliation
hearings before Commissioner Hood, and he made some determinations as to wages and
conditions, but the interim award he handed down103 had largely been arrived at by
consent.104 It granted metal industry employees an extra $6.00 per week, and was
characterised by ‘the speed and lack of acrimony’ with which it was accepted by both
sides.105 The fact that the pay-rises subsequently flowed-on to many other awards106
and were not subject to the crucible of a National Wage Case hearing left many
employers outside of the metal trades angry, with one commentator suggesting that the
effect of Hood’s decision:
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[W]as to retain the nexus between movements in the metal trades award and
other industry awards without giving other employer organisations the benefit of
being able to oppose the metal unions’ claims as strongly as they might have if
they had been the subject of a national wage case.107
The reality of flow-on108 was evidence of the Metal Industry Award’s powerful role and
entrenched institutional position at the peak of the award system. However, the shift
towards negotiated outcomes between metal unions and employers (a movement which,
from the perspective of the former, was an attempt to redress the contradictions between
metal awards as a tool of regulation for the sector and as pace-setter generally) took
place in the context of the general upswing in de facto industry-level bargaining and
wage rounds described in chapters 4 and 5.
In such an environment, the aforementioned tendency of the Metal Trades and Metal
Industry Awards to fall behind wage movements in other industries precisely because of
its lead sector role was intensified. Following the same pattern of direct negotiation
employed in 1970-1971, metal unions and employers came to an agreement for a $15.00
per week pay rise in May 1974.109 However, only six months later, Justice Moore felt
compelled to increase rates by a further $9.00 due to large pay rises (usually of the order
of $20.00 to $25.00 per week)110 granted in 118 awards since April 1974.111 Most
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, he acknowledged that the judgment was
recognition of the fact that pay rises in other industries were a threat to the stability of
the metals sector.112 Crucially, he stated:
I would emphasise that this is a ‘catching up’ by the Metal Industry Award
because many other awards have already been varied in excess of $15.00. This
is not a spring board from which all other awards should move, even awards
which may in the past have followed the Metal Industry Award. The
circumstances upon which I have acted demonstrate that the significance of the
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Metal Industry Award as a leader has to some extent declined though (my
emphasis).113

However, Justice Moore noted that the unions, employers and the state all desired some
method of wage fixation more stable than that prevailing hitherto, with one possible
answer being wage indexation.114 With that in mind, he declared, ‘it is my view that a
firm base must be established before an effective stability in wage fixation can be
achieved and it is also my view that such stability can be achieved only after there has
been an increase in this award with any proper consequent flow’ (my emphasis).115 In
other words, despite his recognition of the fact that the current proceedings stemmed
from wage pressures originating elsewhere in the economy, he nevertheless realised that
the stability of the award framework still rested largely on the Metal Industry Award
retaining its benchmarking function.
This confusing position, whereby an increasingly pluralistic industrial reality sat
uneasily with the entrenched institutional position of metals atop the award pyramid,
persisted throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s. The pattern increasingly came
to be that forward movements in other awards116 were used to buttress metal industry
claims (which often took the form of negotiated agreements such as consent awards),
which then flowed through to other segments of the economy.

In a sense, this

represented something of a hybrid system, whereby the actual economic steam of the
metals sector was diminished but its institutionalised lead-sector role nevertheless
remained profound. On the one hand, in 1975, the Commission was noting that the
Metal Industry Award’s influence had ‘diminished’ and that its influence as a pacesetter had been tarnished by recent events, including the upswing in rates in other
awards.117 At a 1977 metal industry conference, both employers and unions ‘agreed
that the metal trades had not for some years been pace-setters in wage levels.’118 This
113
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development was not necessarily seen as a bad one; indeed, Australian Council of Trade
Unions (ACTU) President Bob Hawke had commented in 1974 that ‘it might be of
more benefit to the metal-trades unions if they were gradually phased out as the
yardstick on awards.’119
On the other hand, however, was the continued industrial aggression of the metal
unions120 and the durability of comparative wage justice claims that took as their
departure point the Metal Industry Award. An event demonstrating both forces in
action was the granting of a catch-up wage increase to General Motors Holden
employees to bring them in line with the Metal Industry Award standard.121 Although
there was a historic nexus between metal awards and those governing the automobile
industry, the claims for flow-on were strengthened by what Commissioner Clarkson
dubbed ‘guerilla tactics,’ such as the imposition of overtime bans. 122 In the context of
general union strength, industrial militancy could force the hand of the Commission
regarding flow-on even where it was reluctant to grant it.
Perhaps the best demonstration of the contradictory position of the metal trades as a
lead sector in the increasingly dysfunctional antipodean Fordist model of development
was the wage explosion of the early 1980s. In chapter 5 I noted how the rise of work
value claims represented a return to the industry-level collective bargaining of the early
to mid-1970s. In keeping with the pattern that had developed in that earlier period, the
initial impulses towards higher wages appear to have largely arisen outside the context
of the metals sector. Plowman noted that ‘with the decline in the manufacturing sector's
bargaining power, the pace setting role has been taken over by the road transport and
warehousing industry awards.’123

In particular, work value cases in the waterside,

warehousing and transport industries had awarded large wage increases to workers
employed therein.124

‘Metal workers get $9-a-week rise’, above n 110, 1.
In 1975, for example, of the approximate 1.74 million working days lost in manufacturing industry
strike action, nearly 1.28 million were lost in the metal, machinery and equipment sector: Australian
Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 1975-1976 (1301.0, No. 61, 1976) 302.; See also: ‘February
disputes near record’, Canberra Times (Canberra) 14 May 1974, 3;
121
Wage rates – General Motors Holden’s Pty Ltd. employees in C.P. Mills, E.G.A. Lambert and J.G.
Carroll (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 17(22) (29 August 1975) ¶717.
122
Ibid.
123
David Plowman, ‘Administered Flexibility: Restructuring the Metal Industry Award’ (1990) 1(2)
Economic and Labour Relations Review 48, 49.
124
Ibid.
119
120

230

In the wake of the collapse of indexation, the ACTU pledged to an industry-by-industry
campaign to lift wages.125 In an affirmation of the continuing relevance of the industrial
clout of the metal unions, they were the first off the block in following the ACTU
Congress’ determination,126 and reached a consent award with the MTIA that was
ratified by the Commission in December 1981. It provided, amongst other things, a
$25.00 a week wage increase to the fitter (with proportionate rises to other
classifications) and a reduction in the work week from 40 to 38 hours.127 The hours
issue was particularly crucial, in that it represented a qualitative step forward for a
general movement towards shorter hours, a movement which less than six months
earlier had been in low waters after the Commission rejected a metal union claim for a
35-hour week.128
Another sense in which the Commission’s decision was critical was the reasoning
behind it. Although the Commission was by this time increasingly being subsumed by
the economistic logic surrounding its institutional intensification, it and the parties
coming before it remained beholden to certain norms and understandings, among them
the centrality of the Metal Industry Award. As was the case in late 1974, part of the
justification for increases in the metal award was ‘movements in wage rates and
conditions of employment in other industries’;129 in other words, a reversal of the
typical post-World War II chain of causality. On the other hand, the durability of the
institutionalised channels linking the Metal Industry Award to others within the award
framework was proven once again, in what was to be the last iteration of the typical
antipodean Fordist process of flow-on. The Commission accepted that there would be
some flow consequent upon their decision to ratify the consent award between metal
unions and the MTIA.130 Indeed, its continued de facto recognition of the legitimacy of
the metal trades as a pace-setter was revealed by the reasoning underlying the
ratification of a consent award between the Transport Workers’ Union (TWU) and the
Australian Road Transport Federation only a few days after the metal industry
‘Metal unions ready to launch campaign’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 16 September 1981, 7.
Ibid.
127
Application to vary Metal Industry Award 1971 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 24(1)
(13 January1982) ¶1.
128
Application to vary Metal Industry Award re hours of work in CCH, Australian Industrial Law
Review, vol 23(9) (6 May 1981) ¶190.
129
Application to vary Metal Industry Award 1971 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 24(1)
(13 January1982) ¶1.
130
Ibid.
125
126

231
agreement.131 Multiple attempts by the TWU to have the Commission enforce the
agreement were rejected on a number of grounds, including the fact that granting
transport workers the wage increase would generate strong pressures for flow-on to
other awards.132 However, the approval of the metal industry consent award threw the
TWU’s claim in a new light. The Commission in a sense expressed its own inability to
control wage rates generally when it stated that ratification ‘would merely be expressing
in an award a standard already in existence and accepted by the parties as
appropriate.’133 Even more importantly, the Commission noted the variation to the
Metal Industry Award and acknowledged ‘[a] $20 wage increase in the Transport
Workers Award, 1972 could no longer be said to provide the basis for setting the pace
for pay increases generally.’134 In other words, despite the wage pressures emanating
therefrom, the Commission was not prepared to make a determination that would
establish the transport sector as an institutionalised pace-setter. Once the metal industry
agreement had confirmed the metal trades in its historical position as the leader,
however, the federal tribunal was open to granting the transport workers’ claims.
The 1981 Metal Industry Award case would be the last turn of the traditional flow-on
wheel, the final cycle of a process that, while once insuring the coherence of antipodean
Fordism, had become dysfunctional. The flow-on was strong, with what was dubbed
the ‘metal industry standard’135 setting the parameters for a large number of awards in
both the federal and state jurisdictions.136 In a major case involving car manufacturers
Ford and General Motors-Holden, the employers claimed (rightly, in view of the
Commission’s decision) ‘that there is overwhelming certainty that the metal trades
settlement, once approved by the commission, will flow to all of the companies whom
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we surveyed.’137 Mulvey notes that within a mere two month period after the December
metals case, ‘it was estimated by both the ACTU and the Commonwealth that around 20
per cent of all employees have received wage increases in line with those provided for
in the Metal Industry Agreement.’138 Moreover, by the end of 1982 the metal industry
standard of the 38-hour week had flowed through to two-thirds of the workforce.139 As
was so often the case in the history of the federal tribunal, it too was forced to
acknowledge the impact of the metal trades increases in the context of the 1983
National Wage Case, set against the backdrop of ‘the worst economic recession since
the 1930s.’140 Amongst the factors the Commission deemed responsible for the crisis
was ‘[t]he sharp increase in labour costs’141 which had ‘resulted from general increases
in pay and reductions in hours since the end of indexation flowing principally from the
metal industry agreements of December 1981.’142
The downturn of 1982 signalled the end of the post-war award hierarchy dominated by
the metal award. The fact that the Commission itself partially blamed the structure of
flow-on for the crisis was significant in that it dovetailed with the demands of
employers and the state (outlined in chapters 5 and 6) to bring an end to the wage
rounds which the Metal Industry Award brought into effect. A 1983 South Australian
decision refusing increases to shop assistants on the basis of the metal industry standard
was prophetic in its trenchant attack on the system of comparative wage justice centred
on the metal trades:
The fact that some other, totally different, employees receive an increase does
not mean that everyone else in the work force is similarly entitled – the more so
when non-tradesmen rates are sought to be equated or aligned in some manner
with those paid to tradesmen. The “me too” syndrome is the cancer in industrial
relations which inevitably produces a leapfrogging effect which is detrimental to
all and self defeating in the long term.143
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Such a statement represents in essence an attack upon one of the central planks of
antipodean Fordism’s mode of regulation and its mechanisms of coherence.

1980s-1990s – The Accord and enterprise bargaining
As explained in chapter 4, from the mid-1970s onwards, the manufacturing sector
entered a period of decline from which it has never since recovered. The metal industry
was struck particularly hard. In just three years, from November 1973 to November
1976, nearly 100,000 jobs were lost in Australian factories.144 In the 1980s this process
of dissolution went critical.

Plowman, drawing upon Metal Trades Federation of

Unions (MTFU) figures, states, ‘[b]etween 1981 and 1983 nearly 100,000 jobs were lost
in the metal and engineering sector.’145 The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS),
although providing slightly different figures, similarly traces a dramatic decline.
Whereas in 1979-1980 basic metals, fabricated metal products, transport and other
machinery equipment sub-sectors employed some 499,404 people,146 by 1983-1984 this
had declined to 415,364.147 Of the four metal trade sub-sectors just mentioned, the first
two experienced only a very modest growth in gross product (at average 1983-1984
prices) from 1981/1982 to 1990/1991, whilst the latter two declined absolutely.148
The increasing disintegration of the Australian metals sector exerted a profound
influence on the developments in the award framework in the 1980s, most specifically
through convincing the metal unions to sign on to the Accord,149 the history of which
was traced in chapter 6.

Given both the success and the historically entrenched

character of post-World War II metal union tactics in securing over-award payments,
the system of wage indexation represented by the Accord should prima facie have been
repugnant to them. Earlier attempts to impose Accord-like measures, such as no-strike
clauses, had been roundly rejected by metal workers,150 whilst the 1976 Amalgamated
Metal Workers’ Union (AMWU) national conference had declared that ‘[a]ll awards,
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whether arrived at by consent, negotiation or agreement, must always leave our
members free to struggle around their economic and social demands, including overaward payments and conditions.’151 Moreover, the metal industry agreement of 1981
had proven the coup de grâce of the Fraser’s government’s failed experiment with wage
indexation.
The severe economic crisis in the metal sector, the fundamentally nationalist character
of the Australian left (which was strongly represented among the metal unions’
leadership) and the opportunity the Accord provided the union officialdom to wrest
control from more militant rank-and-file groups,152 profoundly altered the attitude of the
Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights’ Union (AMWSU)153 and other metal
unions to an incomes policy with an ALP government.154 The wave of redundancies in
the early 1980s meant that ‘[m]any former shopfloor militants were demoralised and
became more open to the conservative argument that a continued wages push would
simply exacerbate unemployment.’155 Against this backdrop, the Accord’s pledge to
simultaneously control both wages and inflation in such a way as to hopefully restore
full employment appeared attractive.156 Moreover, as seen in chapter 6, the Accord, in
its original ‘Mark I’ format, was a wide-ranging document in which a wages policy was
buttressed by a variety of other initiatives attractive to manufacturing unions in
particular, such as industry planning, new occupational health and safety institutions,
and the maintenance of industrial protection.157 The emphasis the Accord placed on
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tripartite institutions of macroeconomic standing was significant in buying the support
of left-wing unions like the AMWSU, who got the impression (or, as it turned out, the
illusion) that they would be involved in determining the future course of Australian
capitalism in a meaningful way.158
Despite the seemingly logical reasons for which the ACTU struck an incomes policy,
and bearing in mind the conviction seemingly shared by unions and metal employers
that something had to be done to stem the developing crisis in that sector, the Accord
inflicted enormous damage on organised labour generally, and on metal unions
specifically. These had the most to gain from employing their industrial muscle to grab
what they could from capital. By restricting wage-claims to the rate of inflation, the
Accord applied a straitjacket to unions in the metals sector, disrupting their historical
pattern of mobilisation, choking shop-floor organisation,159 and making them complicit
in what amounted to large real-wage decreases for their members.160 Most importantly
for my purposes, the Accord almost completely destroyed the pattern of metal sector
flow-on and the hierarchy of awards and, with them, one of the central planks in
antipodean Fordism’s mode of regulation.
That this development was not merely incidental, but rather was a central purpose of the
Accord, can be gleaned easily enough from the text of the agreement itself. In speaking
of the effort to maintain and improve living standards, the ACTU accepted (as noted in
chapter 6) that ‘[t]he achievement of this goal via an incomes and prices policy
approach will require a suppression of sectional priorities and demands’ (my
emphasis).161 The document further provided that ‘[b]oth parties recognise that if the
essential conditions of the centralised system are met that there shall be no extra claims
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except where special and extraordinary circumstances exist’ (my emphasis).162
‘Suppression of sectional priorities and demands’163 and ‘no extra claims’:164 these
together represented a repudiation of the antipodean Fordist pattern of flow-on centred
on the metal trades which, although sectional in origin, achieved general application.
The practical result of this commitment was that a generally militant rank-and-file
movement, well-schooled in the application of industrial pressure to obtain over-award
payments, had to be restrained by the leadership of metal unions.

Bramble explores

this in detail, with on-the-job action by militant workers often restrained by union
leaders enforcing the ‘no extra claims’ provisions of the Accord.165 In the following
chapter, it will be seen that smaller unions with historical links to metal awards, such as
the Food Preservers’ Union and the Federated Confectioners’ Association, were sold
out by the AMWU (in its various incarnations) and the ACTU when they refused to sign
on to the Accord or attempted to subvert its wage-fixing principles.
Not only did the Accord disrupt the historical relationship between the leading metal
award and others within the framework, it also affected the structure and content of the
Metal Industry Award itself. In chapter 6 I looked broadly at the unfolding of the
‘Efficiency and Restructuring’ and ‘Structural Efficiency’ principles in the late 1980s,
the first attempts to decentralise wage fixation through granting access to ‘second-tier’
increases dependent upon industry and/or workplace-level negotiations.

Given the

desire of the AMWU166 both to ensure the viability of the manufacturing sector and to
retain some control over the decentralisation process, these principles took the form of
national-level ‘blueprint’ agreements which were then tailored to the circumstances of
individual enterprises/workplaces.167 The following chapter on food processing will
explore concrete examples of just how these efficiency principles changed the structure
and content of awards.

Suffice it to say here, the parent award was altered in a

thoroughgoing fashion, with its 340-or-so classifications broad-banded into fourteen
wage groups, important flexibilities in the use and deployment of labour introduced and
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restrictive practices removed.168 Most important was the historical reversal of the metal
trade motive chain; whereas before, the breakthrough in particularly militant ‘hot shops’
led to improvements for all metal workers (and from thence, many other employees),
the movement towards award decentralisation promoted a more insular, inward-looking
mentality, where, conceptually at least, the weak could be isolated from the gains of the
strong.
This mentality became explicit with the movement to enterprise bargaining, which was
also traced in chapter 6.

It was seen there that left-unions, most particularly the

AMWU, were growing increasingly restive under the Accord straitjacket, and saw in
enterprise bargaining a way to return to something resembling the old over-award
system. Indeed, in rejecting the April 1991 application for enterprise bargaining, the
Commission, agreeing with the MTIA (whose memory of the 1981-1982 wages
explosion was apparently still raw) stated that premature adoption of such a system
‘would cause a reversion to the wide scale pattern of direct action and leap-frogging of
wage levels existing prior to 1982.’169 The Commission, along with the MTIA, thus
feared that the old pattern of flow-on, led by the metal trades, persisted below the
surface, and required only a change in the institutional environment to resurface. This
was a view that appears to have been held by some metal union leaders. George
Campbell, former secretary of the AMWU, stated ‘[w]e just couldn’t control a
centralised wage structure anymore … Because of our delegate structure we’ve always
had an ability to extract over-award payments.’170 Indeed, MTIA Chief Executive Bert
Evans came close to describing the same situation from the perspective of capital when
he stated that enterprise bargaining is really ‘a euphemism for the use of union
muscle.’171 Even more tellingly, former AMWU Assistant National Secretary Laurie
Carmichael regarded the movement to enterprise bargaining as simply one iteration of
the historical flow-on cycle: ‘In the past, we had gone enterprise bargainingconsolidation, enterprise bargaining-consolidation … we’ll run a campaign and then
bring it back and make sure the whole class benefits’ (my emphasis).172
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An over-award campaign by the metal unions in the early 1990s, dovetailing with the
movement to enterprise bargaining, appeared to many to initially confirm the
Commission’s suspicions. In response to the MTIA proposal to make enterprise-based
payments appendices to the Award (so as to cap pay rises at the industry level), 173 the
Commission declared, ‘[g]iven the coverage of the metal industry award and the
existence of counterpart state awards, how could flow-on of the increases agreed to in
those awards be contained to employers working under those awards?’174 As late as
1992, the MTIA was deeply concerned about the strength of metal unions and their
ability to win large increases, a belief that underpinned their desire for the Commission
to retain a central role in determining enterprise agreements through imposition of a
public interest test.175 Employers in other sectors were still fearful of the spectre of
pace-setting agreements in the metal trades flowing through industry at large, with
Confederation of Australian Industry Chief Executive Ian Spicer opining of 4%
productivity gains being included in the metal award, ‘[i]t is the surest and quickest way
for pay increases to flow throughout industry.’176 In an interesting link to the later
chapter on retail, Coles Myer general manager for employee relations Elise Callander
was in 1991 complaining ‘that the metal trades award is still the locomotive of change,
setting the standard for other industries.’177
The views of all these participants, unions, employers and arms of the state,
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the scale of the transformation of the
economy throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Unemployment, declining union density, the
atrophy of rank-and-file organisations and, perhaps most importantly, the increased
corrosiveness of international competition, had fundamentally weakened the hand of
organised labour. The metal sector, and manufacturing more broadly, had continued to
decline throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In 1989-1990, 411,700 people were employed
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in the four sub-sectors that mostly composed the metal trades.178 In 2010-2011, this had
declined absolutely to 354,100 in the context of a much larger labour force, a decrease
of approximately 14%.179 This process intensified during the recession of the early
1990s, which, more so than any other sub-sector, hit basic metals, metal fabrication and
transport equipment particularly hard, producing a crisis of profitability that helped
determine the tenor of early enterprise bargaining.180
Moreover, the rush of the union movement to embrace enterprise bargaining was hasty
and ill-conceived, premised upon an underestimation of ‘their dependence on the
existing arbitration system and legislation for their ability to run widespread over-award
bargaining campaigns.’181 As Peetz has noted, the phenomenon of collective bargaining
in union ‘hot shops’ spreading to other sectors of the workforce was largely dependent
upon the architecture of the award system itself.182 Without this institutional buttress,
enterprise bargaining would tend to promote the increasing intra- and inter-industry
wage and conditions polarisation observed in the previous chapter and increase the
tendency towards competition between union and non-union enterprises.183
In the event, enterprise bargaining and associated legislative changes proved the death
knell of the antipodean Fordist pattern of flow-on and the notion of comparative wage
justice that lubricated it. After enforced stagnation under the Accord, the devolution of
bargaining to the enterprise level, and the associated degradation of awards as they were
increasingly recast as a bare-boned minimum safety net, ensured that the differences in
wage and conditions outcomes between the industrially strong and the weak became
more pronounced, whilst the general movement was towards ‘a reduction in the power
of workers and trade unions relative to employers singularly and collectively.’ 184 Peter
Tighe, National Secretary of the Communication, Electrical and Plumbing Union and a
member of the MTFU, noted in 2000 the dramatic impact of enterprise bargaining on
the conduct of wage cases in the metal industry:
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What we used to do in past … in the MTFU, we would have a national
negotiating committee who would meet with the MTIA and the Australian
Chamber of Manufactures … and negotiate about wages to try to get a consent
variation to that award. We’d put to the MTIA that we want, say, $30 a week
for trade labour, and maybe $25 for non-trades. They say, ‘nope, you’re not
going to get it, get stuffed’. So we would go out and campaign directly
nationally … we would have a rolling campaign in key companies, and once we
have commitments from those companies, we’d go back to the MTIA … and
sometimes the deal would be done … It would be a consent award [so all
workplaces in the industry would receive the increase gained directly in large
workplaces], and in a lot of places, there would be a shop rate on that, an overaward component … The difference is now that you don’t do that. There are no
industry negotiations. It is all enterprise by enterprise … They do not want to
sit down and have negotiations for a State, or national negotiations, for an
industry outcome … The AiG185 say, “why should the non-unionised members
of the MTIA get caught up in an industry outcome when they are quite happy to
deal directly with their own employees?”. That’s their view now (my
emphasis).186

The system just described placed immense strain on all segments of organised labour.187
Whereas before the militancy of hot shops and a single national campaign could be used
to force change in an award applying to the majority of metalworkers, now metal unions
were faced with the necessity of organising, negotiating and concluding a myriad of
separate agreements.188

Moreover, unlike awards, where unions were prima facie

respondents to instruments covering workers within the ambit of their rules, the
Commission determined that unions could only be parties to an enterprise agreement
where they actually had members employed at the workplace concerned. 189 Given the
fact that, like most sectors, unionisation in the metals sector is most pronounced in large
firms (with small firms being very difficult to organise),190 this movement helped break
the potential for flowing-on the gains won in better organised shops to non-union
counterparts.

185

The Australian Industry Group (AIG), formed by a merger of the MTIA and the Australian Chamber
of Manufactures in 1998.
186
Peter Tighe, cited in Mylett, above n 181, 154.
187
See, for example: David Peetz, ‘The Impacts and Non-Impacts on Unions of Enterprise Bargaining’
(2012) 22(3) Labour & Industry 237, 249-250.
188
A fact recognised by capital. See, for example: Nicholas Way, ‘Metal Bid Follows a Familiar Pattern’,
BRW (Australia), 7 November 1994, 32.
189
Appeal re Morrison Knudsen Corp of Australia Ltd Certified Agreement 1993 in CCH, Australian
Industrial Law Review, vol 36(12) (16 June 1994) ¶204.
190
Mylett, above n 181, 157.

241

Changes in the legal framework surrounding enterprise bargaining also played their part
in destroying the connective tissue binding the industrially strong and weak together.
As explored in the previous chapter, enterprise bargaining in its formative years had the
appeal of being all things to all people. In particular, organised labour perceived in it an
addendum to what was still a fundamentally collectivist system, seeing union
involvement in the bargaining process as a necessary prerequisite.191 However, chapter
6 demonstrated that the actual evolution of the process was one of the enforced
degradation of awards (a theme of key significance for the chapters on the food
processing and retail sectors), the fragmentation of bargaining and union difficulties in
ensuring some kind of uniformity of wage and conditions outcomes. The confluence of
these factors ensured that those employees reliant only on awards increasingly fell
behind those who struck enterprise agreements.192 As Briggs notes, ‘[i]nsulating awards
from enterprise bargaining was considered essential to avoid another “wage breakout”
and undoing the relationships established between minimum rate awards under award
restructuring.’193 Stung by its sidelining at the hands of the ACTU and the ALP
government, the Commission came onside through the formulation of new wage
principles governing the relationship between enterprise agreements and awards. On
the one hand, it spoke of the necessity of equitable minimum standards implanted in
awards; on the other, it noted that ‘the stability and viability of those awards can be
undermined if the disparate outcomes of enterprise bargaining flow back into them’ (my
emphasis).194 The result, in part, has been described by Mylett: ‘[t]he transmission
mechanism between successful over-award campaigns and award wage increases was
broken.’195
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Within the constraints of the early federal legislation, metal unions were more
successful than most at initially securing better-than-average agreements. Given the
role of the AMWU in the transition to enterprise bargaining in the first place, it came as
no surprise that enterprise agreements in the metals sector were both more numerous
and higher-paying than in industry at large.196 As mentioned previously, a few high
profile cases where metal unions were successful in getting large wage increases sent
shivers through the business community.197 These came, however, in a context of
increasing dispersion of wage and conditions outcomes, on both the intra- and interindustry level.198 In 1996, for example, agreements in the metal manufacturing sector
provided for wage increases ranging from 8.6% to a miserly 0.7%.199 In 1997, it was
found that non-union agreements in metals provided average annual wage increases
nearly 2% lower than union agreements.200 Perhaps even more disturbing was the
usurpation of the notion of comparative wage justice, which had historically been of
central importance for metal unions. As I elucidated above, metal workers, through the
vehicle of margins cases, had established wage relativities between classifications
dependent upon skill. Although these often changed between margins hearings, they
were broadly stable at any one point in time, a situation that persisted throughout the
Accord period.201 Enterprise bargaining changed all this. The Australian Centre for
Industrial Relations Research and Training observed:
During the 1980s wage relativities remained almost constant. In 1983, for
example, process workers under the Metal Industry Award earned 82 per cent of
the fitter’s rate, a proportion that remained virtually unchanged in 1991. In the
1990s, however, this situation began to change … In the decade from 1986 to
1995, male trades workers improved their wages by about 56 per cent (in
nominal terms), but this outcome favoured the more highly paid workers … This
196
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suggests that as the wages system has decentralised, wages have not risen as
quickly for the male unskilled as compared to the male skilled.202

The Workplace Relations Act and pattern bargaining
Metal union apprehension of the danger posed by increasingly fragmented outcomes led
to a reconsideration of tactics early on in the piece, with an emphasis on re-establishing
de facto the industry-level negotiations which had been the norm prior to enterprise
bargaining. The MTFU, and particularly the AMWU,203 sought to do this through a
canny campaign of striking similar enterprise agreements with common expiry dates, a
strategy known as pattern bargaining.204 As early as 1994 this had been flagged as an
option by the AMWU,205 which cited the use of similar tactics by US auto unions.206
Two business friendly commentators complained in September 1994 of a metal workers
campaign: ‘In a strategy similar to the old over-award campaigns before the accord,
officials are using pattern bargaining – having a wages settlement secured at one plant
adopted at every plant in the company, irrespective of the needs of each plant – to
spread wage rises.’207 Capital recognised the goal well enough, with Way noting of the
attitude of the AMWU to enterprise bargaining: ‘[I]t wants the Metal Industry Award to
be the core of any agreement, and then to build on this in specific agreements. This is
why pattern bargaining is so crucial to the union – it allows it to spread the same basic
conditions across an industry sector or within a diversified company.’ 208 Of most
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concern to employers was that the example of the metal unions was being followed in
other industries, demonstrating the continued vanguard role played by the former.209
Pattern bargaining occupied a legal grey area in the early to mid-1990s, which gave
trade unions the space to achieve some impressive wage outcomes. The success of
pattern bargaining, in both metals and non-metals manufacturing,210 is evidenced by the
acceleration of wage rises provided for by enterprise agreements in the mid to late
1990s.211 Employer associations, including the MTIA, protested bitterly, petitioning the
government to amend the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and outlaw the practice.212
The ACTU, however, which by this point had also come to realise the danger posed by
the wage and conditions polarity inherent in enterprise bargaining, took heart, and in its
biennial 1997 Congress endorsed a focus on industry-level bargaining.213

Most

significantly, Long notes that ‘[u]nions will also seek to channel pay rises won through
bargaining back into the award system to arrest growing wage disparities.’214 The
ACTU was thus attempting, in a sense, to re-invent the wheel, recreating the
‘transmission belt’ whereby the gains of the industrially strong could be passed on the
weak.
The Victorian AMWU’s ‘Campaign 2000’ was the most ambitious exercise in pattern
bargaining yet when swords were crossed in 1999-2000. The Victorian branch of the
AMWU, backed by seven other metal unions in the MTFU, sought to impose
manufacturing sector-wide standards, including 6% annual pay rises, bans on
contracting out and greater controls over the use of casuals.215

The MTFU had
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explicitly declared that one of the objectives of Campaign 2000 was to ‘replace the
current unfair, piecemeal system of enterprise bargaining with a single genuine
industry-wide agreement.’216

Although the AMWU was unsuccessful in the latter

regard,217 it nevertheless achieved formidable success, due in no small part to the
ascension of the militant ‘Workers First’ faction to leadership within the AMWU.218
Former State Secretary of the Victorian Branch, Craig Johnston, declared of the wage
and conditions improvements: ‘We achieved those things with more than 1,000
agreements covering 40,000 workers. In about 85% of cases we got the whole package
[of demands].’219

The national campaign, although not as coherent, nevertheless

experienced substantial success also.220
It was at this moment, when the spectre of a return to industry-level bargaining
appeared as a credible threat, that the Howard government showed its full hand. This
government had always regarded the antipodean Fordist integration of trade unionism
into the fabric of labour law and industrial relations as a pathology to be excised.221 It
took immediate action upon the campaign’s commencement in 1998-1999 to introduce
legislation outlawing pattern bargaining.222 Although the Bill failed in the Senate, the
AIG found a willing ally in the government, with whom it met several times to
encourage the passage of the amendments.223 The Commission and Federal Court also
revealed through their actions the tremendous change in the industrial relations
landscape. Whereas the Clarrie O’Shea affair in 1969 had essentially rendered the
prosecution of union officials politically untenable, the Federal Court had no qualms in
levelling contempt charges against Craig Johnston, Electrical Trades Union Victorian
Secretary Dean Mighell and Australian Workers’ Union official Cesar Melhem when
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they defied Commission injunctions against mass meetings held in the course of
Campaign 2000.224 Fines of $20,000 were imposed on each of them225 in a case
reiterating the claim of increased juridification, the re-assertion of law’s dominance over
administration, made in the previous chapter.226
Buoyed by the comparative success of Campaign 2000, the AMWU attempted to
replicate its efforts with ‘Campaign 2003,’ which again sought common wage and
conditions improvements through renegotiating a host of enterprise bargains at once. 227
This time, the employers and the state were better prepared. Once again, the Howard
Government came to the aid of the AIG with legislation, which this time successfully
passed. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Act 2002228 gave
the Commission enhanced powers to terminate bargaining periods where it deemed that
genuine agreement was not being sought. This meant industrial action taken was not
deemed as protected and could be subject to fines and common law industrial torts.
Liberal Member of Parliament Don Randall made no bones about the object of the
legislation:
The unions claim that the bill will deny workers the right to strike. It will not do
so, but it will put a serious dent in the side of irresponsible campaigns like the
AMWU's so-called Campaign 2000 and Campaign 2003 … the unions,
particularly the AMWU, advocate pattern bargaining because it gives them
control over entire industries.229

Then-Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations Tony Abbott added:
[E]lements within the union movement have attempted to orchestrate a return to
industry level bargaining through the process known as pattern bargaining … It
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represents an outdated, one-size-fits-all approach to workplace relations where
union officials utilised the centralised system to dictate their agenda to both
employers and employees (my emphasis).230
Used in a number of cases,231 these new powers delighted the AIG.232 For its part, the
AIG held a tighter front, preparing early for the union campaign 233 and supported
wholeheartedly by the federal government.234
When combined with the internal machinations of the AMWU (the Victorian branch
had been weakened through factional infighting that saw Craig Johnston removed in a
coup orchestrated by the more moderate national leadership), 235 Campaign 2003 was
less successful than its predecessors. Employers and the state were able to ensure the
AMWU’s key common demands of shorter hours and a trust fund for employees in
failed companies were not universalised throughout the industry. 236 The attempt by the
AMWU and other unions to ‘recentralise’ bargaining to the sector-level, to ensure fairly
common up-trending standards throughout manufacturing generally (as opposed to the
minimum safety net established by awards), had fallen foul of the changed
circumstances of the Australian state and the instruments of industrial regulation.
With pattern bargaining, most graphically demonstrated in the Campaign 2000/2003
mobilisations, the AMWU attempted to reforge something resembling the industry-level
regulation characteristic of antipodean Fordism. It was this level of regulation that
permitted the latter’s characteristic cycle of wage and conditions flow-on. After playing
a key role in the initial movement towards enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s, the
union realised that the loss of industry-level regulation, historically revolving around
the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, seriously undermined organisational
230
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strength and encouraged a downward cycle of competition between union and nonunion shops.

Within the confines of the new system, the AMWU and other

manufacturing unions tried to stop the rot and reclaim de facto industry-level
arrangements, relying upon pattern bargaining leveraged through enterprises located in
key sectors, particularly metals, whitegoods and vehicle-building.237

However, the

political, economic and, most importantly for my purposes, legal landscape had changed
too much for this attempt to achieve durable success. When seriously threatened by the
success of Campaign 2000, the government and employers closed ranks and enacted
hostile new legislation designed to defeat pattern bargaining, arming the Commission
with new powers to effect this result.238 The demise of pattern bargaining was made
complete by the passage of the WorkChoices legislation.

Section 431(1) of the

amended Act provided that the Commission must terminate a bargaining period if it was
satisfied a party was engaged in pattern bargaining, 239 whilst section 439 ensured that
industrial action taken in support of it would not be protected.240

The repeal of

WorkChoices and its replacement by the Fair Work Act 2009241 of the incoming ALP
government did little to aid the union cause, maintaining as it did the former’s
prohibitions against pattern bargaining in toto.242
It may be argued that the fate of pattern bargaining is an example of law as reactive,
being used instrumentally to achieve a pre-determined purpose. This is partially true.
The fact that I identify law as a juridic form that helps constitute the capitalist mode of
production does not mean that it cannot be used by the state in an instrumental way.
However, the demise of pattern bargaining went deeper than this. Its outlawing was
part of the broader logic of enterprise bargaining and individualisation, which I have
demonstrated are key legal manifestations of liberal-productivism. Pattern bargaining
was corrosive of the ability of these forces these to serve their function within this
model of development. The assault on pattern bargaining was more than just capitalists
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trying to augment their power and line their pockets; it was a vital moment in the
liberal-productivist regime of labour law being purged of any revanchist tendencies on
the part of organised labour.

Conclusions
This imposition of what amounts to an effective legislative ban on pattern bargaining is
the perfect point on which to conclude the analysis of the destruction of the award
hierarchy and the role of the metal trades within it. I have traced the institutionalisation
of the metal industry as a lead sector through the immensely important Metal Trades
and Metal Industry Awards. It has been demonstrated that as antipodean Fordism came
to cohere fully in the aftermath of World War II, the Metal Trades Award came to
dominate the award framework, with successive margins cases in the 1940s and 1950s
increasingly taking national economic capacity and that of the metal trades as
synonymous. Based on the principle of comparative wage justice, pay and conditions
improvements gained by metal unions flowed through the workforce readily, aided by
the fact that respondents to the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards were not
confined to one industry, but were instead found in a huge number and variety of
workplaces.
With the Total Wage and Work Value Cases of 1967 and 1968, the Commission and
employers attempted to shape a new modality of industrial regulation, one in which
opportunities for flow-on were reduced. Full employment and the industrial militancy
of metal unions, however, put paid to these designs, and instead set in motion an
explosion of strikes that saw the defeat of absorption and powerful currents of flow-on.
The crisis of antipodean Fordism that took hold in the early to mid-1970s hit metal
workers hard, with the result that the metal award began to lose steam in its pace-setting
role, with the impetus shifting to other industries such as transport and warehousing.243
However, the durability of the institutionalised channels linking metal awards to others
in the hierarchy ensured that large catch-up claims for metal workers, such as those
granted in 1974 and 1981, were considered necessary for industrial stability and, once
given, flowed through the wage structure.
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It is only with the enforced wage stagnation of the Accord that a tipping point was
reached, breaking the post-war pattern of upward pressure in the metal trades leading to
improvements for other wage-earners. The deleterious effect the Accord had on the
earnings of semi-skilled blue collar workers eventually made the compact politically
untenable, with the AMWU in particular advocating a movement to enterprise
bargaining in the hope of being able to exploit its industrial strength and achieve better
wage and conditions outcomes. In the minds of some AMWU officials, and certainly in
the nightmares of elements of capital, the government, the Commission and the press,
this was conceived as a return to the kind of collective over-award campaigns of postWorld War II vintage.
Such a perspective failed to appreciate the fundamental transformation in Australian
capitalism, in particular the reduced role of the manufacturing sector within it.
Globalised production and the imperatives of international competition had led to
profound job-shedding, reorganisation of the production process and an increasingly
militant anti-union attitude of the part of employers.

Combined with increasingly

inhospitable governments (which became outright hostility with the election of the
Liberal/National Party coalition in 1996) and chronic membership decline, unions found
their bargaining power increasingly usurped. In this context, the essential destruction of
the award system and the movement towards enterprise bargaining made it almost
impossible for metal unions to employ their post-war tactics of relying on the award
framework to universalise gains won by militant ‘hot shops.’ Not only was the ability
of metal unions to win gains for the workforce disrupted; indeed, the metals sector
itself, along with manufacturing as a whole, became increasingly polarised as the
favourable agreements obtained by strategically placed, well-organised workers were
successfully quarantined from non-union shops.
When the AMWU and its allies had realised the danger early in the history of enterprise
bargaining, they attempted, with some initial success, to recentralise bargaining at the
industry-level through pattern bargaining.

However, the state, by now thoroughly

colonised by a productivity and low-wage ideology that saw in pattern bargaining only a
return to an inefficient and antiquated past, enacted legislative change to outlaw such
collective campaigns and raise the stakes for workers and unions considering
undertaking them.

These legal developments marked the destruction of the last

elements of the antipodean Fordist modality of metal sector flow-on, substituting its
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tendency for universality with the liberal-productivist schema of decentralisation and
polarity in the wage structure.

Chapter 8
PRECARITY, INTENSIFICATION AND WORK REORGANISATION IN THE FOOD PROCESSING SECTOR
The previous chapter was focussed on the role of awards, award restructuring and
enterprise bargaining on the structure of the antipodean Fordist cycle of wage and
condition flow-on. The purpose of this chapter is to better understand the implications
of these same processes on the actual content of awards and enterprise bargains,
particularly insofar as they bear upon the liberal-productivist industrial paradigm and
wage-labour nexus elucidated in chapter 4. By investigating when and how these came
to be implanted in the labour law regime, it can be better understood how this regime
fulfils the abstract functions I have identified as according with it.
These forces will be elucidated in great detail here as they have applied to the food
processing sector. This sector is most useful as a case study for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, it has been one of the most deeply affected by the liberal-productivist norms of
precarity and intensified real subordination of labour to capital. Being an industry
which has retained something of a seasonal character (particularly where production is
tied to harvest cycles and yearly changes in consumption levels), the presentation and
profundity of these norms in especially sharp, and their manifestation through award
restructuring and enterprise bargaining can be seen quite transparently. The relevance
of these norms for industry generally is also bolstered by the fact that food processing
has always been one of the largest industries constituting the manufacturing sector in
Australia in terms of employment, trailing only the metals sector for the majority of the
post-World War II years.1 Indeed, in 2010-2011 ‘food product manufacturing’ was the
single largest sub-sector within manufacturing industry, both in terms of employment,
industry value-added and capital expenditure.2
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manufacturing employment. In 2009-2010, its contribution to the total value added by the manufacturing
sector was 17.4%, whilst its share of capital expenditure was 17.4%. This result was achieved despite the
fact that the beverage and tobacco manufacturing group, with which food production was formerly
aggregated, constituted a separate category: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2012
(1301.0, No. 92, 2012) 614, 616.
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Secondly, it will be seen that food processing has been hit hard by the exposure to
international competition that has been a defining trait of liberal-productivism in
Australia. The incidence and depth of competition from lower-wage countries has been
pronounced, enabling multinational corporations to play plants in different jurisdictions
against each other3 whilst forcing an ever leaner production system on those sites
remaining in Australia.

Food processing is thus an ideal sector for deeper study

precisely because it has operated in the environment that has been reshaped most
dramatically in the transition to liberal-productivism.
Lastly, the analysis of this particularly affected manufacturing industry provides a
highly useful partner to the following chapter, which explores much the same processes
except in the context of the retail sector. Indeed, the fact that very similar outcomes and
patterns will be seen to emerge in two completely different industries4 strengthens the
theory of transition forwarded in this thesis, demonstrating that liberal-productivist
tendencies have taken hold of the workforce at large (even though they don’t
necessarily affect all workers to the same degree).
In order to demonstrate exactly what the formal and substantive impacts of award
restructuring and enterprise bargaining have been on workers in food processing, it is
necessary to briefly survey the nature of industrial relations and wage and conditions
determinations in the sector during the phase of antipodean Fordist functionality.

Award regulation in food processing – Antipodean Fordism en
régulation
Broadly speaking, the industrial relations field was dominated until the late 1970s by
then-generally docile unions such as the Food Preservers’ Union (FPU), the Federated
Confectioners’ Association (FCA) and the Manufacturing Grocers’ Employees’
Federation of Australia.

In line with the prevailing antipodean Fordist pattern of

industrial regulation, these unions were respondents to a number of state5 and federal6
A strategy of capital’s that has been dubbed ‘whipsawing.’ See, for example: Ian Greer and Marco
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awards that were a comprehensive codification of the terms and conditions on which
wage labour was to be exploited. These awards were very much in keeping with the
general pattern: composed of a myriad variety of finely gradated classifications,
crystallising certain demarcation barriers and what in neo-liberal parlence would be
considered ‘restrictive practices,’ and establishing strict controls on the engagement of
casual and part-time labour.7 The position of the unions was often guaranteed by
preference clauses,8 whilst industry-level logs of wage and conditions claims were
common.9 The pattern of flow-on identified in chapters 5 and 7 provided crucial inputs
to the sector, with metal trades margins typically determining the parameters for food
processing employees, who also benefited from comparative wage claims premised on
the Metal Industry standard in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.10 This conveyer belt
served to compensate for the general lack of militancy amongst food processing unions
into the 1970s.11
Antipodean Fordism’s subsequent descent into crisis actually had a radicalising effect
on key unions in the sector, namely the FPU and the FCA. Food processing was on the
hard edge of the crisis, deeply affected by profound technological innovation,12
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rationalisation of production consequent upon high and increasing foreign ownership,13
and, most importantly, the increased corrosiveness of international competition in the
form of rapidly rising levels of food imports.14 These developments dovetailed with the
election of a more militant leadership in both unions, particularly in the Victorian
branches. Indeed, the Victorian FCA had in 1976 and 1977 imposed overtime bans,
limitations and had even engaged in strike action for over-award payments outside the
indexation guidelines,15 whilst it and the Victorian FPU had, in a solitary stand, defied
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and refused to sign on to the Accord
guidelines until late 1984.16 As the Accord process deepened into the restructuring and
efficiency and structural efficiency principles in the late 1980s, food manufacturers
were thus faced with comparatively powerful unions who expected meaningful input to
the process of reform. In this process, however, can be discerned the very norms of
flexibility, precarity and work intensification which would be deepened by enterprise
bargaining.

Award reform in the 1980s
Food processing industries proved particularly amenable to the species of change
envisaged by the Commission when it laid down the restructuring and efficiency and
structural efficiency principles. Profound labour process changes, in particular the
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deployment of more flexible and labour-displacing machinery,17 along with the fact that
casual labour had always played a significant role, particularly in the important Food
Preservers Awards, ensured that the flexibilities desired by the Commission had a
ready-made material basis in the sector.
In the initial stages of negotiations with the FPU over access to second-tier wage
increases consequent upon structural efficiency agreements, the Australian Chamber of
Manufactures (ACM), who represented employers subject to the Food Preservers
Awards, made clear in a broad ambit claim the thoroughgoing changes it was after.
Rejecting out of hand the FPU’s claims, the ACM noted that for their offer to even be
considered further, they must agree to:


the introduction of stand-down provisions;



the removal of restrictions on the employment of casuals outside the defined
season;18



an increased spread of ordinary working hours;



an increase in the length of a shift that could be worked without a break from
five hours to six;



the removal of penalty rates for shifts that fell partly on public holidays; and



the introduction of part-time employment.19

Such changes represented a profound corrosion of the standard employment model
central to the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, as well as an intensification of
labour through reducing the ‘porosity’ of the working-day.20
Given the expected union opposition, the Commission was called upon to determine the
dispute. It did so in a way that gave the ACM virtually everything that it wanted: the
17

See, for example, the massive technological change, resulting in vastly improved productivity and
labour-shedding, documented by the Commission at Kelloggs over the course of several years in the mid1980s: Kelloggs (Australia) Pty Ltd v Labor Council (NSW) in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review,
vol 29(21) (21 October 1987) ¶402.
18
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vegetables: Food Preservers Award in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds) Australian Industrial Law
Review, vol 9(9) (22 April 1967) ¶122; Food Preservers’ Award 1972 cl. 8(a)(1)(2)(3).
19
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April 1988, above n 7.
20
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1990) 534.
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union application was dismissed out of hand for not fulfilling the goals of the structural
efficiency exercise, particularly insofar as it did ‘not ensure that working patterns and
arrangements would enhance the flexibility of the industry.’21 Amongst other things,
the Commission granted the employers flexibility regarding employees and seasonal
deployment, the extension of ordinary hours to the weekends and an increase in the
minimum shift length without a break to 5.5 hours.22 State awards followed suit.23 At
the macro-level, therefore, the initiative was in the hands of employers as they sought to
effect the plant-level changes envisaged in the structural efficiency principle.
The nature of structural efficiency agreements at individual workplaces took their lead
from the framework determined at the award level. A few representative agreements
demonstrate the general trends of the increased spread of ordinary hours, relaxed
restrictions on casual and part-time labour, increased flexibility in deploying labour and
avoidance of disputes clauses. In one company, the offsets given for second-tier wage
adjustments included the introduction of casual labour, the abolition of walking and
washing-up times, and adherence to a new disputes avoidance/settlement procedure.24
An agreement for the Tasmanian Cadbury-Schweppes Drinks Division (struck with the
Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees’ Union of Australia) saw attempts to
improve productivity and efficiency at peak times by rostering leisure days, extending
ordinary hours, reducing lost time and new changeover procedures. 25 An enterprise
award covering Nabisco Brands, a cereal and biscuit manufacturer, was varied to
include an extension of the spread and flexibility of working hours and greater
flexibility as to annual leave and meal breaks.26
Confectionary workers fared similarly. In much the same vein as the Food Preservers
Awards, the federal Confectioners Award was varied primarily on the basis of the
Food Preservers Union of Australia, Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Food Preservers’ Interim
Award 1986 (12 June 1990) Print J3010, 1.
22
Ibid 2-4.
23
See, for example: the NSW Food Preservers (State) Award (as varied on 26 June 1990) (Noel Butlin
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Preservers Union of Australia (NSW Branch) in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 33(10) (16
May 1991) ¶135.
24
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30(7) (8 April 1988) ¶127.
25
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February 1988) ¶52.
26
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application put by the ACM and other confectionary manufacturer associations.27 In
particular, the Commission approved the employers’ truncated, four-level classification
structure, granted added flexibility in the deployment of part-time and casual labour and
endorsed greater flexibility in working hours and annual leave provisions.28 These
changes framed developments at the plant-level. At Allens Life Savers Lane Cove
plant, off-sets included the voluntary substitution of Rostered Days Off (RDOs) to
better match stock volumes, strict adherence to rest period times (presumably because
they were not being tightly observed in practice), an avoidance of disputes and
settlement procedures and the reallocation of a labelling task previously done by fitters
to confectioners.29 In an agreement between Beatrice Foods and the FCA (by this time
known as the Confectionary Workers Union), a disputes resolution clause accompanied
greater flexibility in respect of RDOs and the implementation of a new computerised
time clock costing system.30
The patently pro-employer decisions handed down by the Commission in both cases
were, without doubt, a function of the inhospitable climate the FCA and FPU were
operating within. Their stand against the Accord in 1983-1984 had won them few
friends in the Commission,31 the ACTU and the broader labour movement.32 This
resulted in generally equivocal support from other unions during a series of showdowns
with employers in the mid-1980s. As recounted in chapter 5, the FCA lost a bitter 1985
dispute with Dollar Sweets, a small confectionary manufacturer, which became a cause
célèbre of the New Right. The FPU was also faced by increasingly militant employers
27
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32
See, for example: Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 132, 142.

259

from the mid-1980s onwards. The union won a major dispute at Rosella Lipton in
1984-85 after a three month strike, against the opposition of the Hawke ALP
government who viewed it as an attack on the Accord. 33 Large employers such as
Heinz and Nestle also mobilised, locking out workers in wrangles over pay and
conditions (in the latter relating to the flexibility of RDOs) in 1984.34 Although initially
successful in rebuffing management intransigence,35 the employer effort continued
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, with an increasing focus on intensifying the use
of casuals36 and expelling union militants.37
These specific attacks on food processing unions dovetailed with the broader
disempowering impact of the Accord, which the FPU in particular identified as a major
factor in ‘weakening the structure of the trade union movement.’38 This reality underlay
the food employers’ bold attitude in structural efficiency demands, which was described
by the New South Wales branch of the FPU as a guise concealing an attempt to reduce
conditions and over-awards whilst increasing the work week.39 A resolution passed by
the same branch stated that members ‘strongly protest against the employers
expectations of continual trade-offs of hard won working conditions for wage
increases.’40
Some workers at least thus realised the true nature of the restructuring and efficiency
and structural efficiency exercises.

As was outlined in chapter 6, both principles

essentially revolved around the enhancement of managerial prerogative over the control
and deployment of employees and the organisation of the labour process (whilst
maintaining the wage restraint of the Accord).

In particular, they encouraged the
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intensification of labour whilst simultaneously corroding the standard employment
model, compromising the trade-off which had sat at the heart of the antipodean Fordist
wage-labour nexus.

Unfortunately for food processing workers, the movement to

enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s would only serve to sharpen these processes.

Enterprise bargaining
The development of enterprise bargaining was not entirely without precedent in food
processing industries. Some of the larger enterprises within the sector, such as Darrell
Lea, Cadbury-Schweppes and Kelloggs, had a history of enterprise and/or plant-level
agreements, particularly when they fell within the jurisdiction of the states,41 whilst
over-award bargains at individual workplaces were common.42 However, the timing
could not have been worse.

It occurred in the context of a wave of union

amalgamations: the FCA and FPU had amalgamated in 1992 to form the Confectionary
Workers and Food Preservers Union of Australia (CWFPU), which then joined the
Automotive, Metals and Engineering Union (AMEU) in 1994.

After further

amalgamations, the old CWFPU became the Food and Confectionary Division of the
AMWU.43 Although ideally designed to bolster union strength, the amalgamations
created considerable infighting and institutional friction, particularly regarding the
financial autonomy of the division and the status of its officials.44 This consumed time
and resources that could have been better spent fighting for members’ wages and
conditions.
For both food preservers and confectioners, the situation was made worse by the fact
that, nearly a decade after most other workers had won the 38-hour week, their awards
had not been varied accordingly. Although the majority of employees covered by the
See, for example: ‘Federated Confectioners’ Association of Australia, New South Wales Branch and
Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty. Ltd.’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/159, Box 18); ‘Cadbury
Schweppes Pty. Ltd. Confectioners’ Industrial Agreement, (Tasmania) 1979 (Noel Butlin Archives
Centre, N194/96, Box 11); ‘Cadbury Schweppes Pty. Ltd. Confectioners’ Industrial Agreement,
(Tasmania) 1980’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/96, Box 11); Kelloggs (Australia) Pty Ltd v Labor
Council (NSW) in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 29(21) (21 October 1987) ¶402.
42
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43
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awards were already working a 38-week in practice, the Commission still demanded
cost-offsets for the formal award variation.45 Although in the event the CWFPU was
able to tender the results of the structural efficiency exercise as evidence of such
offsets,46 the fact that the formal 38-hour week was achieved so late bespoke of a deeper
problem: the fact that key federal awards, like the Food Preservers Award 1973, Food
Preservers Interim Award 1986 and the Confectionary Award 1980 had been allowed to
atrophy since the late 1980s, particularly concerning hours and various allowances.47
This process of decay, although partially reversed by the mid-1990s,48 underpinned the
rush to enterprise bargaining in the food processing sector.
Broadly speaking, the enterprise agreements struck in the sector throughout the 1990s
intensified the impulses towards flexibility, precarity and enhanced managerial power
that had characterised the rolling-out of the structural efficiency principle. They tended
to further polarise the workforce between an ever-decreasing ‘core’ of full-time
employees and a growing population of casual and part-time workers, established new
and more comprehensive performance indicators, increased the spread of ordinary
working hours, removed restrictive practices and demarcation barriers and subordinated
labour to a ‘productivity culture.’49 The pattern was broadly similar to that which
manifested itself in the retail sector, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.50
However, given the greater relative power of unions like the AMWU compared to the
docile retail union, the process acquired a harder edge in food processing, particularly as
aggressive multinationals (like American food giant Simplot) entered the industrial
scene. We will see below that the experience of the 1990s and 2000s was that food
processing capital made greater recourse to outsourcing, labour hire arrangements and
open confrontation to sideline unions and undermine their bargaining position in the
enterprise bargaining process.

45
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A closer analysis of several representative agreements sharpens these general
propositions. Less than a year after the federal Commission’s adoption of enterprise
bargaining principles in October 1991,51 a national-level enterprise agreement was
signed with Edgell-Birds Eye, a major producer of canned vegetables and frozen foods,
with a single-bargaining unit of concerned unions, including the FPU and the National
Union of Workers. The objectives of the agreement betray the neo-liberal logic that had
infused labour relations in earnest after the passage of the Commission’s new wage
principles in the late 1980s.

Key amongst them are a dedication to improve the

efficiency and productivity of the enterprise,52 the creation of an environment conducive
to flexible work organisation in response to new technologies and changing markets,53
and an evinced desire to become ‘a world competitive manufacturing enterprise.’ 54 The
‘productivity culture’ being sought explicitly required workers and their unions to
reduce demarcation barriers through ‘the integration of all aspects of the production
systems’55 and accept ‘total flexibility of jobs and duties across the Company.’56
Importantly, the agreement also stipulated that ‘[a]t all times terms and conditions of
employment will be based upon the specific needs of the enterprise,’57 a refutation of
the notion of comparative wage justice and metal trades flow-on discussed previously.
Additionally, no quantitative limit was placed to the employment of casual labour.
Another enterprise agreement at canned fruit and juice producer Golden Circle
synergised intensified flexibility with a profound review of work organisation.58
Amongst the concessions being sought by the employer were flexible shift
arrangements to match work patterns to enterprise needs, flexible starting and finishing
times, increasing the daily maximum of work hours to 9.5, and staggering meal breaks
and substituting public holidays to ensure continuity of production.59 A much broader
and deeper system of performance indicators was outlined, whilst employees had to be
willing to ‘accept total flexibility of jobs and duties across the Enterprise, subject only
51
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to individual skills or abilities to perform particular tasks.’60 The desire to enforce
flexibility and establish much more comprehensive performance indicators was equally
apparent in a 1993 agreement at the Phoenix Biscuit Company, which also explicitly
employed the language of ‘Total Quality Management,’ ‘Benchmarking’ and ‘Best
Practice’ which was becoming commonplace at this time.61
These trends, and the process of enterprise bargaining in the food processing sector
generally, took on a harder edge as the 1990s drew on, a function of the entry of
aggressive multinational companies into an already foreign-dominated scene.62 These
engaged in wage and conditions whipsawing between different jurisdictions and proved
more than willing to exploit the union-diminishing potential of the Howard
Government’s Workplace Relations Act 1996, the architecture of which I traced in
chapter 5. American food giant Simplot acquired Edgell-Birds Eye in 1995 after it was
divested by the Australian conglomerate Pacific Dunlop. The company brought with it
the aggressive attitude to unionism characteristic of its homeland. The initial move to
enterprise bargaining had helped divide workers at the sectoral level, but left individual
work places more-or-less intact. Simplot, in common with many other manufacturers,
intensified the process by fragmenting workers within the workplace. In a remarkable
policy document, Simplot outlined a comprehensive strategy to wrest back the initiative
from unions, who were perceived to be ‘getting the upper hand.’ 63

The scheme

involved outsourcing key maintenance positions and the entire complement of casual
workers to Manpower, an American-based labour hire and human resource consultancy
multinational. A Manpower official had stated to Simplot that ‘all the talk in the World
has little affect [sic] on the Unions and at the end of the day actions speak louder and
the Union tend to then get the message – Things must change.’64 The end goal of the
plan was to completely outsource work sites, reduce worker levels, and use the new
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industrial relations legislation to further isolate individual workers and work groups65 ˗
in short, a paradigmatic liberal-productivist arrangement, combining precarity,
enhanced managerial prerogative and juridical atomism.
The belligerent rhetoric was matched by action. As early as December 1996, just over a
year after Simplot’s acquisition of Edgell-Birds Eye’s operations, the company had
outsourced casual labour to Manpower at its Ulverstone plant.66 In late 1997, all
seasonal and casual work at Simplot’s Devonport factory was similarly outsourced.67
And in 1997/early 1998, a major industrial dispute erupted at the Echuca site, with
Simplot locking-out employees after threatening to terminate all their employment
contracts and completely outsource their positions.68 This drastic action earned the
rebuke of the federal tribunal, with Commissioner Tolley opining:
I am also concerned that large multinational companies come into this country
and try to foist, in my view, unacceptable human relations practices on people in
this country. I am severely limited by what I can do pursuant to the Workplace
Relations Act but I can under the Workplace Relations Act make it very clear
there are to be no further threats of termination (my emphasis).69

The limitations referred to by Commissioner Tolley were those that limited the
tribunal’s capacity to intervene in enterprise bargaining, a function of the Howard
government’s desire to reduce the role of the Commission, which was so graphically
seen in chapter 6. Tolley is grasping, in a personal sense, the nub of the liberalproductivist labour law regime so far as the Commission is concerned. The recasting of
the law-administration continuum, elucidated in chapters 4, 5 and 6, saw the range of
the Commission’s responsibilities continually narrowed, whilst its discretion came to be
increasingly fettered by statute. Law was re-asserting itself strongly, whittling away at
the administrative fabric of arbitration to such a degree that, even in the case of the
major stoppage at Echuca, the Commission found its ability to act severely constrained.
65
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Although the workers affected eventually rebuffed management’s attempts after the six
week lock-out, the company succeeded in cutting the union’s pay claim from 8% to 3%,
whilst the new enterprise agreement went a long-way towards removing what Simplot
regarded as ‘restrictive practices,’ including new flexibility in the taking of RDOs, 70 the
introduction of 12-hour shifts,71 and the foisting of some maintenance responsibilities
on production workers.72
In the meantime, the outsourcing of groups of workers to Manpower meant that the
AMWU, Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union of Australia (CEPU) and
other unions now had to devote resources to negotiations with that company. The wellobserved tendency for the labour hire sector to have very low levels of unionisation,73
together with the aforementioned fact that Manpower was party to a strategy of
confronting unions, ensured that this was a task fraught with danger. The ACTU had
successfully struck a ‘heads of agreement’ document with Manpower, which basically
involved the former accepting the flexibility and efficiency demands of the company in
exchange for recognition and the development of consultative arrangements with
appropriate trade unions.74 The AMWU came to a derivative agreement, which was
broadly similar in tone.75 This replicated the broader effort of the AMWU to come to
agreements with labour hire companies to try and reduce pay and conditions
differentials with the parent company (and so presumably reduce the incentive for the
latter to outsource in the first place). Such efforts dovetailed with the movement to
pattern bargaining in the mid to late 1990s, as unions sought to defend the standard
employment model and re-establish some measure of uniformity at the sectoral level.
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The results were inconsistent. Unsurprisingly, given its role in Campaign 2000 and
Campaign 2003, the Victorian branch of the AMWU experienced more success than its
brethren in other states.76 The struggles over outsourcing and labour hire, however,
informed the union effort to come to a national-level agreement with Simplot. In this it
was aided by the fact that union density across its four processing plants was very high.
Moreover, the Food & Confectionary Division of the AMWU had identified the threat
posed by labour hire and resolved to either regulate its use or drive it entirely from the
industry.77 Although this was a very optimistic appraisal of union strength, particularly
amongst smaller operators, the organisation of Simplot workers meant that the company
vision was not fully realised.

Not only did the union achieve a national-level

framework agreement (which set the parameters for agreements at the individual sites),
it also successfully retained some of the proportions clauses on part-time and casual
labour which were being phased out of awards, including the Food Preservers Award
2000, generally.

It remained the case, however, that the national framework

agreement78 gave the company the ability to minimise demarcation barriers, deploy
labour ever more flexibly across different jobs, duties and times, and use labour hire
arrangements provided certain conditions of consultation were observed.79
The pressures facing unions involved in enterprise bargaining in the food sector became
all the more difficult with the intensification of global competition. As indicated in
chapter 4, whereas the crux of antipodean Fordist protectionist policy was to shield
Australian manufacturers from the vicissitudes of the international market, within
liberal-productivism these vicissitudes are welcomed, as competition is recast as a
crucible producing vigorous and efficient firms. The newly open global space, together
with the capacity to disaggregate and globally configure complex production networks,
provided both the opportunity and the rationale for multinational companies to whipsaw
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between different jurisdictions in the hopes of encouraging a self-reinforcing cycle of
wage and conditions undercutting.
The activities of the Australian branch of the American-owned Heinz Company provide
an instructive example. Even under the award system, Heinz had demonstrated its
commitment to enforcing flexibility in labour relations, using casual labour out of
season (in defiance of the award) and re-employing full-time workers who took
voluntary redundancies as casuals.80 The company, however, had in mind much greater
changes. In a revealing policy document in early 1993, it identified what it perceived as
shortcomings and limitations to future growth, which included a poor industrial
relations image, restrictive practices and a limited number of production days.81 The
vision anticipated for the company in 1996, although couched in the aspirational
language of unitarist human resource management, clearly anticipated substantial
rationalisation of production, the development of a low-cost, flexible and exportoriented manufacturing system, changed work practices, a predatory acquisition strategy
and the potential relocation of factories;82 a union, in short, of the precarious, leanproduction industrial paradigm and global production logic of liberal-productivism.
Heinz’s 1992 acquisition of New Zealand-based food processor Wattie’s armed
management with the leverage to bargain towards these desired outcomes. A variety of
reports had found cost advantages of doing business in New Zealand,83 with the
immediate result being that certain operations in Australia (namely the plant at
Dandenong) were threatened with closure.84 AMEU National Organiser Neil Marshall
noted of Heinz management, ‘[t]he Board will meet again in May to determine the
80

Food Preservers Union of Australia and H.J. Heinz Co Australia Pty Ltd, Food Preservers Award,
1973 (1991) Print J7693.
81
H.J. Heinz Pty Ltd, ‘H.J. Heinz Australia-Now and the Future’, 12 January 1993, (Noel Butlin Archives
Centre, Z628, Box 111) 3-4.
82
Ibid 7-9.
83
It is significant to note that around this time New Zealand had embarked upon industrial relations
reforms of its own. Compared to the fairly steady, gradated process of labour law change in Australia,
these were rapid and radical. Until the mid-1980s, New Zealand’s labour law regime was broadly similar
to Australia, with both countries’ systems revolving around compulsory arbitration. After a series of
legislative modifications which made arbitration non-compulsory, the passage of the Employment
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Unwin, 2006) 50, 54, 91-92.
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future of the Dandenong plant, but the position has been made quite clear that if an
Enterprise Agreement can’t be finalised before this meeting the Dandenong operation
will be transferred to New Zealand.’85 In turn, Wattie’s management encouraged a
highly casualised production workforce, the integration of skilled workers into
management, the removal of trade unions and the intensification of greater interAustralasia competition, spurred by the fact that Heinz was internally comparing its
Wattie’s and Dandenong facilities at monthly performance reviews.86
The attempt by Heinz to play the two plants off against each other to strongarm the
enterprise bargaining process was a complete success. The FPU, which until this point
had been more reluctant than other unions to bargain with Heinz,87 was sidelined by the
ACTU, which had taken over the negotiations.88

The ACTU came to a radical

agreement with Heinz in April 1993 over operations at the Dandenong factory, which
provided, amongst other things, for:


130 immediate retrenchments, to be followed by another 90 over the following
12 months;



the addition of a third shift, making for 24-hour production; and



the contracting out of some functions, including plumbing, boiler maintenance
and electrical work.89

It also established the framework for further enterprise agreements that sought to reduce
costs even further.90

The historical irony was that these concessions wouldn’t be

enough for Heinz management, who would go on to ultimately close the Dandenong

85

Letter to George Campbell, AMEU National Secretary, and Doug Cameron, AMEU Assistant National
Secretary, from Neil Marshall, AMEU National Organiser, 25 February 1993 (Noel Butlin Archives
Centre, Z628, Box 111). Interestingly, in this letter, Marshall also suggested establishing
communications with unions in the New Zealand plant to help minimise management’s ability to play the
two against each other.
86
‘Watties Briefing Paper’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 111) 2-3.
87
See, for example: Robert Gottliebsen, ‘Heinz ready to play the Wattie card’, BRW (Australia), 13
November 1992, 20.
88
‘Heinz Jobs Cuts Sound A Warning’, The Age (Melbourne), 2 April 1993, 13.
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Cathy Bolt, ‘Heinz and ACTU in watershed pact to secure future’, Australian Financial Review
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plant in 2000 and relocate its products to New Zealand and two other Australian sites
after running the factory down through lack of investment.91
The story of Heinz is just the most instructive example of what was becoming a general
trend in food-processing throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as multinational corporations
whipsawed between different jurisdictions and plants, encouraging a competitive bloodletting of wages and conditions and leveraging the enterprise bargaining process in their
favour.

Companies such as Arnott’s, John West, Coca-Cola Amatil and Kerry

Ingredients employed the tactic, on both intra-Australia and international scales, with
factory closures and relocation of production cutting costs whilst serving as examples to
other Australian food workers.92

Although I explore throughout this thesis the

characteristics and tendencies of liberal-productivism and its labour law regime in
Australia, this process of whipsawing makes clear the inherently global configuration of
this model of development. As stated in Chapter 4, Australia has gained from this
model more than many other countries, but it is important to remember here that this is
due in no small part to the advantageous terms upon which Australian capitalism
articulated with the world economy. The mass export of mining commodities to the
growing Chinese economy, coupled with capital whipsawing, union repression and
precarisation at home: these were key elements in the coherence of Australian liberalproductivism made possible by the embrace of a global vista.

Conclusions
This case study has explored the unfolding of award restructuring and enterprise
bargaining in the food processing sector, elucidating both the substantive content of
agreements and the interaction of the bargaining process with broader political
See, for example, Damien Carrick, ‘Dandenong crushed by Heinz factory closure’, The World Today
on ABC Local Radio, 19 July 2000, <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s153786.htm>; Narelle
Hooper, ‘Heinz Watties defends its closure’, The Word Today on ABC Local Radio, 19 July 2000,
<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s153797.htm>.
92
See, for example: ‘Arnott’s to close biscuit factory’, The Australian (online), 29 April 2008,
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/arnotts-to-close-biscuit-factory/story-e6frg6nf1111116194132>; Nance Haxton, ‘Australia’s last tuna cannery closes’, PM with Mark Colvin on ABC
Local Radio, 23 February 2010, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2010/s2828175.htm>; ‘Impact of
sweet soft drink slowdown as CCA closes Bayswater soft drink bottling plant’, Australian Food News,
November 5 2014, <http://ausfoodnews.com.au/2014/11/05/impact-of-sweet-soft-drink-slowdown-ascca-closes-bayswater-soft-drink-bottling-plant.html>; Stephen Drill, ‘More than 100 jobs lost as
Melbourne food factory moves to Malaysia’, Herald Sun (online), 9 August 2012,
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/more-than-100-jobs-lost-as-melbourne-food-factorymoves-to-malaysia/story-fndo3ewo-1226446921234>.
91
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economic developments, such as the growing internationalisation of production and
increasing foreign ownership. It has been demonstrated that the fundamental premise of
enterprise bargaining within a liberal-productivist model of development, namely
intensified precarity and flexibility, had their roots in the restructuring and efficiency
and structural efficiency principles of the Accord years. Award reform under these
heads involved, amongst other things, removing restrictions on the employment of
casual and part-time labour, extending ordinary hours, increasing the flexibility of shift
hours and RDOs and changing the payment of penalty rates. Importantly, at a time
when the process was being painted as a progressive one leading to up-skilled, involved
workers and career paths, food workers experienced, and acknowledged, that the
principles were largely a cover for work intensification and the clawback of hard-won
conditions.
Enterprise bargaining intensified these developments, whilst also placing a premium
upon the removal of demarcation barriers and the creation of a ‘productivity’ culture, a
euphemism for employees being subordinated to the needs and requirements of their
enterprise. This lattermost was a refutation of the unifying tendencies operative within
the award system, and helped break the unification of the wage structure headed by the
metal trades explored in chapter 7.
The general pattern of trade-offs required for enterprise bargaining-based wage
increases were broadly similar to those in other sectors, as will be demonstrated when I
come to the case of the retail sector. However, it acquired a harder edge in the food
processing sector because of the historic militancy of key unions and a growing
exposure to international competition. Whereas retailers, particularly food retailers, are
often quite sheltered from global forces, Australian food workers increasingly had to
compete against jurisdictions with lower wages and laxer regulations, such as New
Zealand and Malaysia. Large multinationals such as Heinz proved exceedingly adept at
exploiting this situation, whip-sawing between different locations to leverage the
bargaining process in their favour and extract ever greater concessions from companies
and communities.
This is the very stuff of the liberal-productivist model of development. Premised on a
global production system and the easy movement of capital across national boundaries,
capital is now more-or-less free to seek the greatest valorisation opportunities, with little
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regard for its ‘home.’ Whereas the labour law regime of antipodean Fordism obtained
its logic and coherence in part from the synergy between high levels of industrial
protection, the recycling of monopoly rents through the arbitration system and the
standard employment model, the commensurate liberal-productivist regime relies
instead upon the nexus between free trade, a polarised wage structure and employment
precarity.

For Australian workers generally, and food processing employees in

particular, enterprise bargaining in such a context (a context it has helped constitute) is a
font of union weakness rather than strength. Whilst continued union organisation in the
food manufacturing sector has at times frustrated the realisation of management’s ideal
vision, the overall trajectory has been one determined by capital.

Chapter 9
PRECARITY AND MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE IN
THE NEW SOUTH WALES RETAIL SECTOR
In the previous chapter, I studied how award restructuring and enterprise bargaining
helped constitute a liberal-productivist labour law regime, particularly insofar as they
crystallised the latter’s industrial paradigm and wage-labour nexus. The current chapter
explores much the same processes (with an additional focus on Australian Workplace
Agreements) in the New South Wales (NSW) retail sector.

Specifically, taking

precarity and enhanced managerial prerogative as central to the transformed wagelabour nexus, I will focus specifically on the ways in which awards and, more lately,
enterprise agreements have evolved in the transition to liberal-productivism. Although
the process has been protracted and uneven, these instruments of labour law have been
denuded of virtually all restrictions, both quantitative and qualitative, on the use of
casual and part-time labour. At the same time the model of a five-day, regular-hours
work-week for full-time retail staff has been substantially displaced, particularly as
normal trading hours have been continually extended whilst associated wage premiums
have been reduced. In short, the standard employment model, central to the antipodean
Fordist wage-labour nexus, has been largely destroyed. The result today is an industry
which, more so than any other save hospitality, is characterised by a precarious
employment structure, where management enjoy broad powers to engage large pools of
transient labour (in which women and students are over-represented) across a
fragmented ‘time-regime’ of working hours.1
There are a variety of reasons for selecting the NSW retail sector as a case study. In the
previous chapter it was noted that this current chapter should be read as a partner to it.
By counter-posing a service industry to a manufacturing industry, I can trace similarities
and differences in terms of the key processes identified.

Indeed, I argue in both

chapters 8 and 9 that the fundamental likeness of the food processing and retail stories
immensely strengthen the thesis of transition made in this thesis. An equally important
consideration, however, is the argument that sectors like retail can be thought of as new

Iain Campbell and Jenny Chalmers, ‘Job quality and part-time work in the retail industry: An Australian
case study’ (2008) 19(3) The International Journal of Human Resource Management 487, 488.
1
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lead sectors in the fabric of liberal-productivism.2 It will be recalled that in chapter 4 I
defined lead sectors ‘as those industries in which outcomes disproportionately affect
industrial, economic and social outcomes in other industries.’ Due to a combination of
factors, including the flagging of the manufacturing sector and the increasing retailer
domination of supply chains consequent upon a rapid concentration of retail capital,3 the
retail sector can in a sense be regarded as a new lead sector. 4 Employment security,
trade union militancy and workplace activism; these features of antipodean Fordism
made the least impression on the retail sector. In the new world of liberal-productivism,
employment precarity, a large, fragmented workforce and effete trade unionism became
virtues with which the retail sector was liberally endowed.

In particular, I will

demonstrate in this chapter that the retail sector precociously enshrined the liberalproductivist wage-labour nexus of increased precarity and intensification of labour
stripped of the quid pro quo of job security, rising remuneration and internal labour
markets of antipodean Fordism.
The decision to focus largely on NSW is a function of a number of considerations.
Firstly, a spotlight on a state jurisdiction counterbalances the largely federal focus of the
analysis thus far. Secondly, in acknowledging the necessity of intimate analysis and the
historically state-based character of retail awards,5 it makes sense to concentrate upon
the concrete experience of one particular state. Given the fact that NSW is the most
populous state (and thus changes in retail awards affect a greater number of workers
than is the case in other states) and a nexus existed between NSW retail awards and
Brett Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector, 1971-1988: Crisis and
Experimentation amidst Changing Models of Development’ (2015) 109 Labour History 75, 76-77. Other
scholars have grasped this fact without using the same words. See, for example, the description of retail
as one of the ‘IR pace-setters’ in the work of Justine Evesson et al, ‘‘Lowering the standards’: From
Awards to Work Choices in Retail and Hospitality Collective Agreements’ (Synthesis Report, Workplace
Research Centre, September 2007) 49.
3
Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector’, above n 2, 81.
4
I say ‘in a sense’ due to the fact that it has certainly not assumed the economic role of the metals and
broader manufacturing sectors during the period of antipodean Fordist functionality. I mentioned in
chapter 4 how sectors such as retail and hospitality account for a higher proportion of total employment
than their contribution to GDP. Moreover, unlike the positive feedback loop of lead sector manufacturing
within antipodean Fordism, the pattern within liberal-productivism appears to be largely negative.
Indeed, as we shall see here, retail employers are at the forefront of poor pay, precarious positions and
award stripping.
5
This was primarily a function of the requirement of an ‘inter-state dispute’ to enliven the Federal
Government’s ability to arbitrate and make awards: Australian Constitution s 51(xxxv). Well into the
post-World War II years, Australian retailing remained a predominantly state-based affair, demonstrated
most graphically in the association of major department store chains such as Myer, David Jones, Harris
Scarfe and Aherns with Melbourne, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia
respectively.
2
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those in some other jurisdictions, such as Western Australia6 and the Australian Capital
Territory,7 it has been selected for this analysis.

Where relevant, however,

developments in other states will be described and integrated into the historical account.
Also, when I come to consider the changes effected by WorkChoices, the inquiry will
have to be generalised, given the mortal blow this legislation dealt to state-based
industrial systems.
To begin the analysis, an understanding of retail during the period of antipodean Fordist
functionality must be reached. As shall be seen, insofar as the antipodean Fordist wagelabour nexus was concerned, this period in retail is notable for its brevity and
belatedness.

NSW retail awards – The beginnings
The retail sector proved a laggard in terms of the diffusion of the antipodean Fordist
wage-labour nexus, particularly regarding the pattern of a regular five-day work week
central to the standard employment model. For much of the first half of the twentiethcentury, retail was characterised by regular Saturday and Sunday work. 8 Even after the
advent of Sunday closing,9 full and, later, half-day trading on Saturday were considered
normal working hours that could be worked as part of a six-day roster.10 In NSW, it
was only in 1971-1972 that the five-day week was introduced for retail workers.11 By

6

Re Shop and Warehouse (Wholesale Retail Establishments) Award No. 32 of 1976 in CCH, Australian
Industrial Law Review, vol 23(16) (12 August 1981) ¶377.
7
Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association v Woolworths (Alice Springs) Ltd in CCH,
Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 24(3) (10 February 1982) ¶53.
8
For an excellent summary of the development of trading hours movements and legislation, particularly
regarding the struggle over Saturday work, see: Beverley Kingston, Basket, Bag and Trolley: A history of
shopping in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1994) 111-115.
9
Which, incidentally, was a move strongly pushed by religious groups, concerned at the health of
worker’s morals if church-going suffered at the hands of commerce.
10
Saturday morning work was, however, specially recompensed in some circumstances. For example, in
the Shop Assistants (Newcastle) and (Metropolitan) Awards case (1955) AR 817, 885-886, Baun J
provided for an allowance of 10 shillings for workers thus engaged. It is telling, however, that this was
awarded following a refusal by the Full Bench to grant a five-day working week, in essence representing
a premium in lieu of the full benefits of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus: Re Shop Employees
(State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(17) (5 September 1985) ¶314. See also:
Shop Assistants Metropolitan Case (1967) AR 337.
11
By agreement with retailers, with the requisite awards being varied in 1971 and 1972. See: Shop
Employees (State) Award in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol
14(11) (20 May 1972) ¶194; Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law
Review, vol 27(17) (5 September 1985) ¶314. The system was also subject to a long period of struggle
over rostering arrangements, particularly regarding cycles and roster days. In the initial period of
operation, the five-day work week often resulted in longer daily hours for retail workers given that many

275

contrast, the majority of employees had won the five-day, 40-hour week in the wake of
the federal Arbitration Commission’s 8 September 1947 decision, which was explored
in chapter 5.
The belated granting of the standard work-week, which was introduced by consent
between workers and retailers, came amidst the intensifying class struggle of the late
1960s and early 1970s, the ‘flood tide’ of working-class militancy.12

Particularly

concerning for retail capital was the fact that left-wing unions, such as the
Miscellaneous Workers Union, were making ground against the right-wing Shop
Assistants’ and Warehouse Employees Union, today’s Shop, Distributive and Allied
Employees’ Association (for simplicity, the union will be referred to as the SDA).13
The peak retailers body, the Retail Traders’ Association (RTA), believed ‘that shop
assistants were basically conservative in nature and tended to identify with the firm in
which they working,’14 a mindset the RTA wished to keep free from left-wing union
leadership. The major retailers, such as Woolworths, Coles, Grace Bros, David Jones,
Myer and Waltons, were especially vulnerable to disruption, given the fact that they
were easier to organise and stoppages could wreak havoc given the perishability of
many retail goods and the interdependent nature of supply chains.15
In the event, both the union and the six major retailers aforementioned saw the benefit
in a closed shop arrangement, whereby the SDA got 100% coverage, whilst the
employers entrenched the conservative union to the exclusion of more militant
competitors.16 The deal, struck in 1971, saw the membership of the NSW branch
increase exponentially; whereas in 1968 its ranks numbered only 5,320, by 1973 it had
swelled to 38,000 members.17

The agreement was also of key importance to the

unfolding of the five-day work week for retail workers. Mortimer notes that part of the
stores responded by deploying full-time staff over a four-and-a-half day week: Michael Johnston,
‘Industrial Notes’ (1972) (2) Voice 8 (official journal of the Shop Assistants and Warehouse Employees
Federation of Australia).
12
Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide (Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) 41-71.
13
Dennis Mortimer, ‘Trade Union and Management Strategy: A Case Study of Compulsory Unionism’
(2001) 1(2) Employment Relations Record 81.
14
Ibid 86.
15
A threat made very apparent by the preparedness of the Transport Workers’ Union to enforce boycotts
to ensure compulsory unionism: Nikola Balnave and Dennis Mortimer, ‘Union Security in Retail:
Legislative Intervention or Collective Agreement’ (2005) 13(1) International Journal of Employment
Studies 81.
16
Ibid 98-102.
17
Voice (1973) 5(1) 3.
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retail union strategy for winning this central feature of the antipodean Fordist wagelabour nexus was ‘a long running and unsuccessful campaign to reduce shopping hours
through Saturday closing.’18 The necessity of bringing the SDA into the fold in an era
of heightened class struggle brought with it the need for retailers to make certain
concessions, among them the five-day week, but employer acquiescence was premised
upon the union accepting the legitimacy of Saturday and late night work. Union official
Michael Johnston noted that ‘[t]he 5-day-week campaign was successfully concluded
because the union changed its attitude from one of complete opposition to late night and
Saturday trading to one of controlling the number of Saturdays and late nights our
members had to work.’19 Although such concessions were deemed necessary by the
SDA, this method of accommodating employer demands, whereby every gain had to be
offset by something relinquished, would increasingly undermine union bargaining
power in the 1980s and 1990s and with it the ability of the union to shape the contours
of the transformation in retail industrial relations.
It was thus only at the zenith of antipodean Fordism that the NSW retail sector exhibited
the typical working-time arrangements that characterised the Fordist wage-labour nexus.
The fact that this was achieved on the cusp of Fordist dysfunction ensured that this
nexus found fallow soil.

The 1970s and 1980s – Crucial transitional decades
I have elsewhere stated that ‘[t]he 1970s and 1980s were crucial transitional decades
regarding the place of the retail sector within the fabric of Australian capitalism.’ 20 In
particular, the dominance of manufacturers over retailers within antipodean Fordism
was usurped.

Based on an industrial paradigm that tended towards the efficient

manufacture of standardised commodities on long-production runs,21 oligopolistic
manufacturers in the period of antipodean Fordist functionality were able to exert
control over comparatively homogenous markets that established clear demarcations
between elements in the distribution network.

Within these networks, the role of

Mortimer, ‘Trade Union and Management Strategy’, above n 13, 81.
Michael Johnston, ‘Industrial Notes’ (1973) 5(2) Voice 8.
20
Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector’, above n 2, 81.
21
This encompassed both industrial and agri-food commodities: David Burch and Geoff Lawrence,
‘Supermarket Own Brands, Supply Chains and the Transformation of the Agri-Food System’ (2005)
13(1) International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 1,11.
18
19
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retailers ‘was to buy goods from the range offered by the wholesaler or other
intermediaries, and sell them on to the consumer…it was the manufacturers who
decided what goods were available, and in most countries at what price they could be
sold to the public.’22 In Australia, this latter most point was expressed most clearly by
the ability of manufacturers to control prices through resale price maintenance
practices.23
As the manufacturing sector began to lose steam in the crisis of the 1970s, however, a
number of developments changed the game.

From the 1970 and 1980s onwards,

Australian retailers, particularly grocery and liquor retailers, gained the apex position in
supply chains through the combination of a growing monopoly over the sale of
consumer goods,24 the acquisition of direct interests in the manufacturing sector25 and
the advent of retail ‘house brand’ products.26
This control was a key moment in the repositioning of retail as a lead sector,
particularly insofar as it opened the channels by which its wage-labour nexus could be
flowed up the supply chain to manufacturers.27 Unfortunately for retail employees, this
position of weightier industrial gravity coincided with the movement towards deregulated trading hours. Large retailers sought to counteract stagnation in product
markets, a product of antipodean Fordist crisis,28 by increasing consumption

22

Michael Reid, 'Change at the check-out' (1995)(7904) The Economist 3, 3-4. See also: David Burch
and Jasper Goss, ‘Global Sourcing and Retail Chains: Shifting Relationships of Production in Australian
Agri-foods’ (1999) 64(2) Rural Sociology 334.
23
Stuart Rosewarne, ‘The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties-Part 2’ (1984) 16 Journal of
Australian Political Economy 75, 86.
24
In the mid-1980s, some of the largest mergers seen in the Australian retail sector were taking place,
namely the Coles/Myer and Woolworths/Safeway combinations. The market share of both Coles and
Woolworths increased by more than 15% between 1975 and 1987: National Association of Retail Grocers
of Australia, ‘Submission to ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices for standard groceries
– Part B’ (13 March 2008) 6.
25
Stuart Rosewarne, ‘The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties-Part 1’ (1983) 15 Journal of
Australian Political Economy 18, 33.
26
Ibid 33-34. The existence of a similar transformation in other Fordist countries (albeit usually to a less
extreme degree) demonstrates that the roots of these processes lay in the crisis of Fordism. See, for
example: Jagdish N. Smith, ‘Emerging Trends for the Retailing Industry’ (1983) 59(3) Journal of
Retailing 6; Alexandra Hughes, ‘Forging New Cultures of Food Retailer-Manufacturer Relations?’ in
Neil Wrigley and Michelle Lowe (eds), Retailing, Consumption and Capital (Longman, 1996) 90-115; T.
Marsden, M. Harrison and A. Flynn, ‘Creating competitive space: exploring the social and political
maintenance of retail power’ (1998) 30(3) Environment and Planning A 481.
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140.
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opportunities and squeezing out smaller retailers29 (who were generally granted
exemptions from trading hours legislation). Given the fact that, in the context of
considerable union strength, work outside of normal hours attracted a penalty rate for
full-time staff,30 the progressive extension of trading hours encouraged retailers to
intensify their use of casual and part-time labour.

This development required a

transformation of retail awards, particularly to the effect of removing restrictions on the
engagement of such workers, increasing the pool of potential labour and slowly
undermining the privileged position of full-time employees. What was required, in
short, was a degradation of the standard employment model as it applied to the retail
sector.
In NSW, this process began in earnest in the 1980s. After gaining in the slew of workvalue cases in the early 1980s (discussed in chapter 5),31 retail workers soon found the
retail awards controlling their terms and conditions of employment becoming a
battleground between employers and the SDA which, with some notable exceptions,32
remained committed to pursuing outcomes through the arbitration system.33

29

Ibid 25. This over-riding purpose of extended late night trading was recognised by opponents of
trading hours de-regulation very early in the piece. As early as 1979, Queensland retail unions were
claiming that the ‘only beneficiaries of late night trading in Brisbane were major tenants in major
shopping centres’: Application to vary Order Fixing Trading Hours in CCH, Australian Industrial Law
Review, vol 21(13) (27 June 1979) ¶230.
30
As well as the fact that full-time staff often proved reluctant to work outside their normal spread of
hours. It was for this reason that many of the early efforts to extend trading hours were made conditional
upon staff not being required to work outside of their hitherto normal hours. In NSW, the introduction of
Friday night and Saturday afternoon trading in 1984 was made conditional upon a savings clause being
inserted in the Shop Assistants (General Shops) Interim (State) Award, which provided that full-time staff
employed prior to the 23rd of July, 1984, could not be compelled to work outside their ordinary hours:
Application for interpretation of cl. 8B of Shop Employees (General Shops) Interim (State) Award in
CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(12) (26 June 1985) ¶215.
31
In NSW, retail workers gained an extra $8.70 per week, a common figure as break-throughs in the
transport and metals sector stoked the wage explosion of the early 1980s: In Retail Shops (State) Award in
CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 22(18) (3 September 1980) ¶282. They were also successful
in lifting the minimum wage quite effectively: Brian O’Neill, ‘A New Minimum Wage of $225’ (Summer
1981) Shop and distributive worker 3 (official journal of SDA NSW Branch). However, militant metal
unions pushed ahead, and it was not until 1983/1984 that NSW retail awards were varied in line with the
prevailing metal industry standard: In re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award and Other Awards
(April-June 1983, Pt 2) AR 283; Re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award in CCH, Australian Industrial
Law Review, vol 26(7) (11 April 1984) ¶123.
32
For examples of strike action in NSW, see: Sec 25A notification re company security in CCH,
Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 21(9) (2 May 1979) ¶146; Damon Frith, ‘Business as Usual as
Workers Protest’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 10 November 1988, 6. The fact that strikes
remained limited in retail as a whole can be gleaned from the comparatively paltry strike statistics for the
sector as a whole from 1975-1980 (the period for which we have specific data on the incidence of strikes
in the retail sector specifically). Generally speaking, retail strikes were small in number and usually drew
in relatively few employees. See: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Statistics 1975-1980 (6101.0).
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The material premises of these debates were the accumulating symptoms of a changing
industrial structure and employment relations in the 1970s. As early as 1977, Justice
Macken of the NSW Industrial Commission (whom we shall come to know well in this
chapter) noted in a case regarding the formulation of a single Shop Employees (State)
Award34 that ‘[t]he evidence established a trend in the industry, from 1969 to the present
date, by which casual juniors had come increasingly to be employed.’ 35 He identified a
variety of impulses tending towards this result, including filling employment gaps
created by the five-day week and the impact of self-service technologies and new
marketing procedures in allowing junior employees to perform the same duties as older
workers.36 In a 1980 work-value case, Justice Macken further observed the fundamental
shift towards casualised retail labour, noting how it had effected profound labour
process changes for both full-time and casual/part-time employees.37 Convinced of the
undesirability of retail casualisation, and under pressure from the union, Justice Macken
had even taken some concrete steps in 1977 to combat the problem through requiring
employers to pay casual employees penalty rates for work on public holidays, weekends

Subsequent iterations of Labour Statistics do not specifically measure strike statistics for the retail sector.
This in itself would appear to tell a story as to how negligible strike action in the sector really was.
33
It is worth noting here that in 1974 the NSW branch of the SDA (then known as the Shop Assistants
and Warehouse Employees Federation) amalgamated with the Australian Workers Union which, although
similarly anti-communist, was considerably more militant industrially. This led to an increasingly bold
outlook and tactics in the 1970s, such as seen in the strike of Wollongong shop workers through
September and October 1975: ‘Wollongong Strike’ (1975) 7(4) Voice, 7; and In re Shop Employees
(State) Award (October-December 1976, Pt 4) AR 755, 758. The amalgamation was anathema to the
federal SDA, which, after several years of legal wrangling, successfully scuttled it, aided and abetted by
large employers refusing to recognise the new union: Michael Easson, ‘Maher created a powerful force’,
Sydney Morning Herald (online), January 4, 2010 < http://www.smh.com.au/comment/obituaries/mahercreated-a-powerful-force-20100103-ln9t.html>. This development certainly strengthened the employers’
hand, particularly given the trenchant opposition of the amalgamated union to further trading hours deregulation: Barry Egan, ‘Thank You For Your Support’ (1977) 9(4) Voice 3.
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the Commission under the pressure of the evolving class struggle within the sector, with more powerfully
organised workers in large retailers sometimes able to strike independent awards.
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Australian awards into the 1980s (as noted in chapter 5). Indeed, the Shop Employees (State) Award of
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and after 6.00pm on weekdays.38 This represented a marked departure from the historic
attitude to casual employees, which was succinctly captured by Chief Industrial
Magistrate Williams in a 1972 case denying casual retail workers Sunday penalty rates:
‘Whatever entitlements a casual employee may have, they do not approach in extent,
those of a part-time employee to the same degree as those of a part-time employee
approach those of a full-time employee.’39
What was to be the first major institutional development in the reformulation of the
retail wage-labour nexus, however, was the commencement of an inquiry in December
1982 into the desirability of extending retail trading hours, carried out by Justice
Macken.

Interestingly, the divide between large and small retailers was apparent

immediately from the tenor of the submissions.

As intimated above, many small

retailers have long been in favour of prescribed opening and closing times given the fact
they are usually excluded from their operation. The case was little different in NSW;
most employers and the NSW RTA submitted to the Macken inquiry that no change to
the trading hours regime was necessary.40

Indeed, Lyons notes that ‘[t]he only

submissions to fully embrace extended trading came from the major grocery
supermarket chains,’41 whilst the SDA ‘submitted that extended trading would result in
more casual staff and a decline in full-time and permanent employment.’42
In the event, Justice Macken recommended an additional evening’s trading and the
extension of trading hours until 4.00pm on Saturdays,43 whilst affirming the desirability
of permanent employment over casual status.44

More significant than these

comparatively modest developments was his recommendation that a specialist retail
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industry tribunal be created, a proposal given effect by the Industrial Arbitration (Retail
Trade) Amendment Act 1983.45 This move was key in securing union acceptance of the
report; these had stated, ‘[w]e are of the opinion that the most appropriate manner in
which the report can be implemented is through the establishment of an appropriate
tribunal.’46
The result was the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), a body composed of
two members of the Industrial Commission (one as chair, the other as deputy chair) and
two ‘assessors’ to provide advice, with one nominated by the Labor Council, the other
by the RTA. Despite being born in crisis, it was a creature of the antipodean Fordist
law-administration continuum, essentially combining the juridical structure of
arbitration with a quasi-corporatist practice. It was very much in keeping with broader
quasi-corporatist experiments to escape from the crisis of antipodean Fordism by
intensifying its institutions. Of particular note in this regard is the Accord, discussed in
detail in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Although the form of the Tribunal and the Accord were
very different, the similarities in their constitutive contexts is instructive. Both were
developed in the same context of general economic crisis, yet were premised on the
institutionalised power of the trade union movement and enhancing the authority of the
arbitral tribunals. Both were supported by Australian Labor Party (ALP) governments,
and would attract the ire of intransigent employers.
This body was to prove a central site for the intensifying struggle over retail awards: its
eventual failure was simultaneously part of the failure of antipodean Fordism to rescue
itself from its contradictions.

The 1980s – The Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal era
In 1984, the issue of newly de-regulated trading hours, and how to defuse the threat of
retail employee resistance over them, was centre-stage of a number of legal
developments. Firstly, the SDA and major retailers struck two industrial agreements
(arrived at by consent) to be certified by the NSW Industrial Commission.47
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Industrial Arbitration (Retail Trade) Amendment Act 1983 (NSW).
‘Shop-hours proposals accepted by unions’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 22 October 1983, 8.
47
Industrial Agreement no. 7249, Matter No. 1529 of 1984 bound Coles, Grace Brothers, Target,
Safeway, Woolworths and Jack Butler. Industrial Agreement no. 7258, Matter No. 1564 of 1984 bound
Myer. These agreements were understood as the quid pro quo for union acceptance of de-regulated
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workers engaged by major retailers, the most important gain was the establishment of a
38-hour week for full-time employees48 and the provision of time-and-a-half penalty
rates for Saturday work.49 Additionally, the agreements limited casual employment to
15% of total hours worked, provided proportions clauses limiting the employment of
part-time and junior staff50 and sought to convert casual and part-time positions to fulltime where possible.51

In exchange, employers gained some of the flexibilities

associated with the ‘cost offsets’ demanded by the arbitral tribunals in return for the 38hour week. It is worth quoting the judgement at length in describing these changes:
They include the enactment of radical changes to night-fill and non-selling staff
employees’ conditions, including a reduction in the loading for the working of
ordinary hours from 27% to 17½%. The removal of tea money from employees
who work ordinary hours past 6 p.m. on Thursday and Friday is in itself a saving
of just on 1% in the case of Grace Bros and 1.68% in the case of Coles … Other
offsets include the introduction of premium hours, a reduction in the minimum
weekly hours of part-time employees from twenty to sixteen and an ability to
roster permanent employees more flexibly (my emphasis).52

It has always been the understanding in the retail industry that the levers of the sector
are the bargains struck with the major retailers.53 These consent arrangements proved
no different, with Lyons noting ‘[t]he lack of objectors to the certification of the
agreements reflects the understanding between the government, major retailers, and
RTA that the terms of the agreements would eventually apply to all employees in the

trading hours: J. Taylor, ‘Extended Shopping Hours Have Been Delayed Again’, Sydney Morning Herald
(Sydney), 3 August 1984, 3.
48
As seen in chapter 5, the 38-hour week was at this time becoming commonplace throughout Australian
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maintaining a 40 hour week’: ‘38 Hour Week’ (March-April 1984) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 5.
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561-568.
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industry.’54

The increasing concentration of retail capital,55 and the competition

consequent upon it, however, almost threw these arrangements into turmoil.

The

signing of the industrial agreements had split the RTA, with the President, a Mr Tate,
siding with the major retailers in their interpretation of the Macken report, ranged
against the Secretary, a Mr Lawrence, and other general shop operators. 56 Only after
protracted discussion was a workable agreement reached. The Tribunal under Justice
Macken thus made a new award to apply to all retail employees in shops employing
fifteen or more employees, dubbed the Shop Employees (General Shops) Interim (State)
Award.57 This was based in large part on the industrial agreements, recreating many of
their key provisions.58 Of key significance for my purposes was the fact that the
Tribunal found that the extension of Saturday penalty rates to casuals was a necessary
step in the creation of this award. Justice Macken stated:
If casual employees can be employed on Saturday afternoons at a lower hourly
rate than that applicable to part-time and permanent employees then the award
would provide an inducement to employers to further causalise the industry.
Although it is not ‘necessary’ to promote the employment of permanent and
part-time labour by fixing a deterrent rate for casuals, in my view it is
‘necessary’ to ensure that permanents and part-time employees not be positively
disadvantaged by the terms of the award (my emphasis).59

Although in this last sentence Macken J doesn’t expressly seek to disadvantage casual
employment vis-à-vis permanent staff, he nevertheless recognises the necessity of
protecting the integrity of the standard employment model against the continued
casualisation of the retail sector.
54
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The cost-offsets established in the award (and agreed to by consent) are also revealing.
Of particular importance was the radically recast status of part-time employment, which
until that point had been restricted to women over the age of 21 and men over the age of
60. Age and gender were removed as impediments to part-time worker status, as was
the requirement that part-time employees only be engaged if no suitable full-time
employee is available.60
In the 1984 industrial agreements and the first award of the Tribunal, therefore, we have
a complex, dialectically evolving reality.

Embryonic moves towards increased

workplace flexibility, such as the greatly increased scope of part-time employment, the
reduction of part-time employee minimum hours and increased employer latitude in
rostering co-exist with structures designed to buttress standard employment.

This

understanding dovetails neatly with the idea of institutional searching, the piecemeal
and anarchic effort to escape economic crisis discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.61
Attempts to escape crisis through the generation of new institutions and norms is
typically not an abrupt, once-for-all process; rather, it revolves around the dialectical
relationship between the old and the new within a decaying model of development.
This process of institutional searching assumed a new form vis-à-vis retail awards with
a major 1985 NSW Industrial Commission review of the retail industry in NSW,
brought about in large part by RTA62 opposition to Justice Macken’s ruling awarding all
classes of employees penalty rates for Saturday work. 63 In the first of many moves by
which the Tribunal was marginalised by internally fractured employer groups, the RTA
appealed to the Commission in Court Session regarding the overtime issue.64
Moreover, they argued before the Commission for the deletion of all penalty rates, no
proportions clauses and the establishment of a new category of ‘regular’ employee
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(substantively a precarious form of part-time work) whose minimum shift per week was
only 8 hours.65 The essence of these arguments was no less than a rejection of the
antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, particularly insofar as it crystallised the standard
employment model. The RTA appeal coincided with a union application to flow-on the
provisions of the aforementioned industrial agreements to other retail awards,66 with the
result being a combined hearing that essentially amounted to a complete review of
Justice Macken’s decision and the hierarchy of retail awards in NSW.
The result of the employer’s forum shopping67 was considerably advantageous changes
in the content and structure of retail awards, changes that represented the first
unequivocal legal lubricants to retail precarity. Structurally, the two existing retail
awards, including the recently determined Employees (General Shops) Interim (State)
Award, were collapsed into a single consolidated Shop Employees (State) Award.68
From the perspective of retail employees, this could have been a progressive move if it
had been on the basis sought by unions, that is, an extension of the industrial
agreements throughout the retail award structure at large. In the event, however, the
unification of the two awards represented a lowest common denominator arrangement
given the substantive changes inserted by the NSW Industrial Commission.
The most significant development for the purposes of this thesis was the complete
reversal of Justice Macken’s efforts to minimise the potential for casual labour to
supplant full and part-time workers. The lattermost lost out by seeing the Saturday
afternoon penalty rate cut from the prevailing NSW standard of time-and-a-half to timeand-a-quarter.69 Casuals, however, were denied the entitlement to penalty rates for

‘RTA action to free Shop Award’ (March-April 1985) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 3.
Which, as outlined above, was the understanding between retail workers, employers and the state
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Saturday afternoon work at all.70

The Commission maintained that, given the

preference by full-time workers for weekly employment and statutory guarantees
preventing employers coercing existing full-timers to work extended hours, the payment
of Saturday afternoon penalty rates to casuals would not perform the standard
employment-preserving function Macken J expected of it.71
Whilst understandable in its own terms, this view of the Commission sits uneasily with
another key development, namely the rejection of a union-supported proportions clause
limiting casual employment to 15% of total working hours in retail establishments.
Despite claiming that both employers and unions were in agreement as to the
preferability of full-time weekly employment, the Commission noted the increasing
prevalence of casuals in the industry.72 It noted of this tendency,
Much of this has arisen from the necessity to staff shops through extended hours
and as relief during peak or busy periods. The need of employers to resort to
causal employment has been exacerbated by seemingly inappropriate award
limitations upon part-time employment (my emphasis).73

The significance of this statement is twofold. Firstly, it explicitly acknowledges the
corrosive impact of trading hours de-regulation on the standard employment model,
lately arrived as this was in the retail sector.

Secondly, the Commission astutely

observes the connection between employment patterns, employer strategy and the
contours of retail awards. These do not operate in isolation from the other, but together
constitute a dialectically evolving regulatory space, in which the needs of crisis
resolution and an emergent model of development come up against established
institutions, norms and understandings.74
Just as important as the material decision to remove restrictions on casual employment
was the methodology by which the Commission arrived at it. Noting the considerable
variation in patterns of utilisation of casuals across the industry, it went on to say that
‘[i]n these circumstances we see some merit in the suggestion that the dynamics of the
70
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industry may assist in the resolving of the problem of the proper role of casual
employment.’75 In other words, the Commission endorsed a more de-centralised, selfregulatory method, in which the circumstances of individual retailers took precedence
over the need to control and restrict casual employment in a collective way through the
award system. The same attitude underlies the decision to remove proportions clauses
governing the ratio between adult and junior retail workers in general shops, with the
Commission declaring ‘[w]e are prepared … to meet the employers’ plea for flexibility
… We think that the issue of proportions is one which the industry, is[sic] so far as
general shops are concerned, can meet in a self-regulatory way’ (my emphasis).76
Aside from departing from the antipodean Fordist modality of award setting which was
explored so thoroughly in chapters 5, 6 and 7 (namely, awards being used as tools to
universalise gains won from individualised victories), the attitude of the Commission
both presupposes and encourages a managerialist turn in the conception of labour law.77
The dressing of the casual and junior proportions issues in the language of flexibility
and self-regulation78 is clearly derived from the emergent management concerns in the
1980s to promote efficiency,79 control and value maximisation through greater control
over the engagement and disposal of labour. That this was an explicit concern of retail
capital in particular can be gleaned from a remarkable submission in 1982 by the
Australian Retailers Association (ARA) (a national body to which the RTA was
federated) to a federal committee reviewing Australian industrial relations law and
systems.80 At a time when most employer groups feared the potential of a wages
explosion stemming from a de-centralised industrial relations systems, the ARA was
submitting that compulsory arbitration was a failed system that should be replaced by a
75
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new modality of industrial regulation.81 This system was to be premised on a rejection
of the notion of comparative wage justice, instead endorsing an industry-centred
arrangement guided by the principle ‘that the establishment and variation of wages and
conditions should be approached on an industry by industry basis with no reliance being
possible on standards established in other industries.’82 Against this backdrop, the ARA
lambasted the importation of standards developed elsewhere in the industrial structure
to the retail sector, particularly penalty rates for work outside hitherto ordinary business
hours.83 The reproduction of elements of this industry-centred ideology, along with
some substantive provisions to enact it, within the Commission’s decision speaks of a
new, intensified interpenetration of legal and managerialist norms in which the
circumstances of concentrating and transforming retail capital infuse the legal realm. 84
The decision of the Commission, although delighting employers, 85 sparked outrage
amongst unions and retail workers, with the former declaring it ‘one of the worst
inflicted upon the union movement in this State.’86 Justice Macken lamented that it was
an ‘almost certain fact that, whichever way a decision goes before the Retail Trade
Industrial Tribunal, an appeal will be brought to the Commission in Court Session.’87
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In a timely demonstration of Jessop’s assertion that the state is a complex amalgam of
various institutional apparatuses, the coherence and functionality of which can never be
assumed,88 the SDA called upon the political capital it held with the NSW Labor
Government. The SDA has a long history on the right of the labour movement, heavily
influenced by the post-War Industrial Group movement89 and Catholic social doctrine.
Bramble notes that NSW was a bastion of the traditional Catholic Right faction of the
ALP, which controlled the party apparatus and the NSW Labor Council.90 The SDA
was thus in a position to wield its considerable influence over the legislative machinery
to circumvent the decision of the Commission.91
Government anger at the apparent betrayal of the quid pro quo arrangement over
extended trading hours was palpable,92 compounded by the actions of certain retailers
flouting the liberalised arrangements and opening on Sundays. 93 Indeed, the notion of
an agreement binding retailers, employees and the state was explicitly acknowledged by
one government member, who stated of the worker response to the Macken Report:
At a meeting of retail workers it was decided they would accept longer trading
on the basis that the new working conditions would be fully applied. This
conditional acceptance, and this is a very important part, of Saturday afternoon
trading was put to the Government and accepted. What I am saying, in effect, is
that the Government was part of that agreement and, further, that in this
legislation they are honouring that agreement.94
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The legislation referred to in the above extract was the Factories, Shops and Industries
(Further Amendment) Act 1985.95

Amongst other things, this Act empowered the

government to decree regulations fixing the penalty rate for Saturday work at time-anda-half.96 The Act was panned by retail employers97 and the conservative opposition
parties, who variously claimed that the ALP was beholden to SDA interests 98 and that
the government had usurped the authority and standing of the Industrial Commission.99
The legislation passed, however, and in due course the government enacted regulations
re-instating the Saturday penalty rate schema established by Justice Macken’s original
award.100
The response of the major retailers to these developments is indicative both of the
increasing corrosiveness of the competition principle and the power of concentrated
retail capital. Like most major employers, large retailers were generally happy to take
wages out of competition, a desire that dovetailed with the relatively homogenous wage
structure generated by the universalising tendencies of the arbitration system.101 This
attitude certainly informed the willingness of major retailers to sign the industrial
agreements with the SDA in the first instance, based on the understanding that the
conditions they provided would be generalised in the industry.102

The 1985

Commission decision, however, directly assailed the stability of these arrangements by
providing for lower wages and inferior conditions to those obtaining in the industrial
agreements.

The signatory employers claimed they had been conned by the

government, the SDA and the Labor Council into providing higher Saturday pay, their
anger intensified by perceived state and union laxity in prosecuting other retailers
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breaching penalty rate provisions.103 Woolworths, Coles, Myer, Grace Brothers and
Target demanded changes in the terms of the industrial agreements, changes that
essentially represented a refutation of the consensus originally arrived at with the SDA.
In particular, these five retailers sought provisions that directly intensified the flexibility
of labour and lubricated employee precarity, including:


reducing the minimum hours of part-time employees from 16 to 8 hours a week;



reducing minimum shifts for casuals from 4 hours to 2 hours;



allowing school-aged children to be employed as casuals;



removal of proportions clauses governing the employment of casuals and the
ratio of junior to adult workers; and



introducing fortnightly pay in arrears.104

The substance of these demands was in fact a rejection of the late-blooming antipodean
Fordist wage-labour nexus and its substitution by one that placed a premium on
flexibility, the breakdown of labour-power into increasingly fragmented units and
increased access to transient pools of labour, including the young workers who were
increasingly found in them (as seen in chapter 6). It contained, in short, several of the
key planks of a cogent liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus.
If these changes were not forthcoming, the major retailers made repeated threats to
cancel the agreements, which, according to Justice Macken, ‘led to severe industrial
instability in the industry.’105 Justice Macken attempted to provide something of a
compromise solution, seeking to convert most of the terms of the original agreements
into a new Shop Employees (Major General Shops)(State) Award whilst granting some
concessions to employers, such as allowing the sought-after reduction in minimum
casual shifts on an experimental basis.106 The major retailers, however, could not be
mollified. They challenged the Award in the NSW Court of Appeal, 107 claiming that,
Helen Grant, ‘’Conned’ retailers seek redress over weekend wage bill’, Australian Financial Review
(Australia), 22 April 1986, 36.
104
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having been made in the absence of one of the assessors,108 it was made without
jurisdiction. Incredibly, the Court agreed and duly voided the award,109 a demonstration
par excellence of the distinction between administration and the purer legal form in the
conduct of industrial relations. Whilst Macken J was more concerned about industrial
stability in the retail sector, for the Court of Appeal the case turned upon the minutiae of
procedural rules.
As a result of the court’s decision, Macken J, who by this point was comparing the
uncertainty surrounding the retail industry to the ‘Sword of Damocles,’110 was forced to
make an interim award which, although it rolled over the terms of the industrial
agreements, was explicitly temporary and would be replaced after a period of
negotiation/arbitration between the SDA and the increasingly militant employers. 111
In light of these tensions, 1988 shaped up as a critical year. Firstly, the Tribunal was
reconstituted, with Justice Macken, who had earned the ire of employers,112 replaced by
Deputy-President Wells. Whilst not wishing to overstate the importance of individuals
to the transformations of Australian capitalism, it is nevertheless the case that the nature
of state personnel can impact upon the speed and order of historical change.113 This is
particularly so in times of crisis when, as has been seen, emergent ideologies grate
against established norms and understandings.

Justice Macken, although hardly a

radical, was from a trade union background114 and, more importantly, was steeped in the
history of the debates between retail unions and employers from their inception in the
1970s. Throughout his tenure as chair of the Tribunal, he had evinced a consistent view
vis-à-vis the nature of the arrangements entered into, the bargains underlying them and
Government claimed that the legislation ensured ‘that the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal shall be the
final arbiter concerning industrial matters in the retail trade industry’: New South Wales, Parliamentary
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 April 1986, 2556 (Pat Hills). The peculiarity of this legislation,
abolishing the right of appeal for a specific industry, goes someway to demonstrating the influence of the
SDA on the Labor Government. It also attracted the ire of the conservative opposition parties, with one
National Party member describing it as ‘fascist legislation’: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Assembly, 24 April 1986, 2785 (Gerry Peacocke).
108
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the role of the Tribunal broadly.115 Given the jurisdictional quarrels and the gulf
between the respective awards of the Tribunal and the Commission, Justice Macken’s
removal could not but help to change the terms of the debate. Given his apparent
sympathies for retail employees and firm view of the binding nature of the deals the
major retailers had struck, this was unlikely to be a change for the benefit of workers.
It was before this reconstituted Tribunal that a major case concerning the terms and
conditions of retail employment, as well as ongoing confusion over contemporaneous
but qualitatively different awards, was heard. Of key concern for both parties was the
inconsistency borne by the fact that the majority of the retail industry fell under two
awards, the aforementioned Shop Employees (State) Award and the Shop Employees
(Major General Shops) Interim (State) Award. Both parties wanted to create a single
award, but on very different bases: ‘[T]he unions wanted the new award to contain the
same terms as the 1986 award whereas the RTA sought the provisions of the 1985
award adjusted to incorporate certain provisions re shift work.’116 In essence, this
distinction boiled down to an institutional clash; the unions wished to extend the
decision of the Tribunal, whilst the employers looked to universalise the much less
favourable conditions of the Commission’s 1985 award.117
The Tribunal responded by once again collapsing the awards into a consolidated Shop
Employees (State) Award.

Although the negotiations saw both parties come to

consensus on certain issues, the key issues of Saturday overtime, penalty rates for
casuals, junior rates and proportions clauses remained and had to be arbitrated. The
case represented a definitive victory for the employers on the first of these matters.
Time-and-a-quarter rates would now apply for full-time and part-time employees118 and,
unlike the case of the 1985 Commission decision, there was no longer a sympathetic
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ALP government willing to intervene.119

More broadly, Deputy-President Wells

approved of the Commission’s methodology in the 1985 case of prima facie rejecting a
link between shop assistants and shift workers generally,120 a move which certainly
attacked the universalising wage-labour nexus of antipodean Fordism.
In the context of ever-increasing use of casual labour within the industry, 121 several
other elements of the decision were also highly significant. The union attempt to
moderate the increasing resort of employers to casual labour by the elimination of 15
year-old junior rates was again rebuffed.122 In light of the evidence of a deepening
engagement of causal employees, the Tribunal surmised that the payment of penalty
rates to causals for work outside ordinary hours, as provided in the industrial
agreements, was ineffective in the deterrent role Justice Macken had intended and thus
rejected them.123 Admittedly, the Tribunal did give some substantive effect to the
alleged ‘mutually accepted concept that full-time employment was to be encouraged’124
by the reinstatement of a proportions clause placing a ceiling on the share casual labour
could take in total hours worked in general stores employing 13 or more employees.
However, this clause would now cap the casual share of total hours worked at 25%,
compared to the previous figure of 15%.125 Moreover, the Tribunal rejected the union
claim for a quantitative restriction on part-time employees (namely, of no more than one
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part-timer for every full-time employee).126

This decision thus presented retail

employers with considerably enhanced opportunities to engage and exploit young,
casualised labour at the same time it cut down remaining disincentives to employing
it.127
The year 1988 was most important, however, in an institutional sense. History overtook
the experiment that was the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal in late 1988, when the
conservative Greiner government enacted the Industrial Arbitration (Retail Trade)
Amendment Act 1988,128 which abolished the Tribunal in its entirety and transferred its
business back to the Industrial Commission. The government’s stated rationale was that
the jurisdictional nightmares that had beset the Tribunal imposed considerable costs of
time and money on the parties, without real countervailing advantages to the industry.129
In particular, the Minister of Industrial Relations and Employment, John Fahey, noted
that both employers and unions complained of ‘the drain on their resources in the dual
supply of persons as assessors to the tribunal and as advocates before the tribunal.’130
That this appears to have been a truthful representation of the parties’ views is
supported by the Labor Party’s support for the passage of the Bill, with ALP Councillor
A. B. Manson stating that:
The Retail Traders Association and the New South Wales branch of the Shop
Distributive and Allied Employees Association – the union – have been
consulted and are unanimous in their view that the interests of all parties will be
better served by abolishing the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal and having the
Industrial Commission handle any industrial disputes that may occur.131

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these claims. The strife between the
Tribunal and the Commission had imposed real costs on the time and resources of
participants. However, I have demonstrated that these burdens were essentially selfimposed on the part of retail employers and the RTA, given their desire to circumvent
the more employee-friendly decisions emanating from the Tribunal. Indeed, benefits
‘Success for R.T.A’ (Special Edition, 1988) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1.
Employer joy at the decision can be gleaned from a triumphant special issue of the Retail Traders’
News Bulletin: Ibid.
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flowed for them upon the Tribunal’s dissolution almost immediately, with the
Commission granting employer claims for a reduction of the minimum weekly hours of
part-time employees from 16 to 12 hours.132
The SDA, on the other hand, saw the effort to realise the favourable outcomes achieved
through the Tribunal continually frustrated as the Commission and superior court
system undercut its standing. The SDA’s change of attitude, from making the demand
for an industry tribunal the quid pro quo for trading hours extension to advocating its
abandonment, is thus understandable, but nevertheless ill-inspired. As explored in
chapters 4, 5 and 6, the 1980s was a period of institutional searching for ways out of the
developing economic crisis. In the retail industry this process took on a form of
juridified corporatism, with the role of worker and employer representatives (in the
form of the assessors) woven into the specialist tribunal’s institutional fabric. It was
thus part of the effort to save antipodean Fordism from its crisis tendencies by
intensifying its institutions. The end of the Tribunal represented the closure of an
industry-specific form of crisis resolution, creating a vacuum into which an
unadulterated neo-liberal prescriptions would step.

The 1990s – Award modernisation, enterprise bargaining and the
ascendency of neo-liberalism
In NSW, as in other jurisdictions, the catch-cries of the late 1980s and early 1990s were
structural efficiency and award modernisation (the latter being derivative of the
former).133 As was discussed in chapters 6 and 8, these processes were designed with
the stated purpose of removing institutional impediments to increased productivity and
efficiency in the workplace. Mitchell and Wilson note that the structural efficiency
principle sought ‘various improvements in work practices – many of which were
concerned with existing award restrictions, or non-award practices, related to the
scheduling of work and the organisation of the productive process.’134

Although

formulated at the federal level, the state commissions followed suit in implementing the
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principle, including NSW. Given the protracted disputes over rosters and working
hours arrangements explored so far in this chapter, it is no surprise that the Shop
Employees (State) Award proved a ripe target for the restructuring process, being
overhauled in 1991. The main axis of change included a further commitment to the
principle of enterprise arrangements135 and substantive changes to how work was
organised and labour engaged. It is the latter that is of interest us here.
The 1991 restructuring process dedicated both employers and the SDA to the concept of
award modernisation, with the renovated award stating explicitly:
The parties are committed to examining this industry award to ensure it reflects
the needs of modern retailing and to eliminating or amending provisions which
restrict the ability of retailers and mixed enterprises with retail outlets to adapt
quickly and efficiently to changes affecting their business and the provision of
service to the consumer (my emphasis).136

It goes on to state that ‘the unions are prepared to discuss with employers all matters
raised by the unions and the employers for increased flexibility’137 and that ‘[t]he unions
will not unreasonably oppose agreement.’138

Although mitigated somewhat by

assurances of union involvement in the process of change,139 the SDA and other unions
involved in the retail sector were thus explicitly bound to lay open for negotiation longstanding practices around rostering, casual loadings and award classifications which
had, for the employers, proved an impediment to the task of enforcing retail precarity.
The result of this agreed process of award modernisation essentially presaged the
movement in enterprise agreements, except with fewer benefits and greater trade-offs,
especially so far as causals were concerned. In general shops, the minimum shift
engagement for a casual fell from 4 to 3 hours, whilst they could now work 11 hours on
one day, and 9 on every other, without attracting any overtime payment. 140 Part-time
135
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workers saw their minimum guaranteed daily and weekly hours drop, to 3 and 12 hours
respectively.141 Ordinary trading hours were extended for all classes of shop, including
up to 6.00pm on Saturdays (and thereby neutering the issue of Saturday penalty rates
that had proved an almost insoluble problem in the different political-economic climate
of the 1980s).142
The flexibility of engagement was matched by a movement towards greater functional
flexibility, with the modernised award providing that ‘[e]mployees within each
classification are to perform a wider range of duties including work which is incidental
or peripheral to their main tasks or functions,’143 whilst also preventing employees from
imposing ‘any restrictions or limitations on a reasonable review of work methods or
standard work times.’144 Although direct evidence is lacking, it seems highly likely that
such a clause forestalled union opposition to the new technologies and Taylorist work
forms that had increasingly taken hold in the industry.145 In particular, a process of
‘digital Taylorism’146 had extended tendrils deeply into the organisation of work and
deployment of labour in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, with scanning, electronic point-ofsale and computerised stock-keeping and warehousing technologies fundamentally
altering the structure of the labour process in the retail industry. 147 Most significant for
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this thesis has been the development of a sophisticated nexus between point-of-sale
scanning technologies and computerised rostering systems, allowing management to
very closely align expected demand to labour supply.148 The result has been an ability
on the part of retailers, particularly large retailers, to produce a ‘fragmented timeregime,’149 whereby the working week can be broken into small, discontinuous
components and reassembled, using the whole gamut of full-time, part-time and casual
employees, to match the requirements of employers.150 This development in particular
facilitated and encouraged the retailer drive for the deeper precarity and flexibility they
sought in award restructuring and enterprise bargaining. It is to the latter we now turn.
In chapter 6 I noted that in the early 1990s the Commonwealth and various state
governments began to qualitatively change the modality of industrial relations by
undermining the long-established institutions of compulsory conciliation and
arbitration. In NSW, this process was founded largely on the prescriptions of a Green
Paper on Industrial Relations in NSW, by John Niland.151 This was a highly ideological
document that outlined a cogent neo-liberal alternative to the erstwhile dominant forms
of industrial regulation.

In outline, it proffered a de-centralised system of direct,

collective bargaining between workers and employers, with the resultant Enterprise
Collective Agreements operating to the exclusion of awards and reviewable by the
Commission only in tightly defined circumstances.152 O’Brien opined of this model:
[T]he tribunal is permitted to intervene only when the employer is likely to be in
an objectively stronger position vis-à-vis workers. The structuring of state
intervention … makes the tribunal even more of a ‘bosses’ court’ than the
arbitration system, as historically regarded by unions.153
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The Green Paper provided the seedbed for the Greiner Government’s legislative
overhaul of 1990 and 1991,154 which included the Industrial Arbitration (Enterprise
Agreements) Amendment Act 1990155 and the much more wide-ranging Industrial
Relations Act 1991.156 The latter Act was a watershed moment in the history of NSW
industrial relations, introducing sweeping changes that definitively challenged the
arbitration model.157 It was very much a product of its time. As argued in chapter 6, the
1990-1992 recession was in many ways the full-stop marking the end of the
contradictory Australian experiment with corporatist and neo-liberal forms throughout
the 1980s. The latter now entered a period of ascendency, and infused into labour law
and industrial relations practitioners a deep-seated conviction in the necessity for
fundamental institutional change. This was a nation-wide impulse, and the legislative
developments in NSW were mirrored in other jurisdictions.158
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to describe the legislation in detail, but broadly
put it provided for ‘[t]he end of preference for unionists, the outlawing of closed shops,
the creation of a new industrial court, a stronger enterprise focus and greater protection
for awards and agreements’.159 For our purposes, the most important elements of the
new system were the encouragement of enterprise agreements and the provision of
statutory part-time work contracts.

Both served to intensify the development of

employment precarity and undermine the bargaining power of retail workers.
As mentioned earlier, the retail industry has typically been characterised by state award
regulation, overseen by semi-autonomous state branches of the SDA. Thus, although
enterprise bargaining at the federal level did not really begin in earnest until the passage
of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993,160 the SDA state bodies were nevertheless
compelled to confront the issue earlier than many other trade unions.161
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The disempowering effect of this development cannot be overstated. The SDA is an
archetypal example of the kind of bureaucratic and legalistic union which the arbitration
system tended to produce.162

Lacking the kind of workplace organisation which

allowed other unions to extract concessions from employers at the point of production,
the SDA was heavily dependent upon formalised understandings with major retailers
(usually bought at the price of industrial docility) 163 and the award system to secure
gains for workers, often through the vehicle of National and State Wage Cases. The
movement towards enterprise-level bargaining was thus one which the union regarded
with foreboding,164 placing as it did a premium upon shop-floor organisation.
Like the case in metals discussed in chapter 7, enterprise bargaining in retail encouraged
increasing polarity in the sector, particularly between those who remained dependent on
the increasingly inadequate award and workers able to strike enterprise deals. For the
latter, enterprise bargains and enterprise awards165 throughout the 1990s tended to
intensify the trends towards retail precarity I have noted in exchange for headline wage
increases.

Generally speaking, agreements further increased the spread of normal

hours,166 shrank the size of minimum part-time weekly work hours at the same time
they increased potential maximum hours167 and reduced penalty rates and casual
loadings,168 offering instead higher rates of ordinary pay and comfortable union-friendly
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clauses which entrenched the SDA to the exclusion of other unions.169 The similarities
to the food processing enterprise bargains discussed in the previous chapter are
striking.170

Closer examination of a few of these agreements which I deem

representative is warranted.
In early 1997, the SDA came to an agreement with Coles/Bi-Lo supermarkets, which,
along with Woolworths and, to a lesser extent Franklins,171 had established a near
stranglehold on the Australian grocery retail scene.172 The agreement, which operated
for five years starting from March 1, 1997, provided for a series of staggered pay
increases at six month intervals which, over the life of the agreement, amounted to
$93.30 for full-time adult service assistants (an effective pay rise of 21.65% over the life
of the agreement).173 A range of allowances, such as those for freezer work and first aid
skills, were also increased by 4% per annum.174 Against these headline improvements
in pay, however, were counterposed a suite of developments harmful to retail workers,
most particularly part-time and casual staff. The agreement reproduced the trends
towards the de-regulation of trading hours playing out in the award system by further
extending the spread of ordinary hours. Ordinary hours Monday to Friday were now
stipulated as 5.00am until midnight (previously 5.00am to 10.00pm) whilst the span of
Sunday hours blew out to 7.00am until 8.00pm (previously 8.00am to 6.00pm).175 This
extension of hours was accompanied by a degradation in the conditions of those who
would primarily work these unsocial hours, namely casual and part-time employees.
For the former, the casual loading was decreased from 22% to 20%, done so with the
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explicit recognition that this was ‘[i]n line with many other agreements in retail and in
industry generally.’176 For the latter, the maximum number of hours that could be
worked in a four-week cycle before the attraction of penalty rates rose from 128 to 144
(a 12.5% increase in the availability of part-time labour to be exploited at ordinary
rates).177 Both casuals and part-timers suffered from the continued reduction in penalty
rates. Given the intensity of the issue of Saturday penalty rates we have explored in this
chapter, it is a telling feature of this agreement that work from 5.00am until 10.00pm on
a Saturday attracted no penalty rate at all.178
The framework of change apparent in this agreement was very much the standard
pattern of enterprise bargaining with major retailers. It is reproduced almost exactly in
two major enterprise agreements struck in 1997 and 2000 between the SDA and
discount department store Big W (which has, since its inception, been a division of the
Woolworths group).179 The 1 November 1997 agreement provided pay increases of
between $41.35 and $47.85 for full-time adult employees (an effective rise of 9.9%),
depending upon their classification grade.180 However, this headline pay increase for
full-time employees was accompanied by a reduction in the loading for casual
employees from 23% to 20%,181 whilst penalties for Saturday work were further
eroded.182

Importantly, the agreement institutionalised precarity by including a

temporary employment clause that vested management with ‘the right to engage
employees on a temporary employment basis as either full-time or part-time
employees,’183 so long as the period of employment was not less than a month and not
longer than a year.
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The 2000 agreement closely resembled its predecessor in terms of the contours of
change. Full-time adult employees at the ‘Retail Associate’ grade184 saw their weekly
pay packets increase by $48.90, or 10.12% over the two year life-span of the
agreement.185 The usual trade-offs, however, applied with full force. The span of
ordinary hours was widened, now encompassing 6.00am to midnight week days
(previously 7.00am to midnight) and 6.00am to 10.00pm on Saturday (a substantial
increase on the preceding span of 8.00am to 6.00pm).186 The already scanty Saturday
penalty rate existent in the previous agreement was further reduced; henceforth, the only
rate that would apply would be a 25% loading on work from 10.00pm to midnight. 187
Perhaps most significant for my analysis were the new arrangements governing the
deployment of part-time labour. In particular, it was stipulated that:
Maximum weekly hours have been increased from 32 hours (128 over four
weeks) to 36 hours (144 over four weeks).
Minimum hours have reduced from 10 to 9 a week, or 36 hours over four weeks.
The additional hours loading has decreased from 20 to 15 per cent.188

This clause came to the nub of changes in the retail sector in the transition from
antipodean Fordism to liberal-productivism. It combined within itself substantial labour
intensification and increased insecurity at work. Retail labour was forced to sell itself
over a greater range of hours and with ever decreasing benefits/premiums at exactly the
same time that the assurance of this labour was eroded. Enterprise bargaining encodes,
validates and facilitates the precarious wage-labour nexus of liberal-productivism, and
forms an important plank in the latter’s labour law regime. Given the fact that both of
these representative agreements achieved at the stroke of a pen employer demands
which had served as the basis of intense disputes in the 1980s, it is both a logical and a
historical point that enterprise bargaining in the context of union decline is a central, as
opposed to casual, structure in this transition phase, a reality elucidated in chapters 6
and 8.
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It is also worth mentioning here the incidence of a new form of employment
arrangement established by the 1991 Act,189 namely statutory part-time work contracts
that could formally derogate from the award. These agreements could be made prior to
any pre-existing employment arrangement (in other words could be stipulated as a
condition of employment)190 and provided that:
An employee may work part-time under this Division despite any other
provision of any relevant award or agreement which limits or restricts the
circumstances in which part-time work may be worked or the terms upon which
it may be worked, including provisions:
(a) limiting the number of employees who may work part-time; or
(b) establishing quotas as to the ratio of part-time to full-time employees; or
(c) prescribing a minimum or maximum number of hours a part-time employee
may work.191

The Minister for Industrial Relations, John Fahey, tried to paint the availability of these
arrangements as an outcome beneficial to both employers and workers, claiming the
latter would be able to better balance their working and family/social life. 192 However,
in elaborating the situation the part-time contracts were meant to address, he implicitly
acknowledged that precarity is a central characteristic of a liberal-productivist model of
development and that juridic fetters to its development (such as quotas, ratios and
award-stipulated union input) must be removed. He stated:
While there has been a strong growth in the incidence of part-time work in
recent years, many awards either make no provision for part-time work or
impose substantial restrictions on part-time work. Such provisions may, for
example, limit the number of employees who can work part-time, establish
quotas as to the ratio of part-time to full-time employees, prescribe a minimum
or maximum number of hours a part-time employee may work, or require
consultation with, consent of, or monitoring by a union. These restrictions not
only limit the amount of part-time work available; they also mean that part-time
work is often only available on a casual or temporary basis.193
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An ALP parliamentarian succinctly grasped the elemental relationship between
increased precarity and the changing labour law regime when he asked of the
legislation: ‘[I]f common interests are so satisfactorily served by part-time work, why is
it necessary to remove award protections?’194
Given the increasing incidence and insecurity of part-time retail work, it comes as no
surprise that retail employers made numerous attempts to avail themselves of this new
instrument. The SDA quickly appreciated the danger, with NSW State Secretary Joe de
Bruyn stating that ‘[p]art-time contracts have emerged as the most serious threat to shop
employees from the State Government’s industrial legislation.’195 In particular, the
agreements threatened the increasingly scanty minimum and maximum limits of weekly
part-time employment, the minimum daily engagement period of 3 hours, and opened
the door for split-shift rostering on the part of retailers.196
In the event, the SDA appears to have been able to successfully hold the line against
wide-scale deployment of part-time contracts.197 Attempts in this direction by major
retailers such as David Jones resulted in court action, which served to clarify the rights
of retail employees and made it incumbent upon employers to make known to workers
the entitlements they were sacrificing.198 The true significance of the part-time contract
provisions was institutional, in that they validated and extended spaces that existed
largely outside the regulatory reach of the NSW Industrial Commission. For the first
time, the principle was established that individual employees (as opposed to collective
groups of workers engaged in enterprise bargaining) could have terms and conditions of
employment that effectively derogated from the prevailing award; an award, I have
demonstrated, that was itself being degraded under the impulses of structural efficiency
and modernisation. Given the discussion throughout this thesis of the contrast between
the collective subjects of administration and the individual subject of the abstract legal
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form, it is unsurprising that this early effort at individualisation was a statutory one,
overseen by the ordinary court system as opposed to the traditional arbitral tribunal.
Instruments like the NSW part-time contracts were essentially precursor elements of a
broader process of national labour law change, institutional experiments that presaged
the development of the notorious federal scheme of Australian Workplace Agreements
(AWAs) that was explored at length in chapter 6. As seen there, these had been in
existence since 1996, but it was only with the passage of the WorkChoices199 legislation
that their existence took on the parameters of an existential threat to the award system.
For this and other reasons, WorkChoices and its successor, the Fair Work Act,200 marks
the end-point of my investigation into the evolution of precarity in the NSW retail
sector.

2006 onwards – WorkChoices & after
In chapter 6 I examined the WorkChoices legislation generally, noting how it was a
watershed moment in the history of Australian industrial relations.

Here I am

concerned with the specific features of the regime that were of significance for the
instruments and modality of labour law regulation of the NSW retail sector, particularly
insofar as these developments further entrenched retail precarity. Of central importance
in this regard was the recasting of the constitutional basis upon which federal industrial
relations regulation was erected, a further undermining of the award system as the basis
for enterprise bargaining, and a qualitative and quantitative intensification of AWAs.
Combined, these forces did not so much amount to a revolution for retail as an
extension and deepening of the structural changes elucidated in this chapter.
The first, and perhaps most important, impact of WorkChoices on the retail sector was
its recasting of industrial regulation on the basis of the corporations power, which was
explored extensively in chapter 6. Reliance on the corporations power meant that
Federal government legislation could now capture all employees of constitutional
corporations, save that residue of employees directly employed by state governments
and local councils.201 For the first time in Australian industrial history, the national
state could now ‘regulate employment conditions and labour relations for a majority of
199
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the workforce.’202 It definitively foreclosed the long chapter of state-based regulation of
the retail sector, as the vast majority of retail establishments now came within the
purview of the Commonwealth. Although the reformulation of industrial relations in
the NSW retail sector was deeply imbricated in the evolution of the mode of regulation
at a national level, it had exhibited its own unique character, a product of the pathdependencies and cultural frames of the supporting institutional fabric, particularly the
NSW Industrial Commission. WorkChoices radically swung the centre of industrial
gravity to the federal level, and from this point on, the key determinants of industrial
outcomes for the NSW retail sector were to be located there.
The venerable Shop Employees (State) Award did not die immediately, however. State
awards that had effectively entered the national system through the enlargement of the
federal sphere of regulation were preserved as so-called ‘notional agreements preserving
State awards.’203 These generally reproduced the conditions of the state award and had
the force of federal law,204 but only covered employers bound by the originating state
award immediately before March 27, 2006 (the date WorkChoices became law). For
employers starting up after this date, or those that engaged their employees in fresh
rounds of enterprise or individual bargaining, the WorkChoices regime offered new
possibilities for intensified flexibility and exploitation of retail labour.
The impact of WorkChoices on the content of enterprise agreements in the retail sector
has been explored extensively by the Workplace Research Centre. 205 A major study of
WorkChoices-era retail and hospitality collective agreements206 from New South Wales,
Victoria and Queensland revealed just how corrosive the majority of agreements were
for employees’ pay and conditions, with the majority discarding or reducing previouslyobtaining entitlements.207 Of the 339 agreements analysed, 80% removed annual leave
loading, 76% removed Saturday penalty rates, 71% did away with Sunday penalty rates,
68% disposed of overtime rates and 60% removed public holiday penalty rates, all
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notionally ‘protected award conditions.’208

Certain other non-protected conditions

suffered a similar fate, particularly those that fettered the deployment of casual and parttime labour and/or placed a premium upon its use. For example, a staggering 74% of
agreements decreased the loading paid to casuals,209 62% expunged limits on part-time
hours, 62% removed one- to four week hours averaging,210 and 56% removed minimum
part-time daily hours.211 The authors of the study pithily noted of the impacts on
vulnerable part-time and casual employees, ‘[o]ver time the award system has devised a
number of basic standards designed to give such workers enforceable rights. Under
Work Choices, none of these are guaranteed. Agreements in retail and hospitality have
largely removed those protections.’212
The removal of these protections not only changed the terms upon which casual and
part-time labour was deployed; it imposed a real cut to the earnings of retail workers.
Modelling ten different scenarios based upon commonly used rosters in the retail sector,
falls in pay of between 1-12% occurred across the three categories of full-time,
permanent part-time and casual employees.213 When disaggregated on the basis of
classification, the results are even starker, with ‘part-time workers and casuals generally
doing far worse than permanent full-time workers.’214 The three casual scenarios saw a
maximum percentage loss of earnings of 14.9%, 37.4% and 38.2%, and embraced
75.3%, 85.4% and 84.6% of agreements respectively.215 Although the percentage of
agreements cutting earnings for permanent part-time workers was marginally lower than
was the case for casuals (ranging between 64.9% and 87.7%), the average fall in
earnings was even worse, on account of the removal of the casual loading.216
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Perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the continued significance of retail
unionism, pliable as this had proven in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was the gross
disparity in the terms and conditions of enterprise agreements negotiated by a union
compared to those that did not have union input. Evesson et al note, ‘[u]nion Collective
agreements have overwhelming [sic] retained the protected award matters. About 90
percent of union agreements have kept most of these provisions.’217 Among other
things, the pay obtaining in union agreements was:
[C]onsistently superior to that prevailing for those covered by non-union
agreements. The gains in union agreements have, however, been modest. Few
Work Choices union agreements deliver increases greater than 3 percent per
annum … For non-union agreements in retail the best achievement was an
increase of 0.3 percent. All other retail scenarios resulted in a fall in income,
some as low as minus 17.9 percent on average.218

The SDA was even successful in retaining many of the clauses rendered unenforceable
by WorkChoices (such as those surrounding dispute resolution and union rights),
persuading some employers to sign memoranda of understanding (potentially
enforceable in common law) preserving rights and entitlements.219
Perhaps it was the case that the major retailers, with whom the majority of the unionnegotiated enterprise agreements were struck, had squeezed enough out of the SDA in
the award modernisation and enterprise bargaining rounds of the 1990s and early 2000s
to avoid risking the industrial relations troubles that could have resulted from largescale efforts to sideline the union.220 Given that the union density rate in food retailing
yet match the degree of concentration attained by Woolworths and Coles in the supermarket sector. The
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in 2006 was approximately 32.4% (much higher than the prevailing general rate in retail
of 18.7%),221 an outright confrontation with the SDA made little sense when so much
had already been achieved with their active co-operation.222
Outside the sphere of collective bargaining, we are confronted by AWAs, the statutory
individual contracts which were given a much wider and more flexible sphere of
operation under the WorkChoices regime. The evidence of the wage and conditiondegrading character of AWAs is abundant and damning, as was demonstrated in chapter
6. There is also a plethora of examples of retail employers attempting to avail
themselves of the cost-cutting potential of AWAs, with NSW workplaces being wellrepresented amongst them.223 However, the quantitative incidence of AWAs in the
retail sector, and the impact of WorkChoices upon it, is less than clear, thanks largely to
the secrecy of the Office of the Employment Advocate and the comparative opacity of
the figures collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.224 However, the federal
Workplace Relations Minister, Kevin Andrews, noted in the July of 2005 (several
months before WorkChoices was passed) that 16% of AWAs approved in the previous
three months had been in the retail sector.225 Moreover, figures released demonstrated
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that the retail sector in 2007 had the highest number and concentration of AWAs of any
industry.226
Despite the explosion of AWAs in the sector, however, aggregate ABS figures
demonstrate the continued importance of award-only dependents and collective
agreements. Although the secular pattern since figures were first collected in 2000
suggests a gradual diminution in award-only dependence, this level remains well above
almost every other industry, whilst there has been a steady increase in the proportion of
workers covered by collective agreements.227 Given the fact that the latter included
non-union agreements (which, as has been seen, produced poor wage and conditions
outcomes for retail workers),228 it is not surprising that many retail employers appeared
nonplussed in the dying days of WorkChoices, when renewed interest in non-union
bargains appeared to forestall an anticipated rush on the part of retail employers to sign
workers on to AWAs.229
Regarding the continued prevalence of awards in the sector, this result is actually quite
easily explicable.

Firstly, it has been demonstrated that retail capital had already

achieved fundamental changes in the structure and content of industrial regulation
through the vehicle of awards and collective agreements. Together with the broader
degradation of the award system across state and federal jurisdictions seen in chapter 6,
retail awards were thus rendered much less than what they had once been. Secondly,
the structure of the industry itself ensures that individual agreements would have a very
hard time displacing awards entirely. Although controlled by large retailers in terms of
market share, the retail sector remains dominated quantitatively by small enterprises in a
highly competitive environment, businesses with few resources to dedicate to a
specialised understanding of the legal architecture within which workplace bargaining
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operates. Burgess, Sullivan and Strachan note that ‘[f]or such small businesses …
awards are a convenient framework for determining pay and conditions.’230
The repeal of WorkChoices and its replacement by the Fair Work Act231 is the end-point
of the analysis here. In terms of the forces of retail precarity and enhanced managerial
prerogative traced in this chapter, nothing was fundamentally changed by the passage of
the legislation.

Institutionally, the greatest innovation was the process of award

modernisation, which saw the creation of approximately 120 modern awards, including
the General Retail Industry Award232 and the Fast Food Industry Award.233 Based on
the corporations power, these essentially had common rule effect, and definitively
supplanted the state-based retail awards, including the Shop Employees (State) Award,
from 1 July 2010.

Conspicuously absent were the proportions clauses governing

juniors, part-timers and casuals, part-time minimum hours, Saturday penalty rates and
official recognition of the SDA as the relevant union which had characterised the Shop
Employees (State) Award.
Perhaps the most graphic example of the changed fortunes of retail workers over the
course of the study period is the continual degradation of minimum shift provisions. It
has been seen that minimum shifts for part-time and casual retail workers were reduced
from 4 hours to 3 in NSW, with the new modern awards reproducing the latter state of
affairs. As if this were not enough, retailers have since at least 2010 been arguing for a
decrease in the minimum shift duration, claiming ‘the three-hour minimum did not
accommodate young workers who could work for only two hours between the end of
school and closing time’234 and ‘that it is excluding a number of young people from
participation in the workforce.’235 Although rebuffed by the Fair Work Commission in
the first and second instance236 (much to employer chagrin),237 three times proved a
230
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charm for the retailers, who were granted the right by the tribunal to schedule
secondary-school students for mere 90 minute shifts.238 The case demonstrated just
how thoroughly the language and ideology of neo-liberalism had colonised the
fundamentally transformed federal tribunal. Despite only calling one employer witness
(the director of the National Retail Association) and being faced by the testimony of a
host of SDA witnesses (including the damning views of retail experts Dr Iain Campbell
and Dr Robin Price),239 Vice-President Watson accepted the thoroughly neo-liberal
prescription that the degradation of standards would encourage employers to increase
employment, despite acknowledging that the strength of this change, and its impact on
other employees, was ‘unclear’.240
Few examples can better demonstrate the evolution of the wage-labour nexus in the
retail sector, and its crystallisation in the mode of regulation. From the late-flowering
of the standard employment model in retail in the early 1970s, we have arrived at a
point where an institution which played a leading role in the fabric of antipodean
Fordism has codified in the recast award system a particularly rabid form of precarity,
whereby the most vulnerable (and cheapest) group of employees are accorded scant
protection in terms of their working hours. Such a state of affairs would simply have
been unthinkable in the 1970s and 1980s, bound as they were by the declining but still
significant structures and understandings of the antipodean Fordist model of
development.

Conclusions
In this chapter, I have traced the complex history of the matrix of award and legislative
regulation surrounding the wage-labour nexus in the NSW, and later national, retail
sector. In the former, the process has been a long and convoluted one, with the surface
clamour of politics and jurisdictional disputes sometimes clouding the nature of the
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requirement’, Smart Company (online), 12 July 2010
<http://www.smartcompany.com.au/growth/economy/15505-20100712-retailers-association-slams-fairwork-for-upholding-minimum-three-hour-shift-requirement.html>.
238
National Retail Association [2011] FWA 3777
<https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/html/2011fwa3777.htm>.
239
Who noted that there were already few barriers to employing school-aged children, that many students
wanted longer shifts, and that the proposed change would encourage employers to substitute cheaper
student labour for more expensive workers: Ibid.
240
Ibid.
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fundamental transformation underway. The most basal axis of change has been the
substitution of a liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus for its antipodean Fordist
predecessor.

If the essence of this change could be distilled into one word, it is

‘precarity’: the degradation of the model of standard, full-time employment and the
crisis tendencies it set in motion for capital through the dialectical evolution of
antipodean Fordism.241 Associated with this development has been the enhancement of
managerial prerogative over the control and engagement of workers in the organisation
of the labour process.
In the NSW retail sector, this process has taken varying forms since the 1980s, but
always moving, albeit unevenly and at times haltingly, towards the end of greater
flexibility and insecurity for retail workers. By the late 1970s, it was becoming clear
that the labour utilisation and employment portfolios of retailers was changing rapidly,
with an increased reliance upon casual, and often junior, labour manifesting itself. It
was only in the very late 1970s and 1980s, however, that the transformations of this
industrial structure assumed a legal form. In a context of general union strength, a
sympathetic ALP state government, divisions in the ranks of retail capital and an SDA
somewhat more militant than it would later become, the flexibilisation of employment
was partially handled by a unique institutional configuration, the Retail Trade Industrial
Tribunal. This unique body, which combined the juridical structure of the arbitration
system with a corporatist practice, was part of the broader intensification of antipodean
Fordist institutions to negotiate an escape from crisis.242 The Tribunal attempted to
reconcile new employment practices, such as extended trading hours and broadened
part-time work, with a continued dedication to the basic pattern of standard, full-time
work, confined within reasonably social hours.
In the event, the Tribunal proved to be one of Lipietz’s ‘crippled monstrosities,’243
actively subverted by retail employers who were dissatisfied with its awards. Any
potential the Tribunal possessed of encouraging a new modality of retail industrial
relations was frittered away in jurisdictional squabbles with the NSW Industrial
Commission and the Court of Appeal, both of which tended to be forums more
receptive to employer demands for lower penalty rates, reduced fetters on the
Heino, ‘The state, class and occupational health and safety’, above n 61, 159-161.
Ibid 160-161.
243
Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism (Verso, 1987) 15.
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employment of casual and junior workers, and easier access to part-time labour. The
vehicle of these changes, however, remained the traditional award system, even when
employers sought to bypass the Tribunal through accessing courts of ordinary standing.
It was not until the early 1990s that a new modality of industrial relations for the retail
sector started to cohere.

The processes of structural efficiency reform and award

modernisation substantially degraded the Shop Employees (State) Award, intensifying
precarity through the spread of ordinary trading hours, reducing minimum shift lengths
for casuals and cutting daily and weekly minimum hours for part-timers. This pattern
was essentially reproduced, albeit usually with a wage premium, in the enterprise
bargaining encouraged by the Industrial Relations Act, Industrial Relations Reform Act
and Workplace Relations Act.

Such agreements in the 1990s and 2000s were

underpinned by a progressively stripped-down award and increasingly supplemented by
forms of individual agreements, like the NSW part-time agreement contracts and
AWAs.
WorkChoices and the Fair Work Act both marked the end of the state-based character of
retail regulation, which had been progressively diluted from the early 1990s anyhow, as
enterprise bargaining increasingly took place in the federal sphere. The apotheosis of
this new modality is the modern retail and fast-food awards, which frame bargaining in
the now nationally-regulated retail sector. Compared to the Shop Employees (State)
Award’s quantitative controls of junior and casual labour, guarantee of reasonable
minimum and maximum hours for part-time workers, wide array of penalty rates for
unsocial work, and institutionalised union role, the silence of modern awards on these
matters is deafening. The antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, so lately implanted in
the retail sector, was attacked before it had a chance to fully take root. It is the irony of
history that it is this belatedness that has positioned an industry like retail as a new
liberal-productivist lead sector. The pattern of precarity perfected in these sectors has
ramifications far outside their boundaries, reflected in their new role as ‘IR pace
setters.’244 As early as the late 1970s, retail carried within itself the essence of the
liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus. The realisation of this essence through the
patterns of labour law change is a central, organic plank in the transition to liberal-
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productivism, an understanding that reiterates the defining thread of this thesis: that the
process of transition is an inherently legal phenomenon.

Chapter 10
CONCLUSION
I began this thesis with a quote from the renowned labour law scholar, Otto KahnFreund. He stated that:
The ever-changing forces of society incessantly mould and transform the law
and yet it pretends to stand aloof and prides itself on its immutability in a
tumultuous world. While it seems to be a spectator of the great social drama,
serene and imperturbable, it suffers all the agonies and fights all the struggles of
an actor in the play.1

Within this statement there are two central, dialectically-related points. On the one
hand, there is the notion that law, despite the pretence of its form, is moulded by its
social context; on the other, that it is not just an observer of social change, but is instead
one of its actors.
In this thesis, I have demonstrated the truth of both of these contentions so far as postWorld War II Australian labour law is concerned. I have shown that a labour law
regime is deeply imbricated in the model of development of which it is part. The
specific ways in which the abstract function of labour law, the commodification of
labour power, are exercised within different capitalist epochs is inexplicable without an
understanding of the architecture of those epochs. In particular, it is very hard to
elucidate the concrete roles of a labour law regime without grasping the mechanisms of
coherence and trajectories of crisis opened by the model of development of which it is
part. At the same time, an account of a model of development that does not include
consideration of labour law is necessarily incomplete, precisely because law, as a juridic
form of capital, has a central role in constituting it.
Having nearly come to the end of the analysis, it is necessary to reflect upon the
implications of the approach taken and the utility of the theoretical model of labour law
I have constructed.

Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Introduction’ in Karl Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social
Functions (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949) 43.
1
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The utility of the Parisian Regulation Approach for periodising
Australian capitalism
In chapter 2, I described the spiralling method of theory construction that lies at the
heart of sophisticated regulationist work. This method demands a dialectical interaction
between the abstract and the concrete, with theoretical concepts serving to elucidate key
causal structures and relationships, whilst empirical study comments upon the adequacy
of these concepts.2 This is an iterative process, whereby the initial theoretical departure
point serves as a focussing device, justifying what to study and, more importantly, how
to study it. In turn, the facts thus generated reflect on the soundness, and possible
shortcomings, of the theoretical approach, which can then be modified if necessary.
This exercise has been a guiding thread of this thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 represented the
most abstract departure point. In chapter 2, I explored the history, methodology and
concepts of the Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA), emphasising how it could provide
theoretically rigorous mid-range studies of particular capitalist epochs, cognisant of the
longer-term crisis tendencies of capitalism yet accounting for stabilising forces in the
short to medium term. I discussed the more serious criticisms of the approach, most
importantly increasingly loose ties to its roots in Marxism and an inadequate conception
of law and the state. I noted the importance of restoring to the regulation approach its
Marxist foundation. Just as significantly, I constructed law and the state as juridic
forms of capitalist production and exchange relations, and as such part of the basket of
invariant features characterising the capitalist mode of production. This understanding
is perfectly commensurable with regulationist analysis, and provides the tools to
overcome what is perceived as an historic neglect of the law and the state.
Chapter 3 was dedicated to further expounding this theory of law as a juridic form. It
was demonstrated that, although the rudimentary legal form is implicit in commodity
exchange, its full development into an axiomatic system of abstract, universal and
formal norms regulating juridically equal citizens is a specifically capitalist
phenomenon. This abstract legal form, however, is constantly proved inadequate in the
commodification of labour power as the law of ‘things,’ contract and property law,
attempts to subsume the living, breathing and thinking proletarian. Class struggle can
2

Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (NLB, 1979) 15; Gerry Treuren,
‘State theory and the origins of federal arbitration legislation in Australia’ (1997) 13 Policy, Organisation
and Society 56, 60-61.
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tear holes in this abstract legal form, which can force the state to plug these gaps with
administrative solutions, producing institutions and practices which take as their
reference point collective subjects such as industrial organisations, and whose subject
matter is often specific. I argued law and administration form two poles of a lawadministration continuum, whose exact configuration is intimately tied to a model of
development. In particular, the method by which the latter handles and orders the
contradictions of capitalism, derives coherence and embeds or excludes working-class
power to varying degrees fixes the nexus point of this continuum.
In chapter 4, I took key concepts, namely the Fordism and liberal-productivist idealtypical models of development, and sensitised them to the Australian context, revealing
two more concrete models: antipodean Fordism, stretching from 1945 to the early
1970s; and liberal-productivism, which had begun to cohere in the late 1980s and early
1990s and remains on foot today. I then illuminated the abstract roles and functions of
labour law within these models of development.
Chapters 5 and 6 provided the concrete history of the general evolution of post-World
War II Australian labour law. Utilising a ‘slice’ approach, the state of four key themes
(wage fixation, forms of employment/flexibility, collectivism/individualism together
with the scale of industrial relations, and the broader legal matrix) was investigated at
key dates coinciding with coherence and crisis of antipodean Fordism and the
emergence and coherence of liberal-productivism. I demonstrated that both antipodean
Fordism and liberal-productivism possessed their own regimes of labour law, which
clearly executed the key functions of labour law within the ideal-types, yet did so in
unique ways.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 focussed even closer on certain sectors as case studies to sharpen
some of the more important claims. In chapter 7, I traced the ascent and decline of the
antipodean Fordist cycle of wage and conditions flow-on centred on the metal trades,
one of its central dynamics. The institutionalisation of this process between the end of
World War II and the early 1960s, and its subsequent destruction from the 1980s
onwards, were key moments in the constitution of antipodean Fordism and liberalproductivist labour law respectively. Chapter 8 studied the emergence of the precarity,
intensified managerial prerogative and work reorganisation central to the liberalproductivist wage-labour nexus and industrial paradigm in the food processing sector.
After first accounting for the emergence of Fordist forms in the New South Wales retail
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sector, chapter 9 studies much the same processes as chapter 8. Taken together, chapter
8 and chapter 9 demonstrate the similarity of outcomes and patterns of change in two
completely different industries, strengthening the theory of transition forwarded in this
thesis by demonstrating that liberal-productivist tendencies have taken hold of the
workforce at large.
The findings in chapters 5-9 demonstrate the soundness of the theoretical concepts
forwarded in chapters 2-4, as well as indicating that the sensitisation process of chapter
4 accurately captured both the specificity of Australian capitalism and the fact it was
bound by the general logic of the abstract Fordist and liberal-productivist models of
development.
Below I will discuss the specific relevance of this theoretical soundness for legal theory.
What is more significant here is the fact that the regulationist periodisation schema I
have deployed has been validated, at least as far as this study has gone. The periods of
antipodean Fordist and liberal-productivist functionality clearly accord with distinct
labour law regimes, whilst the phase of most dramatic legal change closely matches the
proposed timeline of institutional searching. To echo Treuren, empirical study has thus
established the adequacy of the theory.3
This validation has implications outside of the study of labour law.

Antipodean

Fordism and liberal-productivism depended for their coherence on a whole basket of
legal, industrial, technological, political and cultural structures and practices. Having
outlined in a rigorous and systematic manner the internal structure of these models of
development, particularly regarding their underlying industrial paradigms, accumulation
regimes and modes of regulation, the interrelationship of these structures and practices
becomes much clearer. More broadly, the utility of the PRA for studying Australian
capitalism has been affirmed. Given the generally limited impact the PRA has made in
Australian scholarship, my work joins that of researchers like Lloyd,4 Chester,5
Treuren, ‘State theory’, above n 2, 60-61.
See, for example: Christopher Lloyd, ‘Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical
Political Economy of Regulation’ (2002) 42(3) Australian Economic History Review 238; Christopher
Lloyd, ‘Australian Capitalism Since 1992: A New Regime of Accumulation?’ (2008) 61 Journal of
Australian Political Economy 30.
5
See, for example: Lynne Chester, ‘Another variety of capitalism?: The Australian mode of régulation’
(Paper presented at 13th Conference of the Association for Heterodox Economics: Economists of
Tomorrow, 6-9 July 2011); Lynne Chester, ‘The Australian variant of neoliberal capitalism’ in Damien
Cahill, Lindy Edwards and Frank Stilwell (eds), Neoliberalism: Beyond the Free Market (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2012) 153.
3
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Broomhill6 and Treuren7 in clearly demonstrating the utility of the approach in studying
Australian capitalism. By firmly re-attaching the PRA to its Marxist roots, I can match
the empirical richness and useful modelling of these authors with greater theoretical
rigor.

The union of the PRA and a theory of juridic forms
In chapters 2 and 3, I made the case that unifying the PRA with a theory of law as a
juridic form of capital created a powerful theoretical synthesis that addressed
shortcomings both approaches suffer from singularly. On the first score, the realisation
that capital has a juridic, as well as economic, existence compelled us in chapters 2 and
3 to acknowledge that the state and law were part of the basket of invariant features of
the capitalist mode of production, in the absence of which it would be incorrect to speak
of a capitalist society. This understanding should serve as a useful corrective to the
relative historical neglect of law in PRA-inspired work. If a mode of regulation is a
concrete arrangement of juridic forms, as I stated in chapter 2, then law must become a
central focus of regulationist work. Moreover, this work cannot merely study law as a
derivative institution regulating a broader capitalist economy. Rather, law must be
studied as a form of capital’s contradictions in and of itself, with its own capacity to
impart disequilibria within a model of development.

The result is a considerably

deepened legal perspective within the PRA, particularly regarding the mode of
regulation concept.
On the other hand, much Marxist-inspired jurisprudence has tended to operate at a highlevel of abstraction, emphasising the abstract basis and functions of law within the
capitalist mode of production.

Such accounts have difficulty grasping how these

abstract functions are exercised in concrete societies.

It is at this point that the

intermediate-level analysis of the PRA, best represented by the model of development
concept, can be of immense value to the explanatory power of the notion of juridic
forms. In particular, it has been demonstrated that different models of development do
not deal with all of capitalism’s crisis tendencies in the same way or to the same degree.
See, for example: Ray Broomhill, ‘Australian Economic Booms in Historical Perspective’ (2008) (61)
Journal of Australian Political Economy 12
7
See, for example: Gerrit Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory and Australian Theorising of Institutional Change
in Industrial Regulation’ (Paper presented at 11 th AIRAANZ Conference, Brisbane, 30 January-1
February 1997).
6
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Instead, they exhibit a hierarchised pattern of institutional forms, which focusses on
some crisis tendencies more than others and achieved coherence in specific ways. An
appreciation of this reality allows us to specify with much greater clarity the roles and
functions of labour law within a particular capitalist epoch.
From chapters 4-9, I have demonstrated the value of this theoretical synthesis in the
case of Australian labour law. Both antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism in
Australia had and have a unique regime of labour law corresponding with them, a
regime that not only derives its dynamic from the model of development of which it is
part, but helps constitute it. In both models of development, the most abstract function
of labour law, the commodification of labour power, remains constant. This will ever
be the case so long as the capitalist mode of production endures.
Each model of development, however, had its own mechanisms of coherence and
trajectories of crisis. Antipodean Fordism had its roots in the ruination of the Great
Depression, a worldwide crisis that was a function, in large part, of working-class
underconsumption and disproportionality between large-scale capitalist production in
Department I and the continued importance of petty bourgeois arrangements in
Department II.

It thus crystallised the wage-labour nexus as the site of primary

contradiction, and demanded for its coherence the placement of adequate purchasing
power in the hands of the proletariat. In this fact is one of the keys to understanding the
logic and structure of the Australian labour law regime during the antipodean Fordist
phase. Chapter 4 demonstrated that for this nexus to both take shape and function, a
series of legal conditions was necessary, namely those that allowed for the diffusion of
wage increases from lead sectors, permitted collective and connective bargaining,
encouraged the organisation of labour and developed a notion of a standard employment
model.
These requirements undergirded the key features of this regime, namely a permissive
attitude towards organised labour, bargaining between capital and labour at a broad
occupational level, the diffusion of wage gains from leading sectors through the award
framework and the growth of administrative fixes to heightened worker power.

I

demonstrated that the arbitration system was the central pivot of the whole regime,
precociously institutionalising the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, and was
emblematic of a law-administration continuum where, so far as labour law was
concerned, the latter was predominant. In particular, compulsory arbitration at this time
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facilitated the pattern of flow-on from the industrially strong to the industrially weak,
further developed and diffused standard employment, and strongly integrated organised
labour into the fabric of the law and the state, all essential planes of coherence in
antipodean Fordism.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, these same features of compulsory arbitration
had become deeply dysfunctional, setting in motion large, destabilising wage-rounds
and entrenching trade union power at a time when it was pressing against and outside
traditional arbitral channels. Liberal-productivism in Australia was thus born of a crisis
rooted at least partially in the power of organised labour and its integration into the
labour law regime, as well as the grating of national state boundaries against growing
transnational capital. Within this model of production, the antipodean Fordist wagelabour nexus is displaced, reconstructed as a cost of international production and
predicated on precarity. The liberal-productivist labour law regime, combining hostility
to trade unions, a destruction of the conciliation and arbitration system in favour of
individualisation, a severing of the institutional links homogenising the wage structure,
erosion of the standard employment model and intensified juridification, helps
constitute the fabric of the new model of development.

The law-administration

continuum is reconfigured, as the administrative structures of arbitration give way to the
purer legal form, with the latter’s focus on abstract, juridically equal citizen-subjects
marginalising administration’s collective subjects and practices.
It is the synthesis of these two bodies of theory that has allowed the generation of a
theoretically rigorous yet empirically rich account of the evolution of Australian labour
law. Counterposed to the traditionally abstract nature of Marxist jurisprudence is the
theoretical impoverishment of most contemporary work on Australian labour law. This
has generally not gone beyond the descriptive point that the rise of neoliberalism has
been associated with legal change that has disempowered organised labour, promoted
individualism and generally intensified employment precarity and greater inequality in
outcomes.8 Accounts in this tradition generally rest upon a conspiratorial view of
labour law change, whereby economic rationalists hijacked the state in the 1980s and
1990s and were able to pass laws (which are typically depicted as passive and reactive)

8

For a useful compendium of such work, see: Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and
Labour Market Regulation (Federation Press, 2006).

325
reflecting their ideological world view.9 By uniting the PRA with a theory of law as a
juridic form of capital, I have been able to integrate the economic, political and
legal/state dimensions of Australia’s evolving political economy in a deeper, more
organic fashion. This, in turn, has elucidated actual causal relationships between labour
law and models of development, far beyond the traditionally descriptive accounts of
labour law and industrial relations scholarship.10
Importantly, the union of the PRA and the theory of juridic forms has a much wider
application than the study of Australian labour law. The process of sensitising idealtypical models of development to particular contexts reveals a myriad of concrete
instantiations, each with their own unique institutional path-dependencies, differing
states of productive forces, and histories of class struggle. Even within the framework
of a common model of development, these idiosyncrasies act as a refractive layer,
ensuring that no two societies experience the model in the same way. At the same time,
the realisation that different societies are bound by the logic of an ideal-typical model of
development focusses attention on similarities in evolution and outcomes.
Labour law is a particularly striking example of this reality. As outlined in chapter 4,
the abstract Fordist wage-labour nexus required a number of legal preconditions to
function. However, an appreciation of the diversity of labour law regimes of Fordist
countries demonstrates that more than one concrete form was compatible with these
functions. For example, although the Australian arbitration system and the traditional
Swedish pattern of national-level wage and conditions negotiations fulfilled roughly the
same functions of wage and conditions flow-on and homogenisation of the wage
structure,11 they had very different modes of operation and institutional histories. An
even better example can be found closer to home. New Zealand was the only country in
the world that shared with Australia an industrial relations system premised on
compulsory arbitration, industrial tribunals and awards. Moreover, it explicitly turned
to Australia as an exemplar of Fordist development.12 Nevertheless, due to a host of
institutional peculiarities and economic differences, the crisis of New Zealand
A prime example is: Andrew Mack, ‘Class, Ideology and Australian Industrial Relations’ (2005) 56
Journal of Australian Political Economy 156.
10
Treuren, ‘State theory’, above n 2, 59; Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory’, above n 7, 358.
11
Harry C. Katz, ‘The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Comparative
Analysis’ (1993) 47(1) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 3, 4-5.
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Wood & Michael Wood (eds) Henry Ford: critical evaluations in business and management Volume 2
(Routledge, 2003) 323-353.
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Fordism’s labour law regime and its replacement by a liberal-productivist successor
assumed a far more rapid and violent character than was the case in Australia. 13 There,
the destruction of awards, outlawing of the closed shop and the creation of a voluntary
system of individual and collective agreements were achieved virtually at the stroke of a
pen with the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.14 The same developments
in Australia generally occurred in a more gradated fashion over a period of years. Even
in the case of two countries that shared a unique institutional heritage, therefore,
substantial differences in the tempo and degree of labour law change resulted.
However, the fact that broadly similar fundamental changes have been observed across
Fordist countries indicates that there are common impulses at play.

Despite the

institutional differences and varying economic structures of Australia, the UK and the
USA, for example, the overall pattern of increased precarity, marginalisation of trade
unions, the erosion of administrative structures and worsening inequality and polarity in
the wage structure is common to all three.15 Collins’ description of the emergence of
business competitiveness as the dominant theme of labour law echoes throughout these
countries, an indicator of the repositioning of competition as a site of dominant
contradiction within liberal-productivism.16

See, for example: Michael Barry and Nick Wailes, ‘Revisiting the Australia-New Zealand Comparison’
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society’ (2012) 43(4) Industrial Relations Journal 302; Kris Warner, ‘The Decline of Unionization in the
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This dual reality demonstrates two crucial points: the logic of a model of development
encourages a degree of convergent evolution in labour law regimes; and, the latter
nevertheless retain their own unique, historically-conditioned character. The process of
sensitising the ideal-typical models of Fordism and liberal-productivism to the
Australian context reveals labour law regimes that clearly execute the key abstract
functions of labour law in both models, yet do so in concretely unique ways. The same
reality would hold for other countries subsumed by the logic of these models of
development. Indeed, this must necessarily be the case, given the fact that in chapters 2
and 4 I noted that a model of development, when pitched at the ideal-typical level, does
not grasp the concrete experience of any one society. The method of sensitisation I
have adopted in this thesis to describe Australian labour law in a theoretically rigorous
and empirically rich fashion is perfectly capable of application in other contexts, and is
demonstrative of one of the greatest virtues of the PRA – the ability to plot the
relationship between broad capitalist epochs and specific instantiations. Such an ability
both demands its middle-range analysis and presupposes the reconnection with a
Marxist political economy I have elucidated.
The union of the PRA and a theory of juridic forms could also be employed in
describing the characteristics of law more broadly. I have focussed on labour law as
one of the most crucial subsets of law, the nexus point where the abstract legal form,
pressed into service to commodify labour power, attempts to incorporate and regulate a
living, breathing and thinking subject, the proletarian.

However, as chapter 3

illuminated, the developed legal form itself is implanted in capitalist production and
exchange relations. Law is an invariant feature of a capitalist society, yet I have
determined, using the PRA, that some of its key predicates, such as the extent of the
commodity form, the valency of market forces and, most importantly, the state and
structuring of class struggle, vary between different capitalist epochs. Law generally
will thus vary between these epochs. For example, the theoretical model of legal
change I have developed in this thesis could quite easily take as its subject social
security law, investigating how this body of law articulated with the broader antipodean
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Fordist/liberal-productivist dynamic.

The same could be said of taxation law and

occupational health and safety legislation.17
Most broadly, the synthesis of the PRA and the theory of juridic forms promises a
sophisticated Marxist theory of law that overcomes the abstraction that has typically
characterised even the best Marxist jurisprudence. This unified theory allows a dual
movement, recognising the roots of the abstract legal form within capitalist social
relations whilst at the same time accounting for the over-determination of its concrete
manifestations. Schematically, this process begins, as I did in chapters 2 and 3, by
tracing the most abstract features of the legal form within the capitalist mode of
production. These features are to be considered the structural horizons of capitalist law,
determining broadly what it can and cannot be whilst at the same time affording a wide
space for the historical contingency consequent upon the interactions and overdeterminations of capitalism’s tendencies. Moving down the hierarchy of abstraction,
the next step in the analysis involves ascertaining how concrete manifestations of these
forms are ordered and hierarchised within distinct epochs of development, the subject
matter of chapter 4. It is at this level that the PRA comes into its own, particularly
through the model of development concept, which can grasp the place of law within this
order of forms. Finally, at the most concrete level of investigation (as seen in chapters
5-9), an understanding must be gained as to how the concrete law of a model of
development simultaneously crystallises its own unique configuration of capitalism’s
abstract tendencies, and relates to the trajectories of crisis it opens.
I have demonstrated the application of this theory in regards to Australian labour law,
but with the appropriate sensitisation of the ideal-typical model, an understanding of the
history of the particular area of law to be studied, and the specification of the means by
which concrete laws articulate with the abstract goals and functions of the legal form, it
could conceivably be used as an analytical tool of much broader legal compass.

Political implications
Theory is necessarily and always political. For those of us working in the Marxist
tradition, Marx’s exhortation that the point of philosophy is not merely to describe the
17
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world, but to change it,18 puts the political implications of our work centre-stage. This
thesis unashamedly holds to the view that the exploitation of the proletariat is the
central dynamic of capitalism. Although it has been demonstrated that labour law can
be made to register working-class power through recourse to administration, its most
abstract and irreducible function, the commodification of labour-power, is already and
always a class measure, allowing the expropriation of surplus value from the worker.
Even the most accommodative, administrative regime of labour law can never escape
this central fact, that it is a vital moment in the process of capital arrogating to itself the
fruits of the workers’ labour. The concern I have for the political implications of my
approach, therefore, is only the extent to which it could be used to the betterment of the
working-class.
Given the fact that my thesis is an historical study, it deals mainly with accomplished
facts. However, the interpretation of the past is itself political, and the understanding of
Australian labour law generated could be of value to the working-class going forward.
An understanding of the physiology of a labour law regime, and how it articulates with
the broader dynamic of a model of development, can allow organised labour to better
formulate strategies for navigating, negating and/or exploiting the limitations and
opportunities presented by it. The dangers of lacking a clear vision, or sharing a vision
that has been largely determined by capital, were painfully exposed in chapters 6 and 7.
By committing itself to the Accord process and enterprise bargaining, the Australian
Council of Trade Unions was buying into a conception of Australian capitalism’s crisis
that saw the only solutions as wage restraint, halting of the antipodean Fordist cycle of
wage and conditions flow-on, decentralisation, precarity and, perhaps most importantly,
the restoration of profitability to capital. The vague conception of a Scandinavian-style
social democracy envisaged by some elements of the union movement19 rapidly wilted
in the face of governments and employers who saw with increasing clarity and focus the
real thrust of the reforms they were implementing. Australian Manufacturing Workers’
Union official Doug Cameron stated tellingly:
We have sought real partnerships and been betrayed; we have promoted cooperation, not capitulation; we have benchmarked; we have introduced teams;
Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology
(International Publishers, 1970) 121, 123.
19
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we have talked endlessly about training and competency with almost no results
for the bulk of our members; we have innovated; we have been flexible; we have
restructured the Award; we have simplified the Award; we have strived for best
practice in manufacturing workplaces; we have bargained and bargained and
bargained. None of this has been enough for government or employers … the
workers have been abandoned to market forces and the latest fads, such as
downsizing, contracting out and re-engineering.20

A fuller understanding of the nature of the transformation underway could have helped
organised labour perceive that the acts of flexibility, enterprise bargaining,
benchmarking and workplace co-operation identified by Cameron were almost certainly
going to result in the outcomes he observed, precisely because the overall vision of
crisis resolution was one determined by employers and an increasingly neoliberal state.
If award restructuring, for example, had been perceived for what it was, an essential
element of the roll-back of antipodean Fordist labour law and a precursor to the award
system’s marginalisation within liberal-productivism, unions might have been more
willing to draw a line in the sand and fight harder for alternatives. The same could be
said of the whole gamut of legal change in the 1980s and 1990s. Had unions and their
members realised the overall direction and tenor of change, they may well have better
foreseen the historic weakness they currently suffer from. Although some may argue
that such a realisation is a counter-factual point of little current relevance, this is far
from the truth. Appreciating the source and nature of past misapprehensions of legal
development can help prevent future occurrences.
The mapping of models of development and their labour law regimes also has a more
direct relationship to the future. Take liberal-productivism for instance. I have noted
throughout the course of this thesis that, although it is bound by the same basic
tendencies and invariant features characterising all capitalist societies, it nevertheless
has its own unique dynamic, range of institutions and trajectories of crisis. Given that
antipodean Fordism imploded and liberal-productivism remains on foot today, it has
been easier to trace the opportunities and limits the former posed to the working-class.
However, as noted in chapters 2 and 4, no model of development is capable of
absolving capitalism of the contradictions inscribed in its DNA. Liberal-productivism
is no exception.

It is true that, both in Fordist countries generally and Australia

Doug Cameron quoted in Stephen Long, ‘The new Australian militancy’, Australian Financial Review
(Australia), 18 March 2000, 22.
20
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specifically, liberal-productivism was premised upon, and reproduces, an historic
weakness in organised labour. Chapter 6 showed in no uncertain terms that the union
movement in Australia is in crisis, beset by chronically dwindling density, the collapse
of the standard employment model and a legal framework that constrains its ability to
mobilise and engage in industrial action. However, this should not be taken to mean
that class struggle is futile, or that it must be directed to the end of restoring antipodean
Fordism.
Chapters 4 and 5 in particular demonstrated that the antipodean Fordist labour law
regime was characterised by the degree to which trade unions were integrated into its
fabric. Although this secured a privileged institutional position for organised labour, it
also encouraged the growth of bureaucratic and moderate ‘arbitral unionism.’21 To gain
access to the system through registration, unions had to make themselves subject to a
profound level of state regulation over their industrial behaviour and internal workings.
Moreover, arbitral unionism engendered an industrially lazy, dependent attitude on the
part of many unions, who depended for their strength not on thorough, organic
organisation of the rank-and-file, but instead on their standing before the Commissions
and closed-shop arrangements. We saw the weaknesses this system bred in chapters 6
and 9.
Liberal-productivism, by contrast, has transformed the tight embrace between labour
law and trade unionism into a cool, often hostile, arms-length relationship. Although
unions have not been de jure expelled from the system, they have been relegated to the
role of unwanted third parties who are faced with the same (if not greater) imposts of
registration without anything like the rewards that accrued in the antipodean Fordist era.
Liberal-productivism would thus seem to be more vulnerable to a militant, communitycentred trade unionism that deliberately chose to remain outside of the system.22
It has also been made clear that, despite some genuine instances where the links
between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the union movement affected the form
and degree of change, the relationship has become an increasingly fallow one for trade
unions. The Hawke and Keating governments introduced many of the labour law
21
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Unwin, 2006) 161-162.
22
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changes that would inflict grievous damage to union strength. Moreover, as explored in
chapter 6, the ALP’s legislative baby, the Fair Work Act 2009,23 has reproduced almost
all of the key provisions of the draconian WorkChoices,24 such as its limitations on
industrial action, bans on solidarity strikes, a tough right of entry code for union
officials, a regime of largely individualistic rights and a reliance on the corporations
power of the Constitution. Affiliation to the ALP thus seems no longer capable of
effecting positive change, either in the labour law regime specifically or the broader
course of Australian capitalism.25 In such a context, unions would be better served by
disaffiliating from the ALP and using the money freed up for organising purposes.26
More broadly, the particular crisis tendencies of liberal-productivism render it far less
stable than its Fordist predecessor. In Australia, the system is fuelled by debt, has tied
the country’s fortunes ever closer to the unstable currents of international production
and competition, and has produced a potentially dangerous (to both itself and capital)
underclass of precarious workers, what Standing has dubbed the ‘precariat.’ 27 The
fragility of the whole edifice was revealed by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, whilst
the continued slow-down of manufacturing in China has seen the hitherto high terms of
trade, fuelled by mining commodity exports, decline precipitously. It may be that the
boom time of liberal-productivism in Australia has come to an end; stagnation is
creeping in, and crisis may be close to hand.28 As with the decay of antipodean
Fordism, such developments tend to open phases of institutional searching, periods in
which competing institutions and ideologies grate against each other, and when attempts
to change society’s tack (short of a revolution) are most easily effected. If such a period
is indeed upon us, a clear and informed conception of where we have come from is
absolutely crucial to the working-class.
By elucidating the labour law regimes of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism,
and the transition between them, I hope to have made one small contribution towards
this clearer vision. The rise of liberal-productivism has been devastating for organised
23
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labour and the working-class. They cannot afford a repeat in the tumultuous times to
come.
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